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Abstract 
 
This thesis undertakes an explanatory case study of the Korean cultural industries policy 
shift recently instituted under the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun governments (1998-
2008). This shift can be well positioned within the broader context of the creative turn 
in national cultural policy around the world, which was initiated by the British New 
Labour governments (1997-2010). Indeed, the trend ‘has had a remarkable take-up 
across many parts of the world’, elevating the British discourse on creativity into a 
policy ‘doctrine’ or ‘credo’ not only in the UK, but also across the globe.  
 
Despite the similarities in the driving discourses and policy methods, this thesis argues 
that the Korean policy shift was significantly different from its British counterpart as a 
result of the differing pace and trajectories of industrialization in the two countries. 
Starting from the concept of the East Asian developmental state as an entry point, this 
thesis explores three major questions: How and why did Korea go through a cultural 
industries policy shift in the period following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis? Has the 
shift produced a policy framework which is different from that of the previous 
developmental state, and if so, what is its form? What results have the policy shift and 
framework brought about in the Korean cultural industries sector, and how were they 
achieved? By addressing the process, product and performance of the policy shift in this 
way, this thesis presents a distinctive description and analysis of the way the cultural 
and creative industries (CI) have been nurtured in the era of ‘post-organized capitalism’.  
 
As a former representative developmental state and as a neo-developmental state 
currently known for having made a clear break with the past, the Korean case can 
provide a unique opportunity to re-think the recently fashionable creative turn among 
various nations. Given its position in the global economic hierarchy as either a high-end 
developing country or a low-end developed country, the story of Korea’s fundamental CI 
policy shift can furnish something of interest and academic value to both these groups.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the UK, the discourse of creativity has been developed by 
government for the past decade and is currently being bound 
into a conception of the ‘creative economy’. Official thinking 
is discursive in the sense that it is a self-sustaining outlook 
increasingly driven towards consistency. It has become a 
doctrine by virtue of being an object of unceasing advocacy by 
its proponents. It is now an obligatory starting point for those 
who wish to enter into dialogue with policymakers. 
(Schlesinger, 2007: 378) 
 
 
From the late 1990s onwards, a new kind of cultural policy emerged rapidly in the UK 
policy arena. It all started when the New Labour government of the time coined a term, 
‘creative industries’ to refer to a group of industries based upon ‘individual creativity’ 
and which had high ‘potential for wealth and job creation’ through the generation of 
‘intellectual property’ (DCMS, 1998). As Schlesinger observes, the government promoted 
both the term and the policy ceaselessly during its term in the office (1997-2010).  
 
Whether this kind of discursive practice is intellectually and ethically acceptable or not 
has been a subject of persistent dispute over the last decade (Jenkins, 2004; Elliott & 
Atkinson, 2007; Freedman, 2010). On another level, however, it is hard to deny that this 
so-called creative turn in national cultural policy, that New Labour invented and 
nurtured, has had a significant influence not only on UK policy (Taylor, 2006; Higgs et 
al., 2008), but also on many governments across the world (Wang, 2004; Lee, 2004; 
Hartley, 2005; O'Connor & Xin, 2006; Higgs & Cunningham, 2008; Cunningham, 2009a; 
2009b). One can now confirm without difficulty the increasing power of this British 
discourse in the international policy arena, which contrasts to the declining influence of 
the French discourse that stressed heavily rationales such as cultural exception, identity 
and diversity against GATT/WTO. Indeed, the arguments of creativity, the creative 
industries and the creative economy have become:    
 
[E]specially dominant in the emergent cultural policies of Taiwan, China, Singapore 
and Hong Kong, driven no doubt by the prize of WTO membership and the promise of 
global competitiveness. As national creative industries are absorbed into a global 
creative economy, neo-liberal assumptions begin to drive out the old ideologies. 
Seen in this context, France’s ‘exception culturelle’ appears as a defiant 
anachronism threatened by a gathering consensus. (Bilton, 2007: 169)  
 
Of the East Asian countries deeply influenced by the British discourse of creativity, 
South Korea (hereafter, Korea) presents an enlightening case study that provides ‘an 
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interesting barometer for creative industries policy in the future’ (ibid.). There are at 
least two reasons for this. Firstly, Korea is poised between the two policy traditions, 
shifting from aggressively defending its indigenous cultural industries to opening up its 
market widely, while it is also ‘enjoying the best of both worlds’ by combining the old 
policy of nurturing strong domestic industries with the new approach predicated on 
penetrating the emerging global marketplace. Although broadly agreeing with his 
analysis, I am not convinced with Bilton’s view that both this position of Korea’s and the 
regional phenomenon of ‘Korean wave’ (Kim, 2007; Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008) are 
unsustainable. His predictions are based on a dubious dichotomy between the ‘old 
ideologies’ of protectionism and the new ‘neo-liberal’ cultural policies toward the 
creative industries. Surely a more sophisticated consideration of the particular 
experiences and conditions of Korean (or East Asian) industrialization is called for.  
 
In a nutshell, eclecticism (or the being poised between) has been the essential 
characteristic of the Korean state since the beginning of its industrialization in the 
1960s. Korea deployed a model called the ‘developmental state’ (Johnson, 1982; 
Amsden, 1989; Woo, 1991; Evans, 1995), which is poised between the Anglo-American 
and Stalinist models, and achieved an average annual growth rate of 8.1% between 1965 
and 1999 (Akhand & Gupta, 2006: 6). This ‘outstanding’ (Amsden, 1989), ‘impressive’ 
(Wade, 1990) or ‘extremely rapid’ (World Bank, 1993) growth performance was shared 
by neighbouring countries, including Japan (the first runner), Taiwan and Singapore in 
the period following the Second World War. Why, then, should one believe that the 
eclectic position taken towards cultural industries policy in Korea cannot be sustained 
at the present juncture?  
 
Of course this does not imply that the current ‘success of South Korean creative 
industries’ (Kean, 2004: 276) or Korea’s status as the ‘dominant force’ (Bilton, 2007: 
169) in the Asian cultural market is guaranteed. What I would argue instead is that the 
Korean cultural industries policy shift since the late 1990s can be understood as another 
way of nurturing cultural and creative industries (hereafter, CI) under contemporary 
global neo-liberalism, rather than in terms of the dichotomy. The Korean CI policy shift 
was led by two centre-left governments (1998-2008) which embraced the British ‘Third 
Way’ as a governmental philosophy (cf. 5.1.2), whilst also perpetuating the old ideology 
of mercantilism from the previous developmental statist regimes (cf. 3.1.1). An equally 
important factor is that because they came to power following the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, these governments had little choice but to accept the ‘neo-liberal’ norms 
imposed by the IMF as a condition of financial assistance (Ha & Lee, 2007: 902). These 
11 
 
dynamics allowed the centre-left governments to declare many of the conventional 
tenets of the developmental state including protectionism neither suitable nor desirable, 
and to dismantle them quickly (Pirie, 2008: 58). Therefore, during the decade of 
significant change in Korean CI policy, it is more correct to say that Korea was poised 
between mercantilism (rather than protectionism) and neo-liberalism (in the version of 
the Third-Way rather than Thatcherism). This might be the simplest explanation of why 
post-crisis Korean governments embraced the new British discourse of creativity as an 
alternative to the old French discourse in order to construct a promotional logic for 
emerging CI.  
 
The question then becomes, to what extent did Korean CI policy assimilate the British 
framework? In this thesis I will be arguing that this adoption was more of an 
appropriation than assimilation. It can best be understood as the rise of a new version 
of Korea’s pragmatically eclectic approach towards CI policy, which I want to call neo-
developmental CI policy.  
 
Given the complex position of Korean CI policy, a nuanced approach is required to 
comprehend the origin, structure and usage of this new eclecticism. Therefore, I plan to 
conduct a detailed description, explanation and evaluation of the Korean CI policy shift 
since the late 1990s. In doing so, I will address three key questions relating to the 
process, product and performance of the policy shift that provide the analytical 
framework of this thesis: How and why the CI policy shift was put into practice; what 
policy framework was produced in the process; and what significant changes the policy 
shift and new framework have brought about in Korea. Exploring these questions will 
enable me to show that the Korean CI policy shift was the direct result of the 
transformation of Korean state itself from a developmental to a neo-developmental 
state, as distinguished from a neo-liberal state. I will also demonstrate that the impact 
of this neo-developmental transformation on CI policy can be boiled down to a double 
pronged strategy. On one hand, the negative aspects of the developmental state, such 
as censorship and corruption, were reigned in as a result of continued embedding of 
democratic institutions and practices, while on the other hand, Korea’s ability to pursue 
opportunities opened up by global spread of neo-liberal polices was strengthened 
through active intervention into the governance, infrastructure, and value chains of the 
CI. These fundamental reforms contributed to the impressive and steady growth in the 
Korean CI in both the domestic and overseas markets (cf. 8.1).  
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Before proceeding to examine these issues in greater detail, however, it is necessary to 
delineate the concept of the developmental state because it provides the entry point 
for this research. What is the developmental state and how does the neo-developmental 
state differ from it? To understand this, requires brief reference to the evolution of the 
current world economic order.    
 
 
1.1 Post-Organization and the Rise of the Neo-Developmental State 
 
Lash and Urry’s periodization (1987; 1994) provides a useful model for situating the East 
Asian developmental state in world economic history. They trace the evolution of the 
world economic order since the 19th century from liberal capitalism through organized 
capitalism, toward post-organized or disorganized capitalism. In the age of ‘liberal 
capitalism’, which broadly overlapped with the 19th century, the circuits of capital 
(including money, the means of production, consumer commodities, and labour-power) 
operated at the local or regional level with relatively little intersection. In the final 
decades of the 19th century, however, various types of capital began to circulate more 
significantly at national level, bringing about organization ‘in the economy’, followed by 
the organization of classes ‘in civil society’, and much later by the ‘organization of the 
state’ (Lash & Urry, 1987: 7). Drawing on Jürgen Kocka’s perspective, they call this new 
economic order ‘organized capitalism’ and note how it blossomed through Fordism and 
became dominant among leading industrial countries in the early and middle 20th 
century. Organized capitalism was characterized by the large bureaucratic organizations 
that controlled the economy, civil society and the state and by the tight cooperation 
between them. However, this order started to dissolve from the 1960s and 1970s 
onwards, with the emergence of ‘post-organized’ capitalism, which featured circuits of 
capital qualitatively stretched over the international scale in terms of increases in 
global trade, foreign direct investment and global movements of finance (Lash & Urry, 
1994: 2).  
 
This last stage of post-organization has been accompanied by not only economic but 
also social restructurings. These can be seen as a series of paradigm shifts, of which 
post-Fordism, 1  informationalization, postmodernization and glocalization have been 
                                                          
1 Fordism can be regarded the master feature of the organized capitalism. As Webster (1995) argues drawing on the 
Regulation school, it does not simply mean a mode of production or consumption, but a capitalist regime of accumulation 
which accompanies at least five interrelated characteristics: (1) mass production of products in exploiting economies of 
scale, (2) industrial workers as the major labour under the protection of Keynesian economics, (3) mass consumption as 
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most noted. Post-Fordism describes a shift in the ‘capitalist regime of accumulation’ 
since the mid-1970s in which emergent flexibility in the production and consumption of 
industrial goods and services was emphasized (Webster, 1995). Post-Fordism inevitably 
entails ‘informationalization’, which identifies the base of this flexible economy with 
the newly established information and communication technology and systems (Lash & 
Urry, 1994: 109). Meanwhile, informationalization’s foregrounding of ‘information’ is 
complemented by the discourse of postmodernism which captures the importance of 
‘symbols’ in the new economy (ibid.: 3-4). As the ‘cultural logic of late capitalism’ 
(Jameson, 1984) or the process of ‘reflexive modernization’, postmodernism has 
stressed something beyond the technological revolution. The recent phenomenon of 
‘aestheticization’ is the shining exemplar, which means ‘increasing component of sign 
value embodied in material objects’ as well as ‘the proliferation of objects which 
possess a substantial aesthetic component’ (Lash & Urry, 1994: 4). Finally, globalization 
is arguably the longest and broadest shift within post-organization. It started in the 19th 
century in the form of strong nationalism and colonialism, but has evolved into a post-
nationalist glocalization under which the nation state has become too small for global 
problems and too big for the local problems (Williams, 1983).  
 
The key point is that in the course of this multi-faceted shift, the rigid organization and 
cooperation of organized capitalism appears to have been rapidly deconstructed, 
allowing various subjects and objects of the capitalist political economy to circulate at 
greater distance and at greater velocity, thus begetting a desperate need for each 
nation state (not only in developed countries, but in the developing world too) to 
restructure the traditional economic, political and cultural fabric of their societies. It is 
in the context of this shift from organized to post-organized capitalism that the East 
Asian developmental state bloomed and was then transformed. 
  
 
1.1.1 East Asian Developmental State as a Variant of European Continental Tradition 
 
Lash and Urry’s ‘liberal capitalism’ started after the ‘First Industrial Revolution in 
Britain, toward the end of the eighteenth century’ (Amsden, 1989: 3). Drawing on the 
works of classical economists such as Smith and Ricardo, Britain did not only reinvent 
itself as the representative laissez-fare country adopting a free-market/free-trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the base for mass production and full employment, (4) national oligopoly guaranteed and controlled by nation-state, (5) 
the consensus about the importance of planning.  
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system, but also encouraged many other NDCs (Now Developed Countries) to follow the 
new system from around 1860s (Chang, 2003b: 13-16). However, things changed 
significantly after the ‘Second Industrial Revolution in Germany and the United States’ 
approximately 100 years later (Amsden, ibid.). From that point on and up to the 1970s, 
interventionist policies were re-adopted by governments in many NDCs that became 
suspicious of the ability of liberalization policies to cope with the instability of the 
world economic and political systems, especially in light of the two world wars and the 
Great Depression. That is, the organization period was led by the Western 
interventionist ‘national industrial state’ (Pirie, 2008: 23).  
 
However, this is not the whole story. Several competitive economies arose during this 
period in East Asia. These countries modernized themselves through a process that can 
be called ‘late industrialization’, which was based upon neither ‘invention’, the 
principle of the First Industrial Revolution, nor ‘innovation’, the principle of the Second 
Industrial Revolution, but rather on ‘learning’ (Amsden, 1989). In order to address their 
underdevelopment and thus catch up with industrialized Western countries as quickly as 
possible, these East Asian states didn’t hesitate to construct themselves as the master 
or director of that learning or, more honestly, ‘imitation’ (Kim Linsu, 1997). While 
imitating the Prussian model of industrialization rather than the British one (Cumings, 
1999a), these countries continuously deployed the shame of comparative 
underdevelopment to ensure that the need for rapid development was enshrined in the 
constructions of strong nationalism. 
 
For Chalmers Johnson (1982), who invoked the concept of the ‘developmental state’ in 
his study of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the East 
Asian countries constructed a ‘plan-rational’ state during the mid-20th century in order 
to accomplish their first priority of ‘economic development’. This was neither the ‘plan-
ideological’ state of the former USSR, nor the ‘market-rational’ one of the UK and US. 
This plan-rational developmental state conjoined private ownership with state guidance, 
and thus was not only different from the Stalinist states that monopolized both 
ownership and control on the basis of ‘state socialism’, but also from the Anglo-Saxon 
‘regulatory states’ in which private control over private ownership was prevalent under 
the cause of ‘laissez faire’ while the state concerned itself with the forms and 
procedures of economic competition instead of substantive matters. The key to this 
strategy was, to use Robert Wade’s expression (1990), a ‘governed market’ that was 
able to produce ‘synergistic connection’ between the public and the private systems.  
Such connection was synergistic because the outputs of each become the inputs for the 
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other. That is, the bureaucrats disciplined and mobilized economic actors, while the 
bureaucracy’s privilege and legitimacy depended on economic (and thus the economic 
actors’) success. This synergetic connection or ‘mutual dependency’ between public 
and private sectors has been the backbone of the East Asian developmental states, 
resulting in the ‘coexistence of vigorous market competition and active state 
administration, energetic export promotion and deliberate import substitution, and 
both efforts to recruit foreign capital and technology and effort to control and regulate 
them’ (Chan et al., 1998: 3).  
 
For the second half of the 20th century, this industrialization strategy of the 
developmental states proved very successful in achieving economic performance, thus 
challenging the ‘conventional wisdom of both dogmatic dependency analysis and 
neoclassical free market approaches’ (Castells, 1992: 33). What should be reiterated, 
nonetheless, is the fact that the developmental state is not ‘something sui generis’, but 
rather a ‘variant of the European continental tradition’ (Cumings, 1999a: 62) or a ‘Third 
World variant of the national industrial state’ (Pirie, 2008: 23). It was indeed a product 
of the global economic structures generated by the second industrial revolution. By 
learning the economic logic of organized capitalism faithfully and then implementing it 
in an extreme way, the East Asian developmental states achieved both compressed 
industrialization and remarkable economic growth.  
 
 
1.1.2 Convergence between the National Industrial and Developmental States 
 
Later, however, stable environments for the growth by learning began to be slowly 
dismantled when the leading Western countries started to move away from 
interventionist state policy in the wake of neo-liberalism or, in Lash and Urry’s term, 
‘post-organization’. The visible turning point is often said to be the economic crises in 
the 1970s which foregrounded the increasing need of social as well as economic 
restructuring in the NDCs. Major capitalist economies had suffered from chronic 
problems of low profitability during this period (Pirie, 2008: 24). What enabled neo-
liberalism to be rigorously implemented in the developing countries, on the other hand, 
was the 1982 debt crisis in South America, which discouraged many state-led NICs 
(Newly Industrializing Countries) while encouraging anti-interventionist neo-liberal 
advocates (Chang, 2003a: 1-2). In addition, from the late 1980s on several international 
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events made neo-liberal reform programmes much more fashionable.2 Consequently, 
this ideology, which the Thatcher and Reagan governments promoted most audaciously, 
has become world-wide and created a new liberal economic world order. Resonating 
with the shift from organized to post-organized capitalism, the declining ideology of 
19th century liberalism was revived and came to reign over the world economy once 
again. As a result, the neo-liberal state has become the dominant state form from the 
late 20th century onward.  
 
How, then, has this shift affected the individual states in the early-developed European 
countries and the late-developing Asian countries? Britain furnishes a good case of the 
former. The ‘national industrial state’ in post-war Britain pursued not just 
interventionist economics, but also the welfare society. The objective of the ‘welfare 
state’ was the outcome of implicit agreement between all political parties at the time. 
Indeed, until the mid-1970s, the fundamental policies of the post-war Labour 
government remained unchanged under the social democratic consensus, which 
featured ‘increased social benefits and health provisions’, ‘state ownership’ of basic 
infrastructure industries, ‘Keynesian policies of avoiding unemployment by government 
over-spending and relaxation of monetary controls’ (Budge et al., 2004: 69). Yet, as 
mentioned, this consensus depended on the early post-war prosperity and could not 
survive the successive economic crises of the 1970s. The Thatcher government 
undertook an all-out attack on the basic assumption of former British governments. It 
moved governmental policy away from social benefits towards self-responsibility, from 
state ownership to privatization and deregulation, and from government control to free 
market mechanisms. In the face of economic crises, the government introduced 
‘emergency cutbacks in public spending and the stripping away of regulation’, and 
finally turned these emergency measures into ‘permanent policy’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 
86).  
 
Although neo-liberalization was initiated by leading developed countries as a response 
to the post-organization of capitalism, East Asian developmental states including Korea 
could not avoid this new wave (Weiss, 2003; Hall, 2003; Pirie, 2008). This cannot be 
solely attributed to the increasing pervasiveness of global standards imposed by 
powerful international organizations such as IMF and GATT/WTO during the 1980s and 
1990s. It is also undeniable that East Asian developmental states felt a strong need not 
                                                          
2 For example, the fall of Communism after 1989, the rapid development of information and communication technology, 
the launch of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the economic boom in the US in contrast to the relative stagnation in 
Japan and Germany, etc. 
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to fall behind again in adapting to new general tendencies in the world economic 
system, such as post-Fordism and informationalization, and to attune their institutions 
in line with those of the developed countries. This has been the key factor in their 
ability to keep fostering export-driven growth. Equally significant is the fact that these 
states came to understand the necessity of addressing ‘crony capitalism’—the ugly face 
of the developmental state—after experiencing several economic meltdowns both 
directly and indirectly. The mutual dependency between bureaucrats and big businesses, 
although efficient and effective in achieving ambitious industrialization and export goals, 
often led to serious structural corruption, ‘in which relatives in the government lent 
money to relatives in business, piling money upon growth expectations and growth upon 
money expectations, somewhat like a chain letter or crap game that worked year in and 
year out’ (Cumings, 2005: 227). This is probably why progressive governments in NICs 
often appeared to be in favour of neo-liberal reforms in the economic structure of their 
countries. The centre-left governments in Korea between 1998 and 2008 are a good 
example. Leading the process of political and economic restructuring to conform to the 
global norm, they made of Korea an ‘exceptional’ case in terms of ‘the speed’ with 
which reform was effected and ‘the clarity’ of the break with the past (Pirie, 2008: 58).  
 
 
1.1.3 From Developmental State to Neo-Developmental State 
 
Three very important points need to be made in relation to this speedy and clear ‘break 
with the past’ in Korea and other East Asian states. First of all, in contrast to their 
adoption of interventionist policy in the early post-war era, this new adoption of neo-
liberal reforms seems to have caused real convergence. To be more specific, while the 
developmental states achieved rapid economic growth on the basis of lessons learned 
from ‘national industrial states’, they neglected a major objective pursued in the 
national industrial states; throughout the era of organized capitalism, the 
developmental states achieved growth but at the cost of social welfare. Whereas close 
collusion with big businesses was maintained, the authoritarian developmental states 
mercilessly repressed the ‘distributional allies’ of labour and oppositional political 
groups (Koo & Kim, 1992: 141-143). Combined with the chronic problems of crony 
capitalism, this authoritarian control of labour was the major weaknesses of the 
developmental state. However, at least in Korea, the financial crisis in 1997 made it 
possible for the people to elect the symbolic leader of its distributional allies, Kim Dae-
Jung, as their president. After his inauguration, political democracy and social welfare 
have been rapidly entrenched in Korean institutions, while radical neo-liberal reforms of 
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financial and corporate structures have been effected at the same time. Therefore, it 
can be said that the post-organization phase of the world economic order seems to 
cause more substantial convergence between the East Asian learners and the Western 
first-movers than the previous phase had. 3  In a broad sense, this more real-time 
convergence can be considered the very background against which Britain (as a leading 
NDC) and Korea (as a leading NIC) appear to have experienced a similar policy shift in 
their CI fields since 1997.  
 
The second point is that this convergence notwithstanding, the similarities between the 
two camps’ post-organization should not be exaggerated. Even though the convergence 
may be labelled ‘neo-liberal’ because it incorporates key reforms such as privatization 
and deregulation (especially in the financial sectors), it is also true that the implications 
of the similar reforms can differ greatly depending on the local context. Most 
significantly, the East Asian NICs have never experienced industrialization under liberal 
capitalism, and therefore the current neo-liberal reform is actually the first liberal 
reform in their history. Thus, the type of deregulation called for in Korea has been 
much different than that in the corporatist UK economy of the early 1980s. On top of 
this, past successes under the developmental state have left a strong impression in 
Korea. For example, in most surveys Park Jung-Hee, the authoritarian leader during the 
industrialization period, is still the most popular president in Korean history (Seoul-
Kyeongje, 2008). With all the neo-liberal reforms, both the dynamism and the side 
effects of dense industrialization are still very much present in every sector of Korean 
society.  
 
My final point here is that, while the Western developed countries pursued a welfare 
society under organized capitalism and have introduced neo-liberal reforms under the 
post-organized capitalism, this was not the case in the East Asian developmental states. 
Conversely, these countries have been pursuing the two objectives at the same time as 
part of their post-organization. This distinctive trajectory has produced different kinds 
of tensions and problems that need to be addressed. Given the various differences, the 
neo-liberal convergence should not be taken at face value. In brief, current 
convergence between Western developed countries and East Asian developing countries 
may be better labelled post-organizational rather than neo-liberal. This is because, 
however significant, neo-liberal reforms cannot account for the whole picture of the 
                                                          
3 This is partly because the current learning has been undertaken in the condition of time-space compression due to the 
informationalization and globalization which was hardly imaginable in the former learning context of organized 
capitalism. 
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broader economic and social restructuring toward the post-organization. This could not 
be more pertinent in the East Asian case.    
 
Overall, therefore, it is clear that what the ‘neo-liberal’ reforms caused in Korea was 
not a shift from the developmental state to the neo-liberal state, but rather to the neo-
developmental state. As Cho (2000: 442) argues, the economic crisis and emergence of 
the opposition party government have not contributed to fundamental purge of the 
existing developmental regime, but have led to a ‘new refreshment’ of the old regime 
with the help of democratic reforms. Thus, since it still maintains ‘a catching up 
ideology’ and occasionally employs industrial policy crafted by its predecessor (i.e. the 
developmental state), ‘neo-developmental’ states such as Korea and Taiwan can be 
distinguished from a ‘post-developmental’ state like Japan, and even more so from the 
neo-liberal state (Hill, 2007). In this regard, the three engines that drive the neo-
developmental state are; strong mercantilism (from the developmental state), social 
welfare (from the national industrial state), and increased competition (from the neo-
liberal state). Conversely, the neo-developmental state can be understood as a reaction 
to the limitations of each of the three state forms: Excessive and indiscreet state 
intervention under the developmental state inevitably results in crony capitalism; while 
the national industrial state cannot ensure social welfare in the long term without 
enhancing global competitiveness and the promotion of free market competition in neo-
liberal states does not naturally guarantee competitiveness without institutional 
regulation and promotion.  
 
Thus I argue that some of the East Asian developmental states, which undertook their 
late industrialization by learning the strategy of the national industrial state under 
organized capitalism, have given way under conditions of post-organization to neo-
developmental states that seek to appropriate the strengths of the national industrial, 
developmental and neo-liberal states while avoiding their weaknesses. In light of the 
global crises of 2008 and 2011 in which many assumptions of neo-liberalism came to be 
widely attacked, it is too soon to tell whether this three-fold experiment by the neo-
developmental state is a suitable and feasible strategy or an opportunistic wildcat 
scheme. Although limited to the sector of cultural and creative industries policy, this 
thesis aims to directly engage with this matter, and I hope to make an original 
contribution to the existing debate about feasible paths for CI policy shifts which have 
been taking place around the world since the late 1990s. Korea is the main object of 
this study and CI policy is the main sector of interest, so it is necessary to make a few 
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points here concerning the major features of Korean CI policy before the rise of the 
neo-developmental state in 1998.  
 
 
1.2   Korean Cultural (Industries) Policy before the Neo-Developmental Era 
 
 
1.2.1 Four Stages of Modern Korea 
 
Korea is ‘one of the oldest countries in the world’ (Cumings, 2005: 212) with a history 
spanning more than two millennia from Gojoseon (the first kingdom in the peninsula: -
108 B.C.) to Joseon (the last dynasty: 1392-1897/1910) and the two post-war states; the 
Republic of Korea (South: 1948-) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North: 
1948-). Limiting ‘Korea’ to mean the Republic of Korea, however, makes periodizing its 
history fairly simple because it is not only short but also easily divided according to 
dramatic changes of presidential regime.  
 
   Table 1.1 A History of the Modern Korean State 
 
 
As seen in Table 1.1, from the founding of Republic of Korea in 1948 until the previous 
government (2003-08), the history can be broadly divided into four periods: (1) 
President Rhee Syng-Man’s 1st Republic and the transitory Second Republic (1948-61); (2) 
President Park Jung-Hee’s Third and Fourth Republics (1961/63-79); (3) President Chun 
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Doo-Hwan’s Fifth Republic, President Roh Tae-Woo’s Sixth Republic and President Kim 
Young-Sam’s Civilian Government (1980-98); (4) President Kim Dae-Jung’s Government 
of the People and President Roh Moo-Hyun’s Participatory Government (1998-2008). 
 
Each period is characterized by a particular kind of development strategy, which can be 
understood as part of the whole story of the rise and fall of the Korean developmental 
state. The first stage was indeed the period of confusion full of tensions due to several 
radical events including the Korean War, but the state had neither the conviction nor 
the power to address the tensions and thereby ended up failing to foster either 
democratic or economic development. The second period was the heyday of the Korean 
developmental state, which can be summarized by the miraculous economic growth 
achieved at the cost of democracy under the strong leadership of President Park, who 
headed the first military junta in Korea. The third period represents a transition period, 
during which Korea experienced significant advancement of liberalization, 
democratization and globalization, but raced into the traumatic financial meltdown of 
1997. Finally, the last period led by two progressive presidents can be understood as the 
completion stage of the transformation from the old developmental state toward the 
neo-developmental state. As stated earlier, this neo-developmental state pursued a 
distinctive principle of the parallel development of democracy and a market economy, 
drawing on three different models under the strong influences of post-organization. 
Then, how has Korean cultural industries policy evolved along with the development of 
the stages? 
 
 
1.2.2 The Korean Developmental State and its Cultural Policy 
 
During the confusion period right after the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the 
state was not able to formulate any systematic economic policy (Koo & Kim, 1992: 123), 
let alone a cultural policy. Therefore, despite stressing the importance of ‘national 
culture’ or ‘traditional culture’ within state development (Yim, 2002: 40), the Rhee 
government did not produce any prominent cultural policy, and ceded the opportunity 
to formulate Korean cultural policy to the second period. By establishing notable laws, 
institutions and long-term plans related specifically to the cultural sector for the first 
time, the Park government did officially open the field of Korean cultural policy. To 
illustrate, the promulgation of the Public Performance Act (1961), the Motion Pictures 
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Act (1962) and the Culture and Arts Promotion Act (1972)4; the publication of The First 
Five-Year Plan for Culture and Arts Promotion (1973) and The Second Five-Year Plan 
(1978); and the establishment of the Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation 
(1973) and the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation (1973).  
 
However, it must not be forgotten that these initiatives were undertaken by the 
Ministry of Public Information and oriented toward the specific purpose of the 
authoritarian integration and further mobilization of the people. As Kim Yer-Su (1988: 
27) argues, ‘contributing to justification and integration of the regime’ was the first and 
foremost rationale of the government’s cultural policy. Seen in this context, the major 
achievement of the government, i.e. ‘constructing the absent cultural institutions and 
infrastructure under the government’s control’, can be considered somewhat 
disingenuous. Top-down administration brought about radical increases in the number of 
cultural facilities, but this was ‘mainly for display’ and was not designed to meet public 
needs or consumer demands (ibid.). For instance, the Korean Culture and Arts 
Foundation was established to ‘divert people’s attention from the dictatorship and 
sooth political opposition groups by the help of culture and the arts’, and The First 
Five-Year Plan for Culture and Arts Promotion was designed to use culture as the 
‘instrument of economic development’ within the broader trajectory of the New Village 
(Saemaul in Korean) Movement—the mass mobilization movement to modernize rural 
villages initiated by Park in the early 1970s.5 
 
Another key strategy adopted to ensure that the cultural sector functioned to serve the 
regime was the insulation of the domestic market from international influences. For 
example, the regime introduced the first Public Performance Act in 1961, followed by 
the first Motion Pictures Act in the next year, which required permission to be sought 
before any foreign performance troupes or overseas films could be imported. In a 
similar vein, to borrow an expression from Oh Jee-Chul (October 2009), the former Vice 
Minister at the Korean Culture Ministry, one of the ‘world’s strongest Screen Quotas’ 
was introduced in 1967. Again, this policy move contains two conflicting aspects: It was 
partly aimed at protecting Korean cultural industries in their infancy stages and thus the 
cultural identity of the nation, but was mainly driven by the fear that free cultural 
exchange with other countries could stimulate popular resistance against the severe 
                                                          
4 It may be noted that Korean cultural policy officially started with the inauguration of the Ministry of Culture and Public 
Information (MCPI) in 1968. However, many argue that the real starting point of Korean cultural policy was the 
promulgation of the Culture and Arts Promotion Act in 1972 (Chung, 1993: 94)  in that it defined for the first time the 
object of cultural policy and became the legal ground for the government to deal with the cultural sector. 
 
5 Http://contents.archives.go.kr [Accessed on 10 July 2010]. 
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censorship and control imposed by the regime and thus threaten its security. While it 
might have been inevitable to protect the domestic cultural market in the early stage of 
its development, in this case the cover of protectionism was surely abused to justify 
authoritarian rule (Park, 1988; Shin, 1988).  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the major cultural policy strategies under the 
Korean developmental state were the rapid establishment of institutions and 
infrastructures under the tight control of the government, and the insulation of 
domestic cultural sector for both protection and manipulation; and both strategies 
aimed at serving the primal objective of ensuring the cultural sector’s contribution to 
regime justification and national development. In light of this, it is clear that cultural 
policy under the developmental state was not only subject to its economic policy, but 
also modelled after it. The thesis argues that this developmental cultural policy 
underwent a fundamental transformation under the progressive governments in the 
succeeding period.  
 
 
1.2.3 The Rise of Neo-Developmental Cultural Industries (CI) Policy 
 
At this juncture I would like to make a few points relating to the transformation from 
developmental to neo-developmental CI policy in Korea, in order to reveal the broad 
logic of this study, which will be fleshed out with concrete evidence in further chapters.  
 
First of all, the neo-developmental transformation of cultural policy would have been 
far more difficult, if not impossible, without many reforms introduced during the third 
period of transitions. Even if the changes put in place by successive presidents were in 
fact half-hearted, liberalization during Chun’s presidency, democratization during Roh’s 
presidency, and globalization during Kim Young-Sam’s presidency left deep imprints on 
the development of Korean CI policy. For instance, the establishment of the Ministry of 
Culture by president Roh in 1990 was the very moment from which Korean cultural 
policy started to separate itself from the public information policy; and the 
establishment of the Cultural Industries Bureau within the Ministry by the Kim Young-
Sam government in 1994 can be regarded as the point from which Korean CI policy 
officially began. In spite of many limitations, therefore, the reforms undertaken during 
the transition period certainly laid the foundations for the decisive dissolution of the old 
developmental CI policy in the transformation period.  
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The second point is, however, that this logical incrementalism should not mislead one 
to believe that the transformation of CI policy was either smooth or natural. It is 
important to remember that the governments of the transition and transformation 
periods had been the enemies since the birth of the Korean developmental state in the 
1960s. With its primal objective of ‘contributing to the justification and integration of 
the regime’ (Kim Yer-Su, 1988), developmental cultural policy had caused an acute 
conflict between affirmative official culture and critical popular-folk cultures. The 
election of a progressive government in December 1997 reversed this position for the 
first time in Korean history. The group who had regarded themselves as the guardians of 
affirmative culture lost their status, while those who had always positioned themselves 
as critical rebels suddenly assumed the power to manage many cultural organizations 
and distribute huge amounts of money. Although this new power bloc did not use the 
old sticks (most significantly, severe censorship and license control) and carrots (many 
unofficial favours for those who conformed) as the developmental state did, acute 
conflict not only remained, but became increasingly complicated and politicized during 
the course of the policy transformation.  
 
The third point that needs to be made here is that the transformation was not only 
guided by efforts to overcome the weaknesses of the developmental state, but also by 
efforts to emulate the strengths of ‘advanced countries’. In terms of CI policy, the 
British case was the major model to be emulated. Here, Kim Dae-Jung’s personal 
conviction and relationships played a very important role. Firstly, his fundamental 
conviction about the necessity of the ‘parallel development of democracy and the 
market economy’ took Britain as its model (Kim, 2000: 311). In this vein, President 
Kim’s primary cultural pledge appropriated the British arm’s length principle. 
Furthermore, while struggling to win the presidential election in 1997, he took great 
encouragement from Tony Blair’s victory in the UK and tried to apply the secrets of New 
Labour’s success to his own situation (Kyunghyang-Shinmun, 1997; Munhwa-Ilbo, 1997). 
Moreover, Kim’s governmental philosophy was strongly influenced by the work of 
Anthony Giddens, with whom he had developed a personal relationship.  
 
Against this background, the financial meltdown that Kim inherited brought New 
Labour’s stress on the social and economic value of creativity and creative industries 
into sharp relief. Therefore, the neo-developmental transformation of Korean CI policy 
initiated by Kim Dae-Jung and his successor, Roh Moo-Hyun cannot be fully understood 
without comprehending New Labour’s policy experiment. New Labour tried to find the 
‘Third Way’ in order to go beyond both the national industrial state (i.e. the old Labour) 
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and the neo-liberal state (i.e. the Thatcherism). The Korean neo-developmental state 
basically followed this path, while attempting to retain the strengths of the 
developmental state. The case of the Korean CI policy shift illustrates this point very 
clearly.  
 
 
1.3 The Significance and Structure of the Thesis  
 
To sum up, this thesis seeks to conceptualize a distinctive way of nurturing CI in the era 
of post-organized capitalism by exploring in detail the case of the Korean CI policy shift 
under the two progressive governments (1998-2008). As a former representative 
developmental state and as a neo-developmental state currently known for having made 
a clear break with the past, the Korean example can provide a unique opportunity to re-
think the recently fashionable creative turn in national cultural policy around the world. 
Given its position in the global economic hierarchy as either a high-end developing 
country or a low-end developed country, the story of Korea’s fundamental CI policy 
shift can be expected to contain something of interest and academic value to both 
groups.  
 
Korea’s industrialization has been one of the major issues in development studies since 
the 1980s. Much research has been done to explain how developmental states in East 
Asia succeeded in producing a relatively rapid rate of development compared to other 
NICs. The most notable debate has been between neo-classical economists and the 
institutionalists. The former argued that this rapid growth was mainly indebted to the 
formation of minimally distorted markets in a broad sense (Kruger 1980; World Bank, 
1993), while the institutionalists maintained that such growth was possible because the 
state intervened to keep the prices ‘right’ for their particular conditions, but ‘wrong’ 
against the mainstream economics (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). The Korean case has 
also been significant in political studies, with Korea’s democratization having been a 
hot issue since the 1990s (Bedeski, 1994; Oh, 1999). The major issue here was whether 
‘Asian democracy’, of the sort which leaders of the developmental states had insisted 
on implementing in their societies, was another version of democracy (cf. Zakaria, 1994) 
or an authoritarian political system in disguise (Kim Dae-Jung, 1994). After the Asian 
financial crisis and the first governmental change in 1997, many reports, books and 
journal articles have been published as renewed interest in Korean politics has focused 
on questions of how these significant events have reshaped the old wisdom about the 
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Korean economy and politics (Pempel, 1999a; 1999b; Winters, 1999; Shin & Chang, 2003; 
Pirie, 2005).  
 
Strangely enough, however, the historic changes have not attracted researchers’ 
interest in the field of cultural policy, making it ‘extremely difficult to find any trail of 
academic research on the Korean cultural industry’ (Kim, 2007: 39). Taking into 
consideration its potential to be a ‘barometer’ for world CI policy in the future (Bilton, 
2007: 169), it is surprising that the international cultural policy research community has 
paid so little attention to the Korean CI policy shift, whilst a myriad of research projects 
have focused on the rise of creative industries and related policies in the UK after the 
election of New Labour. This is the major gap in the literature that this study aims to 
fill.  
 
The situation is not that different within Korea and Korean language scholarship. Most 
existing research on Korean CI policy do not engage the policy shift since 1997 within 
the broader shift in the domestic or international dynamics of the political economy. 
This is partly because most research on CI policy in Korea has been conducted for 
practical purposes, funded by the government or its quangos to serve specific policy 
functions. Therefore, such research has not been able to provide a critical and 
comprehensive perspective from which current Korean CI policy can be positioned in 
relation to that of the old developmental state on one hand and to those of other 
countries on the other. With my focus on the processes, products and performance—the 
whole mechanism—of the policy transformation, I aim to transcend the limitations of 
pragmatic and/or fragmented descriptions and evaluations. 
   
In short, while the political and economic transformation in Korea have attracted much 
scholarship, as has the CI policy in the UK, little if any attention has been paid to the 
similar CI policy shift in Korea. If that weren’t reason enough to approach this research 
topic, the phenomenal success of Korean cultural industries over the last decade calls 
out for explication. Since the early post-millennium years, the Korean CI have started to 
grow very fast domestically and their products/contents have become very popular in 
many Asian countries under the name of the Korean wave. To illustrate, the share of 
Korean films in the domestic market doubled from 25.1% in 1998 to 50% in 2007 and the 
number of exported Korean films soared from 33 in 1998 to 321 in 2007 (KOFIC, 2004; 
2008a). Korean CI policy has been noted by many policymakers in the region, in that its 
fundamental policy transformation set the ground for this impressive growth. To take an 
example,     
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Chinese researchers are now looking more closely at the success of South Korean 
creative industries (Chen 2003). The fact that South Korea managed to navigate the 
Asian economic crisis and emerge with new state and private investment in its 
creative content industries rather than production remaining an inhouse function of 
industry chaebols, provides a salutatory lesson for China, itself attempting to 
reshape and professionalise its cultural economy around its new institutional 
groupings. (Kean, 2004: 276) 
 
Therefore, an analysis of the mechanisms of the Korean policy shift can be expected not 
only to reveal a distinctive way of formulating and implementing CI policy in the age of 
post-organization, but also, adding to earlier research, to help reveal which key factors 
contributed to the rapid and substantial increase in the competitiveness of Korean 
contents in both Korean domestic and international cultural markets. Such insights 
would have a realistic appeal to policymakers in NICs because a narrative from a neo-
developmental state can arouse more empathy and provide more suitable and feasible 
references than one from a neo-liberal state could. Moreover, this study can also be 
useful by introducing policymakers in NDCs to a similar but different path of CI policy 
shift, thus providing complementary knowledge and perspectives. 
 
The thesis starts by examining British discourse on creative industries policy. To clarify 
the conceptual frame as well as the reference points for my exploration, Chapter 2 
describes how the discourse was formed; explains what the main features of the policy 
discourse are; and evaluates what the new policy has achieved in Britain. Chapter 3 
puts Korean policy making in its place. By focusing on the concept of the developmental 
state, I shall summarize the institutional history of Korean policy making from the 
establishment of Republic of Korea in 1948 to the financial crisis and the election of 
President Kim Dae-Jung in 1997. A major concern will be the magnitude and type of 
impact that Korean developmental state industrial policy has had on Korean cultural 
policy in general and on CI policy in particular. Chapter 4 then provides a 
methodological discussion which states and justifies the methods used for gathering and 
analyzing research data. The findings from my field work will be presented in Chapters 
five through eight. Chapter 5 describes the process of the CI policy shift during Kim Dae-
Jung’s government (1998-2003) by identifying landmark events in the field; Chapter 6 
(re)constructs the overall CI policy framework which resulted from the shift over the 
course of the Kim and Roh (2003-08) governments; Chapter 7 undertakes case studies of 
two major quangos (i.e. KOFIC and KOCCA) in the Korean CI field in order to assess and 
explain the similarities and differences between the ways in which the policy 
framework was implemented by quangos promoting different genres of CI; and Chapter 
8 examines whether the policy shift and the resultant policy framework achieved the 
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expected performance in both economic and cultural senses. Then, the concluding 
chapter will draw the findings together to clarify the key features of the neo-
developmental transformation in Korean CI policy, and then outline its major 
implications for CI policy development of both developed and developing countries. This 
is followed by Postscript, added after the viva, that digs into the implications of the 
research findings in terms of international policy transfer and thereby states more 
explicitly the importance of local conditions for the creative turn in general.  
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2. The British ‘Creative Industries’ Discourse 
 
One of the things that always saddened me in the past was the 
way in which the responsibilities of what was then the 
Department of National Heritage were written off by many 
commentators as an add-on to the main economic business of 
government. That perception is now changing rapidly, and not 
before time. These areas of industry, which rely on individual 
talent and the creation of value through imaginative skill, are 
not just part of the enjoyment agenda; they are vital for 
employment and our economy, too. (Smith, 1998: 147)  
 
 
The previous chapter conceptualized the neo-liberal restructuring under the Thatcher 
Government as a response to the world-wide shift toward post-organized capitalism. 
The Third-Way restructuring of cultural policy under the New Labour government can be 
then understood as a response to both the post-organization and the neo-liberal 
restructuring. With the rise of New Labour to power, the state of affairs in the UK 
cultural policy arena significantly changed. As quoted, ‘Mr. Smith’ drew ‘a map’ (Frith, 
1999) for this shift as the first Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. This 
chapter aims to provide a detailed outline of the changes that were instituted.   
 
New labour policymakers often framed the post-organization as the rise of the 
‘knowledge economy’ or the ‘new economy’. From the early days it was the 
policymakers’ key project to reconceptualize Britain and its competitiveness in 
accordance with the rules of ‘the new global economy’ (cf. Fairclough, 2000). For 
instance, as Robin Cook declared, the promotion of ‘Cool Britannia’ sought to ‘replace a 
myth of an old Britain’ that had continuously declined from its glorious past, with the 
new image of a youthful and fashionable country full of cutting-edge talent and 
activities (Awan, 2008). When it comes to cultural policy, the key word for this 
ambitious initiative was ‘creative industries’. In order to engage in the emerging trends 
and sectors under the new economy, the policymakers devised the new concept and 
promoted it along with related policies.  
 
There are of course contending views on this government-driven discourse that 
predicates the centrality of the creative industries from the perspective of the 
emerging new economy. To illustrate, while contrasting ‘modernist’ categories 
including the public sphere and governmentality with a newly emerging paradigm such 
as ‘the DIY citizen’, John Hartley (2004b) argues that along with creativity, the ‘new 
economy’ as the latest version of the ‘knowledge economy’ is producing significant 
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changes in the conventional methods of cultural production and consumption. Stuart 
Cunningham (2004) also asserts that the ‘cultural industries and policy’ heyday around 
the 1980s and 1990s gave way to the ‘service industries model’ of industry development 
and regulation, which is now giving way to new developments around the ‘knowledge-
based economy’. Accordingly, he welcomes the fact that governments around world 
have recognized that most classic strategies are insufficient for fostering the new 
economy, and are now accepting a ‘renewed interventionist role for the state in setting 
21st-century industry policies’. In this regard, these pro-new economy researchers 
appear to not only approve of but also to advocate the British discourse of creativity 
and creative industries (see also Flew, 2004; Higgs et al., 2008).  
 
On the other hand, other commentators are suspicious of the new economy and thus of 
creative industries policy. For Toby Miller (2004), it seems not proper even to confer the 
status of a ‘research topic’ on inaccurate concepts such as the ‘new economy’ and 
‘creativity’. Instead, he argues that as part of technological futurism, the new economy 
discourse has been a ‘smokescreen’ for the prevailing neo-liberal Washington Consensus, 
which have resulted in slower worldwide growth and greater worldwide inequality. Andy 
Pratt (2004) points out that the articulation of the ‘new economy’ with ‘creativity’ in 
strategic policy making has a long history of over a century, and does not represent a 
‘rupture’ at all. He also insists that most accounts drawing on the term appear ‘locked 
into a fairly crude form of technological determinism’. Against the over-inflated 
expectations of the new economy, these sceptical researchers have worked hard to 
reveal the shortcomings and negative impacts of the British CI policy shift (see also 
Garnham, 2005; Oakley, 2004; 2009).  
 
Nonetheless, both parties almost readily agree that interest in the new economy has 
driven a great shift in British cultural policy, and has given prominence to ‘creative 
industries’ as a ‘pioneer sector of the economy’ (The Work Foundation, 2007: 16). 
Besides, it should be noted on another level that the newly emerging CI policy consists 
of ‘a body of thought’ (Schlesinger, 2007) or a conceptual ‘constellation’ (Benjamin, 
2003), which therefore cannot be easily totalized or reduced to a simple position or two. 
Hence, taking a step back from the sharp division around the new economy, this chapter 
seeks to describe the production and products of the British policy shift, rather than to 
judge their value too hastily. In doing so, I shall first explore the terminological shift 
toward ‘creative industries’, focusing on its politico-economic background. This chapter 
then attempts to overview the body of work that arose during the shift to comprise the 
CI policy framework. Finally, I will critically examine assessments of the policy shift. My 
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ultimate aim in clarifying the shift in British policy here is to provide a useful reference 
point for examining the parallel Korean experience. Therefore, this chapter may be 
viewed as a reading of the British experience through the Korean perspective. 
 
 
2.1 From the Culture Industry via Cultural Industries to Creative Industries  
 
 
2.1.1 ‘Culture Industry’ by Adorno and Horkheimer 
 
The term, ‘creative industries’ can be regarded as a part of a family of concepts that 
resulted from the (re)marriage of culture and industry in the 19th century.6 The first 
fruit of this union was the so-called ‘mass culture’ or ‘popular culture’, which was first 
labelled as ‘Culture industry’ by two Western Marxist scholars, Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1947). They used the label to censure the undesirable marriage between culture and 
industry. For them, the Culture industry was a medium of ‘mass deception’ in late-
capitalist society (conceived as a stage of Western Enlightenment) and has functioned 
as a means of soft fascism, pseudo-individualism, baby-talk, social cement, and so forth 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947; Adorno, 1991). The manipulation of the common people 
by either Nazi fascism in Germany or by capitalist popular culture in the US are both 
dramatic exemplars. Adorno and Horkheimer insist that the arts, the essence of culture, 
can become ‘the useful’ only when they become ‘the useless’. That is, it is only by 
refusing to be a part of a huge instrumental system in service of the useful, that the 
arts and culture can nurture critical reflexive reason as a foil for conformist 
instrumental reason. In short, the two thinkers claimed that the current situation within 
the Culture industry and its effects ought to be halted and reversed as soon as possible.  
 
As O'Connor noted (2007: 18), Adorno’s account of the ‘Culture industry’ resonated with 
post-war anxieties about mass, industrial or ‘Americanized’ culture, and thereby came 
to be connected with the objective of contemporary European cultural policy to protect 
its ‘authentic’ cultural tradition. Adorno’s position on modernist social aesthetics 
operates at the level of formal logic and contradictions, and has been influential in a 
                                                          
6 The first pages of Western history of aesthetics suggest that this combination of culture and industry can be regarded as 
re-marriage. For example, in the ancient Greece, painting, sculpture, architecture were analyzed as the product of ‘techne’ 
(‘ars’ in Latin) along with shoemaking. Since then, the ‘arts’ have been separated from ‘mere’ techniques, being 
escalated into the ‘disegno’ by Italians in the 16th century and then into the ‘beaux-arts’ (i.e. fine arts as the essence of 
culture) by French scholars in the 18th century (cf. Tatarkiewicz, 1980). In this light, the convergence between the 
traditional arts and cutting-edge computer games under the title of creative industries (driven by British policymakers) in 
the 21st century may be regarded as a much more significant symptom than might be thought.  
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number of intellectual traditions. Despite the virtue of its prophetic mood, however, his 
position has attracted much criticism. In the UK two such theoretical positions are 
particularly prominent: British Cultural Studies and the Political Economy of Culture 
School. 
 
British Cultural Studies arose from the dialectic between culturalism (e.g. R. Williams, R. 
Hoggart, E. P. Thomson) and structuralism (e.g. C. Levi-strauss, L. Althusser, R. 
Barthes), and has problematized the supposed symbolic function of the Culture Industry 
as a totalizing, manipulating mechanism (cf. Hall, 1980b). Three key criticisms emerge 
from this perspective. First of all, the existence of the manipulating mechanism itself is 
doubtful, because encoded messages are not always decoded by audiences in the 
designed or preferred way (Hall, 1980a). Some might be manipulated to strengthen the 
interest of the ruling class, but there are also many audiences pursuing their own 
interpretations of resistance. This criticism can be connected with Benjamin’s analysis 
(1968) that in some of the mechanically reproducible art works one can discern 
undeniable possibilities of emancipation. 
 
Following Gramsci, British Cultural Studies has also problematized the concept of the 
‘ruling class’ assumed in Adorno’s conception. He supposed that there are a handful of 
elites who controlled or manipulated the people from the top of the Culture industry. 
As Gramsci demonstrated (1988), however, the group should not be understood as a 
singular homogeneous class, but rather as a ‘historical bloc’ that seeks ‘hegemony’ over 
society. A society is composed of various sectors and thus the members of the historical 
bloc and their interests can only be diverse, which means that the bloc is configured as 
loose ties among distinct, sometimes conflicting, positions. Therefore, it is not 
impossible to produce counter-hegemony and the criticism of the Culture industry as a 
whole is not an adequate solution, especially in this age of identity politics.  
 
Adorno’s adherence to authentic culture, probably the result of influence from the two 
great German traditions of idealism and Marxism, is the final target. For example, 
postmodernists following Nietzsche have radically put into practice the conviction that 
there is no truth, but only interpretations of the truth. If this is correct, it becomes 
impossible to explain why Beethoven, Schönberg and Beckett could be true, real, 
authentic and genuine, while Stravinsky and Jazz are not (Adorno, 2002). In addition, 
why are most good examples from Europe rather than Asia, Africa or America? Although 
British Cultural Studies did not fully agree with the French postmodernists, they did 
adopt its critique of essential or foundational grand narratives and their power to put 
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everything into a unitary system or line (Hall, 1996). Adorno’s ultimate position is surely 
not so naïve, since it neither depends on a simple dialectic nor provides a clear utopia. 
However, it too set out a grand narrative by proposing an extremely delicate alternative 
based upon modernist aesthetics. This criticism resonates with Bourdieu’s ‘social 
critique of taste judgment’ (1984) in that the problem of perception and its solution 
within the theory of the ‘Culture industry’ fully draws on Adrono’s own ‘habitus’ as a 
German Jewish Marxist social philosopher. 
 
In addition to Cultural Studies, another theoretical position in the UK has taken note of 
the term, ‘Culture industry’. ‘The political economy of culture school’, composed of 
Nicholas Garnham, Graham Murdock, James Curran and others, was ‘fiercely opposed to 
the (over)emphasis on the ideological effects of cultural objects conceived exclusively 
as “texts” rather than as commodities’ (O'Connor, 2007: 19). On this basis, they 
criticized British cultural studies for abandoning real economic analysis in favour of 
textual analysis, and thus brought in ambiguous cultural politics (Garnham, 1990). 
Furthermore, against both the particular version of Marxist economics and the elitist 
pessimism of the Frankfurt School (Garnham, 2005), they sought to revise Adorno’s 
Culture industry thesis in a different direction. 
 
In brief, contending that culture under capitalism is produced increasingly as a 
commodity and thus subject to the system of production, they criticized Adorno’s thesis 
for the following reasons (O'Connor, 2007: 19-22). Firstly, the cultural industries in part 
correspond to some fundamental human need for meaning or enjoyment. Secondly, the 
prediction and ‘pre-programming’ of audience response was simply not possible. Besides, 
the concept of the ‘Culture industry’ failed to register the distinctions between the 
different kinds of cultural commodities that were derived from the mechanism whereby 
exchange value was collected. Finally, the absorption of the artist into the Culture 
industry as a key index of cultural catastrophe has not been happening. All in all, 
through analysis of the real economy, one also arrives at the same conclusion that 
cultural production within the culture industry is not necessarily subjected to the total 
system of pre-programmed cultural commodities.  
 
There is no reason to see these two British traditions as substitutes to each other. They 
are more like auxiliaries because soft and hard analyses can and should go together. The 
most notable common feature is that both attempted to secure a space for ‘cultural 
democracy’ beyond the ‘democratization of culture’ by rejecting the over-evaluation of 
a totalizing system almost transcendentally imposed. These strands of criticisms 
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required Adorno’s Culture industry thesis to be reconsidered. In social history, the new 
society movement that arose following May ’68 accelerated the need for this revision in 
accordance with the rapidly growing Culture industry on the one hand, and with the 
evident success of capitalism on the other. The coming of ‘New Times’ (Hall & Jacques, 
1989) brought into light the inadequateness of Adorno’s pessimistic speculative 
prospects. The direct result of this re-evaluation was the birth of the ‘cultural 
industries’, the second child of the (re)marriage of industry and culture.  
 
 
2.1.2 ‘Cultural Industries’ by GLC 
 
In the UK, the Greater London Council (GLC) was the main agent that established and 
activated the usage of this distinct family member (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005: 3).7 It 
should be noted here that the 1980s and 1990s were not only the cultural industries 
‘heyday’ (Cunningham, 2004), but the period that saw the rapid growth of neo-
liberalism. In the course of the long economic downturn through the 1970s, the post-
war consensus on the welfare state was blurred and was replaced by the discourse of 
neo-liberal competition in society. As an active response to the emergence of post-
organization, this new political trend drove Britain into a wholesale restructuring of its 
social formation in parallel with the so-called new economy. This strong trend, then, 
has rapidly become a world-wide trend since the late 1980s when even the communist 
nations admitted the limitations of a controlled economy. Although the global financial 
crisis after 2008 is currently causing great upheaval, a significant set of neo-liberal 
policy terms remain very powerful such as self-funding and privatization.   
 
This transformation from the social democratic welfare state to the neo-liberal state 
has had a great influence on British cultural policy. Above all, it brought about a shift in 
policy rationales ‘from the social and political concerns prevailing during the 1970s to 
[concerns for] economic development’ (Bianchini, 1993: 2). What emerged subsequently 
was a tight convergence of culture with economics. The convergence, though, was not 
simply imposed by the government. The substantial cutbacks in public spending that the 
Thatcher government implemented provoked the CI sector into developing elaborate 
logics and persuasive evidence concerning the values of their own works. This later 
evolved into the discourse of democratized creativity and its economic/social values 
                                                          
7 On the international level, the first and main agent was UNESCO. In the early 1980s, it produced several seminal works 
to address the importance of cultural industries in policy circles, including Cultural Industries: A Challenge for the 
Future of Culture (1982). 
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(Bilton, 2007). It is precisely in this situation that the GLC had sought a new cultural 
politics between 1979 and 1986 through its use of the new term of ‘cultural industries’.  
 
Although it was the first cultural industries strategy to emerge at a local level in the UK, 
the GLC’s work was more than just a local initiative and implied bigger ambitions 
toward democratic cultural policy. Several points need to be made in relation to this. 
Firstly, when the GLC policymakers introduced the concept of the cultural industries 
into the British cultural policy arena, it had far greater practical implications than the 
term ‘Culture industry’ had had. They first endeavoured to show that public policy 
could use the market as a way to distribute cultural goods and services, and that it 
needed to do so in order to serve audience demand rather than the ambitions of 
producers or policymakers (cf. Garnham, 1990). To be more concrete,  
 
It [GLC] represented an attempt to break out of a cultural policy centred on the 
‘arts’ – and on subsidies to artists and producing institutions as the foundation of 
that policy. They began to address the conditions of the commercial production of 
culture using economic and statistical tools (e.g. value-chains, employment 
mapping), focusing on how the sector as a whole worked – including those crucial 
ancillary and non-creative activities. As such it represented an industrial approach to 
cultural policy, using economic means to achieve cultural (and economic) objectives. 
(O’Connor, 2007: 24)  
 
 In brief, ‘cultural industries’ was a term invented to embrace commercial industry 
sectors such as film, television and book publishing into the expanding cultural policy 
field beyond the traditional boundaries of the ‘arts’ (Cunningham, 2004: 106). Even 
though GLC policymakers took part in the new convergence between culture and the 
economy, it would be distorting the truth to conclude that the left-wing policymakers 
capitulated to the steely Thatcher government. The opposite was in fact the case. That 
is, their practical cultural industries policy, which was introduced to serve audiences’ 
needs without wasting public funds, was intended to challenge the government’s neo-
liberal policy by more properly understanding the new socio-economic conditions and 
thus initiating new policy-making schemes. In this sense, their position may be 
summarized as ‘pragmatic anti-idealist egalitarianism’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 139-140).  
 
Because of the degree to which it posed a challenge to the Thatcherite government, the 
GLC could not avoid being abolished, finally, in 1986. Nevertheless, its policy scheme 
and actions became a milestone not only in local policy terms but also in terms of more 
general cultural policy as well. Their position was emulated by many metropolitan 
authorities beyond London in dealing with the Conservative but entrepreneurial 
government. Sheffield’s cultural industries quarter, established in 1986 as the first of its 
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kind, is one of the most direct examples (Moss, 2002). In this way, the GLC’s cultural 
industries policy came to have a significant influence on subsequent local economic and 
cultural strategies. Furthermore, it raised some fundamental questions about the 
relationship between culture, economics and politics by inserting cultural industries into 
the agenda of democratic cultural policy. Overall, the GLC re-ignited the ever hot-
button issue of these relationships in a form suitably revised for the changing socio-
economic conditions that emerged under the post-organization of the 1980s.  
 
 
2.1.3 ‘Creative Industries’ by CITF 
 
After eighteen years of Conservative rule in the UK, New Labour got into power in 1997. 
Did this implicate the end of neo-liberalism? Did this officially entitle the GLC’s cultural 
industries policy as the new governmental cultural policy? The answer was certainly no, 
even if New Labour used ‘cultural industries’ very actively during the pre-election 
period (Schlesinger, 2007). Instead, the term gave way to another child of the 
conceptual family under investigation, the ‘creative industries’. After a landslide 
victory in the election, the government imported this substitute concept from Australia, 
where it had been used in a major government policy statement, Creative Nation in 
1994 (Throsby, 2008a). It is since this adoption and its following radical transformation 
by the New Labour government that the concept of the ‘creative industries’ has become 
commonly understood and widely used internationally. The agent of the transformation 
was the Creative Industries Task Force (hereafter, CITF) chaired by the Secretary of 
State for Culture at that time, Chris Smith.   
 
Particular attention needs to be paid to this task force. It should be first noted that the 
CITF was not only composed of representatives from government departments and 
public bodies, but also incorporated nine industry advisers, including ‘big names’ such 
as Richard Branson, Paul Smith and David Puttnam (DCMS, 1998: 4). This kind of 
celebrity task force was not formed by chance. In order to rebrand Britain as a cutting-
edge country, what Tony Blair did at the very outset (in July 1997) was to hold a 
glamorous celebrity reception at Downing Street. In this line, ‘Panel 2000’, a 
governmental task force was established to promote the ‘new’ Britain in April 1998. 
Both Panel 2000 and the CITF, which had been established a few months earlier, were 
representative celebrity task forces strongly influenced by the then hot ‘Cool Britannia’. 
Another point to be made is that the original remit of the CITF was to ‘recommend 
steps to maximise the economic impact of the UK creative industries at home and 
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abroad’ (DMCS, 1999: 6) by assessing both their needs and their value in terms of 
government policy. Hence, the invitation of celebrities from the industries (beyond old 
and easy bureaucracy) may be assessed as having been an efficient way to list the 
industries’ urgent needs and an effective way to spread the new policy discourse. In 
pursuing this remit, however, the most significant contribution the task force made 
before it was wound up in June 2000 was the publication of influential seminal reports.8  
 
Among others, most famous of these must be the Creative Industries Mapping Document 
1998 that the CITF produced as the result of its six meetings between 8 October 1997 
and 26 October 1998. The document became a popular knowledge-product itself not 
only nationally but also internationally, by outlining the definition and scope of the 
‘creative industries’. According to this famous document (DCMS, 1998), the creative 
industries can be defined as ‘those activities which have their origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation 
though the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’. And the activities that 
lead to wealth and job creation through the exploitation of intellectual property with 
creativity mainly take place in thirteen key sub-sectors: ‘advertising, architecture, the 
art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure 
software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software, and television and radio’. 
Despite a hoard of criticisms of the working statements (see 2.3.1), the productive role 
of these handy statements for concrete policy actions cannot be neglected. By 
articulating the definition and scope of the creative industries and producing a series of 
coherent documents, the CITF provided not only a strong conceptual base for further 
discursive practices, but also practical and workable tools with which further policy 
works could address the real economy. 
 
Through these processes, according to the revised CI Mapping Document published in 
2001, ‘the creative industries have moved from the fringes to the mainstream’ (DCMS, 
2001: 3). On the basis of the clear, handy or bold conceptualization, the CITF 
successfully initiated the rise of the ‘creative industries’ as the alternative to the 
‘cultural industries’. What, then, has made this rapid shift in terminology possible? First 
of all, the complex ideological position of the newly elected Labour government should 
be considered. After long restructuring under the Conservative administrations (1979–
97), there was no way that the New Labour government could ignore the fundamental 
neo-liberal shift in the economy. The social and economic grand restructuring was the 
                                                          
8 For the full list of the reports, see UK Parliament (1999). 
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undeniable starting point. However, this did not necessarily mean that New Labour 
could afford to abandon its Labour tradition. Instead, the government sought to position 
itself between the two blocs. How was this position applied to CI policy?  
 
According to Creative Britain (1998: 142), a collection of speeches Chris Smith made as 
the first Secretary of State for Culture, there were four major themes New Labour 
policymakers agreed on in setting out the new cultural policy directions: ‘access, 
excellence, education and the creative economy’. He argues that creativity is at the 
heart of those themes which stand as the great aims of New Labour cultural policy, 
because creativity:  
 
[I]s important in and for itself, for its own worth; it is after all better to create than 
to destroy, better to leap with imagination than to desiccate with pedantry. It is 
also important for what it can do for each of us as individual, sensitive, intelligent 
human beings: fulfilling ourselves and our potential. It is important for what it can 
do for society, because creativity is inherently a social and interactive process, and 
it helps to bind us together as people. And it is important for what it can do for our 
economy, for those great surging industries that promise to provide real 
opportunities if we nurture them well. (Smith, 1998: 148) 
 
From this quote, it can be inferred that foregrounding ‘creative industries’ was part of a 
broader strategy to establish and promote this discourse of creativity with which New 
Labour attempted to position itself uniquely. In short, by stressing ‘excellence’ and the 
‘creative economy’ in nurturing ‘creative industries’, New Labour could distance itself 
from Old Labour’s egalitarianism and follow the legacy first developed by the 
Conservatives for the promotion of the knowledge economy (Pratt, 2005: 32-35). That’s 
why one can discern ‘a maturing of the Thatcherite ethos, stressing efficiency, 
effectiveness, value for money, and market forces’ in New Labour’s CI policy 
(Roodhouse, 2006: 16). On the other hand, by stressing ‘access’ and ‘education’ as the 
points at which the active state could intervene in the cultural sector, the CI policy 
enabled New Labour to differentiate itself from Conservative neo-liberalism. Within this 
dynamic, Labour-friendly think tanks such as DEMOS and COMEDIA acted as the hotbed 
of related policies from the early days (cf. Schlesinger, 2009). In sum, the new concept 
of the creative industries was a useful means to ensure the ‘Third Way’ in the cultural 
policy field. 
 
This new concept, then, played a pivotal role in the restructuring of the cultural sector. 
As the scope of the term (i.e. the 13 sub-sectors) reveals, ‘creative industries’ can be 
understood to combine ‘the creative arts and the cultural industries’ (Hartley, 2005: 6). 
Furthermore, as seen in its definition, the term was invented to capture the emerging 
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enterprise dynamics of the new economy that the two previous terms could not 
(Cunningham, 2002). That is,  
 
‘Creative industries’ is a term that suits the political, cultural and technological 
landscape of these times. It focuses on the twin truths that (i) the core of ‘culture’ 
is still creativity, but (ii) creativity is produced, deployed, consumed and enjoyed 
quite differently in post-industrialised societies … Creative industries are the service 
industries of the new knowledge economy. (Hartley & Cunningham, 2002: 20) 
 
Put another way, the invention and promotion of creative industries policy can be 
understood as an ambitious response by the government and industries engaging in 
cultural sectors to the prevailing post-organization. The attempt was ambitious in that 
it sought to break down the traditional binary division between the fine/high arts and 
the cultural industries (Smith, 1998: 144) and, furthermore, between the ‘arts and 
commerce’ (Caves, 2000). It went on more audaciously to position the newly converging 
area as not only one of the fastest growing sectors, but also the template which shows 
other industries how to survive and innovate in the age of post-organization. As a result, 
the cultural industries, previously ignored in the national policy field, could rapidly 
emerge as the ‘high profile exemplars of the creativity and innovation’ (O’Connor, 2007: 
41) that were to rebrand Britain for the 21st century.9  
 
This post-organizational restructuring, especially the aspect of post-modern 
aestheticization, can help unravel why and how the DCMS undertook the change of 
terms so decisively, and in turn, why the Ministries or Departments of Culture in other 
countries benchmarked the shift so readily. What was, then, the concrete product of 
the cultural policy reform undertaken by New Labour? What policy framework arose as a 
result of the emerging and spreading discourse of creative industries? Those are the 
issues I shall now turn to.  
 
 
2.2 The British Creative Industries Policy Framework  
 
 
2.2.1 Three Key Words 
 
Three key words for the creative industries emerge from the foundational definition 
suggested by the CITF in 1998: ‘individual creativity’, ‘intellectual property’ and 
                                                          
9 This may be considered as the moment when the original objective of the conceptual family was finally achieved. 
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‘wealth and job creation’. As Bilton (2007: xvii) points out, the definition seems to 
correspond well to the conventional value chain in the sector. If an ‘industry’ can be 
understood as the ‘individuals and enterprises’ which produce ‘goods or services with 
some common characteristics that make them complements or substitutes in 
consumption’ (Throsby, 2008a: 218), the common characteristics of creative industries 
are defined to be the creativity and intellectual property positioned at the two ends of 
the value chain. When intellectual property becomes commercialized and contents are 
consumed, the final aim of the creative industries is achieved in the production of 
wealth and jobs. This wealth and job creation through creative activities will become in 
turn conducive to the enhancement of individual creativity in the society. 
 
(1) Individual Creativity 
 
Although this is a kind of circular process, there is no doubt that individual creativity is 
the base and the starting point of it all. For Smith (1998: 50-51), creativity in its widest 
sense is at the heart of British competitiveness as the ‘foundation of a new generation 
of high-tech, high-skills industries’, since creative ‘ideas are the building blocks of 
innovation, and innovation builds industries’. What then is this ‘creativity’?  
 
Much of the literature on creativity often depends on ‘the etymological roots of the 
word, seeing creativity as about bringing something into existence, generating, 
inventing, dealing imaginatively with seemingly intractable problems’ (Landry & 
Bianchini, 1995: 18). However, it should be noted that the recent version of creativity, 
which have also been adopted by British policymakers, seem rather different from 
traditional aesthetic, romantic, and psychological ones in several aspects. Firstly, this 
individual creativity is a democratized version of creativity as a personal capacity. Here, 
creativity is no longer simply the natural talent of a handful of genius types, which 
cannot be earned by others. Secondly, it is also a rationalized version, in that it does 
not imply a kind of irrational state of mind as a necessary factor of creativity. It can be 
also regarded as a more pragmatic version in that it does not just point to personal 
capacity, but to the final outcome of using it. The perspective that creativity does not 
depend on the outcome but the capacity or the ideas that emerge from it is strongly 
denied. Finally, therefore, this version of creativity notes not only the importance of 
individual personalities and capacities, but also the collective conditions and processes 
involved in applying creativity in the real world. Collective performance toward 
beneficial innovation as the result of managing individuals’ creative ideas and skills 
cannot be stressed strongly enough in this version.  
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To be concise, the more democratized, rationalized, pragmatic and collectivistic type 
of creativity at stake here might be summarized as the combination of ‘artistic’ 
competences (novelty/originality) and ‘managerial’ performances (usefulness/value) 
which are open to any human being (Bilton, 2007; Sternberg, 2006). For instance, All 
Our Futures, one of the key reports which was published in the early days of New 
Labour CI policy, defined creativity as ‘imaginative activity fashioned so as to produce 
outcomes that are both original and of value’ (NACCCE, 1999: 29). Policymakers’ 
adoption of the new creativity must be greatly influenced by the fact that this 
creativity appears apposite to the tight convergence of culture and the economy. At the 
same time, however, by distancing itself from the elitist tone of ‘culture’, this version 
of creativity also seeks to be wide enough to encourage the self-fulfilment of all 
individuals and thus to produce social benefits for the whole community. The basic 
structure of the British CI discourse, first put into place in the CI Mapping Document, 
has been constructed through this dialectic between the creativity of each and every 
individual and its combined socio-economic usages and value.  
 
(2) Intellectual Property 
 
As discussed earlier, most crucial to this political initiative of New Labour’s was ‘the 
identification of the creative industries’ with the ‘new economy’ (O’Connor, 2007: 42). 
Hence, it was often argued that within and through this new economy ‘creativity, 
culture, national identity and the nation’s future wealth are all inextricably bound up 
together’ (Smith, 1998: 147).  
 
As John Howkins (2001) argues in his influential book, The Creative Economy: How 
People make Money from Ideas, intellectual property is far from a homogeneous entity. 
It consists of at least four distinctive types: patents, copyrights, trademarks and 
industrial design (Howkins, 2001: 31-70). The first of these, patents are the clearest 
example of intellectual property as property, and not merely as property but as 
monopolies. Copyrights exists only in ‘qualifying’ works which must be original and have 
involved the author’s skill and labour, although the test of originality and skill is lower 
than the tests for a patent. At the next level, come trademarks such as brands, which 
require neither any unique inventiveness as patents do, nor any intellectual or artistic 
effort as copyrighted work does. However, they have become the core factor in most 
marketplace competition. Finally, industrial design can be protected both by 
registration like a patent and by a ‘design right’ like copyright. This categorization of 
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intellectual property right (IPR) was well received by British policymakers,10 resulting in 
the transformation of The Patent Office (1852) into The Intellectual Property Office 
(2007). 
 
Having explained the concept of intellectual property, a question then emerges, why 
was intellectual property singled out among various types of innovation based on 
individual creativity? This is probably due to the fact that intellectual property has been 
regarded the ‘currency’ of the new economy (Bilton, 2007: xviii). On this ground, the 
exploitation of IPR has been considered as ‘the crucial link’ between various agendas 
for ‘positioning the creative industries at the forefront of economic competitiveness’ 
(O’Connor, 2007: 42-43). It can thus be argued that the post-organizational 
restructuring of the previous economic and social orders accelerated the coming of the 
knowledge economy or information society, which, in the end, brought about the 
emergence of IPR.  What the DCMS sought to do was to jump on this bandwagon.  
 
Given the variety of intellectual property itself and the complexity of the broader shift 
behind it, the phrase, ‘generation and exploitation of intellectual property’ in the 
definition, never implies a simple task. Although it might be simple to identify the 
origin of intellectual property (i.e. individual creativity, skill and talent), it is indeed a 
complex and complicated process to transform or actualize them into tangible social 
and economic capital. Therefore, as Smith put it (1998: 106), ‘it is content above all 
that matters’ in the situation where the rapidly developing technology of the new 
economy furnishes not only greater demand, but also the ‘possibility of a new 
framework for trading in rights’. In this way, IPR, as the currency of the new economy 
or the trophy of the innovation industries, has become one of the most prominent 
concepts in the UK discourse of CI policy.  
 
(3) Wealth and Job Creation 
 
Roughly speaking, it may well be reasonable to label the policies developed to address 
the need for enhancing individual creativity as creative education policy, and those for 
promoting the importance of IPR as creative economy policy. Then, what policy was 
devised for addressing ‘wealth and job creation’, the last key word? Two kinds of policy 
can be separately noted. The first was the creative business policy designed to support 
private companies within CI to grow quickly and stably; and the other was the creative 
                                                          
10 Http://www.ipo.gov.uk/about/history.htm [Accessed on 11 April 2011].  
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city policy designed to provide a favourable ecology for creativity and articulate its 
fruits with the regeneration of British cities.  
 
Since the emerging creative industries had looked promising, it was repeatedly argued 
by New Labour policymakers that the future hope for the nation could be found in these 
emerging industries (Blair, 2007; Brown, 2008). In the end, however, it is the private 
sector that employs the creative talent and produces tangible profits. Put another way, 
the ‘government can never do the work of creating’, although ‘it can and must support 
those who do’ (Smith, 1998: 142). Therefore, the Labour government sought to secure 
the conditions in which British ‘content providers’ (ibid.: 106) could create IPR and 
thereby wealth and jobs. Indeed, enabling creative businesses to grow was always a key 
task for the New Labour government to achieve the master objective of moving CI ‘from 
the fringes to the mainstream’ (DCMS, 2001: 3) or putting CI ‘at the heart of the 
economy’ (DCMS, 2008: 9).  
 
In helping creative enterprises grow, the policymakers have also noted the importance 
of the city. As the major site where the production and consumption of content happens, 
cities can provide a ‘creative milieu’ (Landry, 2000) of which the production companies 
can take advantage. To borrow Florida’s terms, ‘tolerance’ in a city can attract ‘talent’ 
to the city and the talent can induce ‘technology’ into the city (Florida, 2002). In the 
reverse direction, the jobs and wealth created through the activities of the creative 
economy in and around cities can be directly translated into the capital with which 
chronic problems such as physical run-down and social exclusion can be tackled 
(Matarasso, 1997; 2005). The ‘Barcelona model’, noted by Richard Rogers in leading the 
Urban Task Force under New Labour, may be one of the most referenced exemplars by 
the policymakers (Monclús, 2003). Numerous Millennium projects and the bid to select 
Britain’s second city as European Capital of Culture in 2008 (Griffiths, 2006) were also 
significant drives in this policy initiative. As a result, for Tony Blair (2007), British ‘cities 
have been regenerated around new industries and new galleries. We have become the 
world’s creative hub’.  
 
Up to this point, in order to discern the British CI policy framework, I have noted the 
foundational definition of CI and discussed its three key words of creativity, intellectual 
property, and wealth and job creation. As a result, some core areas of British CI policy 
have been identified: creative education, the creative economy, creative business and 
the creative city. There is, however, another different policy area, which covers the 
role of government over all the processes mentioned above, which may be called 
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creative governance policy. The next section seeks to discuss the five policy areas in 
greater detail so as to flesh out the framework.  
 
 
2.2.2 Five Key Policy Areas 
 
I have delineated the main point of each of these five policy areas above. However, 
what should be mentioned is that all five policies are not only interacting, but also 
inevitably intertwined in various ways. Moreover, although these policies are positioned 
within the context of CI promotion here, they cannot be confined to the CI sector alone. 
For example, the aim of creative education policy is broader than the production of 
skilful talent for creative businesses, while the scope of creative city policy is not 
limited to mobilizing the cultural sector of a city for its development or regeneration. 
Bearing this in mind and drawing on the previous discussion, I shall suggest that the 
British CI policy framework can be modelled as in Figure 2.1. 
 
          Figure 2.1 The British Creative Industries Policy Framework
11
 
 
 
This figure illustrates my theorization of CI policy as a discursive formation comprised of 
five sub-discourses. To test the framework, it is useful to take two representative 
                                                          
11 The form of the figure is borrowed from the ‘circuit of culture’ in Du Gay et al. (1997: 3).  
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examples. First, when the CITF was established in June 1997, it investigated six ‘generic 
issues’ of the creative industries: ‘skills and education, export promotion, access to 
finance, taxation and regulation, intellectual property rights and regional issues’. After 
finishing their examination, the DCMS published revised version of the CI Mapping 
Document (DCMS, 2001) that identified ‘a range of issues which impact on’ the growth 
potential of British CI. Secondly, as Tessa Jowell declared, the CEP (Creative Economy 
Programme) was launched in November 2005 in order to develop ‘the early Mapping 
Document work’ (The Work Foundation, 2007: 6). As a result, similar generic issues 
were once more examined, including ‘education and skills, infrastructure, competition 
and IP, access to finance and business support, diversity, technology, and evidence and 
analysis’. The main findings of the programme were published as a new strategy paper 
with an old title, that is, Creative Britain (DCMS, 2008). This paper also identified a 
group of issues to be addressed for promoting British CI more efficiently. Table 2.1 
shows that all the issues suggested by these two famous policy documents can be 
categorized under the five sub-policies.  
    
   Table 2.1 The Key Areas of the British CI Policy Framework 
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By comparing the two policy statements, one can understand not only that the five sub-
policies were indeed the core areas of the policy framework, but also that the 
framework developed by the CITF in the early days was maintained throughout the New 
Labour period. This section briefly sketches out each of these areas.  
  
(1) Creative Governance Policy  
 
As noted, introducing and promoting ‘creative industries’ helped the DCMS expand the 
boundaries and weight of the government’s cultural policy. By successfully holding up 
the creative industries as the way forward for the future of the country, the ‘smallest 
and newest department’ quickly gained power (O’Connor, 2007: 41). In addition to 
leading interdepartmental cooperation in promoting the new discourse of CI, the DCMS 
also made considerable efforts to establish quangos such as NESTA (1998), the UK Film 
Council (2000), and Creative & Cultural Skills (2004). This effort can be understood as a 
restructuring of the governance systems of the newly emerging CI sectors. If 
‘governance’ can be defined as the ‘broader means by which activities are coordinated 
beyond simple state regulation and control’ (Pratt, 2004: 124), the government efforts 
mentioned above may be labelled as creative governance policy, in that they were set 
up to realize governance within the newly conceptualised creative industries field; and 
therefore they should be conceived of a kind of novel and useful governance.  
 
Beyond building strategic partnerships between the government, quangos, and 
industries, the DCMS also sought to implement creative governance policy by collecting 
and providing more ‘robust and timely data’ on the sector, and thus keeping its 
promotion strategy ‘up-to-date’. Many themed reports, fact files and annual estimates 
were produced for this purpose. These efforts themselves should not be underestimated, 
even if the ‘evidence-based policy’, another buzz word distributed widely by New 
Labour, was not that successfully implemented (Oakley, 2004). 
 
(2) Creative Education Policy 
 
In accordance with creative governance policy, the revised perspective on creativity has 
led ‘creative education’ to be given top priority among governmental agendas. If the 
nation’s future fully depends on creativity, how can a government ensure that this 
creativity is realized to its highest potential? For Mr. Smith (1998: 145-146),  
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The role of creativity and culture teaching in the school system is vitally important, 
not only for the individual fulfilment of the pupils but for the equipping of society 
with the creative wealth-makers of tomorrow. … But education, and the part that 
creativity can play within it, does not stop at the walls of the school. For many, the 
role of the public library, or the local museum, in developing knowledge and cultural 
excitement is a vital element of continuing education. … Putting educational value 
into everything we do in support of the creative and cultural worlds is one of the 
most crucial parts of public policy. 
 
As seen in the quotation, creative education policy appears to focus on three main tasks. 
The first is to enhance the creativity of school children through formal education 
(curriculum); while the second is to turn the creative talent nurtured in schools into the 
wealth-generating producers of CI products. The final task is to connect people with the 
creative sector even after graduation through life-long education. The Creative 
Partnerships, SKillset (Sector Skills Council for Creative Media), Creative & Cultural 
Skills, NESTA, and so forth, have each played their own part in this policy area. Likewise, 
among many creative education policy reports published over the period, two deserve 
special mention as examples of how this theme was developed under the Labour 
government. These are All Our Futures, published in September 1999 by the National 
Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education (NACCCE), and Nurturing 
Creativity in Young People published by Paul Roberts in 2006. These reports not only 
suggested a clear framework for developing creativity among children and young people 
(in principle), but also envisaged a progression within this framework from the early 
years through mainstream education to pathways into the Creative Industries (in 
practice). 
 
(3) Creative Economy Policy  
 
The ‘Creative economy’ can be described as the systems of ‘production, exchange and 
consumption of goods and services’ that are related to the creative industries (Howkins, 
2001: ix). That is, what makes the wealth and job creation from the activities of 
generating and exploiting intellectual property so significant is the bright future of the 
creative economy as part of the greater weightless/smokeless ‘new economy’. Although 
the umbrella concept shifted from ‘creative industries’ to ‘creative economy’ in New 
Labour’s cultural policy over the second half of the 2000s (Schlesinger, 2009: 11-17; 
Cunningham, 2009b: 383), the latter concept had already been playing a pivotal role in 
establishing cultural and creative industries policy from the beginning.  
 
As an increasingly important part of the new hegemonic knowledge economy, the 
creative economy has provided both considerable opportunities and threats. The New 
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Labour Prime Ministers seemed to focus on stressing the bright side. For example, in 
Culture and Creativity in 2007, Blair argued that for the last 10 years Britain ‘ha[s] 
become the world’s creative hub’ by nurturing and having ‘the most innovative 
designers and architects, the most popular museums and galleries, the biggest art 
market, the greatest theatres’ (Blair, 2007). Gordon Brown also declared that ‘People 
across the globe’ have come to recognize ‘Britain as a hub of creative endeavour, 
innovation and excellence’ and are drawn to the strength of Britain’s ‘creative economy’ 
(Brown, 2008). However, at the same time such successes do not look too solid. For 
example, one of the most influential reports of New Labour’s creativity discourse, the 
Cox Review, was ‘triggered by concerns about how UK businesses can face up to the 
challenge of a world that is becoming vastly more competitive’ (Cox, 2005: 3). Another 
significant report, Creative Britain (DCMS, 2008), starts with Andy Burnham and other 
Ministers’ confirmation of the ambivalent situation, stating that  
 
[The rise of creative economy] presents a competitive advantage for Britain, but a 
major challenge too. Countries elsewhere in the world –both developed and fast-
developing– are competing ever more vigorously, looking to seize new opportunities. 
 
In this regard, British CI policymakers have, broadly speaking, devised two kinds of 
policy concerning the creative economy in order to better maximize the opportunities 
and minimize the threats: creative economy policy and creative business policy. While 
the former engages with the environment within which the economy can flourish, the 
latter concerns the aims to help the enterprises within the economy to survive and grow.   
 
As shown in the Table 2.1, ‘ensuring wider public awareness of the importance of 
intellectual property rights to longer-term creativity’ and ‘exploiting the opportunities 
presented by e-commerce and the Internet’ were key objectives of creative economy 
policy in 2001. Creative Britain (DCMS, 2008) reiterated the issues as follows: ‘fostering 
and protecting intellectual property’ and ‘supporting research and innovation’ in terms 
of technological development. The UK IPO (2007), the Technology Strategy Board (2007) 
and NESTA have been notable agents for these missions. There is no doubt that the key 
word in this policy area has been intellectual property; which links individual creativity 
and wealth and job creation. Put another way, in this British policy discourse, the 
newly-conceptualized creativity no longer operates within the territory of the 
traditional binary division between high/serious/fine and low/popular/applied arts, but 
instead works within the rapidly de-territorized and re-territorized realm of IPR which is 
hardly subject to any simplistic or hierarchical demarcation. This shift is surely indebted 
to the emerging significance of the creative economy.  
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(4) Creative Business Policy  
 
However, IPR and contents are produced by the private sector, i.e. creative businesses. 
Thus creative business policy was required to complete creative economy policy. This 
policy aimed to cover the various needs that creative enterprises have in practice. 
Among others, cultural SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) that had been 
regarded as ‘fragile’ or ‘under-capitalised’ became its main target (Leadbeater & 
Oakley, 1999). Many strategies emerged to address their problems, such as the lack of 
management skills, bargaining power and sources of finance. The necessity of ensuring 
their ‘access to appropriate financial support’ (DCMS, 2001) was particularly stressed. It 
was therefore a key mission of the DCMS to connect ‘small creative businesses and 
start-ups’ with the public sector ‘through the Art Council’s investment programmes and 
the work of other funders and NDPBs such as the UK Film Council, Museums, Libraries 
and Archives Council, RDAs and local authorities among others’(DCMS, 2008: 48). 
Encouraging bids for Enterprise Capital Funds from the creative industries was another 
effort to increase the availability of finance to the sector.  
 
Of course, offering help with financing was not the sole concern of creative business 
policy. For example, providing the traditional arts sector with the ‘business skills’ 
necessary for exploiting its commercial potential was one of the core objectives of Arts 
Council England, while the establishment of a ‘network of business support’ for CI at 
the regional level became a key issue for the Regional Development Agencies (ibid.: 42-
45). These policy efforts correspond to the emphasis in CIMP 2001 placed on the 
importance of ‘recognising the interlocking relationship and synergies between the 
subsidised and commercial creative sectors, between the creative industries and 
broader cultural sectors, and promoting the UK’s diverse vibrant cultural life’ (DCMS, 
2001: 14). 
 
(5) Creative City Policy  
 
As noted earlier, in this policy scheme creative cities have been regarded to be very 
important for two reasons. The first reason is that cities are the main centres of IPR 
production and consumption, and are hence the first places where the diverse benefits 
of the creative industries and the creative economy should be developed and exhibited. 
The first aspect here, that of developing the creative capacity in the city, was stressed 
by the policymakers in terms of ‘supporting creative clusters’. The idea of a ‘creative 
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cluster’ was promoted as a means of bringing coherence to public investment in the 
local creative economies, of developing the necessary infrastructures for specialist 
labour and supply networks in different regions, and thus, of stimulating creative 
businesses to compete closely and co-operate with each other to enhance productivity 
(DCMS, 2008: 56-62). The key agents responsible for achieving this were the Regional 
Development Agencies and the Local Government Association on the one hand, and the 
UK Film Council, British Arts Councils and the Arts and Humanities Research Council on 
the other.   
 
While a strong emphasis was placed on developing urban capacity for creativity, what of 
the second aspect mentioned above, exhibiting the benefits derived from the creative 
economy? Given the level of publicly funded expenditure on the creative industries and 
the creative economy, it was necessary to demonstrate the fruits of this investment not 
only within the sector, but also to society as a whole. What then are the universal 
benefits that derive from nurturing the emerging creative industries? The policymakers 
noted ‘the regeneration of whole areas’ (Smith, 1998: 131-136). According to Smith, the 
best way of getting social regeneration off the ground in any neighbourhood or town 
must be to start from ‘cultural regeneration’, since it can contribute to social cohesion, 
environmental renewal, health promotion, creative organizational planning, and so 
forth. In short, the wealth and jobs created by the creative businesses within the 
creative clusters of creative cities are particularly important owing to their potential as 
a means of not only physical and economic, but also social and cultural regeneration in 
their regions.  
 
There are many examples which confirm the essential position of ‘creative cities’ in the 
British CI policy discourse. Among others, the policy documents such as Creative 
Industries: The Regional Dimension (DCMS, 2000), Culture at the Heart of Regeneration 
(DCMS, 2004) and Culture and Creativity in 2007 (DCMS, 2007) are noteworthy. It should 
be also mentioned that this interest in regional creative economies always goes hand in 
hand with interest in the national creative economy. Methods of checking the decline in 
specific cities were a core issue to be addressed in the cultural industries policies of the 
GLC and other metropolitan regions since the early 1980s. Labour-friendly think tanks 
were an active player in this process, and thus the New Labour policymakers had been 
exposed with this policy scheme very much from their opposition period (Frith, 1999). 
Therefore, when they came into power, New Labour policymakers finally had an 
opportunity to combine the (familiar) city-level policies with broader nation-level ones 
featuring the key words such as cluster, hub, re-branding and regeneration. 
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2.3 Criticisms of the Emergent Creative Industries Policy  
 
So far I have discussed how the term ‘creative industries’ emerged as the master 
concept underpinning British CI policy, and I have detailed the policy framework that 
actually emerged in implementing the new initiative. The aim of this section is to 
examine the criticisms raised against the emergent CI policy and thus to critically 
evaluate the performance of the policy discourse and practice. In doing so, it is useful 
to group the criticisms into two categories: overall criticisms and specific criticisms. 
The former concern broadly the limitations and side effects found in the process of 
formulating and implementing the policy, while the latter engage directly in the five 
policy areas discussed above.  
 
 
2.3.1 The Overall Criticisms  
 
   Table 2.2 The Overall Criticisms of British CI Policy 
 
 
As shown in the table above, on the level of overall criticisms, three major arguments 
have been repeatedly raised by critics of the creative industries discourse. First of all, 
the accuracy and validity of the key concepts in the discourse have been called into 
question. It can be fairly argued that the CI policy was essentially a strategic discourse 
concerning the dialectics between the ‘new economy’ as the prime external force and 
‘creativity’ as the prime internal capability. Consequently, these two concepts have 
been heavily criticized.  
 
According to Garnham (2005), who once led the rise of ‘cultural industries’ in the 
political economy school, it is the connection to the new economy that is at the heart 
of the problems of the DCMS strategy. This is to say that following in Daniel Bell’s 
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footsteps, the policy discourse commits the fallacy of ‘naïve pluralism’, an example of 
which would be ‘democratisation without politicisation’ (O’Connor, 2009: 400). Kate 
Oakley (2004), who was once a consultant for the government on developing CI policy, 
also believes that the most problematic aspect of the discourse must be the belief that 
Britain’s economic future lay with the move towards the new economy. Therefore, she 
calls for dismissing the prevalent rhetoric that ‘the business cycle had been superseded’. 
In short, the concept of the new economy has been charged with being ‘technological 
futurism’ (Miller, 2004) or ‘determinism’ (Pratt, 2004), and thus the CI discourse 
appears to represent a suspiciously sharp break with the old economy, which provokes 
over-inflated expectations.  
 
Likewise, the equally central concept of ‘creativity’ has been seriously questioned. 
Reading any DCMS report on CI, it might be easy to fall into the fantasy that the 
‘inevitable and all embracing’ (Pratt, 2004: 120) creativity could save any individual, 
community or country in need. However, in practice ‘creativity is difficult’ (Bilton, 2007: 
xiii). In addition, there is little evidence that cultural creativity is the same as other 
types of creativity, scientific creativity for example, in its origin and mechanisms 
(Gardner, 1993). Without admitting these conditions, policymakers have overused the 
concept of creativity at the cost of the emptying out of any real meaning. As a result, 
the democratized and rationalized version of creativity seems to have been reified into 
a sort of magic recipe which presents an omnipotent and omnipresent solution for any 
kind of problem. Such an overstatement of creativity can be thus criticized not only for 
being tautological, but also for failing to reflect the complexities and complications of 
reality (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Thus the assumption that creativity has the 
potential to serve as a handy basis for either social or economic policy sounds 
unrealistic. 
 
Secondly, many have also raised criticisms of the foundational definition of CI by the 
CITF. They might be grouped into three basic types: criticisms about the breadth, depth 
and colour of the definition. First, it can be argued that the CITF’s definition is clear, 
but not distinct. Although it suggests what creative industries are and what they are for; 
the definition explains nothing about where the boundary between the industries and 
others should be drawn, nor about the grounds on which they should be distinguished. 
As a result, the term appears to be of little analytical value in that any industry, person 
or activity that involves creativity would necessarily be ‘creative’ (Pratt, 2005; 
Galloway & Dunlop, 2007). Indeed, it is the flexibility of the definition that could be its 
downfall. For instance, the identification of the 13 sub-sectors of CI appears quite 
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arbitrary and incoherent. Many researchers have attempted to suggest alternative 
models of the scope of CI to address this limitation, with the most recognized effort 
being Throsby’s ‘concentric circles model’ (2008a; 2008b).  
 
In addition to the breadth, the ‘depth’ of the definition is not satisfactory 
(Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005: 6). Here, depth refers to the whole system of ‘cultural 
production chain’ or ‘circuit’ including content origination, exchange, reproduction, 
manufacturing input, education and critique, and archiving (Pratt, 2005: 34). The 
definition of ‘creative industries’ does stress, somewhat paradoxically, an artist-centred, 
supply-side cultural support policy, abandoning the strong focus of ‘cultural industries’ 
on distribution and consumption (Garnham, 2005). In this light, it can be suggested that 
the DCMS definition does not merely oversimplify the ‘complex structure’ of the CI field, 
but also leaves out key matters such as ‘employment and remuneration arrangements’ 
(O’Connor, 2007: 43-44). As a result, it seems that the DCMS has been confused about 
the difference between promoting creative entrepreneurialism in principle, and 
formulating a sufficient industrial strategy in practice.  
 
The colour of the definition is somewhat unnatural as well. In essence, the definition 
sought to represent and stimulate the linking of culture and creativity with the economy 
and industry. However, as the CITF’s initial raison d'être suggests, this definition fails to 
strike the balance between the two entities. To be more concise, it is hardly a cultural 
definition, but rather an economic one. This is principally due to the fact that it 
purposely ignores the traditional functions of culture or the cultural industries, such as 
generating ‘symbolic meaning’ and providing ‘public goods’ (Galloway & Dunlop, 2007). 
Consequently, while it represents the bright future and/or infinite potential of the new 
economy which some of the creative industries might enjoy, it conceals,  on the other 
hand, the grim reality of ‘market failure’ which is still very much present in the 
traditional ‘arts’ sector.  
 
Despite all the conceptual and definitional weaknesses, the term and its related policies 
have gained wide currency over the last decade. Bound up with the plausible rhetoric of 
the new economy and creativity, the DCMS succeeded in raising the profile of CI sectors 
considerably. As noted earlier, this transformation of CI from an ignored add-on sector 
to a highly appreciated strategic sector was also strongly affected by post-modern 
‘aestheticization’ (Lash & Urry, 1994: 4), which comprises the proliferation of 
immaterial aesthetic contents and the increased importance of the aesthetic 
component in other kinds of goods and services. Therefore, it is understandable that the 
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policymakers tried to exploit this marked tendency of post-organization by uplifting the 
status of creative industries discourse and promoting it. However, critics have noted 
that the rapid escalation of CI was predicated on the basis of data which was collected 
and defined unsoundly (cf. Cunningham, 2009b: 383).  
 
The first problem relates to the inaccuracy of the statistics used to stress the 
importance of the newly defined CI. Even if the DCMS collected data on market size, 
exports, and employment levels in each sector within CI, the resulting figures were 
nothing but ‘tentative calculations’ (Frith, 1999). Therefore, it can be said that the 
economic mapping of CI is not that solid because it depends on ‘secondary data’ from 
‘questionable sources’ that was collected over differing periods of time with ‘unrelated 
methodologies’ (Roodhouse, 2006, see also Selwood, 2002). Then, how can one measure 
the more subtle impacts it was assumed that CI would have, such as social cohesion and 
inclusion?  
 
Secondly, manipulation of evidence is worse than inaccuracy, and there is widely spread 
allegation that the DCMS included fast growing sub-sectors that were hardly connected 
with CI in its data in order to catch the eye of policymakers in other government 
departments. If this was the case, the policymakers cannot avoid the criticism that ‘by 
including all forms of software production’ the government circulated statistics which 
‘artificially inflated their figures’ (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005: 9).  
 
In addition to the origins of evidence, many have noted the negative impact caused by 
the success of such unsupported rhetoric. Put another way, these inaccurate and 
inflated numbers have served to ‘mask’ real problems such as insecure working 
conditions in the CI sector (Oakley, 2004: 69). Thus the idealization or romanticization 
of the creative industries and the creative class was costly, not least because the 
various tensions, dilemmas or contradictions present in the sector were buried beneath 
the glittering surface, making it increasingly hard to address them. In this light, it can 
be argued that the evidence-based policy the DCMS often claimed to be pursuing was 
nothing short of an image-based policy.  
 
 
2.3.2 The Specific Criticisms  
 
I have discussed the conceptual, definitional and evidential problems that arose during 
the course of CI policy development. However, there are also criticisms which stem 
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from the overall criticisms, but that correspond more directly to the five specific areas 
of the policy framework. The critique of ‘creative governance’ seems to be the best 
starting point.  
    
   Table 2.3 The Specific Criticisms of British CI Policy 
 
 
After examining the ‘self-referential’ aspect of key reports in the CI policy development, 
Schlesinger (2007) notes that the elaboration and refinement of the policy discourse 
have been ‘conducted within the tent’ of a few adherents. In an article on the role of 
expertise in the public debate on the creative industries (Schlesinger, 2009), he further 
argues that the ‘tent’ was made of a ‘New Labour policy generation’ strongly shaped by 
its origins in a few think tanks such as DEMOS and IPPR. With the case of establishing 
the Creative Economy Programme and publishing Creative Britain, he aptly shows that 
despite their similar origin and orientation, these adherents could not enable the DCMS 
to avoid a number of conflicts with its quangos or with other departments. In short, the 
governance over the newly conceptualized creative industries was neither open nor 
diverse, driving the DCMS to depend heavily on some preferred suppliers of ideas and 
evidence, and thus to become less and less creative. 
 
Creative education policy which directly engages with the issue of how to enhance 
individual creativity has also been questioned. As noted, the policymakers appear to 
have the fantasy of omnipresent and all-embracing creativity, neglecting the 
difficultness inherent in nurturing, managing or instrumentalizing it. Therefore, in spite 
of some fresh approaches developed and implemented by, for example, Creative 
Partnerships 12  and NESTA, there exists little evidence that those policy efforts 
                                                          
12 For example, according to Creative Partnerships’ own report (2007: 3), up to then Creative Partnerships had worked 
with 575,000 young people and 70,000 teachers, employing over 4,800 creative practitioners and cultural organizations 
with the expenditure of more than £100 million.  
56 
 
contributed to the enhancement of the individual creativity of the British public. 
Technically speaking, it seems almost impossible from the beginning to measure ‘one-
kind-fits-all’ creativity. It is thus not surprising the British policymakers embraced an 
alternative, but still abstract, objective of creative education policy, namely, the 
transformation of all non-professional people into a ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2000). 
However, can it become a universal objective for a person to belong to the ‘grand 
middle-class melting pot of corporate multi-culturalism’ (Miller, 2004)? It seems not 
only infeasible, but perhaps also undesirable (cf. Peck, 2005). 
 
Critics also cast doubt on the background and impact of creative economy policy. 
Garnham (2005: 19) argues that the rise of intellectual property as the prime object to 
be protected and/or fostered was combined with the project to create a more stable 
market for cultural goods by diluting their ‘inherent public goods features’. Within the 
creative economy as part of the broader new economy, the traditional cultural sector, 
roughly bound with the Information and Communication Technology, has been forced to 
pursue the imperative of marketization. According to McGuigan (2003; 2005), such 
marketization is the inevitable result of combining neo-liberalism with technological 
determinism, which can be summarized as the ‘corporate violation of public culture’. 
The price is very expensive; creativity and culture ceased to be an ‘end’ in any sense, 
but fully became a ‘means’ to other ends.  Before investing huge sums funded by the 
tax-payer on R&D in cutting-edge technologies for the protection and promotion of the 
creative economy this erosion of public policy and its cultural rationale should have 
been addressed.  
 
When it comes to creative business policy, the gap between policy performance and its 
original objectives appears to be very wide. Above all, helping small businesses was 
particularly stressed in terms of addressing the ‘missing middle’ between SMEs and 
MNCs (Multi-National Corporations) (Leadbeater & Oakley, 1999). However, Oakley 
(2009) observes that over the previous decade the various publicly funded support 
interventions made by the DCMS ‘were not so different from those which could have 
been pursued under a cultural industries framework’. That is, creative business policy 
could not fill the missing middle. Another key object of the policy was to stimulate 
‘synergies between the subsidised and commercial creative sectors’ (DCMS, 2001). 
However, strong claims have been made that this was never actualized. It is often 
argued instead that the fad of ‘creativity and innovation’ that followed the creative 
industries caused the instrumentalization of cultural policy and thus the ‘extinction’ of 
the cultural sector (Belfiore, 2002) or the ‘disappearance’ of the arts (Oakley, 2009).  
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The last area under investigation is creative city policy, which was widely received by 
British local and regional authorities. The central and local governments implemented 
the ‘flagship’ project policy enthusiastically, in the hope that it would manifest its 
posited three key impacts, namely, the project as a development in its own right, the 
project as a marshalling point for further investment, and the project as an efficient 
marketing tool for the city (Smyth, 1994). However, these prestige projects which 
revolved around the establishment of cultural buildings, quarters or even districts could 
not always deliver their expected objectives. Even if ‘best practices’ were diligently 
collected and advertised by the DCMS, there were also huge blows, including the 
Millennium Dome in London (cf. McGuigan, 2003) and the National Centre for Popular 
Music in Sheffield (cf. Moss, 2002). These cases reveal dramatically the reality that 
flagship cultural projects could significantly damage not only the economic conditions 
but the citizens’ ‘morale in a very public way’ (ibid.: 218). In addition, the marshalling 
and marketing roles of these projects were problematic. The former, which was 
predicated on the assumption that citywide trickle-down benefits would accrue often 
failed to materialize (Evans, 2007), despite the fact that such benefits were frequently 
cited as justification for large public subsidies. Similarly, the marketing role often failed 
for the reason that as soon as the same strategic option is adopted in every city across 
the land, flagship cultural projects can be expected to lose their capacity to imbue the 
city with vivid entrepreneurialism, and become an obstacle to the creation of any 
impressive or distinct local identity. That is, the policymakers’ vision of building 
creative clusters, cities and thus nation may be criticized as being a ‘cookie-cutter’ 
approach without regard for the specifics of place (Oakley, 2004). More fundamentally, 
the vision is problematic, not least because in this radically liberalized and globalized 
setting it never guaranteed that ‘policies designed to boost cultural industries also 
boost the national interest’ (Frith, 1999: 5).  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined how the concept of the creative industries arrived in the UK 
cultural policy arena, what policy framework the concept lead to in driving a radical 
shift in CI policy, and what kinds of criticisms have been raised against the process and 
the framework. I first focused on the terminological shift from the Culture industry 
(Frankfurt School) via the cultural industries (GLC) toward the creative industries (CITF). 
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While ‘Culture industry’ was coined in the 1940s to censure the re-marriage of culture 
and industry, ‘creative industries’ was coined in the late 1990s to promote the re-
marriage not only between culture and industry, but also between the arts, the cultural 
industries and even ICT. What the DCMS attempted to achieve with this new concept 
was the promotion of the discourse of creativity and creative industries in parallel with 
the emergent new economy under the ultimate cause of Cool Britannia or Creative 
Britain.  
 
As noted, this was part of New Labour’s efforts to realize the Third Way in the cultural 
policy arena and to move beyond Old Labour’s egalitarianism and the Conservative’s 
neo-liberalism. There is no doubt that the policymakers were eager to equally stress 
‘access’ and ‘education’ along with ‘excellence’ and ‘creative economy’ (Smith, 1998: 
142). Indeed, the hallmark of New Labour and its Third Way was the ‘integration of 
social and economic policies’ (Aitchison & Evans, 2003: 136). Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to deny what made ‘creative industries’ nationally and internationally fashionable was 
the stress on the latter rather than the former. The British discourse of the creative 
industries was readily adopted and benchmarked by foreign policymakers owing to the 
functional resonance it offered between cultural restructuring and the rise of the new 
economy or, more broadly, post-industrialization. This restructuring can be said to be 
‘neo-liberal’ on the grounds that it not only followed but also accelerated the 
overriding direction of the convergence between culture and the economy first 
formulated under the Thatcher government. However, it is an oversimplification to say 
that Blair was ‘Thatcher in trousers’ (Hobsbawm, 2000: 107). If the term ‘neo-liberal’ 
needs to be used, New Labour would be better understood as a ‘left neo-liberal 
government’ rather than an orthodox or extreme one. Indeed, that is exactly the term 
that Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-08) cautiously used to describe his own 
government’s pursuance of the Third Way (Roh, 2009; Oh, 2009). As will be shown later, 
this eclectic aspect of New Labour played an important part when this discourse of 
creativity was transferred to Korea. And it is highly probable that this eclecticism 
accounts for much of the borderless popularity of the British discourse from Canada and 
New Zealand to China and Russia.    
 
I also explored the policy framework that this policy shift ushered in. As the 
foundational definition of ‘creative industries’ clearly presents, the policy framework 
was constructed around three key concepts; individual creativity, intellectual property, 
and wealth and job creation. In close relation to these concepts, five major areas of 
British CI policy emerged; creative governance policy, creative education policy, 
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creative economy policy, creative business policy, and creative city policy. At the core 
of the framework lies a narrative in which the democratized and rationalized version of 
‘creativity’ was enshrined as the prime source of British competitiveness under the 
overwhelming trends of the ‘new economy’.  
 
Creative education policy aimed to nurture this creativity not only in formal schools, 
but also in each and every sector of the society. As the currency of the new economy, 
‘intellectual property’ was understood to bridge the potential of creativity into the real 
benefit of wealth and job creation. Creative economy policy in a narrow sense was 
devised to protect and promote this new currency, and thereby to guarantee a more 
stable structure and wider opportunities to expand the creative industries or activities. 
Besides, the policymakers clearly understood that the creation of IPR and, further, 
wealth and jobs, could not be achieved by the government, but rather by creative 
businesses. Accordingly, creative business policy was developed and implemented to 
help businesses grow in the right direction so as to increase their chances of accessing 
the requisite information, advice and, above all, funds. Support for the creative 
enterprises at the local and regional levels was then expected to result in the mutual 
development of the enterprises and their cities, not just as a result of the wealth and 
job created there, but also through other externalities such as increased educational 
opportunities, social cohesion, city branding, and tourist/investment attraction. In 
implementing this strategy, flagship projects (in terms of buildings, complex, districts 
or events) were preferred in accordance with the logic of the ‘creative cluster’. The 
final part of the framework was creative governance policy, which sought to ensure 
updated governance over the newly emerging CI policy field; and my discussion of it 
concludes my examination of the comprehensive structure and mechanism of the New 
Labour policy framework for the creative industries.   
 
However, at the same time, it should be noted that this new policy framework was 
undoubtedly a political construct which inevitably accompanied many limitations not 
only in origins but also in impact. It was invented around the new millennium as part of 
the broader project of Cool Britannia. Changing clothes from ‘Cool Britannia’ to 
‘World’s Creative hub’, this political project was the object of unceasing promotion 
throughout the New Labour period. This is why the religious metaphors for the CI policy 
promotion appear fairly plausible, such as ‘beaming smile and shared hymnbook’ (Frith, 
1999), ‘missionary zeal’ (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005) and ‘Hallelujah Chorus of self-
sustaining approbation’ (Schlesinger, 2009). In the last section I examined how this 
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aspect of politicization or dogmatization affected the formulation and implementation 
of the policy framework.  
 
The criticisms of the ‘creative industries’ and related concepts were examined in detail 
under the categories of overall and specific criticisms. While the overall criticisms 
focused on the conceptual, definitional and evidential shortcomings of the policy 
practices, the specific criticisms engaged with the limitations of implementing the five 
policy areas within the policy framework. They are both valid and timely. In correcting 
mistakes and minimizing side effects resulting from the radical pursuit of a whole new 
kind of policy paradigm, the critical points raised need to be sincerely accepted and 
reflected on in relation to the overarching policy direction and to every area of the 
policy. Taking into consideration the change in government from Labour to the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition in May 2010, this can be said again far louder. 
In this reflection process, what needs to be addressed most urgently is the ‘inherent 
tension’ between economic, social and cultural goals and the policymakers’ passivity or 
cunningness to ‘bury such tensions’ under the bright rhetoric of ‘creativity’ (Oakley, 
2006: 206).  
 
This is, however, not to nullify the significance of the British cultural policy shift since 
1997. As Pratt puts it (2005: 33), the Mapping Documents and the ensuing policy 
experiments ‘cannot be overestimated’, since British cultural policy might have 
continued to be identified with ‘the arts lobby’ and have been neglected by the 
Treasury and other governmental departments without them. Whereas traditional 
central government cultural policy had focused on grant-giving to subsidized institutions 
for the creative (visual and performance) arts (Leadbeater & Oakley, 1999), this new 
policy of creative industries brought to light the need for a paradigm shift in cultural 
policy toward nurturing the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of individuals’ 
creativity, the self-sustainability of the businesses and the regeneration of the cities.13 
In this regard, despite growing criticism against the policy shift, the initiative may be 
viewed as an effort to ensure the long-term sustainability of the cultural sector in the 
age of ‘post-organized capitalism’. To gain economic respect for the sector was not the 
end of the policy, but should rather be considered as the core process necessary to 
secure the competitiveness of the sector. It is not yet clear whether the creative 
industries policy will become a kind of ‘Trojan horse’ or not in the realm of cultural 
                                                          
13 According to a governmental report (DCMS, 2010), in parallel with the paradigm shift in the policy arena, British 
creative industries grew by an average of 5% per annum between 1997 and 2007 (cf. an average of 3% for the whole of 
the economy) and creative employment increased by an average growth rate of 2% per annum from 1.6m in 1997 to 
nearly 2m in 2008 (cf. 1% for the whole of the economy).  
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practice (Cunningham, 2009b). But what can be said is that, while it is vital to recognize 
the limitations of the government-driven CI policy shift, it is equally important to 
understand how the shift was deeply structured by chronic problems in the cultural 
sectors as much as by the global politico-economic conditions.  
 
To conclude, this chapter will function as a reference point for examining the Korean CI 
policy shift that happened in parallel with the British one in terms of both period and 
direction. It is clear that the British policy shift experience was noted by Korean 
policymakers and used as the object of active benchmarking, as it was in many other 
countries. Bound up with the overarching political project of the Third Way, this new 
understanding of CI came to play an important role in the Korean cultural policy arena. 
Therefore, without having a solid understanding of the British experience, it is difficult 
to understand why and how the Korean policymakers were able to drive the policy shift 
so confidently. Secondly, in examining the British case three categories were mobilized: 
the process of the policy shift, the policy framework that was its product, and the 
evaluation of its performance. These categories will be applied to analyze the Korean 
case of CI policy shift, in order to enable the two cases to be contrasted more closely 
and the commonalities and disparities between them to be presented more clearly. 
Before examining the Korean case in minute detail, however, it is essential to acquire 
intimate knowledge of the unique institutional context of Korean policy making. This is 
the theme I shall now turn to. 
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3. Putting Korean Policy Making in Its Place  
  
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have pursued a particular 
approach to capitalism, one in which the government is not 
driven by presumptions about the desirability of competition 
as a device to improve choice and lower prices for domestic 
consumers. Instead, the three Asian countries have created a 
capitalism with few national political guarantees for organized 
labor, little impetus toward the social welfare state, high 
degrees of mercantilism, limited penetration by foreign 
investment, and few of the problems associated with 
neocorporatist European planning or extensive public 
entitlements. They have also generated capitalisms that [have] 
been exceptionally dependent on access to the U.S. market. 
(Pempel, 1999a: 179) 
 
 
This chapter aims to set out the historical context of Korean policy making. As discussed 
in chapter one, given the completely different set of cultural, political and economic 
conditions that Korea had to deal with, it pursued quite a different path toward 
industrialization than that pursued by Britain. Along with Japan and Taiwan, Korea 
achieved miraculous growth performance during the post-Second World War period 
under the guidance of ‘the developmental state’. From the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
onwards, however, the Korean political economy started to break away rapidly from the 
influences of the developmental state.  
 
To clarify what the ‘state’ means in this context: it refers to the ‘continuous 
administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive system that is capable of restructuring 
its relations to social groups, as well as relations among those groups’ (Woo-Cumings, 
1996: 326). Strong states can be distinguished from the weaker ones according to how 
easily and/or comprehensively they can alter these structural relations. With the 
conviction that ‘economic development requires a state which can create and regulate 
[the] economic and political relationships that can support sustained industrialization’ 
(Chang, 1999: 183), the developmental states sought to be strong enough to direct 
fundamental structural changes, as well as to impose a whole new economic vision.  
 
As the quotation that starts this chapter suggests, there are at least three categories to 
which attention should be paid in order to understand the characteristics of East Asian 
developmental states. These are the ideological position, institutional intervention and 
international articulation. First, the East Asian developmental state pursued the third 
position between the ‘laissez-faire capitalist mode’ of Britain and the US and the 
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‘dirigiste mode’ of the Soviet Union (Pempel, 1999a: 161) to implement the structural 
changes required for rapid industrialization, while replacing the previous mode of the 
agrarian predatory state. In making the position a reality the states had to introduce 
many ‘institutions’, either adapted from developed countries or invented by themselves, 
to achieve strong control over both industrial mobilization and societal integration 
(Chang, 1999; Cho, 2000). A particular international context enabled this institutional 
intervention in the domestic field to work; and this context can be summarized as the 
favourable relationship with the US throughout the Cold War (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 21-
24). Without understanding how the Korean developmental state made its choices in all 
these categories, one cannot fully understand any kind of policy development in Korea, 
not only in the past but also in the present.  
 
Therefore, this chapter begins by describing these three features of the East Asian 
developmental state in detail. Japan, Korea and Taiwan will serve as the main case 
studies, and their common features, all distinguishable from the experiences of other 
industrialized and industrializing countries, will be unravelled. Following that, the 
modern history of Korea will be explored so as to understand how the general mode of 
the developmental state was realized in post-independence Korea. Although the general 
characteristics of the developmental state were evident in all three countries, each 
country embodied them differently in practice due to particular historical and cultural 
conditions. With the four-stage periodization of modern Korea (see table 1.1), I shall 
seek to delineate how the Korean developmental state arose, evolved and finally 
changed into something else, namely, the neo-developmental state.  
 
Ultimately, the historical development of Korean cultural policy will be traced. 
Particular attention will be paid to the cultural policy of the transition period between 
the Korean developmental and neo-developmental states in order to establish the pre-
conditions for the ‘Korean CI policy shift’ that is the main subject of this thesis. Since 
Korean cultural policy was born during the growth period (i.e. the peak of Korean 
developmental state), the cultural policy of the time was not only subjected to the 
government’s industrial policy, but also modelled on it.  Examining the landmark events 
and major features of cultural (industries) policy during the 1980s and 1990s can reveal 
how developmental cultural policy gradually changed under the three governments of 
the transition period. This will allow me to define the core issues of Korean CI policy as 
they stood before the rise of the Korean neo-developmental state. 
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3.1 The Features of the Developmental State  
 
Like ‘Janus’, modern states have ‘two faces’: one looking inward and the other turning 
outward (Pempel, 1999a: 147). If the ideological/theoretical position of the 
developmental state can be considered to be its head, then the institutional 
intervention into domestic society and the mediation between internal fields and 
international hegemonic blocs would be the two faces. This exploration starts with the 
head.  
 
 
3.1.1 The Ideological Position of the Developmental State  
 
As Chalmers Johnson (1982) notes, the East Asian developmental states stood between 
‘plan-ideological’ states and ‘market-rational’ states. Rejecting both Stalinist ‘state 
socialism’ and the Anglo-Saxon ‘regulatory state’, they sought to formulate ‘governed 
markets’ (Wade, 1990). This distinctive position on the relationship between the state 
and the market is the essence of the East Asian developmental state. What, then, 
emerged from this position? Instead of rigidly adhering to particular scholarly 
conventions or policy orthodoxies, these countries came to pragmatically adopt 
strategies and tactics from seemingly opposing perspectives, thus making ‘eclecticism’ 
into the hallmark of their ‘economic miracles’ (Chan et al., 1998: 3). This is not to say, 
nevertheless, that it is impossible to trace the origin of the developmental state.  
 
As stated earlier, this model is the third world variant of the ‘national industrial state’, 
which emerged during the second stage of world industrialization led by Germany and 
the US. Indeed, there was a significant link between Japan and Germany (then, Prussia), 
which needs to be pointed out. As Bruce Cumings (1999) shows in an article on the 
‘genealogy’ of the developmental state, German history from the 1840s to the 1880s 
furnished Japan with a fantastic model to ‘copy’. First of all, in theoretical terms, 
rather than Adam Smith it was Friedrich List, the leading German economist who 
developed the ‘National [Innovation] System’ that inspired the Japanese designers of 
the state in the late 19th century. List’s system teaches the logic of how a late-
developing industrial country should protect its markets and nascent industries from 
advanced industrial powers. In a similar vein, Japan found it useful to adopt many 
German institutions for their state building project. For example, Ito Hirobumi, a key 
member of the Meiji Reformation, studied at University College London in the 1860s, 
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and visited many European countries to learn how to build a modern state. However, it 
was after visiting Germany that he declared, ‘I understand the secret of the state, now I 
can die a happy man’ (Halliday, 1975: cited in Cumings, 1999). It is thus not surprising 
that he modelled the Japanese constitution and much else very closely upon the 
Prussian example. It is also important to note here that Ito became the first Governor-
General of Korea as a Japanese protectorate in 1905. After the forced annexation of 
Korea in 1910, the Governor-General’s power became ‘near absolute’ in Korea (Kohli, 
1999). With this power, Ito and his successors introduced the highly efficient Prussian-
Japanese state system and growth model into Korea, while exploiting the country 
ruthlessly for the benefit of Japan.  
 
In this way the East Asian developmental state became a variant of the European 
continental tradition by appropriating Prussian ‘Staatswissenschaften’ or ‘state science’ 
(Cumings, 1999: 87). In both regions the key issue was late-industrialization and thus 
catch-up. Then, what is the difference between them? East Asian countries were much 
later than Germany: as the agents of ‘late-late development’ (Woo, 1991: 5) they faced 
a much bigger gap compared to the advanced economies and therefore needed much 
faster industrialization. The major ideology used to ensure this objective was economic 
nationalism, which not only set ‘economic development’ as the state’s first priority, but 
also used the cause as the magic key to achieve all kinds of national agendas including 
‘overcoming the depression’, ‘war preparation and war fighting’, ‘post-war 
reconstruction’ and ‘independence from the US’ (Johnson, 1982). That is, actively 
promoting the ‘bonds of nationhood’ that drew on fairly homogeneous ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds sustained for hundreds (if not thousands) of years, the East Asian 
states could easily persuade their societies to share and pursue the all-encompassing 
goal of economic development as an inevitable means for national survival (Pempel, 
1999a: 168-169). By conceptualizing catching up and then competing with mighty 
Western countries as a matter of national survival, these states could successfully 
justify or mystify ‘their commitment to production-enhancing, growth-oriented 
priorities’ (Weiss, 2003: 247). 
 
There is another key mechanism that the states employed to achieve individual 
penetration at the ideological level: war-time emergency. From 1931 to 1945, Japan 
initiated the Pacific War, using Korea and Taiwan as its major military supply bases. As 
Johnson (1999) argues, Japan’s rapid growth started in preparing for these wars and the 
Japanese state mobilized its economy for war, but never demobilized it during peace 
time. This story of war-time mobilization can be also applied to Korea and Taiwan. 
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After their liberation from Japan, the two nations each went through severe wars and 
remain technically in a state of civil war up to now. Combined with the economic 
nationalism, this version of militarism created a sense of constant emergency in each of 
these countries that harnessed not only the economy, but the whole society under the 
central, unitary and strong control of the state.  
 
However, this strong control was far from plan-irrational or plan-ideological statism. 
The difference was made by the ‘existence of a small, inexpensive, but elite state 
bureaucracy’ staffed by the best and brightest in each society (Johnson, 1982: 314-315). 
Since Johnson identified this bureaucracy as the first and foremost element of the East 
Asian growth model, many scholars have focused on the role of bureaucrats in the 
countries’ industrialization. Several points need to be made here.  
 
Above all, it should be noted that ‘Korean, Japanese, and Chinese society had long 
experience with “civil government” in the form of Confucian statecraft and 
bureaucracies full of scholar-officials and their assorted underlings’ (Cumings, 1999: 87). 
The Prussian model was, then, not the sole source of their bureaucratic structures and 
cultures. Secondly, as the ultimate agent responsible for formulating and implementing 
the catch-up plans, the bureaucrats were at the centre of the state machine, making 
the administration considerably more prominent in the process of industrialization than 
the legislature or the judiciary (Hahm & Plein, 1998: 96). It is particularly important to 
acknowledge the role of the ‘relatively insulated pilot agencies [that were] in charge of 
that transformative project’ including the MITI (Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) in Japan and the EPB (Economic Planning Board) in Korea (Weiss, 2003: 247). 
Finally, these state bureaucracies can be characterized by what Peter Evans (1995) has 
called ‘embedded autonomy’; the bureaucrats enjoyed disproportionately high levels of 
autonomy and power so that they could direct changes in the national economic 
structure and social fabric. With such power, what prevented these autonomous and 
powerful bureaucrats from pillaging their own societies? It was their horizontal networks 
and functional links with society, namely, their social embeddedness. Put another way, 
this link between the state elites and important industrial forces, such as big businesses 
and the industrial classes, enabled the bureaucratized states to achieve their goals of 
structural transformation smoothly. For Evans, this is the key variable that distinguishes 
East Asian developmental states, including ‘Korea’, from African predatory states such 
as ‘Zaire’ (Evans, 1995: 45-47). 
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3.1.2 The Institutional Intervention to Domestic Society  
 
Having explained the developmental state’s ideological position (i.e. the head of Janus), 
I shall now move on to an examination of the two faces. The inner looking face of the 
developmental state is its comprehensive and coercive institutional interventions into 
domestic society. To recap, the bureaucratized state not only employed the brightest 
talent in each country, but also enjoyed an embedded autonomy that was highly 
effective in leading social transformation. In order to launch and manage these 
structural changes, the state first needed to secure its leadership or directorship. 
Indeed, the developmental states used strong ideological tools such as militarism and 
nationalism to tame society. On top of this, the states devised and mobilized a 
considerable number of forceful institutions and instruments to achieve this mission.   
 
The starting point of this institutional intervention was the provision of a specific vision 
for the future. For example, East Asian developmental states were able to achieve a far 
more rapid industrialization than South American states because they focused on 
export-oriented industrialization, rather than adhering to import-substitution 
industrialization (Woo-Cumings, 1996: 325). It is notable that at its early stages, the 
developmental state itself was the sole agent with the potential to make this kind of 
‘Big Push’ decision in Japan, Korea and Taiwan (Chang, 1999). The state made these 
decisions in accordance with future-orientated national strategic need, rather than with 
concern for the natural development of its private sector. Furthermore, these decisions 
made at every critical juncture in economic development were objectified into a series 
of five-year or three-year plans. These plans were used as an ultimate guideline or 
manual for the actions of both the public and private sectors, and showed businesses 
where to move and how to co-operate with each other, bringing down the transaction 
costs inevitable for these kinds of structural change. In short, the developmental state 
was indeed ‘an entrepreneurial agent’ (Chang, 1999: 194) that was, and had to be, able 
to set necessary focal points and signalling devices, as well as establishing the vision for 
and goals of long-term development instead of blindly following contemporary price 
signals or comparative advantage.  
 
What kinds of institutions were adopted by the state to actualize these development 
plans? It is useful to remember that a ‘state’ is defined as a system ‘capable of 
restructuring its relations to social groups, as well as relations among those groups’. As 
explained, in the case of East Asian developmental state, its simultaneous 
embeddedness within social groups and autonomy from them was essential in 
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restructuring these relations smoothly but rapidly. When economic development is 
directed by state plans, the state tends to focus on two major relationships: those 
between the state and business, and those between the state and labour. The state 
devised many institutions to control these relationships, which can be categorized as 
relating to industrial mobilization and societal integration. 
 
      Table 3.1 The Institutional Intervention of the Developmental State into Domestic Society 
 
 
Industrial mobilization in the state-business relationship was the main concern of the 
developmental states’ industrial policy. In both Japan and Korea, governments focused 
on nurturing national champions that could compete with the big companies in NDCs 
(Chan et al., 1998). The products of this extensive state support were Japan’s zaibatzu 
and Korea’s chaebol, huge conglomerates well known for their mammoth size and 
octopus-like scope (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 15-19). Various instruments were used to 
nurture MNCs (Multi-National Corporations) in each country initially for the goals of 
import substitution and subsequent export expansion (Amsden, 1989; Koo & Kim, 1992; 
Woo-Cumings, 1996; Pempel, 1999a). Firstly, the states provided their MNCs with huge 
subsidies coupled with tax exemptions designed to both encourage and compensate (i.e. 
for the risky entry into new industrial sectors or international competition and the 
maintenance of good export records). The state also regulated or punished the MNCs 
with rigidly powerful instruments, such as the credit-based financial system, (arbitrary) 
intensive tax audits, and even the withdrawal of import or export licenses. Finally, the 
states placed stringent limits on the entry of foreign capital and the activities of foreign 
MNCs to protect the international competitiveness of the national champions, by 
imposing massive quotas and tariffs as well as manipulating the price system and 
currency values. Therefore, born and bred under intense pressure from the state, these 
representative big companies in the developmental states should be seen as the 
connecting hybrid between the public and the private sectors.  
 
While this reveals that the new MNCs in each developmental state were ‘quasi-state 
organizations’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 17), a discussion of their social integration will 
illuminate their roles in the private domain. As the state-directed plans were effective 
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in producing compressed economic growth, the zaibatzus and chaebols in the frontline 
of the development were able to provide millions of new jobs. This resulted in a 
conspicuous enhancement of welfare for ordinary people through the promise of life-
time employment14 and concomitant housing, education, credit and other benefits. This 
is one of the reasons why the states did not pay much attention to the welfare policy 
until the 1990s; rapid economic growth contributed to significantly low unemployment 
rates, which in turn lessened the need for a national welfare system, especially 
because of the existence of a strong company welfare system. In conjunction with the 
externalities of rapid economic growth, such as the quality of life enhancements that 
followed increased investment in social overhead capital, this welfare promotion 
through the patriarchal relationship between father/companies and its 
children/employees played a pivotal role in assimilating the common people along with 
the alliance between the big state and big businesses.  
 
A number of institutions were established by the developmental states to address the 
state-labour relationship on the basis of this alliance. First of all, the states ceaselessly 
stressed the importance of education in order to better transform ordinary people into 
the type of human resources required for state-led industrialization, and made formal 
educational credentials into the prime, as well as the most popular, channel for 
individual mobility into the political and economic elites. As Pempel (1999a: 169) notes, 
‘education in all three countries [was] heavily geared toward the production of 
technicians, engineers, and businesspeople, which in turn [was also] conducive to 
economic growth based on manufacturing prowess’. The type of education was clearly 
significant, and technical subjects necessary for development were highly encouraged. 
In addition to formal education, mass conscription into the military and grand-scale 
mass movements, such as the New Life Movement set up by Chiang Kai-Shek and the 
New Village Movement by Park Chung-Hee, were important apparatuses for the 
development and mobilization of individuals in accordance with state-led 
industrialization designs.  
 
The final sector from the diagram above relates to the socially integrative aspects of 
the state-labour relationship. Labour policy or, more accurately, labour repression 
policy was the main institution for managing this relationship, and it is the area in 
which the authoritarian character of the entrepreneurial state can be seen most clearly. 
As Woo-Cumings (1996: 337) asserts, ‘the flipside of the state-big business symbiosis was 
                                                          
14 It should be noted that this is no longer the case in post-crisis Korea.  
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an effective suppression of popular protests and a thorough evisceration of labour as a 
political force’. All in all, the unskilled workers in SMEs were subjected to harsh 
conditions; extremely long hours, hard physically demanding work, and extremely low 
wages. Citing various concerns, such as international competitiveness, national security 
and firm-level paternalism, the state and businesses sought to curb the rightful claims 
of workers, and to keep labour weak and systematically exploited (Pempel, 1999a: 167). 
In this light, it can be suggested that, although the labour policy gave the appearance of 
being successful in conflict management and thereby produced a bright growth record 
for a few decades, it could not achieve societal integration in the real sense. In other 
words, the industrial policy for maximal industrial mobilization and the labour control 
policy for authoritarian societal integration are like the two sides of a coin in the 
institutional intervention of developmental states (cf. Cho, 2000: 409), which can be 
conceptualized as authoritarian entrepreneurialism.  
 
 
3.1.3 International Mediation 
 
Johnson (1999: 52) argues that there is no ‘necessary connection between 
authoritarianism and the developmental state’. In reality, however, authoritarianism 
was actively used to mobilize the vast majority of the population into grand 
development projects in the East Asian developmental states. A key point is how the 
marriage of ‘maximal industrial mobilization’ and ‘authoritarian societal integration’ 
was able to give birth to miraculous growth performance. What made this miracle 
possible was the particular international context in which the developmental states 
were situated: the anti-communist bloc in the Asia-Pacific region formed by the US in 
the Cold War period. While the developmental states were very strong inside, they were 
extremely weak within this bloc. For this reason, managing foreign relations was just as 
significant for the developmental states as domestic intervention was.  
 
In a nutshell, by joining the anti-communist bloc the developmental states could enjoy 
three kinds of advantages: security, foreign capital and access to export markets. First 
of all, without the military intervention of the US in 1950, South Korea and Taiwan 
probably would not have survived as independent states (Pempel, 1999a: 177). Thus, 
especially with the constant and substantial threat from the communist bloc ever-
present, the need to ensure security has always been high in the region. In this regard, 
the strategic sustenance given to Japan, Korea and Taiwan by the U.S. military was both 
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an insurance that allowed them to start building their industries and economies, as well 
as a lifeline in a very literal sense. As Woo-Cumings summarizes well (1996: 334),      
  
Taiwan and South Korea were destitute and enervated in 1950, but perched on the 
seismic faultine of global politics; their geopolitical situation was both leverage and 
mortgage to extract maximum ‘rent’ from the global hegemony with which these 
states could sustain themselves and incubate the fledging local capital. 
 
It should be also noted that this ‘rent’ went beyond military protection to include 
massive financial aid. For example, more than two-thirds of Japan’s imports in 1947 
were covered by U.S. aid (Pempel, 1999a: 174) and between 1945 and 1948 Korea 
received $409m from the US in relief funds (Oh, 1999: 25). After the Korean War, as the 
strategic importance of the region’s role as a bulwark against the spread of Communism 
increased in the American global calculation, the scale of aid was also significantly 
increased. Aid to Taiwan stood at $1.5 billion over the period 1950-64 excluding $2.5 
billion in military equipment, while the average annual aid to Korea was about $270 
million from 1953 and 1958, accounting for 15% of the average annual GNP and over 80% 
of foreign exchange (Pempel, 1999a: 154). Stimulated by the Vietnam War, this aid 
continued to increase until the 1970s. In total the US provided $12.6 billion to Korea 
and $5.6 billion to Taiwan between1946 and 1976 (Woo-Cumings, 1996: 334). As the 
figures clearly reveal, the importance of US foreign aid to the East Asian countries, 
especially for the economic take-off stage, cannot be exaggerated.  
 
The role of Japan, as the first runner, also needs to be mentioned. For example, after 
signing a treaty normalizing relations with Japan in 1965, Korea received soft loans and 
grants totalling $800 million from Japan, which furnished a crucial element of the then 
brand-new export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy (Pirie, 2008: 66). 
Furthermore, this financial relationship within the anti-communist bloc also functioned 
as a conduit for technology transfer. Up to the early 1990s, for instance, Korean firms 
within the automobile and electronics industries acquired almost all of their core 
technologies through licensing agreements with firms in Japan or the US and reverse-
engineering (Bello & Rosenfield, 1990; Kim Linsu, 1997). 
 
The final significant benefit of the relationship was that the US provided the biggest 
market for exports from the developmental states, and a relatively uncompetitive 
market at the time. The Vietnam War can be considered most important here, because 
it made it possible for Korea and Taiwan to start their export-led industrialization in the 
mid-1960s. For example, ‘as a direct result of Korea’s military engagement in Vietnam’, 
the US opened its door to Korean goods as ‘a relatively inexpensive gesture of thanks’, 
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that resulted in the growth of Korean exports to the US by 232% between 1964 and 1968 
(Pirie, 2008: 66-67). Equally significantly, the US decided to procure necessary items for 
the US troops in Vietnam and for the South Vietnamese government from Korea and 
Taiwan, thus affording these two countries their first opportunities to ship ‘new 
industrial products’. For instance, whereas Korean exports to America had been limited 
to labour-intensive manufactured goods, during the war Vietnam accounted for 94.29% 
of total Korean steel exports, 51.75% of its exports of transportation equipment, 40.77% 
of non-electrical machinery, and 40.87% of other chemical exports (Woo, 1991: 95-96). 
Just as the Korean War in the early 1950s had given Japan ‘an economic windfall 
comparable to the Marshall Plan’, so the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s gave Korea and 
Taiwan a similar opportunity (Woo-Cumings, 1999).  
 
Therefore, in terms of their international relations, it can be said that the central 
experience of the developmental states was far from ‘a realm of independence where 
autonomy and equality reigned, but an alternative form of political economy enmeshed 
in a hegemonic web’ (Cumings, 2005: 228). Throughout the Cold War, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan industrialized within this web designed and managed by the US. Without 
participating in the web and thus articulating their domestic societies with the anti-
communist bloc, the developmental states’ economic and political development could 
hardly have been imaginable. This confirms that, although the developmental states 
appeared super-strong in the domestic sphere, they were ultimately dependent on and 
constrained by international conditions. This fate of having become ‘semi-sovereign 
country’ (Cumings, 1999b) or ‘vassal state’ (Castells, 1992) as a result of the Cold War is 
indeed the final feature that distinguishes the developmental states from other state 
models.     
 
 
3.2 The Rise and Fall of the Korean Developmental State  
  
The preceding section was devoted to describing the three major eclectic features of 
the East Asian developmental state: its plan-rational position, its authoritarian 
entrepreneurialism and its effectively semi-sovereign status (cf. Table 3.2). As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, modern Korean history up to 2008 can be 
divided into four periods: confusion (1948-61); growth (1961/63-79), transition (1980-
98), and transformation (1998-2008). This section will examine Korean history period by 
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period, focusing on how the features of the developmental state have been realized in 
interaction with the particular circumstances of post-independence Korea.  
 
    Table 3.2 The Three Major Features of the East Asian Developmental State  
 
 
 
3.2.1 Establishing the Nation within Fundamental Changes (1948-61) 
 
South Korea was governed by an American Military government for three years after 
independence from Japan in 1945, while the North was governed by the USSR. In 1948, 
Rhee Syng-Man was elected as the first president of the newly born Republic of Korea. 
In 1950, however, one of the most horrible civil wars in modern history started in Korea. 
These radical changes in the 1940s and 1950s suggest that this first government was 
hardly able to enjoy the security and stability required for formulating and 
implementing systematic policy practices. Nonetheless, this establishing or confusion 
period in Korean history was significant, because it was during that period that the 
major tensions which would keep recurring later in the development of Korean 
developmental state appeared in a very raw form. There are at least three major 
historical factors that ignited these tensions.   
 
The first factor is the governmental philosophy of Confucianism, with which the Joseon 
Dynasty had governed the peninsula for over 500 years. For centuries before the 
introduction of a modern state structure, Korea had been an agrarian bureaucratic state 
with ‘an elaborate procedure for entry to the civil service, a highly organized civil 
service itself, and a practice of administering the country from the centre and from the 
top down’ (Cumings, 2005: 214-215). Civil servants were usually the most respected 
‘scholar-officials’ who were steeped in the Confucian classics from early childhood and 
overcame bitter competition to pass the highest level of state exams. This tradition was 
the base upon which post-war Korean state could easily attract the best and the 
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brightest in the country toward nationalistic goals. Equally significantly, after 
independence from Japan the fundamental and rigid Confucian ethics of the Joseon 
Dynasty, such as ‘the Three Bonds and Five Relationships’15 and the concept of ‘Regard 
King, teacher and father as one’ were deployed as the guiding ethos of the emancipated 
nation. It is only in this context that the peculiar ‘boss culture’ in Korea can be 
understood. This has been prevalent in each and every societal sector, and is most 
clearly exemplified by the paramount role of Korean Presidents or chaebol owners in 
their institutions. This culture, which depends heavily on traditional Confucian ethics of 
paternalism and familism, has been indeed ‘one of the most outstanding features of 
Korean politics’ (Oh, 1999: 214).  
 
The second historical factor relates to the continued influence of the Japanese colonial 
period. Although Korea has never abandoned its national animosity toward Japan since 
independence and the productive capacity built under the colonial period was mostly 
destroyed during the Korean War, it cannot be denied that the Japanese occupation left 
a deep imprint on the Korean political economy of the time (Pirie, 2008: 61-62). For 
instance, the US Army military government not only ‘resuscitated the instruments of 
Japanese rule’, but recycled the ‘human and institutional legacies’ of the colonial era 
to govern South Korea. Moreover, in order to maintain his ever-decaying power, 
President Rhee sought to reconstruct the ‘leviathan colonial state’, that is, ‘a strong, 
bureaucratic, hyper-militarised state’ once formed and managed by the Japanese. 
There is now a broad consensus (Woo, 1991; Kohli, 1999) that this influence provided 
the soil on which the later Korean developmental state could transplant the economic 
strategies for rapid development that had already proved efficient in Japan.   
 
American intervention was probably the most important factor for the regime. As 
explained in the previous section, massive economic and military aid from the US was 
‘fundamental in creating the basis for a modern economy’ (Castells, 1992: 37) in Korea. 
The three years of US Military Government (1945-48) were particularly significant and 
saw the introduction of many American systems and institutions as new social norms, 
including the education and military systems. After the Korean War, the devastation and 
the on-going confrontation with the communist bloc (over the 38th parallel in Korea as 
the Asian ‘Berlin Wall’) made Korea increasingly dependent on the US. Along this line, 
the Rhee government adopted anti-communism as its prime governmental principle, not 
                                                          
15 This is one of the fundamental teachings of the Confucianism. ‘The three bonds (ruler-ruled, father-son, husband-wife) 
and five relationships (ruler-ruled, father-son, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, friend-friend)’ teaches about 
the basic principles and disciplines of human relationships.  
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only to ensure the nation’s security, but also in order to eliminate political rivals. It also 
initiated ‘Import-Substitution Industrialization’ based on US aid. Even if this ISI strategy 
provided both the opportunity and the motivation for the chaebols to raise production 
capacity and enter new industries (Kim Linsu, 1997: 199), it was not the product of 
strategic consideration, but rather a mere response to the economic exigencies. Koo & 
Kim (1992: 123) aptly describe this situation as follows:  
 
Had there existed any strategic choice by Rhee, it was aid maximization, to squeeze 
as much economic and military aid possible from the United States by skilfully 
manipulating U.S. security interest in the peninsula.   
 
Despite all these efforts, US economic aid to Korea rapidly decreased from $382m to 
$192.8m between 1957 and 1961, causing a severe recession in the early 1960s (Pirie, 
2008: 66). On top of this, the corrupt and incompetent Rhee government could not 
manage the tensions between Confucian ethics, the remnants of Japanese imperialism, 
growing American influences, and the anti-communist ethos, and thus left serious social 
disorders untouched. In the end, therefore, a students’ uprising triggered by the rigged 
presidential election in April 1960 forced President Rhee to step down from office. The 
second Republic was soon established and adopted a new Cabinet System, but this 
government was equally slow and indecisive in tackling social and economic problems, 
possibly due to its obscure vision as well as conservative class interests. In this situation, 
Major General Park Chung-Hee, a former officer in the Japanese Army, executed a 
military coup on 16 May 1961 claiming this was caused ‘to rescue the nation from the 
brink of starvation’ (cited in Koo & Kim, 1992: 124). This marked the starting point of 
the Korean developmental state.   
  
 
3.2.2 Economic Development under the Developmental State (1961-79) 
 
President Park, the champion of the Korean developmental state, directed quasi-
military Korean industrialization through his grip on absolute power throughout his two 
decades of office. This second period of growth can be divided into two: the building of 
light industry after the coup (1961/63-72) and the focus on building heavy industry 
under the ‘Yushin’ (a kind of emergency state) regime (1972-79). Korea recorded one of 
the most striking cases of economic growth in world history during this period.  
 
Differentiating itself from the Rhee government, Park’s military government was able to 
combine together Confucian authoritarianism, Japanese industrialization strategies, 
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American support, and anti-communist ideology in undertaking the ‘construction of a 
powerful South Korean economy as the foundation for its nationalist project’ (Castells, 
1992: 38). In the early years, Park built a special ‘development alliance’ with powerful 
capitalists by arresting them on charges of ‘illicit wealth accumulation’ and then 
granting special pardons on condition of their active participation in his grand plan of 
industrialization. He then overhauled and reorganized the bureaucracy by purging many 
corrupt and incompetent bureaucrats on the one hand, and by creating new 
organizations including the powerful Economic Planning Board (EPB) on the other, while 
also restructuring the financial system by nationalizing banks and subjecting the central 
bank to government authority (Koo & Kim, 1992: 125-131). This cleared the ground for 
the adoption of a whole new economic strategy of ‘Export-Oriented Industrialization’ in 
about 1964. As mentioned, the Vietnam War and the normalization of relationships with 
Japan became the most significant moments in this economic take-off by providing 
necessary markets and financial sources (Pirie, 2008: 66). Admittedly, this strategy was 
also the product of unanticipated interactions with international conditions rather than 
a completely intentional decision by the state. However, the EOI strategy started to hit 
its stride with the introduction of a single floating exchange rate system and the 
devaluation of the currency in 1964. This became a great watershed in Korean economic 
history, because it completely changed the character of Korean capital from mercantile 
to industrial, and thus brought about a shift in the principle of accumulation from a 
zero-sum to a positive-sum game (Jones & Sakong, 1980).   
 
Park executed an internal coup in October 1972 to cope with financial problems at the 
end of the 1960s, and also to extend his tenure beyond the constitutional limit. 
Installing the Yushin Regime, an extremely authoritarian emergency regime modelled 
after the Japanese Yushin in the 1870s, he ‘closed all the political space and bestowed 
upon himself a life-time presidency with unchecked executive power’ (Koo & Kim, 1992: 
132). This new regime shrewdly rescued chaebols from serious debt troubles by 
nullifying all the loan agreements between business firms and private moneylenders and 
by replacing a large number of short-term loans with long-term ones at a lower interest 
rate. It also imposed harsher measures against organized labour by suspending the 
workers’ right to collective bargaining and action, and by prohibiting strikes at foreign-
invested firms.  
 
After resolving these issues, Park announced a new plan to build up the heavy and 
chemical industries in his New Year’s address in 1973. Although the feasibility of the 
plan attracted much scepticism and criticism from both inside and outside of Korea, the 
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government decided to concentrate all the resources at its disposal on nurturing the six 
selected strategic industries; steel, electronics, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, 
machinery and nonferrous metals. Even though significant changes of international 
economic and political conditions in the early 1970s must have influenced this decision 
to pursue the new kind of export-oriented industrialization, 16  the ‘most important 
factor’ was probably the urgent need to diffuse popular discontent led by Kim Dae-Jung, 
whom Park defeated very narrowly in the 1971 presidential election ‘despite all the 
propaganda and alleged vote-buying by the regime’ (Koo & Kim, 1992: 133). The 
government once again deployed the sacred mission of economic development in order 
to divert people’s interest and energy from their political demands, and triggered major 
changes in the industrial and financial structure. Rapidly increased international capital 
flows and the creation of new organizations, such as the General Trading Company that 
was also modelled after the Japanese example, enabled the government to provide the 
chaebols with great support during the second half of the 1970s,17 so that they could 
achieve the fundamental industrial turnaround and the ambitious economic goals that 
the government had set.  
 
In a nutshell, during the 1960s and 1970s, Park’s developmental state achieved 
impressive economic growth in Korea by making every effort ‘to mobilize and control 
labor to make possible the formation and growth of the Chaebol’ (Castells, 1992: 38). 
To be more specific, the Korean developmental state devised an extreme version of 
authoritarian entrepreneurialism for the country’s rapid industrialization: president-
centred, state-directed, chaebol-led, labour-sacrificed, export-oriented industrialization. 
It is again noteworthy that the success of this strategy was entirely predicated on 
particular internal and external conditions: the nationalistic exploitation of the people 
through top-town manipulation and bottom-up participation, as well as generous 
military, financial and political support from anti-communist allies.  
 
 
3.2.3 Transition toward Liberalization, Democratization and Globalization (1980-98) 
 
As the supreme ruler for almost two decades, President Park did not merely achieve 
impressive growth performance, but also established conditions and trajectories that 
                                                          
16 For instance, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, Japan’s move into high-tech industries letting go of 
some labour-intensive sectors of heavy industries, the Nixon doctrine which stressed greater effort for self-defence 
among US allies.  
 
17 Key examples are as follows: giving a dozen chaebols monopolistic licenses to enjoy an attractive package of trade, 
finance and tax advantages and opportunities to acquire ill-managed companies. 
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were inescapable for the course of development under subsequent governments. Above 
all, the growth first, distribution later strategy set by Park was faithfully followed by 
the succeeding former-general presidents. However, at the same time, the third period 
(1980-98) saw the slow eclipse of Park’s axiom of Korean industrialization. This was due 
to the impact of three fundamental changes; liberalization, democratization and 
globalization.  
 
The first president in this transition period was Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-87), who assumed 
power in another military coup in December 1979 shortly after Park’s assassination. 
General Chun elected himself president after massacring hundreds of students and 
citizens that were protesting the arrest of Kim Dae-Jung and the imposition of martial 
law in Kwangju in May 1980. Mainly owing to the rise of neo-liberalism in the US, 
however, the junta couldn’t avoid introducing some ‘liberalization’ measures into 
Korean industrial policy, covering international trade (e.g. the Tariff Reform Act, 1984), 
foreign investment (e.g. Foreign Capital Inducement Law, 1984) and the financial 
system (e.g. denationalization, rather than privatization, of commercial banks in the 
early 1980s) (Kim Linsu, 1997: 33-39). Meanwhile, in order to resolve problems of excess 
investment and capacity in the heavy and chemical industries, the regime sought to 
reorganize both the industrial composition and firm-level structure by issuing several 
laws and orders, such as the Measure to Rationalize Corporate Structure in 1980 and the 
Fair Trade Act in 1981. The regime also responded to growing pressure from the 
opposition group, by publicly admitting the need to nurture SMEs, increase social 
welfare, and broaden wealth distribution, which led to the SME Formation Act of 1986 
and a change of nomenclature in the title of five-year economic plan to the Five-Year 
Economic and Social Development Plan. However, this ‘public gesture’ designed to 
reconcile with the ‘distributional alliance’ (i.e. the antipode of the state-chaebol 
collusion), shortly turned out to be insubstantial. Despite much ‘public fanfare’ for the 
reform of chaebols, the assets of top chaebols grew substantially over the period, while 
the share of loans made to SMEs declined conspicuously and labour faced harsher 
restrictions and controls than they had done under any previous regime (Koo & Kim, 
1992: 141-143).  
 
Korea started down the path towards democratization in 1987, when President Chun 
neglected fervent popular demand for constitutional reform, and announced the 
transition of power to Roh Tae-Woo, a military general who had served him faithfully 
during the 1979/1980 coup. Intensely dissatisfied with this decision, increasing numbers 
of university students led escalating public violence and were joined by many other 
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groups including middle class citizens. They took the upcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics as 
political hostage. Consequently, on 29 June, Roh reluctantly reversed Chun’s decision 
and accepted the opposition’s eight demands: (1) direct presidential elections, (2) an 
amnesty for Kim Dae-Jung, (3) the release of all political prisoners except those charged 
with serious crimes, (4) guaranteed human rights, (5) freedom of the press, (6) local 
autonomy, (7) freedom for political parties, and (8) a campaign against crime and 
corruption (Bedeski, 1994: 69). Ironically, the amnesty for Kim Dae-Jung intensified the 
long rivalry between him and Kim Young-Sam, the other significant leader of the Korean 
movement for democratization, thus helping Roh Tae-Woo win the direct election in 
late 1987. The split between opposition parties contributed to the continuation of the 
military dictatorship in Korea. Nevertheless, the constitutional changes of 1987 ensured 
that this last military president could not implement the type of dictatorship that 
previous juntas had enjoyed. ‘Because of his relatively weak political status’, president 
Roh Tae-Woo (1988-93) was not able to initiate strong industrial restructuring, 
especially while striving to respond to the pressure for greater democratization and 
consumer demand at home and to changing international dynamics triggered by the 
collapse of the communist bloc (Hahm & Plein, 1998: 103). Even so, the Korean strategy 
of Chaebol-led export-oriented industrialization worked very well in the late 1980s due 
to the so-called ‘three low-tides’ of low interest rates, low oil prices and low US dollar 
exchange rates. 
 
After merging his party with Roh Tae-Woo’s ruling party, Kim Young-Sam (hereafter, YS) 
was able to win the presidential election against Kim Dae-Jung (hereafter, DJ) in 1992. 
Despite offering the excuse that ‘if you want to catch a tiger, you must get into the 
tiger’s den’, YS’s merger with Roh’s party came under severe criticism as being both 
shameful and regressive. Nonetheless, as the first civilian President after thirty-two-
years of military dictatorship, YS set ‘New Korea’ as the official vision of his 
government and freely initiated new political and economic agendas. Consequently, 
during his presidency, Korea experienced not only the more radical implications of the 
liberalization and democratization initiated in the 1980s,18 but also the completely new 
effects of globalization. For instance, the ambitious five-year economic plan that the YS 
government announced in June 1993 set out the direction of the new economy for the 
New Korea, highlighting the necessity of ‘reforms’ to achieve economic justice through 
fair income distribution, the ‘deregulation’ of economic activities to align the Korean 
                                                          
18 Key examples are as follows: the renunciation of formal control over the appointment of bank management in 1993, 
the liberalisation of interest rates by 1996, the induction of anti-corruption measures such as ‘disclosure of assets’ of 
high-ranking civil servants and the ‘real-name financial transaction system’, the reestablishment of local government 
election in 1995.  
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economy for increasing liberalization, and ‘internationalization’ to catch up with 
inevitable globalization trends (Oh, 1999: 137). More symbolically, the YS government 
made a radical decision to join the OECD in order to accelerate and advance domestic 
‘neo-liberal’ reforms up to the so-called ‘global standard’, and by doing so, 
differentiated itself from the previous juntas. 
 
According to Pirie’s (2008: 77) analysis based upon Jessop’s (2002) concepts, this 
transition period can be divided into two stages. The period governed by General Chun 
and General Roh was the stage of ‘neo-liberal policy adjustment’, in which the 
governments tried to improve the existing mode of regulation and the regime of 
accumulation with some neo-liberal measures. Then, during the second stage under the 
YS government, a ‘neo-liberal regime shift’ was pursued, in which the government 
attempted to introduce new systems of regulation and establish a new regime of 
accumulation along neo-liberal lines, while core elements of the Korean developmental 
state were dismantled. What should be noted, however, is that the outcome was not 
very satisfactory. Despite the promising start, the result of the YS administration’s 
ambitious reform efforts turned out to be ‘Korea’s greatest political failure’ (Shin, 1999: 
9-11). The government fell back on the ‘repressive measures of the authoritarian past’ 
with regard to democratization, invoking the familiar excuses of ‘fighting against 
communist forces’ and ‘improving national competitiveness’. Also, in relation to 
liberalization, a series of ‘spectacular bribes-for-loans scandals’ in and around the 
government rendered the effectiveness of the reform gestures suspect. More 
fundamentally, in 1997, Korea came to experience an unprecedented economic crisis 
and financial meltdown, which resulted in the currency collapse and a chain of 
bankruptcies that forced the YS government to appeal to the IMF. In spite of ‘neo-
liberal policy adjustments’ followed by ‘neo-liberal regime shift’ over two decades, the 
dragon ‘in distress’ (Bello & Rosenfield, 1990) ended up hitting the buffers.  
 
 
3.2.4 The Asian Financial Crisis and the Rise of the Neo-Developmental State (1998-
2008) 
 
There is no doubt that ‘the year 1997 proved to be a turning point in Korea’s modern 
history’ (Chung & Kirkby, 2002: 1). The turning point was marked by two interrelated 
events of huge significance: the unprecedented financial crisis in the economy and the 
first change of governmental party in politics. 
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There is some debate about the cause of the Asian Economic Crisis, which spread from 
Thailand and Singapore to Indonesia and Korea in the summer of 1997. Some have 
argued that neo-liberal reforms, such as market opening and the liberalization of 
industrial planning played a decisive role in accordance with the increased volatility of 
international capital flows (Shin & Chang, 2003; Winters, 1999). This is true, insofar as a 
series of moral hazards are noted to have been pervasive among the Korean political 
and business elites of the time. Put another way, it is clear that the traumatic crisis was 
the direct result of a ‘combination’ of hasty market opening and a continued failure to 
address structural problems in the Korean economy (Pirie, 2008: 94). If that was the 
case, then, why was it that the reforms toward liberalization, democratization and 
globalization during the transition period had not been able to tackle the structural 
problems? Above all, the key reason is that the three presidents of the period were part 
of the state-chaebol alliance rather than part of the oppositional distributional alliance. 
In other words, they were never free from the profound structural problem of ‘crony 
capitalism’, which sprung from the early days of Korean developmental state.  
 
As was stressed earlier, Korea’s meteoric economic transformation was achieved 
through nurturing the chaebols as national champions. However, this strategy was based 
upon a mutual dependency between the state and big business; a double-edged sword 
that produced both rapid growth and crony capitalism. The somewhat rational 
corruption under crony capitalism, ‘with cash flowing from state to business and from 
business to politician in truly floodtide dimensions’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 16), prevented 
the chaebols from being truly self-reliant and entrepreneurial, driving them to take the 
easy option of relying on guidance and insurance from the state. They were neither 
rent-seeking, because they took many risks in expanding their domestic and overseas 
businesses, nor entrepreneurial, because they knew that the state would refund any 
costs of their failures insofar as they obeyed its orders. Furthermore, the economic 
growth led by this collusion was built upon the sacrifice of labour—the common people—
that was imposed and/or encouraged by the authoritarian state. As Castells (1992: 40) 
points out, ‘the mode of incorporation of labor into the industrial structure was much 
more brutal and repressive’ in Korea than in other developmental states. Labour was 
the biggest victim of crony capitalism, stuck between the two extreme options of 
militant confrontation and servile adaptation. The three presidents in the transition 
period who succeeded the ruling party established by General Park in the 1960s were 
not only incompetent in unravelling these structural problems of crony capitalism, but 
also masters at taking advantage of them. In 1997, Presidents Chun and Roh were 
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convicted of bribery for receiving $276 million and $350 million (respectively) while in 
office. Similarly, YS suffered from one ‘slush fund’ scandal after another that extended 
to his second son and several close staff, and became ‘both morally and politically dead’ 
in his later days in office (Shin, 1999: 8, 11). The reforms undertaken by their 
governments were meaningful in initiating the transition from the old mode of the 
developmental state, but were not sufficient to achieve it.  
 
Then, the Asian financial crisis became a key factor in the first democratic change of 
government in Korea. Without the crisis, the election of President Kim Dae-Jung in 
December 1997, which is ‘often compared with the elections of South Africa’s Nelson 
Mandela and Poland’s Lech Walesa’, would have been unimaginable (Shin, 1999: 12). 
Since the 1960s, DJ had always been the number one enemy of the military juntas, and 
suffered from ceaseless threats to his life under the accusation of being the leading 
communist. This was why in 1992, when DJ was in competition with YS for the 
presidency, army generals openly warned that they would stage a coup if DJ won the 
election. However, the unprecedented crisis in 1997 undid such out-dated McCarthyism, 
allowing the champion of the distributional allies in Korea to become president.  
 
In his inauguration address, therefore, DJ (1998b) signified the inauguration day as 
‘historic’ and ‘proud’ one in Korean history, in that ‘a government that champions both 
democratic and economic development is established finally’. Put another way, as the 
first president from the opposition camp, he was officially criticizing former Korean 
governments for pursuing only economic development at the cost of democratic 
development. This unique identity was more dramatically expressed in his Liberation 
Day address in August 1999. In the middle of implementing various reforms of the 
chaebols, DJ declared, ‘I am determined to go down in Korea’s history as [the] 
president who first accomplished corporate reforms and straightened things out in the 
economy for the middle and working classes’ (Cited in Ha & Lee, 2007: 908). As Rodney 
Hall notes (2003: 95), with strong support from the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, DJ ‘as 
reformer and democratizer’ kept executing the ‘discursive representation of key 
practices associated with the Asian development model as cronyism and corruption’ in 
order to normatively delegitimize the practices. That is, ‘the old regime was politically 
reconfigured’ by DJ who aggressively used the crisis period to ‘attack the country’s 
long-powerful chaebol and to force through financial restructuring’ (Pempel, 1999b: 
226). DJ’s successor, President Roh Moo-Hyun inherited this mission. When it comes to 
principle-led reforms and anti-authoritarian character, he can be regarded as more 
thorough than DJ. Nonetheless, in an interview at the end of his Presidency, Roh 
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acknowledged his debt to DJ, saying: ‘I thought I had initiated many new programmes 
and projects. In the end, however, I came to realize that most of them had already been 
started by President Kim Dae-Jung. I followed in his footsteps’ (Oh, 2009). 
 
Under the two progressive governments (1998-2008), therefore, Korea saw the real 
demise of the developmental state. On the one hand, the coercive industrial policies for 
maximal industrial mobilization were cleared away by intensive and extensive financial 
and corporate reforms. The former were designed to ensure the ‘re-capitalization of 
weak financial intermediaries’, the ‘establishment of prudential supervisory 
frameworks’, and a ‘radical liberalization of financial markets’, while the latter were 
orientated toward ‘enhancing transparency by introducing combined financial 
statements’, ‘strengthening minority shareholder rights’, and ‘toughening the role of 
directors’.19 On the other hand, the oppressive labour policy of authoritarian societal 
integration was replaced with one for democratic reconciliation and thus cooperation. 
For example, for the first time in Korean history, a tripartite committee was established 
to develop a social pact among the government, labour, and business, and 
‘unprecedented social safety net measures’, including unemployment insurance and a 
national basic livelihood, were introduced (cf. Ha & Lee, 2007; Pirie, 2008). What 
should be noted is that although these reforms look very similar to the universal 
measures of ‘neo-liberalism’, what the two progressive governments pursued was not 
neo-liberalism, but the Third Way (cf. section 5.1.2).  
 
 
3.3 Korean Cultural (Industries) Policy during the Transition Period 
 
The previous section examined the historical development of the Korean developmental 
state. I shall now turn to the Korean cultural (industries) policies existent before the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. The aim is to define the core features of Korean CI policy 
before the rise of the neo-developmental state with reference to its industrial policy.  
 
As discussed above, it was in the second period led by President Park, the champion of 
Korean developmental state, that the Korean government started to produce ‘cultural 
policy’ in earnest. In that period, Korea saw significant development in terms of 
                                                          
19 As a result of the financial reform, for instance, a number of ill-managed financial institutions disappeared between 
January 1998 and June 2006; including 15 commercial banks, 29 merchant banks, 15 securities houses, 17 insurance 
companies, and 11 investment trusts (Ha & Lee, 2007: 899). In addition, to ensure  corporate reform, the government 
announced in June 1998 a corporate ‘blacklist’ naming 55 firms that were classified as insolvent and non-viable including 
20 affiliates of the top five chaebols and 32 affiliates of the top six to 64 chaebols (ibid.: 904). 
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organizations, institutions and budgets related to the cultural sector. The ‘Culture and 
Arts Promotion Act’ (1972) was the first move the Korean government made to define 
the cultural sector as a whole and to promote it. The First Five-Year Plan for Culture 
and Arts Promotion (1973) was indeed the first long-term plan the Korean government 
produced for the cultural sector; while the Korean Motion Picture Promotion 
Corporation (1973) and the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation (1973) were the first 
quangos in the cultural sector. Nevertheless, it cannot be stressed enough that these 
policy moves were connected with the theme of regime legitimacy, and precisely 
resembled the government’s industrial policy in justifying state-led development with 
the goal of rapid quantitative growth. Of course, this key mechanism was ensured by 
both controlling and insulating the domestic cultural market thoroughly through various 
institutional sticks and carrots; most significantly, censorship and subsidies. Just as in 
industrial policy, the overall trends set in place by the Park government in cultural 
policy were gradually changed by the three governments in the transition period. So, to 
what extent did the basic direction of the developmental cultural policy shift during the 
period?  
 
 
3.3.1 The Chun Government: Expanding the Role of Government in Cultural Policy 
 
Despite visible advances in many areas of cultural policy, the Park regime did not regard 
the cultural sector as something important or autonomous. Therefore, instead of 
promoting the sector, the government tried to subject it to ideological functions, such 
as the advancement of nationalism or anti-communism. For example, in 1966 the 
government established a new category of ‘anti-communist film’ in the Grand Bell 
Awards20 and set as the prize for the category a license to import one foreign film, 
which led to a boom in the production of anti-communist films among film production 
companies and a concomitant ‘qualitative downgrade of Korean films’ (Jwa & Lee, 2006: 
131). Moreover, the regime directed nearly ‘70% of total public expenditure on the 
cultural sector’ into nurturing Korea’s traditional culture and heritage in order to stress 
the importance of national cultural identity (Yim, 2002: 40). 
 
Given this legacy, the Chun government’s (1980-88) major contribution to Korean 
cultural policy can be said to be its significant enhancement of the role of the state. Its 
two major plans, The New Plan for Cultural Development (1981) and The Cultural Plan 
                                                          
20 It was the most prestigious film award in Korea at the time. 
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in the Sixth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1986), illustrate the 
extent to which the government had started to recognize other objectives of cultural 
policy, such as ‘promoting the excellence of the arts, improving cultural welfare, 
promoting regional culture, and expanding cultural exchange with other countries’ (Yim, 
2002: 40-41). As a result, the previously tight and severe control over the cultural 
sector was loosened a little. For example, the fifth revision of the ‘Film Act’ in 
December 1984 replaced the licensing system with the registration and also replaced 
censorship by the Ministry of Culture and Public Information with a process of 
deliberation by the Performance Ethics Board, thus freeing up to some extent both the 
content of films and the conditions of their production. In addition, the strong 
protection of the domestic cultural market started to break down. For instance, as a 
result of the first US-Korean negotiations about the Korean film market in 1985, the 
government implemented the sixth revision of the ‘Film Act’ in December 1986, and 
allowed foreigners and foreign corporations to operate in the Korean film industry, 
while also abolishing import quotas and prices ceilings for foreign and imported films 
respectively.  
 
However, as an authoritarian military regime, the government could not overcome the 
limitations of the previous Park government. Because of its illegitimate origin (i.e. the 
coup in 1979/80), the government censorship of political expression was more severe 
than ever (Jwa & Lee, 2006: 103-104). Even though other kinds of freedom of expression 
were loosened, relating to sex or violence for example, restrictions on the freedom of 
expression for political matters, including the freedom of press, were tightened. The 
expression of ‘ddang-Chun news’ shows this point very well. During the fifth republic all 
the broadcasting companies started their evening news with the report of the daily 
activity of President Chun right after the bell sound at nine o’clock. Korean intellectuals 
criticized this situation of severe press control by employing the cynical phrase ‘ddang-
Chun news’.21 The opening of the domestic market was also problematic. It was not the 
result of any consideration of the current conditions or the future needs of the domestic 
cultural ecology (KOFIC, 2007b: 38). The government was startled by strong criticism of 
its policies by the United States Trade Representative instigated by the MPEAA (Motion 
Picture Export Association of America) (Jwa & Lee, 2006: 104), and hastily decided to 
open the Korean film market in order to maintain the export of Korean industrial goods 
to the US, which was at that time the biggest market for Korea. It is thus fair to say that 
as with the Park government, the Chun government saw the cultural sector broadly as 
                                                          
21 Ddang is the onomatopoeia for the bell sound in Korean. 
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an add-on, and adhered to the old wisdom of developmental cultural policy, which 
advocated ‘constructing the absent cultural institutions and infrastructure’ rapidly 
under tight control so as to ‘contribute to the justification and integration of the regime’ 
(Kim Yer-Su, 1988: 27).  
 
 
3.3.2 The Roh Government: Introducing Democracy into Korean Cultural Policy 
 
These limitations needed to be addressed under Roh Tae-Woo’s presidency (1988-93), 
which was established immediately following the powerful democratization movement 
of June 1987. Along with many significant political reforms directed towards a more 
democratic society, agendas familiar from the international policy scene, such as the 
‘democratization of culture’ and ‘cultural democracy’, started to be discussed in the 
Korean cultural policy field during this period (Kim Moon-Hwan, 1988; 1996). One of the 
results was the establishment of Cultural Development Research Institute, the first 
cultural policy research institute in Korea. It was established within the Korean Culture 
and Arts Foundation (KCAF), and shortly thereafter began to publish The Journal of 
Cultural Policy, which was the first journal of cultural policy in Korea. 22 From this 
moment, it can be said that the Korean government started to regard the cultural 
sector and cultural policy as something worthy of scientific research.   
 
The first volume of The Journal of Cultural Policy (1988) clearly reveals the mood of 
the time in Korean cultural policy. Kim Yer-Su (1988) presented his earnest hope that 
this democratic change in cultural policies would lead to the enhancement of ‘people’s 
capacities for cultural creation’, as well as a ‘status change for culture’ from a means 
of social control to a driver of national development. Noting the significance of 
democratization in the cultural policy field, Park (1988) also maintained that 
‘government-led control-oriented systems and acts’ would soon have to be replaced 
with new ones led by the private and voluntary sectors, since the former had suppressed 
the basic conditions of cultural creation, such as freedom of expression and creative 
activities, for too long and to too great an extent. In a similar vein, Shin (1988) noted 
the close relationship between the paternalistic dictatorship and the hyper-centralized 
system in the Korean cultural sector, and insisted that the era of democratization had 
to take note of the imbalance in the level of local cultural sector development between 
                                                          
22 Before the establishment of this research institute and its journal, there was virtually no space for cultural policy 
research in Korea. In 1994 the institute was expanded and re-established as the KCPI (Korea Cultural Policy Institute). In 
2002 it became the KCTI (Korean Culture and Tourism Institute) by merging with the KTRI (Korea Tourism Research 
Institute).  
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the capital, Seoul, and the other cities, provinces and regions. Most noteworthy, is the 
strong consensus across all the commentators that the Korean cultural sector had been 
lethargic because of the former authoritarian military governments, and that therefore 
a new era of democratic cultural policies was desperately needed for the survival of 
‘Korean culture’. They all agreed that it was impossible to keep the state, the market 
and civil society closed from the outside world and it was thus inevitable to implement 
the opening and internationalization of the Korean cultural sector. On these grounds, 
they suggested that the policy milieu should be democratized as quickly as possible in 
order to be competitive and therefore avoid the imminent loss of cultural identity (cf. 
Park, 1988: 34-36).  
 
Under this strong consensus, the Roh government divided the Ministry of Culture and 
Public Information into the Ministry of Culture and the Department of the Public 
Information in 1990. This was a very symbolic event, which marked the institutional 
separation of cultural administration from the functions of public surveillance and 
nationalistic mobilization. This was indeed the moment when the independence of 
culture that many cultural activists had demanded exuberantly since the 1987 protest 
was finally achieved within government policy. The French Ministry of Culture was taken 
as a benchmark, according to Kim Moon-Hwan (November, 2009), who took part in 
establishing the new Culture Ministry. For instance, the first Korean Culture Minister 
was openly called the ‘Korean Andre Malraux’ by others and himself (Kyunghyang-
Shinmun, 1991). One of the reasons behind this was that UNESCO was not only situated 
in France, but led by French practitioners at that time. The 10-Year Plan for Developing 
Culture: 1990-1999, which the new Culture Ministry drew up in 1990 as a kind of 
declaration, was openly designed to correspond to or import UNESCO’s current scheme 
of ‘cultural development’. In this way, the effort to build up a new kind of cultural 
policy for the new era of democratization drew heavily on French agendas.   
 
 
3.3.3 The YS Government: Initiating Korean Cultural Industries Policy 
 
Kim Young-Sam was the first civilian president following 32-years of military rule and 
was the last president of the transition period. To distinguish its different origin from 
the preceding military governments, the YS government stressed its objective of 
cultural democracy, the importance of cultural creativity and even the necessity of 
‘cultural welfare’ (Shim, 1993: 22-26). As the nation was in preparation for joining the 
OECD, the liberalization and opening of the cultural sector was also accelerated. To 
88 
 
illustrate, in The New Five-Year Plan for Promoting Cultural Development (1993) the 
government adopted the following key cultural policy objectives: enhancing cultural 
creativity and improving the cultural environment; activating local culture and 
balancing cultural welfare; developing cultural industries and activating corporate 
cultures; establishing national righteousness; building up pan-Korean culture and 
globalizing national culture.  
 
The most important of these objectives for CI was of course that of developing the 
cultural industries. After YS issued orders that culture should be used effectively to add 
economic value (Park et al., 2007: 3), the objective became an urgent task for the 
Culture Ministry, with the result that the Ministry established the Cultural Industry 
Bureau in 1994. Many scholars agree that this marks the point from which the Korean 
government started to formulate serious CI policies (Lee et al., 2005; Park et al., 2007). 
Prior to this point, the government had not felt any difference between film policy and 
arts policy, for example. However, in preparing for the full-scale globalization it sought 
after, the government came to understand the difference between the cultural 
industries sector and the culture and the arts sector, and took note of the importance 
of the former in national economic development. This divergence is of significant 
importance because it can be considered the turning point in Korean CI policy between 
regulating individual firms from a national perspective and promoting cultural industries 
as a whole from an international perspective. 
 
For all its symbolic importance, however, the establishment of the CI Bureau could not 
ensure the development of the new cultural industries in itself. Even though the Bureau 
sought to change the government’s attitude toward the CI sector and in turn the 
people’s perception of CI, in a frank assessment, it failed to make any visible or 
significant interventions in the policy field. Above all, the Bureau did not contribute any 
major additions or revisions in terms of legislation for promoting CI. While many kinds of 
rhetoric were developed and distributed, they were hardly transformed into a 
sustainable legal base for the industries. Likewise, in contrast to the heightened 
interest in CI, the government did not allot sufficient budget for the newly established 
CI Bureau. The budget of the Ministry of Culture and Sports represented only a very 
small portion of the total budget (0.63% in 1993, 0.68% in 1995, 0.73% in 1996, 0.91% in 
1997). Moreover, the budget for the CI Bureau accounted for only a slight fraction of the 
Ministry’s budget (as of 1997, only 2%) (MCST, 2008a: 5).   
 
89 
 
To sum up, although the YS government opened a new era in Korean CI policy by 
establishing an independent bureau for CI promotion within the Culture Ministry, this 
was a long way from the emergence of a systematic and well-supported CI policy 
framework. Its various efforts notwithstanding, the reality is that the YS government 
was unsuccessful in removing the conceptual straight jacket that saw the cultural sector 
as a mere add-on, and was thus not dissimilar to the previous two governments of the 
transition period. This speculation is well evidenced by the fact that when the economic 
crisis occurred in 1997, the government quite promptly cancelled all budgets for ten 
major cultural projects (Park et al., 2007: 16). It may therefore be concluded that, 
while the YS government was eager to develop the Korean CI sector and CI policy, it 
remained unable to make a real impact (Lee et al., 2005). It built up organizations 
which were neither professional nor strong enough to lead the restructuring; it 
introduced new perspectives on and rhetoric about cultural industries which were not 
developed further to ensure the necessary legal frameworks; and although it increased 
the budget for the sector, it did not provide sufficient funding to secure a substantial 
take-off.   
 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the features of East Asian developmental states in general, 
the historical development of the Korean developmental state in particular and the 
history of Korean cultural (industries) policy. The ‘state science’ of the developmental 
state was first explored in relation to its distinctive ideological/theoretical position 
concerning the relationship between state and market; its institutional interventions to 
initiate and facilitate economic restructuring and growth; and its mediation between 
domestic society and the international arena. With these categories, I have extracted 
three fundamental aspects of the developmental states, all of which illustrate the 
character of eclecticism very well; the plan-rational state, their authoritarian 
entrepreneurialism and their realistically semi-sovereign status.  
 
First, the developmental state took the ‘plan-rational’ position between plan-irrational 
and market-rational positions, which can be characterized by ‘embedded autonomy’ in 
terms of the structural relationships between the bureaucratized state and its social 
groups. As to institutional intervention by the state into domestic society, the 
developmental state adopted a principle that may be called authoritarian 
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entrepreneurialism, and which blossomed through ‘collusion between the state and the 
big businesses’ at the cost of sacrificing the ‘distributional alliance’. Finally, in contrast 
to the ultimate power it enjoyed within domestic society, the developmental state 
attained little autonomy in the international field throughout the Cold War, and made 
itself into a ‘semi-sovereign state’ heavily dependent on the US for security, capital and 
trade.  
 
Since the 1980s, these features of the developmental state have started to disintegrate. 
The international conditions changed first. The US adopted a completely new economic 
policy of neo-liberalism and the Cold War ended with the collapse of the communist 
bloc. For example, in 1992 Korea normalized its relationship with China in exchange for 
breaking its relationship with Taiwan, and now China has replaced the US to become the 
biggest market for Korean exports. Secondly, in parallel with these international 
fluctuations, the mode of authoritarian intervention gradually dissolved under the 
direction of liberalization, democratization and globalization in Korea until the 
economic crisis of 1997, and has disappeared rapidly since then. The half-hearted 
governments during the transition period could not prevent the economic crisis, because 
they were part of the state-chaebol collusion, which had been at the core of Korean 
industrialization strategy since the Park regime. They could only be limited in their 
ability to tackle the structural problems of Korean crony capitalism—the dark side of 
that collusion. Therefore, it is not surprising that the demise of the Korean 
developmental state was realized under DJ’s reign. He had been the leader of 
oppositional distributional allies for decades before becoming president. As Pempel 
(1999a: 167) argues,    
 
Union membership stood at approximately 10 percent of the workforce in South 
Korea; there were no minimum-wage standards, and strikes and closed shops had 
long been outlawed. … Even the liberalization following 1987 subsequently gave way 
to massive police interventions to break up serious strikes in the 1990s and to 
antilabor laws in 1996. Only with the election of Kim Dae-Jung in 1997 did Korean 
labor seem to have an official governmental ally.   
 
On top of the democratization and liberalization of labour policy, the DJ government 
focused on removing the harmful consequences of crony capitalism by introducing, for 
the first time, a ‘modern’ legal system concerning financial structure and corporate 
governance (Pirie, 2008: 129). The economic crisis was the fundamental background to 
all these policy activities. The intervention of international organizations also played a 
significant role in removing the old conventions of the developmental state. For 
example, the IMF demanded the removal of restrictions on capital account transactions 
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in exchange for financial assistance and the DJ government accepted this demand in 
hopes of attracting foreign investment (Ha & Lee, 2007: 902). However, DJ’s identity as 
the leader of the distributional allies was most prominent in this process of replacing 
the old regime with a new one. Given such dynamics, the centre-left governments 
continued to implement reforms of the previous ‘coercive industrial policy’ and 
‘oppressive labour policy’, which had been the two strongest weapons of the Korean 
developmental state.   
 
The ideological position of the developmental state requires special attention, given 
that the removal of state intervention from financial structure and international trade 
does not necessarily mean the end of plan-rational state. As Kohli (1999) puts it, East 
Asian developmental states opted for ‘active market manipulation’ instead of deifying 
‘the market’, but in ways that were ‘market enhancing rather than market rejecting’. 
In this sense of mercantilism, the DJ government was second to none, compared with 
previous Korean governments. Beyond introducing some of the roles of the ‘regulatory 
state’, the DJ government also made every effort to discover and nurture new kinds of 
national strategic industries, such as Information Technology and Bio-Technology. To 
illustrate, after running through DJ’s IT policy, Choi and Kim (2005: 49) concluded that 
it was definitely a familiar kind of ‘state-led, supplier-centred, quantity-focused’ policy. 
Note that under the DJ government, culture technology (CT) became one of the six 
growth-driving technologies, including IT and BT, that the government decided to 
promote intensively.   
 
The last section confirmed that this scheme of transition and transformation from the 
Korean developmental state, which is clearly shown in its industrial policy, applies well 
to the development of Korean cultural policy. Korean cultural policy started under 
Park’s government, resembling industrial policy and serving several ideological functions. 
Before the advent of democratization in 1987 the policy initiatives were orientated 
around display in favour of the government, and not to the ordinary people’s needs or 
audience demand. Under the Roh Tae-Woo government, autonomous cultural policies 
emerged for the first time in Korea, and under the YS government Korean CI policy was 
launched officially with the establishment of the CI Bureau. Nonetheless, as was the 
case in industrial policy, these reforms did not bear fruit in the cultural policy field. 
Regardless of government rhetoric, during the transition period the cultural sector 
(including CI) continued to be regarded as an add-on, as the underdeveloped 
organization, delayed legislation and curtailed budget for it suggest.  
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Nobody expected all these Issues to be completely changed under the DJ government, 
which was inaugurated in the middle of an unprecedented, traumatic financial crisis. 
Born at the crossroads between cultural policy and industrial policy and at the 
transitional juncture between the developmental and the neo-developmental (or neo-
liberal) eras, the subject of Korean cultural industries policy can be, indeed, considered 
a salient point from which one can get a sense of the subtle and complicated position 
that the Korean neo-developmental state has been recently seeking or been subjected 
to. However, before scrutinizing the shift in Korean CI policy since 1998, coordinated, 
rather than directed, by the DJ government, it is essential to discuss the methodology 
that this research has adopted.  
  
93 
 
4. Methodology  
 
 
This chapter outlines and reflects on the methods used in my research to inform the 
work that follows in the subsequent chapters. I originally intended to compare the 
British and Korean CI policy shifts since 1997 to examine the creative turn in national 
cultural policy around the world in parallel with the rise of the new economy. However, 
it was found during the review of existing research reports that in contrast to the British 
policy shift, the similar shift in Korean cultural industries policy had not been the topic 
of comprehensive and critical investigation. What emerged from this observation was 
the need to focus on the Korean experience to provide the cultural policy research field, 
both domestic and international, with a new explanatory dimension.  
 
Hence, while maintaining the original interest in the creative turn pursued by many 
countries across the world, this research turned into a case study on the Korean 
government’s CI policy. The primary aim was to describe what happened in the Korean 
CI policy arena during the shift and to explain how and why that policy shift was first 
initiated and then realized in the way that it was. It was expected that since the Korean 
policy shift had been received as not only a very radical, but also a successful case in 
the East Asian region, the case study could yield a meaningful and generalizable 
perspective that would lead to a better understanding of the background and the 
procedures involved in the fashionable rise of creativity discourse in the world’s cultural 
policy arena. To put it another way, this research is an ‘explanatory case study’ in 
terms of the Korean CI policy shift, but simultaneously is an ‘exploratory case study’ in 
terms of the world-wide creative turn in national cultural policy (cf. Yin, 2003: 5-7).  
 
Conducting a case study is a comprehensive research strategy rather than merely a 
method of data collection (Doyle & Frith, 2006: 565; Gillham, 2000: 13), and therefore 
appropriate methods need to be carefully chosen for their fit to the purpose of the case 
study. As Creswell (2007: 37-39) noted, qualitative approaches are recommended when 
researchers have to collect data in ‘natural settings’ rather than in a contrived situation, 
when they need to gather ‘multiple forms of data’ rather than relying on a single data 
source, and when there is a need to ‘collect data themselves’ through documentation, 
observation and interviews instead of drawing on questionnaires or instruments 
developed by other researchers. Since there was a narrow range of research on the 
topic, it was inevitable for the researcher to adopt qualitative approaches. In this vein, 
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several qualitative methods and strategies were mobilized, of which desk-based 
research, semi-structured interviews and two smaller case studies are the most notable. 
 
The first step was to draw up a historical and conceptual map of the Korean CI policy 
field. Desk research was a necessary method for collecting relevant data for this 
purpose. Many secondary sources published by other scholars were first gathered and 
analyzed. This was followed by intensive collection and in-depth analysis of various 
kinds of policy documents produced during the policy shift, such as long-term policy 
plans, a variety of White Papers, 23  and presidential speeches. With the help of an 
outline produced during the desk research, semi-structured interviews with key figures 
were designed and conducted to explore the issues further. The people who were 
directly involved in the policy shift furnished new and invaluable data and perspectives. 
Finally, this case study of one country’s CI policy shift employed smaller case studies of 
two representative quangos in the policy field. They were chosen to provide more 
detailed information and evidence about the policy shift while complementing the 
broad interest at the level of national cultural policy. These three methods are 
explained in turn below.  
 
 
4.1 Desk-Based Research 
 
Desk-based research or documentary research was the starting point of this project. As 
Derrida (1976) noted with the concept of the ‘metaphysics of presence’, Western 
philosophy has valued speech more than writing, pushing out the latter to a marginal 
and secondary position. This seems to correspond well to a trend which underestimates 
the role of documentation in the social research field. However, are documents only a 
subsidiary source? Directly challenging this trend, Prior (2003: 26) argues: 
 
Documents form a ‘field’ for research in their own right, and should not be 
considered as mere props to human action. Documents need to be considered as 
situated products, rather than as fixed and stable ‘things’ in the world. … 
Documents are produced in social settings and are always to be regarded as 
collective (social) products. Determining how documents are consumed and used in 
organized settings – that is, how they function – should form an important part of 
any social scientific research project. Content is not the most important feature of a 
document.  
 
Concisely, desk research has at least two distinctive dimensions. Documents need to be 
                                                          
23 In Korea, the term, ‘White Paper’ is used to denote an annual report of governmental activities rather than forerunners 
to legislation.  
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first examined as the ‘containers’ of existing content, and their function as active 
signifying ‘agents’ also needs to be traced. Put another way, a document can be the 
object of not only ‘content’ analysis, but also ‘discourse’ analysis which further 
concerns the author, authority, audience, and objective of the text in terms of ‘the 
application of power’ (Jupp, 1996: 300). During the early stage of my desk research, 
documents were treated as a mere ‘resource’ for content analysis; yet as document 
collection proceeded and other kinds of data were collated, the documents became 
another ‘topic’ themselves, requiring discourse analysis to see beyond their textual 
content (Prior, 2008: 824). This development may be viewed as a matter of necessity, 
rather than of choice, for a policy research project like this study. Two phases of 
documentary research need to be distinguished: the review of ‘secondary’ documents 
and the collection and analysis of ‘primary’ documents (cf. Finnegan, 1996: 141-143).24  
 
As noted, this study started with a review of a variety of literature on the CI policy in 
both the UK and in Korea. Since New Labour’s Britain was the most conspicuous 
reference point for this new trend in the global cultural policy arena, the literature on 
the British policy shift was examined first. Major electronic academic databases, such as 
socIndex, ASSIA, Index of Theses, were searched with the key words of ‘creative 
industries’, ‘cultural industries’ and ‘creativity’. Key policy documents, published by 
the DCMS and major quangos, were briefly examined as well. After becoming familiar 
with both academic and policy documents on the rise of CI policy, the British policy 
shift was summarized to provide a lens with which the Korean experience could be 
looked into. This summarization required a conceptual framework that covered the 
different aspects of the policy shift. As shown in Chapter 2, three aspects were stressed: 
How and why was the policy shift initiated and developed (the process of the policy 
shift)? What kind of policy framework came about during the process (its product)? And 
how have both the policy shift and the policy framework been evaluated (its 
performance)? 
 
Following that, the literature on Korean CI policy making was searched, categorized and 
analyzed in a similar way. Since there was an extremely narrow range of research on 
the Korean CI policy (shift) in English, a far greater amount of time was spent searching 
Korean databases. Two major academic search engines in Korea (that is, KISS and RISS) 
were mobilized. In addition, in order to identify the policy research reports written by 
government-sponsored researchers, the digital archives of the Culture Ministry and its 
                                                          
24 ‘Primary’ source is defined here as ‘the basic and original material for providing the researcher’s raw evidence’.   
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major quangos (including research institutions) were searched time and again. Although 
the academic articles and the policy reports were very helpful for understanding the 
historical context, current structure and core issues of the Korean CI policy arena, I 
could not find any research in which the CI policy shift became a theme in its own right. 
At this stage of desk research, a possibly key variable between the British and Korean 
experiences emerged: the concept of the developmental state. However, it was not 
explored in detail until the end of the field work.  
 
Meanwhile, the research scope was revised to focus on the Korean case. This marked 
the beginning of the second round of my documentary research: the collection and 
analysis of primary documents. Three kinds of documents deserve separate attention. 
First of all, two types of ‘official state’ documents and records were collected (Scott, 
1990: 14).25 To understand the direction of the policy shift, I identified and gathered 
key long-term policy plans published by the Korean Culture Ministry and its major 
quangos during DJ and Roh’s presidencies. The homepage of the Culture Ministry 
(http://www.mcst.go.kr) was not that useful, especially since its archive did not 
contain some of the key plans. Fortunately, most of the plans were available in the 
digital archive of the National Assembly Library (http://www.nanet.go.kr). Since KOCCA 
and KOFIC were to be my smaller case studies, particular attention was paid to their 
plans as well. Then, to understand what activities were implemented to realize the 
plans and how the activities were evaluated by the Ministry itself, I collected and 
reviewed the White Papers on ‘Korean cultural policy’ and ‘Korean CI policy’ which 
contain the annual review of activities of the Ministry and its quangos. White Papers for 
individual genres of Korean CI, published by the quangos for themselves, were also 
included in this process. Most of them were available through the on-line archives of the 
Korean Culture and Tourism Institute (KCTI), the individual quangos or the National 
Assembly Library. These official documents provided foundational data for the analysis 
of the official definitions, the perceived problems, and the preferred solutions 
concerning the Korean CI policy shift.  
 
The second kind of documents comprised those produced by key figures. These included 
both ‘official’ and ‘personal’ documents. Above all, since it became clear at this stage 
that the role of President Kim Dae-Jung was decisive in the policy transformation, his 
presidential speech books, (auto)biographies, letters, and so forth were collected. The 
                                                          
25  According to Scott (1990), documents may be roughly divided into official or personal ones according to their 
‘authorship’. The documents which have their source in bureaucracies can be viewed as official ones, which can be 
further divided into official state and official private documents.  
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Korean digital Presidential Archive (http://www.pa.go.kr), the archives of the Kim Dae-
Jung Presidential Library & Museum (http://www.kdjlibrary.org) and the Kim Dae-Jung 
Peace Centre (http://kdjpeace.com) were prominent sources for these documents. 
Among others, his presidential speech books required special attention on the grounds 
that they can be considered to be the most influential and official documents in the 
Korean policy arena. Hence, the speeches that contain words such as ‘culture’, 
‘creativity’ and ‘cultural industries’ were all listed and scrutinized. A similar type of 
data collection and examination was applied to the speeches of his successor, President 
Roh. Compared to DJ, Roh made far fewer speeches which contained those key words. 
In addition, the speeches that the Culture Ministers made under the two governments 
were reviewed on the Culture Ministry’s homepage.  
 
The last kind of documents collected comprised non-official documents. Two types of 
data were especially notable. First, in order to assess the Korean media’s view of the 
policy transformation and the core events during the shift, I searched KINDS 
(http://www.kinds.or.kr), the ‘state-of-the art database system’ of Korean news 
articles managed by the Korea Press Foundation, a quango under the Culture Ministry.26 
Then, the statements and reviews produced by key NGOs and interest groups in the 
cultural sector were collected through search engines provided by DAUM and NAVER, 
two flagship internet portal sites in the Korean language. While the first two types of 
documents collected were ‘internal documents’ published by official policy participants, 
these final two types were categorized as ‘external documents’ on the policy shift, and 
these provided an alternative perspective from which the somewhat subjective 
descriptions and interpretations of major events in the official documents could be 
supplemented and also challenged. 
 
This document collection and the following preliminary investigation were important in 
designing the field work as well as in building up a knowledge base for the research. 
However, the field work in Korea in turn made a huge difference to the later process of 
documentary research. It enabled my desk research to proceed from ‘textual’ analysis 
to ‘discourse’ analysis (Fairclough, 2003: 3). I shall now turn to the second major 
method for the research, the semi-structured interviews.  
 
 
                                                          
26 KINDS (Korean Integrated Newspaper Database System) was established in January 1990, and offers over 12 million 
media articles from not only major central and local daily newspapers, but also internet newspapers, televised news text, 
weekly newspapers, etc.  
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4.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
The major part of the field work in Korea between August and November 2009 was 
taken up with conducting interviews with key figures directly involved in the policy shift. 
At the early stage of research design, interviews were considered necessary for verifying 
the findings from the desk research through comparison with the elite participants’ 
voices. They would also allow for the collection of direct and original data that was 
simply unavailable or intentionally hidden in the published documents. In preparing for 
the field work, therefore, the first task involved identifying the key figures that led or 
witnessed the Korean CI policy shift and that could thereby provide authoritative 
descriptions and explanations of it. 
 
In addressing this issue, the knowledge gained through the earlier desk research was 
actively mobilized. For example, during the desk research I discovered that the three CI 
Bureau chiefs under the DJ government played a pivotal role, because many media 
articles at that time interviewed them or were written drawing on their statements 
covering almost all significant events in the CI policy arena.  Besides, the three civil 
servants not only made key decisions at the Ministry level under DJ’s presidency, but 
were all also promoted to the position of Vice Minister or Assistant Minister in the 
following Roh administration. Therefore, in terms of both time-span and interest-scope, 
they were regarded as the most promising informants for this research. After listing 
their names, the media articles were re-read to avoid stereotypical questions and to 
develop questions that fitted the interests of this research project. Through a similar 
kind of selection process, a list of potential interviewees was produced which covered 
three broad sectors: the Ministry, major quangos, and government-supported research 
institutions.    
 
These potential interviewees were contacted via e-mail or telephone. Some were not 
available, yet new names were introduced during the early interviews. Consequently, 
over the course of the three-month field work period spent in Korea, I was able to 
conduct thirty interviews with twenty-six interviewees (See Appendix A for the whole 
list). The average interview length was about one and a half hours and all interviews 
were recorded. Since highly sensitive issues concerning the governance of the policy 
field were to be discussed, it was agreed that the recordings should be kept private. All 
respondents agreed to be cited in my research by name, on the condition that they 
could review any direct citations before publication.  
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Among the many forms interviews can take, the semi-structured face-to-face interview 
was chosen. The reason for selecting semi-structured open-ended interviews was that 
they are very useful for obtaining ‘descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with 
respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena’ (Kvale, 1996: 5-6). 
Since all my interviewees’ life worlds were the policy arena where the policy shift had 
happened, this technique was viewed as highly appropriate to the researcher’s interest. 
 
The use of the interview as a research method is nothing mysterious: An interview is 
a conversation that has a structure and a purpose. It goes beyond the spontaneous 
exchange of views as in every day conversation, and becomes a careful questioning 
and listing approach with the purpose of obtaining thoroughly tested knowledge 
(Ibid.).  
 
In short, the semi-structured interview can be defined as an art of ‘ordered but flexible 
questioning’ (Dunn, 2000: 61). Therefore, before the interviews a guideline was 
prepared with a dozen questions which emerged during the desk research as core areas 
to be explored. In practice, however, according to both the interviewee’s role in the 
shift and the information about the interviewee that I was able to gain before the 
interview, some questions were not asked, new questions were added, or the same 
questions were asked in a different order and form. During the interviews, the format of 
face-to-face individual conversation in a naturalized setting turned out quite useful. 27 It 
enabled me to openly ask about the respondents’ practices and reactions, as well as 
their feelings and impressions concerning major events and principles of the policy shift. 
This resulted in a large amount of highly detailed data (Johnson, 2002). In addition, the 
interview method allowed me to observe closely the interviewees’ nonverbal responses 
and thus discern their distinctively sensitive positions and memories (Kadushin & 
Kadushin, 1997: 309-311).   
 
Once the interviews were completed, they were first transcribed in Korean and later 
partly in English. To make sense of the large amount of qualitative data required highly 
intuitive work. However, since the same dozen questions were asked in nearly all of the 
interviews, the coding process was not so difficult. As expected, in the course of 
reading and highlighting the transcripts, several repeated themes and ideas which the 
researcher had not recognized earlier started to emerge across the various responses. 
As the analysis proceeded, therefore, the list of key issues against which the transcripts 
were categorized and compared was inevitably and constantly renewed. Meanwhile, the 
                                                          
27 All interviews were individual interviews with one exception. When interviewing KOFIC’s staff, I had to meet two 
researchers at the same time at their request.  
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transcripts were analyzed in order. The interviews with civil servants and Ministers were 
analyzed first. The analysis of the interviews with quango personnel and policy 
researchers followed in turn. This phased analysis of the transcripts contributed to 
producing and developing workable data sets, and also to comprehending the three 
groups’ different positions and perspectives.  
 
These data sets were then connected to the broad conceptual framework of this 
research, that is, the process, product and performance of the Korean policy shift. 
Although the framework emerged in the early stage of desk research, it appeared still 
useful for presenting the findings from the interviews. Hence, the three areas of the 
framework could each be deployed as the main theme of one of the three findings 
chapters. Therefore, I sought to connect the findings from the interviews with those 
from the documentation in relation to each theme. There is an important point to be 
made concerning this stage. As noted earlier, before the field work in Korea, I had 
mainly treated the related policy documents as passive ‘resources’ or inert ‘containers’. 
However, interviewing the people who planned and/or produced such documents 
enabled me to view the ways in which they were actually called upon and functioned in 
the policy arena. As I understood ‘the documents in action’ (Prior, 2008) during the 
policy shift, the documents also started their second role of active ‘agent’ within my 
research, incorporating themselves into the core organizations, institutions and people 
in the policy field. For instance, when I first read Contents Korea Vision 21 (MCT, 
2001b), a long-term plan for CI promotion published in June 2001, I was perplexed by 
the sudden appearance of a new term, ‘cultural contents industries’, at a time when 
the Ministry was still actively using the traditional term ‘cultural industries’. When I 
met the CI Bureau chief who first introduced that concept, I was able to understand 
how furious the competition between the Ministries was around the leadership of 
promoting digital industries and what kind of results this struggle brought about. This 
kind of first-hand knowledge enabled me to re-read all the documents from a different 
perspective and thus to understand the functions and implications of the documents 
more properly.  
 
Accordingly, as the analysis of the interview transcripts progressed, it was necessary to 
continue revising the original narrative assumed during previous documentary research. 
In turn, the new understanding of the key policy documents enabled a more 
comprehensive investigation of the interview transcripts. This stage of articulating the 
findings from interviews and from documentation was understood by the researcher to 
prove that qualitative research can only be a highly ‘interpretive inquiry’ and thus an 
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‘emergent’ process rather than tightly prefigured one (Creswell, 2007: 39).  
 
 
4.3 Case Studies   
 
The last research method to be explained is the case study method applied to two 
quangos, the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) and the Korea Culture and Content Agency 
(KOCCA). As noted earlier, this thesis itself can be regarded as an explanatory case 
study of the Korean CI policy shift that took place under the two centre-left 
governments (1998-2008). At the same time, it can be considered as an exploratory case 
study which seeks to contribute to the understanding of the fashionable creative turn 
across the world through the transformative experience of a former developmental 
state. For this purpose, the examination of the role of representative CI promotion 
quangos was indispensable, because the quangos have been widely understood to be not 
only one of the most important products of the policy shift, but also one of the most  
important agents of the policy shift after their establishment or transformation. At the 
core of the Korean CI policy shift, it may be said, was a group of emergent CI promotion 
quangos which displayed the ambivalent character of product-agent. This establishes an 
ideal condition for the use of the case study method.  
 
[The] Case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin, 2003: 13) 
 
Why, then, were KOFIC and KOCA chosen as the objects of the smaller case studies? To 
explain this choice, it is useful to outline the contours of the CI policy arena in the early 
days of the policy shift. Before the inauguration of the DJ government, there had been 
only two quangos with a remit for cultural industries promotion. The first was the 
Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation (KMPPC) for film promotion; and the other 
was the Korea Broadcasting Institute (KBI) for broadcasting promotion. However, since 
the latter was more like a research institution that covered various issues around the 
broadcasting industry and the related policies, the KMPPC had been in fact the only 
quango for CI promotion in Korea. To make things worse, the quango had long suffered 
from strong criticisms by the film industry that it was not only incompetent but also too 
authoritarian. Since the newly-elected DJ government had great interest in and passion 
for nurturing CI, this problematic situation needed to be addressed quickly. Therefore, 
DJ’s Culture Ministry selected five strategic genres among Korean CI for intensive 
promotion (i.e. film, broadcasting, games, animation and popular music) (MCT, 1998; 
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1999a), and decided to make one quango for the promotion of each genre. The two 
strategies employed to do this were to transform existing quangos and to establish new 
ones.  
 
Following the first of these strategies, the KBI was expanded and the KMPPC was 
transformed into KOFIC. In the case of the KBI, however, the expansion did not change 
its major function as research institute for the broadcasting industry. In contrast, the 
transformation of the KMPPC into KOFIC in May 1999 was indeed a paradigm shift in the 
policy arena. Many film industry experts who had once criticized the KMPPC heavily 
came to actively participate in formulating DJ’s cultural pledges and then realizing 
them in the policy field. The establishment of KOFIC was one of the major pledges 
concerning cultural matters. For these reasons, KOFIC was chosen as the most 
appropriate case study, and moreover, the only case which could provide opportunities 
to directly compare the situations existing before and after the policy shift at the level 
of a single (transformed) quango. 
 
Of the newly established quangos, the first to be set up was the Korea Games Promotion 
Centre (KGPC) for games promotion. This was followed by the establishment of KOCCA 
for the final two of the five genres highlighted by the Culture Ministry, animation and 
popular music. KOCCA was chosen instead of the KGPC for three reasons. Firstly, the 
success of the KGPC prepared the ground for the establishment of KOCCA, which was 
consequently based on the KGPC model.  Therefore, examining KOCCA would enable the 
experience of the KGPC to be learned, but not vice versa. Secondly, while the KGPC was 
created only two months after the establishment of KOFIC, KOCCA was established 
about two years later in August 2001. KOCCA can therefore furnish an opportunity to 
comprehend the change in atmosphere over the two-year take-off period of the new 
Korean CI policy. Finally, since it was established when the cultural industries were 
designated as one of the national strategic industries in Korea, KOCCA was designed to 
be and actually became a symbolic CI promotion quango. It started as a quango for the 
promotion of minor genres of CI, such as animation, comics and music industries, but 
evolved into the ‘head temple’ (KOCCA, 2009: 23) for Korean CI promotion charged with 
taking care of the whole eco-system of Korean CI. This evolution ended up with KOCCA’s 
merger with, or acquisition of, the KBI and KOGIA (the former KGPC) under the current 
Lee government in May 2009,28 when the researcher was preparing for the field work. 
                                                          
28 On 7 May 2009, KOCCA merged with the Korea Games Industry Agency (KOGIA), the Korea Broadcasting Institute 
(KBI), the Cultural Contents Centre, and the Digital Contents Business Group (which had belonged to Korea IT industry 
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Therefore, KOCCA was regarded as the only quango with the same significance as KOFIC, 
and provided a good example of the establishment and growth of a completely new 
quango.  
 
Because examining these two quangos was initially part of the broader research design, 
the researcher did not employ any additional data collection methods for the case 
studies. As explained, during desk research and interviews these case studies were an 
essential part of the inquiry and investigation. During the early stage of analysis, these 
case studies seemed to be well used as part of the second findings chapter (Chapter 6) 
which deals with the product of the Korean CI policy shift. However, further analyses 
confirmed that these quangos were not merely the most visible products of the shift, 
but also pivotal factors and agents of the shift. Therefore, it was judged better to 
designate a separate chapter (Chapter 7) for the two cases, with the aim of re-
examining the process and the product of the national CI policy shift from the 
perspective of the major quangos.  
 
In this light, the role of these case studies in the research project may be summarized 
in three distinctive senses. Above all, since the two quangos were representative 
product-agents of the Korean CI policy shift, examining their experiences in greater 
detail can complement the findings from the examination of the policy shift from the 
perspective of a broader interest in national CI policy. That is, these more micro-level 
descriptions and explanations would be conducive to fleshing out the fuller picture of 
the Korean CI policy shift. The case studies can also be used as means of ‘triangulation’ 
(Gillham, 2000: 29-30). What were the common policy practices that KOFIC and KOCCA 
both focused on implementing? Did they follow the broader direction of the new CI 
policy that the MCT endeavoured to introduce and promote? Addressing these kinds of 
questions can provide an opportunity to compare the perspectives of the major quangos 
and the records/documents they produced with the perspectives of the Culture Ministry 
and the records/documents it produced, in order to gain a more straightforward picture 
of the policy shift. Finally, even if both quangos were the key product-agents of the 
policy shift, they displayed significant differences from the beginning. They were 
created in different ways and at different stages of the policy shift. Therefore, tracing 
the reasons for the emergence of these differences at the outset and also the further 
differences that later ensued can lead to a better understanding of the structure and 
power-relations of the Korean CI policy field. It can therefore aid in the unravelling of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Promotion Agency). As a result, KOCCA changed its name from the ‘Korea Culture and Content Agency’ (2001-09) to 
the ‘Korea Creative Content Agency’.  
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several seemingly paradoxical phenomena observed in the process and the product of 
the policy shift.  
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the research methodology that underpins this thesis. Desk-
based research, semi-structured interviews and case studies constitute the major 
methods, and thus the rationale, context, procedure and significance of employing each 
method were explained in turn. In sum, desk research provided a knowledge base about 
the research topic and guidelines for the field work. The semi-structured interviews 
with key figures furnished first-hand information and perspectives unavailable in the 
published documents, and thereby transformed the desk research at the later stage 
from textual analysis to discourse analysis. Articulating these two sources to unravel or 
reconstruct the process, product and performance of the Korean CI policy shift was a 
very challenging, but rewarding process. Two case studies were employed for the 
purpose of providing a more detailed elaboration of the shift, validating the narratives 
from the Ministry level against the experiences of the major quangos, and deepening 
the understanding of the policy arena through the examination of the differences 
between the quangos.  
 
Through the whole process of the research, one of the major concerns was to ‘strike a 
balance between academic distance’ from the interviewees and understanding closely 
the ‘specific codes and conventions of their environment’ (Boyle, 1995: 36). It was 
indeed difficult to put myself in the various policy participants’ places to understand 
the varying meanings of the same policy process and product to them, while 
simultaneously trying to take a more comprehensive and critical stance myself. As a 
qualitative case study, it should be acknowledged, there was in the end nothing I could 
do other than to remain sensitive and aware in order not to allow ‘equivocal evidence 
or biased views to influence the direction of [my] findings and conclusions’ (Yin, 2003: 
10). The following four chapters present the results of these earnest efforts.   
 
  
105 
 
5. The Process of the Korean Cultural Industries (CI) Policy Shift 
 
 
A major shift has taken place in Korean CI policy over recent years, and this chapter 
presents my findings of why and how this shift has occurred. Focusing on Kim Dae-Jung’s 
presidency (1998-2003), when a progressive government gained power in the country for 
the first time, this chapter seeks to trace the new development of Korean CI policy 
chronologically and to clarify major landmarks in the process, including new policy 
initiatives and the establishment of new acts, plans and institutions.  
 
As noted earlier, Korea is well known for its compressed industrialization process. Being 
the biggest of the ‘four little dragons’ (Vogel, 1991) or ‘Asia’s next giant’ (Amsden, 
1989), Korea is representative of the developmental states during the post-Second 
World War period, and has achieved impressive economic growth by formulating and 
implementing a particular set of industrial and labour policies. This process was led by 
three military governments (1961-93), and thus led to a centralization of authoritarian 
power under the Office of the President that came to be institutionalized in Korea, 
which became a sort of ‘unipolar system’ with all powers being concentrated in the 
hands of ‘one person’ (Kim Y-M, 1996). Due to this particular history and this particular 
feature of Korean politics, it is not only appropriate but also methodologically sound to 
pay close attention to the context of the Presidents' decision-making processes in order 
to examine major policy changes in Korea.  
 
In Chapter 3, I briefly examined how Korean cultural policy evolved in accordance with 
its industrial policy during the country’s developmental and the transitional periods. I 
concluded that in real terms Korean CI policy emerged into the national policy arena 
during DJ’s presidency, even though it had been officially (yet ineffectually) initiated in 
1994 with the establishment of the CI Bureau. As the most charismatic leader and 
symbol of the opposition, DJ had been the ‘loathed-beyond-measure bete noire of the 
dictators’ for about three decades (Cumings, 1999b: 36). However, after his election 
victory in December 1997, DJ’s longstanding principle of the ‘parallel development of 
democracy and the market economy’ which had once been used to attack the 
authoritarian military governments became the prime principle of the new Korean 
government. Along with all the other policy reforms introduced by DJ, the CI policy shift 
under his presidency stemmed from this overarching principle.   
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In many speeches, DJ regarded himself as ‘a cultural president in the cultural age’. How 
and why, then, did the cultural president lead the CI policy shift and what kinds of 
consequences were delivered in the policy field? To answer this question, I shall 
distinguish three distinctive stages: (1) the period leading up to DJ’s inauguration, (2) 
his early presidency, and (3) his late presidency. The first section draws on primary 
sources, such as historical records, news articles, letters and biographies, and deals 
with the formation of DJ’s key ideas about CI, and those who played a key role in the 
process. The second section explores how DJ’s ideas were first translated by his Culture 
Ministry during the early part of his presidency (1998-2000), and the CI policy landmarks 
that followed. Finally, the third section focuses upon the period 2001 to 2003, when the 
MCT (Ministry of Culture and Tourism) started to initiate various projects on its own, 
including the invention of new policy terms. During this period, the MCT drove a more 
ambitious and aggressive CI promotion policy in order to compete with other ministries. 
The final two sections will mainly draw on two sources: interviews with key witnesses of 
the policy shift and key policy documents produced by the MCT and its quangos.  
 
 
5.1 Early Influences over Kim Dae-Jung’s Approach to CI Policy: 1980-98 
 
Two factors appear to have had a significant influence on the type of CI policy that DJ 
implemented; the convictions born of his life and political experience as an opposition 
leader, and the range of political-economic conditions that prevailed when he came to 
office. In addition, a number of advisers and experts were influential in helping him link 
these convictions and experiences to the necessities of the political economic 
conditions. Therefore, this section deals with the period starting from his death 
sentence in 1980 up to his presidential inauguration in 1998, and focuses on what DJ’s 
main philosophy of CI policy was, on how and why it was formed, and on its significance. 
Three figures had an important impact on the development of DJ’s political philosophy, 
namely, Alvin Toffler, Anthony Giddens and Lee Kuan-Yew. DJ wanted to go beyond the 
East Asian developmental state model led by authoritarian leaders such as Singaporean 
Prime Minster Lee and South Korean General-President Park, and therefore actively 
embraced and mobilized Toffler’s idea of the ‘Third Wave’ (1980) and Giddens’s 
concept of the ‘Third Way’ (1998) in constructing his policy directions. CI policy was one 
of the policy areas where this strategy to overcome the limitations of the 
developmental state was executed most faithfully and thus revealed most clearly. 
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5.1.1 Reading Toffler in Prison: The Third Wave and Information Revolution 
 
In August 1973, DJ was kidnapped by Korean CIA agents in Tokyo and rescued by 
American CIA moments before being thrown into the sea. In December 1979, President 
Park was assassinated by the chief of Korean CIA, one of his closest associates. Between 
these two events, DJ was arrested and remained either in prison or under house arrest.  
DJ was pardoned after Park’s death, but before long Major General Chun Doo-Hwan took 
power in another military coup. Consequently, DJ and his associates were arrested 
under the Martial Act Command and sentenced to death on fabricated charges of 
treason in 1980. DJ’s key philosophy was formed during this time that he spent in prison. 
Recalling those painful days, First Lady Lee Hee-Ho (2008: 235) wrote in her biography: 
 
Two days after the reduction from Death to life imprisonment [25 January 1981], my 
husband told me that since he no longer needed to fear death, from then on he 
would prefer to read about history, philosophy, theology, economics and national 
defence than religion. … The prison was the very university where he was able to 
focus on reading, thinking and faith, and thereby to train and enrich his soul. … I 
sent him about 500-600 books over those 2 years and 6 months.  
 
Of the many books he read in prison, there is no doubt that Arnold Toynbee, one of the 
most famous British historians, had the greatest influence on DJ, as confirmed in several 
of his letters and interviews (cf. Kim, 2000: 93-101). DJ read A Study of History (1934-
61) again and again, and internalized Toynbee’s framework of human history, including 
the concepts of ‘challenge and response’, while summarizing impressive historic cases 
to be used as key references later. What then is the challenge the contemporary world 
is facing? DJ found the answer in Alvin Toffler’s book, The Third Wave (1980). However, 
it was not only Toffler’s book which influenced DJ’s thought; they met face-to-face for 
the first time in September 1997 when the Asian Financial Crisis was deepening and DJ 
had become a presidential candidate for the fourth time. During the meeting, DJ 
answered Toffler’s first question about the restructuring needed for Korea as follows:  
 
First of all, I want to mention that your books have affected my philosophy a lot. I 
read The Third Wave in prison. Your books, including Future Shock and Power Shift, 
have had great influence on all of us. In them, you stressed ‘demassifying’ and 
‘decentralizing’. …The Korean economic structure also needs to be decentralized by 
breaking the links through which the government controls the banks and thus the 
conglomerates. (Hanguk-Gyeongje, 1997) 
 
During this meeting, Toffler gave his word that if DJ won the election, he would help his 
government (Donga-Ilbo, 1998a). When this came about, Toffler visited Seoul to become 
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DJ’s adviser. During this visit, Toffler said, ‘there are not many national leaders who 
have an accurate perception of the importance of informationalization. I would like to 
share my vision with President Kim’ (Hankook-Ilbo, 1998). How did that ‘sharing’ 
develop thereafter?  
 
In March 2000, Toffler came to Korea once again to deliver lectures at the APEC (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation) Seoul Forum, which DJ suggested at the APEC Summit in 
1999. Later, in June 2001, he revisited Korea to give DJ a briefing of his policy report, 
Beyond the Crisis: Korea in the 21st Century (Toffler Associates, 2001). Suggesting seven 
urgent tasks for the sustainable development of the Korean economy, Toffler stressed 
that ‘Korea stands at the crossroad of a choice. If Korea does not choose for itself, the 
choice will be forced. The choice is between being left as a subjected country with a 
low-cost labour economy, or becoming a leading country in world economy by ensuring 
its competitiveness’ (Segye-Ilbo, 2001). In his following lectures and interviews in Seoul, 
he kept stressing that the ‘new economy’, the ‘knowledge-based economy’ or the 
‘Third Wave economy’ must be the key for the survival of post-crisis Korea.  
 
How then is Toffler’s role to be evaluated? On 4 September 2000, DJ had a special joint 
interview with three major Broadcasting companies in Korea. When asked what the 
motive behind his strong drive toward the knowledge economy was, DJ answered that 
he had always wanted to promote the coming of the information age in Korea ‘after 
reading Alvin Toffler’s The Third Wave’, but did not have the opportunity as an 
opposition leader. ‘That is why I strongly drove policies in that direction as soon as I 
became President’, DJ added (Kukmin-Ilbo, 2000). There is another interesting episode. 
About four years after DJ’s retirement, Toffler visited DJ’s house in Seoul on 31 May 
2007. This time, DJ more clearly declared that ‘the most influential person for the 
informationalization of Korea must be Dr. Toffler’ (Newsmaker, 2007).   
 
 
5.1.2 Meeting Giddens in Cambridge: the Third Way and Productive Welfare  
 
Another key adviser was the also internationally known academic, Anthony Giddens, 
who unlike Toffler, was not officially appointed as an advisor by DJ. However, his 
influence on the Korean policy field was just as great as Toffler’s, and all the 
fundamental philosophies of the DJ government bear the mark of his influence. It was in 
Cambridge in 1993 that DJ first met Giddens. After losing the 1992 election, DJ retired 
from politics and departed to Cambridge in order to start a new career as a researcher. 
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During this period (January to June 1993), he maintained a close relationship with his 
neighbours, one of whom was Giddens. Both publicly and privately, they had many 
discussions with each other. For example,  
 
The 20th century is the century when the human beings have universalized 
democracy. However, the democracy of the 20th-century is still a democracy that 
works within the nation state. Therefore, even democratic countries pursue their 
own interests at the cost of others. Now we need to go beyond such a nation-state 
democracy so that the human rights and happiness of all the nations and states can 
be guaranteed equally. …. When I stayed in Cambridge, I discussed this type of 
democracy with its famous scholars such as Anthony Giddens and John Dunn. Giddens 
told me that he was considering calling this ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. I suggested 
that he call it ‘global democracy’. (Kim, 1998a: 56) 
 
Why is this relationship between DJ and Giddens important? First of all, the similarity 
between DJ’s and Giddens’s thoughts about desirable political ideology is noteworthy. 
While in prison, DJ established his foundational positions not only about the 
contemporary challenge (i.e. the information revolution), but also about the 
contemporary response to it (i.e. the parallel development of democracy and the 
market economy). This thesis of parallel development takes Britain as its model. 
 
In theory, modernization (in economic sense) does not need to be developed in 
parallel with democracy. Both are the products of the genius of British people. 
Watching British experiences, we can find that by becoming the cause and result to 
each other the two have developed successfully to become a model. Many countries 
have learned this from Britain. Two different types of learning can be traced. The US 
and France took modernization and democracy together, while Prussia, Japan and 
Russia took only modernization, rejecting democracy. … Roughly speaking, the US 
and France has made sustainable development by overcoming several crises and 
maintaining national cohesion. To be contrary, the countries which rejected 
democracy pressed their nationals inside and kept engaging with invading wars 
outside. As a result, Russia became a communist country, and Japan and Germany 
could not but suffer from their tragic defeat. (Kim, 1982/2000: 311)
29
  
 
On this ground, he pursued a position on Korean politics different from both the Minja 
Party that pursued the market economy at the cost of democracy, and from the Minjung 
Party which pursued democracy at the cost of the market economy (Kim, 1992). This 
perspective was also expressed as an objection to both General Park’s economic 
development and North Korea’s communism. Thus, it can be said that DJ’s political 
position is very similar to Giddens’s Third Way which went beyond neo-liberalism (i.e. 
Thatcherism) and old Labour’s corporatism.  
 
DJ’s answer to a question about ‘DJ-nomics’ during an interview in May 1999 provides a 
clear example of this position: ‘It is not neo-liberalism, which believes that the market 
                                                          
29 This was originally written on 23 September 1982 as his twenty-sixth prison letter.  
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is omnipotent. It is the pre-condition for establishing community on the basis of 
humanism. … I pursue the ‘Third Way’ that Giddens has advocated in the UK’ (Maeil-
Kyungje, 1999). On the other side, in his second visit of DJ’s presidency, Giddens said in 
an interview that he positioned DJ’s ideology as ‘centre-left’ after listening to DJ’s 
speech in Cambridge, and that the establishment of his government in Asia could be 
taken as  proof for the revival of social democracy (Hanguk-Gyeongje, 2001).  
 
To go into further detail, Giddens’s Third Way played a fundamental role in revising the 
Korean government’s philosophy. In August 1998, DJ initiated the ‘Second National 
Building’ movement (Kim, 1998c) on the basis of the parallel development thesis. 
However, after he mentioned for the first time the concept of ‘productive welfare’ in 
his 1999 New Year’s day speech, the basic philosophy of the government expanded from 
that of parallel development into the ‘trinity thesis’, so as to incorporate the new 
concept (Kim, 1999a; 1999b). The Korean media regarded this revision to be very 
significant in that it showed the DJ government’s turn from the neo-liberal reforms 
imposed by the IMF to the Third Way with the strong emphasis on new types of welfare 
system (Donga-Ilbo, 1999; Kyunghyang-Shinmun, 1999b). What, then, happened 
between August 1998 and January 1999?  
 
In October, Giddens visited Korea at the invitation of Han Sang-Jin, who was the Chief 
Secretary of the Presidential Committee on Policy Planning and who later translated 
The Third Way into Korean. During this first visit, Giddens met DJ in the Blue House (the 
official residence of the Korean President). According to a news article titled ‘Meeting 
between the Second National Building Movement and the Third Way’ (Maeil-Kyungje, 
1998), DJ asked about Giddens’s concept of ‘social partnership’ after explaining his 
‘Second National Building’ movement in this meeting. In the interview with Han on the 
next day, Giddens summarized the meeting as follows:  
 
When I met President Kim yesterday, we talked about this matter for quite some 
time. My concept of social investment means investment in human capital. The 
previous welfare state tried to help people in suffering by giving money. But what I 
am talking about is to create jobs through policies such as job training and education 
reform. (Donga-Ilbo, 1998b) 
 
In April 1999, DJ declared that since the previous year had seen the fruits of his radical 
reforms, from then on his government would pursue a policy of making Korea a 
‘productive welfare country’ (Segye-Ilbo, 1999). ‘This idea is what I have insisted on 
since I was an opposition leader. It is almost the same as the Third Way Anthony 
Giddens designed’, he elaborated. This is the secret behind the DJ administration’s 
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revision or expansion of the governmental philosophy in 1999. Giddens’s influence was 
very much decisive.  
 
 
5.1.3 Debate with Lee Kuan-Yew: Going beyond the Developmental State Model 
 
While Toffler inspired DJ’s convictions about the post-industrial society and the 
information revolution, Giddens strengthened his belief in parallel development and 
productive welfare. DJ had close relationships with them and actively utilized their 
ideas in his government policy. Even though the core concepts were absorbed by DJ at 
different times and for different reasons, in the long run they were intricately combined 
in DJ’s policy planning and CI policy making. DJ’s debate with Lee Kuan-Yew, 
Singapore’s former Prime Minster, can be considered an important moment in the 
process that lead to this combination.   
 
DJ (1994) published an article in Foreign Affairs, ‘Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s 
Anti-Democratic Values’. In this article he expressed his deep objection to Lee’s belief, 
suggested in the same journal a few months earlier, that Western-style democracy was 
not applicable to East Asia. Setting this argument off against his parallel development 
thesis, DJ defined it as ‘lingering doubts’, which have been raised mainly by ‘Asia's 
authoritarian leaders, Lee being the most articulate among them’. DJ went on to argue 
that Lee's view of Asian cultures is ‘not only unsupportable but self-serving’. 
 
A key point is that this article shows how DJ combined the parallel development and the 
information revolution theses in order to both describe and prescribe the Asian political 
and economic context. For instance, from the following quotation, one can infer 
paradoxically his perception of impeding crisis in the East Asian political economy that 
arguably foreshadows the coming Asian financial Crisis.  
 
Despite the stubborn resistance of authoritarian rulers like Lee, Asia has made great 
strides toward democracy. … The Asian economies are moving from a capital- and 
labor-intensive industrial phase into an information- and technology-intensive one. 
Many experts have acknowledged that this new economic world order requires 
guaranteed freedom of information and creativity. These things are possible only in 
a democratic society. Thus Asia has no practical alternative to democracy; it is a 
matter of survival in an age of intensifying global economic competition. (Kim, 1994) 
 
Compare the above statement with the below statement written in the prison era.  
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Firstly, democratic countries such as Britain, the US and France prepared the 
institutional structures through which the contradictions of the modernization 
process, especially the working class's or common people's discontent can be 
instantly expressed through the free press or the political system before it 
accumulates and becomes cemented. This is why they have succeeded in overcoming 
several crises so efficiently, as their histories show. Secondly, on the other hand, the 
countries which rejected democracy did not ensure freedom of the press and thus 
blocked the path through which the people's discontent could be formed and 
reflected. … When it is impossible to solve problems through public opinion and 
institutions, the dissatisfaction between people and the maldistribution of wealth 
cannot but increase more and more. (Kim, 1982/2000: 312)  
 
The second quotation is the original version of the parallel development thesis. Here, 
one can see a formula for a society’s sustainable development: democratic society → 
public sphere (established through freedom of expression including a free press) → 
social capital (ensured by naturally resolving discontent and dissatisfaction between 
people) → sustainable growth. What about the first quotation which combines the 
parallel development thesis with the informational revolution thesis? It suggests a 
similar, but slightly distinct formula for a society’s survival: democratic society → 
guaranteed freedom of information and creativity → the development of the new 
(knowledge) economy. It would be possible to call the former social capital logic and 
the latter creative capital logic. Both are based on the assumption that democratic 
society ensures a public sphere which can, in turn, produce significant capital for the 
economic development of society.    
    
These two logics of democratic advantage cannot be stressed enough, as far as DJ’s 
policy planning including CI policy is concerned. DJ often expressed the social capital 
logic in terms of the ‘arm’s length principle’ and the creative capital logic with the 
phrase of ‘CI as a new national basic industry’, as we shall see. The social capital logic 
seems to stress a political function of democracy in the development of the economy in 
general, while the creative capital logic emphasizes an economic role of democracy in 
the development of the new economy in particular. To go one step further, the former 
is primarily related to the removal of a negative environment for CI development 
through the abolition of conditions that deter the growth of the public sphere and thus 
social capital, while the latter is more concerned with the establishment of a positive 
environment by promoting the information society and thus creative capital. This is 
probably the reason why reactions to CI policy proposed by DJ tend to focus on either 
the radically increased interest in cultural value, or an extreme stress on CI’s economic 
value. However, it is not fair to judge DJ’s position either way, because the essence of 
DJ’s thinking is ‘parallel development’ ensured through democratic advantage.  
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   Table 5.1 DJ’s Two Logics of Democratic Advantage  
 
 
    
5.1.4 DJ’s Election Pledge and Inauguration Speech  
 
DJ’s long-held convictions were first translated into CI policy language through his 
election pledge and inauguration speech. In the 1992 election, DJ started to present his 
philosophy of cultural policy with the concept of the ‘arm’s length principle’ and 
suggested key pledges such as; reform of government and public organizations, a change 
in the government’s role, and an expansion of the government budget for the cultural 
sector (Koo, 2000: 142). In the 1997 election, while the broad positioning of policies was 
maintained, the promotion of CI rose to become one of the top objectives. For example, 
in his 1997 cultural pledge, among its 13 objectives the two most stressed were number 
one, ‘the abolition of censorship of culture and the arts, and the provision of an 
autonomous environment’, and number five, ‘nurturing cultural industries as  a national 
basic industry of the 21st century’ (Ibid.: 146-147). It is notable that these two 
objectives directly reflect the social capital logic and the creative capital logic 
respectively. 
 
Furthermore, in his inauguration speech, DJ clearly repeated the two logics of 
democratic advantage: 
 
The information age means that everyone will have access to information whenever 
and wherever and will be able to easily and cheaply make use of it. Only a 
democratic society will be able to take full advantage of benefits of the information 
age. … Culture is also one of the rising industries of the 21st century. Tourism, the 
convention industry, the audio-visual industry, and unique cultural commodities are 
a treasure trove for which a limitless market is awaiting. (Kim, 1998b)    
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According to my interview with Kim Moon-Hwan (November 2009), who was in charge of 
the cultural part of DJ’s inauguration speech, the script was revised several times in the 
direction which, for him, the ‘economic importance of CI was stressed too much’. When 
he asked the top authority what happened, the answer was that DJ himself had changed 
it. This episode indicates how firmly DJ held the belief that democratic reforms could 
ensure both social and creative advantage in the information age, and that that 
advantage could directly contribute to the economic performance of Korean CI. The 
fact that DJ stressed the importance of CI as one of the fundamental national industries 
of the 21st century in his inauguration speech was later proudly and repeatedly 
mentioned by his Ministers and civil servants at the MCT.  
 
 
5.2 CI Policy Development during Kim Dae-Jung’s Early Presidency: 1998-2000  
 
After finally winning the Presidential election in his fourth challenge, DJ brought about 
quite a few changes in the CI policy field which were highly significant for the future 
development of CI in Korea. It is undeniable that although DJ was the most important 
player in this shift, it could not have been achieved without the parts played by civil 
servants who responded actively to DJ’s call. An important aim of this section is to 
clarify how DJ’s longstanding convictions were translated into actual events by the civil 
servants at the Ministry. Other players such as quangos and experts in the industry, 
almost neglected by the previous governments, also played their parts. In tracing the 
process, two concepts require special attention: the ‘arm’s length principle’ and ‘CI as 
a new national basic industry’. The CI policymakers under the DJ government did not 
only use them as foundational concepts, but deliberately combined them to produce the 
assumed democratic advantages. This section deals with the early stage of DJ’s 
presidency, while the next focuses on the later stage.  
 
 
5.2.1 Establishment of the MCT and Expansion of the CI Bureau (February 1998) 
 
Preparing the inauguration, DJ declared that he would change the Ministry of Culture 
and Sport (MCS) into the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) as a means for 
governmental reform. A key change was to abolish the Department of Public 
Information and transfer its key divisions to the Culture Ministry. This is quite 
symptomatic of his policy, because when they had been part of the same ministry 
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before being separated in 1990, the cultural divisions had always come second and were 
subjected to the public information function. Now, the shoe was to be on the other foot! 
One direct result was the expansion of the CI Bureau within the MCT with its absorption 
of divisions which covered broadcasting and newspapers. Later, in August 1998, the 
Bureau also absorbed the Games Industry Division from the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare. Consequently, the CI Bureau was re-established to lead every sector of Korean 
CI, with its power and status significantly enhanced within the Ministry in terms of staff 
numbers, budget levels, and so forth. Two early episodes highlight the rising status of 
the Culture Ministry and its CI Bureau.  
 
In February 1998, the MCT became the first Ministry that was asked to present a report 
to the President under the new administration. According to Kim Sung-Jae (October 
2009), then Chair of the Advisory Committee to the MCT and later DJ’s last Culture 
Minister, since the Culture Ministry was still ‘one of the smallest’, this was a very 
unusual event and thus interpreted as a clear sign of ‘how strong DJ’s belief was in the 
importance of the cultural sector in the 21st century’. Besides, through this reporting, 
the MCT could take ‘arm’s length principle’ (hereafter, ALP) as its title phrase and 
further made it a buzzword of the DJ government. The first section of the report was 
titled ‘Supporting without Interfering’ and the President showed strong agreement with 
the title. Other Ministries took note and were extremely impressed by the event. That 
was one of the reasons why the ALP concept, usually circulating only in the cultural 
policy field, spread so widely beyond the MCT. As a result, ‘ALP became the principle of 
governance not only for culture and the arts sector, but for the whole sector of social 
policy in the DJ government’ (Kim Sung-Jae, October 2009). 
 
The other episode is DJ’s first meeting with high-ranking civil servants held on 27 April 
1998. During the conversation, the CI Bureau Chief intentionally asked DJ to ensure one 
more time the significance of CI to the civil servants gathered. DJ responded very 
decisively that if somebody still thought the cultural industries were not one of the 
‘national basic industries’, he or she would be absolutely wrong since ‘in the 21st 
century national power means economic and cultural power’, whereas it had meant 
‘economic and military power in the 20th’.  
 
Cultural industries, especially audio-visual industries have enormous added value. 
This is no less than shipbuilding or car manufacturing. A recent movie, ‘Titanic’ has 
earned more than $1 billion in international markets. ‘Jurassic Park’ directed by 
Spielberg earned $850 million. The animation, ‘Lion King’ earned $840 million. The 
total cost was only $50 million. To earn $850 million, all the Korean car 
manufacturers would have to export more than their entire annual output. … In 
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addition, cultural industries not only earn money, but spread Korea’s image around 
the world. In competing with other countries, both the quality of products and the 
image of the country are important. If the image is bad, the country cannot attract 
foreign investment. Culture is the means to polish the image. You cannot emphasize 
the importance of culture enough. (Kim, 1998d) 
 
Such aggressive official confirmation from the new President in front of all the key 
figures of his Ministries can be regarded as the turning point from which the weight of CI 
started to surpass that of culture and the arts for the first time in the history of Korean 
cultural policy and, more importantly, the point from which the power of the Culture 
Ministry started to surpass that of other small Ministries for the first time in the history 
of Korean government policy. 
 
 
5.2.2 Opening the Korean Market to Japanese Popular Culture (October 1998) 
 
On 20 October 1998, the Day of Culture in Korea, the MCT published The Government of 
the People’s New Policy for Culture and Tourism to ‘overcome the current crisis and 
realize the “Second National Building” through the power of culture’ (MCT, 1998). One 
of its action plans was to ‘open up the Korean market to Japanese popular culture’ in 
order ‘to realize universal globalism on the grounds of cultural identity’. On the same 
day, the ‘Basic Direction and Action Plans for Cultural Exchange between Korea and 
Japan’ was passed after deliberation in the cabinet meeting. As soon as a plan was 
suggested, it was simultaneously brought into implementation. This was due to the 
strong will of the top decision maker, DJ. According to his speech made in Japan just 10 
days ago,  
 
Right before this summit between Korea and Japan, I decided on the policy to 
receive Japanese culture which had been prohibited in Korea. There was a sharp 
division of opinions between those who approved and disapproved. However, 
according to history, it is obvious that a closed-door policy of culture is one of the 
worst to the development of a nation. A closed country inevitably denies itself 
positive stimulation from quality foreign culture and becomes stagnant to collapse. 
… Receiving Japanese culture and thereby getting stimulated, Korea can develop its 
culture more. This in turn can contribute to the development of Japanese culture. In 
this regard, I sought to persuade the Korean people that receiving Japanese culture 
is good for Korea and that Korea should not be out of date anymore. (Kim, 1998e) 
 
My interview with Oh Jee-Chul, then CI Bureau Chief, revealed this opening had been 
discussed for quite some time under the previous government. There had been 
vehement debates about the pros and cons of opening to Japanese cultural products in 
and around the Culture Ministry. Therefore, the Ministry had hesitated to go forward on 
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account of the many worries and criticisms that bitter memories of Japanese 
colonization induced. However, in the name of ‘grand reconciliation’ for mutual 
development, DJ made the decision to open up the market to Japanese popular culture. 
He regarded it as a necessary condition for Korea to enter the new era of ‘universal 
globalism’ for the 21st century. Of course, there were some practical considerations 
behind the scenes which helped DJ make the decision. At that time, only a few years 
before the 2002 FIFA World Cup which Korea and Japan co-hosted, ‘illegal copies of 
many Japanese cultural products were being widely distributed among the younger 
generation’ and ‘the internet superhighway the government was planning to build would 
soon connect countries to each other anyway’ (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009). So, what 
was the result? Did strong Japanese popular culture encroach on the weak Korean 
market as many had worried, destroying Korean cultural contents and thus identity? 
Over the last decade, the result has been quite the opposite. Indeed, as Oh notes, 
without it the phenomenal success of the Korean wave might not have been possible: 
 
Much of the economic benefit from exporting Korean cultural products now comes 
from the Japanese market. The Korean wave started from China, but the success in 
Japan was more crucial for Korean cultural products to be widely distributed among 
other countries across Asia. Without opening the Korean market to Japan, could it 
have been possible? YS considered opening the market, but did not do so. On the 
contrary, DJ made the decision, taking full responsibility himself. This difference is 
really important in understanding the distinct achievements of the two governments. 
There has always been national animosity toward Japan in Korea since the liberation. 
DJ thought the 21st century was the time to move forward. His challenging mind and 
attitude were the very background of the Korean wave. (Oh, October 2009) 
 
 
5.2.3 Promulgation of the Framework Act on the Promotion of CI (February 1999) 
 
In February 1999, the Framework Act for the Promotion of the Cultural Industries was 
passed by the Korean National Assembly. This has been widely assessed as one of the 
most memorable achievements by the DJ government in the cultural policy field (Park 
et al., 2007). As seen in the title of the act, it was designed to be the framework or 
mother law for the sector. While the Culture and Arts Promotion Act (1972) had covered 
all the genres within culture and the arts sector, there was no law which covered all 
the genres within the CI sector. Before it was passed, there were only laws for some 
genres of CI enacted in response to different situations. Besides, they were positioned 
as sub-acts of the Culture and Arts Promotion Act. With the promulgation of the 
Framework Act on the Promotion of the Cultural Industries (hereafter, the ‘Framework 
Act’) the existing laws were separated from the culture and the arts sector and 
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connected systematically to each other. As a result, the ‘conceptual, financial and legal 
foundation for CI promotion’ could be clearly defined and secured in Korea for the first 
time (Lee Hae-Don, September 2009).  
 
The ‘Framework Act’ (1999) declared the aim of Korean CI policy as the ‘enhancement 
of the cultural quality of life for the people and the development of the national 
economy’. To achieve these aims, it prescribed the following: the definition and the 
scope of CI, the duties of the Ministry and the Minister, the rationale of promotion, the 
establishment of the cultural industry quarter, and the establishment of a promotion 
fund for the cultural industry. Above all, it is noteworthy that the act specified the 
direct object of CI policy by providing a clear definition and scope. According to the act, 
‘cultural industries’ refers to the industries related to the production, distribution and 
consumption of cultural products, and ‘cultural products’ refers to both tangible and 
intangible goods and services that create economic value by embodying cultural 
elements.  
 
Furthermore, the act legally declared that cultural industries consist of 9 categories: 
industries related with  film as described in the Promotion of the Motion Pictures 
Industry Act; those related to sound recording, video products and games software as 
described in the Sound Records, Video Products and Games Software Act; those relating 
to publishing, printing and periodicals as described in the relevant acts;  broadcasting 
programmes as described in the Broadcasting Act; broadcasting programmes as 
described in the Cable Broadcasting Act, cultural properties as described in the 
Protection of Cultural Properties Act; character products,30 animation, design (except 
industrial design), traditional craft, advertising, art work, theatrical performance which 
embody cultural elements; multi-media contents made by two-way multi-media 
technology (except ICT); and  traditional clothes, food, etc. which are defined by 
Presidential decrees.  
 
As the categories of CI show, the scope was not designed according to a deep philosophy, 
but according to existing acts which seemed related to CI. The reason why industrial 
design and ICT were excluded was to avoid conflicts with other Ministries which were 
already responsible for those sectors (Chung K-R et al., 2004: 84). Therefore, the 
‘Framework Act’ was not limitless. However, nobody can deny that it has ensured a high 
                                                          
30 In Korea, the ‘character’ industry refers to the industry to merchandize the characters in cultural contents such as 
‘Teletubies’ and ‘Charlie & Lola’.  
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priority for the CI sector within the government in terms of strong organization, 
consistent policies, and a sufficient budget. The Korean cultural industries were able to 
become one of the key industries in the country due to this act, in a very real sense 
beyond the status of mere rhetoric. It should be also mentioned that this new 
comprehensive act for CI promotion brought about a series of fundamental revisions to 
the existing acts, which had functioned to control individual sectors such as  the Act on 
Sound Recordings, Video Products & Games Software (1999), that covering films (2002), 
and that concerning publishing and print (2002).  
 
 
5.2.4 The First Long-Term Plan for CI (March 1999)  
 
Owing to DJ’s particular interest, ‘the expansion of the knowledge base’ and ‘the 
promotion of culture and tourism’ were included among the five major directives of the 
government’s policies in 1999. As the Ministry that took charge of two of the five 
directives, the status of the MCT further soared. It was against this background that The 
Five-Year Plan for CI Development (1999) was produced by the MCT as the first long-
term government plan for CI. It was also the plan that ‘established detailed policies for 
promoting CI for the first time’ (MCT, 2001a: 39). That is, one month after the 
monumental promulgation of the ‘Framework Act’, another landmark came out.  
 
Right after the publication of the New Policy, Oh Jee-Chul constructed a taskforce 
research team to develop its CI part into a long-term plan with more specific objectives 
and phased action plans. According to a researcher who participated in the taskforce, 
this team published a cultural policy plan that was completely new in both kind and 
attitude.  
 
Even though the CI Bureau was established in 1994, the bureau had initiated few 
actions. For example, even in 1997 when the CI Bureau was working in the Culture 
Ministry, a number of comic books were confiscated from book shops in the name of 
youth protection. In other words, there was deep tension between regulation and 
promotion. Although the bureau understood the importance of CI, it could not 
activate substantial policies against the then popular notion that some CI had 
negative effects on youth. … Given this situation, The Five-Year Plan for CI 
Development was totally different from previous cultural policy plans. This plan 
daringly defined comics, games and popular music as ‘industries’ and insisted that 
the government make dramatic investments in them. (Yim Hak-Soon, September 
2009) 
 
It can be stressed again here that this plan was prepared as part of the MCT’s response 
to the Second National Building movement which DJ passionately initiated in the middle 
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of the Asian financial crisis. This was why the civil servants at the MCT were able to 
undertake the radical shift from regulation for ‘youth protection’ to the promotion of 
the knowledge economy without worrying that they might be criticized heavily as they 
had been in the past. The new ‘Framework Act’ also encouraged them to move forward 
against the negative social consensus about certain CI genres at the time.  
 
Most noteworthy in this shift is its similarity to the shift towards opening the market to 
Japanese popular culture. In essence, ‘this shift was far from a natural evolution of CI 
policy’ (Yim, Sep 2009). While the unprecedented situation in the national political 
economy at the time prepared the environment for the shift, DJ led the move as the top 
decision maker through his solid philosophy and conviction. Following this new tradition, 
DJ’s MCT published a series of new-type policy plans. In February 2000, it published a 
revised version of the five-year plan, Cultural Industries Vision 21. In June 2001, 
Contents Korea Vision 21 was published and introduced the new key concept of ‘cultural 
contents industries’.  
 
 
5.2.5 Introducing British Discourse of Creative Industries (April 1999)  
 
In April 1998, only two months after his inauguration, DJ took part in the second ASEM 
(Asia-Europe Meeting) held in London. Tony Blair, who was launching the then iconic 
political hype of ‘Cool Britannia’, presided at this meeting, while DJ was to host the 
third meeting in 2000. Agreeing on the importance of CI, these two leaders co-launched 
a website called ‘design challenge’ (www.designit.org) which was introduced with the 
following message: 
 
We believe that young people all over the world, working together on creative new 
ideas and with the enthusiasm to see them through, have a special contribution to 
make towards the well-being of us all. That's why the United Kingdom and Korea are 
inviting you to participate in this website which we have set up under the umbrella 
of ASEM.31 
 
This kind of cooperation was reproduced at the level of research also. In December 1998, 
Kim Moon-Hwan, the Chief of KCPI (Korea Cultural Policy Institute) at the time, visited 
the UK at the invitation from the British government. He visited the DCMS and its 
quangos, and gathered many reports and documents produced by them. In April 1999, 
when Korea was excited with the British Queen’s first-ever visit to the country, he 
                                                          
31 Cited in http://www.designdb.com/db20/webzine/mag158/m2.htm [Accessed on 5 May 2009]. 
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published an introductory report with the help of three researchers, Cultural Policies in 
the World (1): British Cultural Policy (Yang et al., 1999). Of particular importance is 
that the report introduced the newly coined concept of ‘creative industries’. Given that 
the famous Creative Industries Mapping Document was published in November 1998, 
just one month later the researchers in KCPI, the then only national institute in Korea 
for cultural policy research, were introduced to the new British trend in CI policy and 
started to use it as a crucial reference point. In the introduction, Kim Moon-Hwan says,  
 
Under the label of the creative industries, cultural heritage, arts works and various 
kinds of cultural industries are supported in balance, from which we can learn a lot. 
(Ibid.: ii) 
 
From this point on, it seems that the MCT really did ‘learn a lot’ from British creative 
industries policy. To take a few examples from the CI Bureau chiefs under DJ’s 
presidency, ‘Somebody gave me Cool Britannia, a short compilation of Blair’s speeches 
about culture. I got very impressed and copied them to distribute my staff in the Bureau’ 
(Oh, the first chief); ‘while I was in the Bureau, we often took a look at what was 
happening in the UK’ (Lim, the second chief); ‘since the MCT covers similar areas as the 
DCMS does, there were quite a few policies we could benchmark’ (Yoo, the third 
chief).32 Even Park Ji-Won, the most powerful Culture Minister under DJ’s presidency, 
made a speech from which the following is an extract that discusses how to turn Korea 
into a ‘cultural country’: 
 
The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair said that British arts, cultural industries and 
creative talent are playing very significant roles in renewing the sense of community, 
national identity and national pride, and thereby are becoming not only a source of 
national pride but also the power to maintain the country. This is the very reason 
why the government should support culture and the arts. (Park, 2000b) 
 
The discussion above can be seen as illustrating how the Korean Culture Ministry, which 
was established by benchmarking the French Culture Ministry and its discourses on 
cultural identity and exception had slowly ‘moved toward the British discourse’, which 
stresses individual creativity, the creative industries and the cultural economy (Kim 
Moon-Hwan, November 2009). In the late 1980s the former corresponded well to 
matters of immediate concern in Korea which was then in the middle of a nation-wide 
democratization movement. However, the British approach’s emphasis on the 
promotion and nurture of CI as national strategic industries must have appeared more 
                                                          
32 Consequently, it is not surprising that when KCPI (former body of KCTI) published Research on the Actual Condition 
of Cultural Industries Statistics (December 1999) in order to solve the problem that there was no reliable statistics of 
Korean CI, British statistics of creative industries prepared by CI Task Force was scrutinized (KCPI, 1999: 42-45).  
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useful and persuasive to the Korean policymakers in the late 1990s, who were charged 
with the priority of overcoming the current economic crisis.  
 
 
5.2.6 Establishing KOFIC (May 1999), KMRB (June 1999), and KGPC (July 1999) 
 
Along with the expansive restructuring of the CI Bureau, new quangos were established 
to support and promote the newly rising CI sector. At the early stage of this process, the 
cases of KOFIC (Korean Film Council), KMRB (Korea Media Rating Board) and KGPC 
(Korea Games Promotion Centre) are noteworthy. 
 
KOFIC was established first in May 1999. As DJ promised before the election, his MCT 
transformed several existing corporations that had been tightly controlled by the 
Ministry into autonomous commissions or councils, which operated through consensus 
between civil experts that staffed them. The establishment of KOFIC was certainly a 
landmark in that it was the first example of DJ’s pledge to apply the ALP concept to all 
quangos in the cultural sector. It was indeed established under the leadership of experts 
from the film industry rather than of civil servants. As will be shown in a later chapter, 
although its implementation process was full of conflicts, the establishment of KOFIC 
could not have been imaginable without close cooperation between DJ and progressive 
figures from the industry. Since the film industry had always been the most watched 
and the most prestigious sector of the Korean cultural industries, this move had 
substantial impact on other CI genres.  
 
The KMRB was established in June 1999 under similar circumstances, directly related to 
DJ’s pledge to ‘abolish censorship’ and guarantee freedom of expression (Hankook-Ilbo, 
1998b). Its establishment can be traced back to 5 October 1996, when the 
Constitutional Court issued a judgement declaring that the censorship before exhibition 
of films by the Performance Ethics Board was against the Constitution. Many believed 
the era of film censorship, that has spanned the last 75 years, was finally over (Kukmin-
Ilbo, 1996; Hankyoreh-Shinmun, 1996). However, that was not yet the case. Although 
the MCT revised the Public Performance Act and thereby transformed the ‘Performance 
Ethics Board’ into the ‘Korean Performing Arts Promotion Commission’ in October 1997, 
indirect censorship that did not directly contradict the judgement remained in place. 
The emphasis shifted from censorship to a rating system, but some films were still 
refused a commercial rating and thus could not be exhibited anywhere. DJ wanted to 
resolve this problem. Revising the ‘Film Promotion Act’, his MCT transformed the 
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‘Korean Performing Arts Promotion Commission’ into the ‘Korea Media Rating Board’ 
which maintained greater independence and transparency than its predecessors.33 
 
While KOFIC and the KMRB were transformed from old-style quangos, the KGPC was 
built from scratch in July 1999. Taking over responsibility for the games industry from 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the MCT decided to create a completely new type of 
promotion organization in order to establish a completely new consensus that the games 
industry was indeed worthy of governmental support. The strategy the MCT chose was 
to select an expert from the private sector and give him significant and autonomous 
power without intervention. This was another version of ALP! The expert was Lee Jung-
Hyun, who was working at a leading IT company and later became the first Secretary 
General of the KGPC. Fully trusting him, the MCT gave him seed money to construct a 
team of experts from the industry and lent him a huge office space in Technomart, a 
complex which contains the first multiplex cinema in Korea. Since there were not many 
people engaged in the games industry at that time and the working conditions of Korean 
game companies were very crude, the team could easily persuade their fellows to move 
their companies into the space by promising many benefits. This was the process 
through which the KGPC was established with close relations to the industry.  
 
Civil servants at the MCT had played a crucial role in the process. They did not only 
trust, but also respected the experts who were recruited as staff of KGPC. They also 
gave us as much support of various sorts as possible. For example, when we were 
pondering whether promoting the video-games industry was possible in Korea; they 
convened Samsung CEOs into a meeting to discuss with us the possibility of 
surpassing foreign competitors such as Sony. It should be also noted that half of the 
arcade-games industry was dominated by organized criminal gangs at that time. 
Without the efforts of civil servants, it would have been much harder to build up a 
rational and transparent channel of distribution for the Korean games industry. (Lee 
Jung-Hyun, September 2009) 
 
In a nutshell, the establishment of all of these three quangos in the middle of 1999 was 
predicated on the ‘arm’s length principle’, although they were each different from the 
others in purpose and structure. In the early stage, DJ’s MCT made every effort to 
transform old-style organizations, to ensure the freedom of expression, and to establish 
new types of promotion organizations. The intention of applying ALP to the new 
quangos was to establish democratic and cooperative governance in the policy field, 
and thereby to transform CI into a national basic industry for the new millennium.  
 
                                                          
33 Nevertheless, under the KMRB rating reservation was preserved. A specialist film industry lawyer, Cho recognized 
that it was against the Constitution and succeeded one more time to induce the judgement by the Constitutional Court that 
rating reservation was unconstitutional in August 2001. However, this time his battle was strongly supported by KOFIC 
where he would work as an inspector later (Cho Gwang-Hee, September 2009).  
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5.2.7 Appointing Powerful Ministers (May 1999)  
 
The events discussed up to now demonstrate the rapid elevation of the status of the 
MCT and its CI Bureau within the government. This tendency accelerated with the 
appointment of Park Ji-Won as the Culture Minister in May 1999. Although the first 
Minister under DJ’s presidency established some landmarks in Korean CI policy, she was 
replaced despite her desire to stay on in the post. According to one of my interviewees, 
this replacement was due to the evaluation that ‘she was not implementing the 
required reforms strongly enough’.  
 
To complete the mission, DJ sent Park Ji-Won to the Ministry; one of his closest staff, 
who had been called ‘DJ’s mouth’ since the 1980s. While he was Minister, he was sent 
to North Korea as DJ’s special envoy for the first-ever summit between the two Koreas. 
After finishing his duty as Culture Minister, he became the Presidential Chief of Staff. 
This career path shows very well how close he was to DJ and thus how powerful he was 
within the government. Among the many things he achieved, the most important thing 
might be the key role that he played in ensuring that the MCT was successful in the 
competition between various Ministries over which one would assume leadership in 
promoting CI. According to the then CI Bureau chief, 
 
When his staff asked for help, Minister Park was always thorough about everything. 
Whenever the Ministry of Information showed their will to take initiatives in 
promoting the games industry, Park threw a direct punch. After a Cabinet Meeting, 
for instance, Minister Park took off his cabinet badge and tried to pin it on to the 
Minister of Information, saying ‘OK, You do my job from now on!’ Of course, the 
Information Minister had to back off, because the Culture Minister was so powerful. 
And when Park heard that a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Information kept 
talking about their stake, he summoned the official to say, ‘You shouldn’t have done 
that. It is already decided at a much higher level than yours’. (Lim Byoung-Soo, 
October 2009) 
 
This episode clearly demonstrates how strong and broad his influence was within the 
government. Moreover, his role was also conspicuous outside the government. During his 
term of office, for example, Park picked up a suggestion from the CI Bureau that Korea 
should host the ‘World Cyber Games’ (a kind of gaming Olympics), got permission and 
support directly from DJ, and persuaded Samsung to sponsor the Gaming Olympics 
annually to the tune of 20-30 billion Won (Lim, October 2009). This kind of power could 
never have been imaginable for the Culture Ministry even a few years earlier.  
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After Park went back to the Blue House, he continued to play key roles in the 
government, as the Senior Secretary for Policy Planning and later as the Chief of Staff. 
Nothing could have been better for the civil servants in the Culture Ministry. 
Furthermore, it is notable that Minister Park’s successors were also very powerful. As 
seen in the table below, they were all Senior Secretaries under DJ’s presidency before 
their appointment as Culture Minister.  
     
    Table 5.2 Culture Ministers during the DJ Administration 
 
  
At least three points follow on from this observation. Firstly, all the Culture Ministers 
during DJ’s term in office were close and faithful followers of the President, which 
shows DJ’s desire to maintain close and consistent control of the Ministry in order to 
ensure the reforms required for the ‘cultural age’. Secondly, most of them were very 
powerful people within the government, which is the reason why the Culture Ministry’s 
status was raised significantly so that it could compete with other Ministries. Finally, 
the Ministers actually used all their powers to achieve DJ’s election pledges for cultural 
matters, which indicates that most of the achievements in cultural (industries) policy 
under DJ’s presidency were intentionally planned, rather than the result of coincidence. 
 
 
5.2.8 Ensuring ‘More Than 1%’ of the Government Budget (since 2000)  
 
As mentioned earlier, one important part of DJ’s election pledges had been his plan to 
allot one per cent of the government’s entire budget to the promotion of the cultural 
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sector. At the dawn of the new millennium, when Minister Park was in charge, this 
pledge was realized one year earlier than planned. Since the establishment of the 
Korean Culture Ministry in 1990, together with ALP, this was the phrase mentioned by 
cultural policy experts whenever the future of the Ministry was discussed (Kim Moon-
Hwan, November 2009). However, it can be said that before DJ’s inauguration these 
objectives remained merely wishful thinking. Presidents mentioned them as political 
rhetoric, but they were backed with little political will. Moreover, the Culture Ministry 
had neither the power nor the clarity of vision required to pursue them. This situation 
was completely reversed under DJ’s presidency. 
   
Kim Sung-Jae was the Senior Secretary for Policy Planning who took charge of the 
government budget in the Blue House, and was therefore in a position to know how this 
‘1% pledge’ was realized. With Minister Park, this future Culture Minister played a key 
role:  
 
Reminding ourselves of the IMF loan situation at the time, it should be regarded a 
miracle. … When we pursued the realization of the 1% pledge, other Ministries raised 
a considerable fuss. They asked ‘Why does the MCT need so large a budget?’ They 
had thought the Ministry would be only for consumption. It took much time and 
effort for us to build up a new perception that culture can be another sector of 
production. (Kim, October 2009) 
 
The year 2000 was very symbolic to the MCT because DJ always defined the 21st century 
as the ‘cultural age’. Consequently, as seen in Table 5.3, in 2000 the budget for the 
Culture Ministry exceeded the 1% line for the first time. In the end, the other Ministries 
had to accept this decision, because DJ’s determination was too strong and the Culture 
Minister was too powerful. What is quite interesting is that the symbolic year’s budget 
for the CI Bureau was 15.3% of the whole Ministry budget, which remains the highest 
level on record. The rise in the CI Bureau’s share of the Culture Ministry’s budget was 
also quite dramatic: In the final budget prepared by the previous YS government its 
share had been only 2.2% (1998); in the first budget prepared by the DJ government, 
however, it rose to 11.7% (1999). Between 1998 and 2002, therefore, the CI Bureau 
budget skyrocketed by a factor of more than 1100% from 16.8 billion won to 195.8 
billion won. This rapid budget increase for CI was far more shocking than it might 
initially appear, given that this budget was prepared in the middle of a serious 
economic crisis and carefully monitored by the IMF which had lent money to the Korean 
government.  
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Table 5.3 The Culture Ministry and the CI Bureau Budgets between 1994 and 2007    
 
Unit: hundred million won (≒hundred thousand US dollar)34                        Source: MCST (2008a: 5)  
 
 
5.3 CI policy Development during Kim Dae-Jung’s Late Presidency: 2001-03 
 
The last section dealt with landmarks in CI policy development made during DJ’s early 
presidency. Foregrounding the twin principles of ‘ALP’ and ‘CI as a National Basic 
Industry’, the cultural president led the Korean CI policy shift by reorganizing the 
Culture Ministry, expanding its budget, transforming and/or establishing quangos, 
enacting monumental acts, and publishing new-style policy plans, and so forth. DJ 
actively intervened in key matters concerning CI policy to secure the shift that he 
desired, and also appointed his closest associates as his Culture Ministers. However, a 
slightly different pattern emerged from 2001 onwards. Whilst the MCT continued to 
follow DJ’s overarching guidance and to take advantage of DJ’s special interest in their 
sector, the civil servants started to devise their own projects, using the experience and 
knowledge they had accumulated over the previous three years. In this later stage, key 
                                                          
34 In understanding the statics in this thesis, 1 US dollar may be roughly calculated to be equal to 1,000 Korean Won. For 
example, the exchange rate on 31 December 2002 was $:W=1:1200, while that on 31 December 2007 was 1:938.  
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new CI policy concepts were invented, CI’s new status as a national strategic industry 
was declared officially, and the most prestigious quago in the CI sector was established. 
 
 
5.3.1 The Rise of ‘Cultural Contents Industries’ and ‘CT’ (early 2001)  
 
In June 2001, the MCT published Contents Korea Vision 21, which was based on The 
Five-Year Plan for CI Development, but suggested the revision of its action plans in 
accordance with rapidly changing policy environment. Defining ‘accelerating digitization 
and media convergence’ as the potential sources of a ‘radical expansion of the contents 
market’, the new policy plan insisted that the existing support policy system should be 
reorganized so as to respond to market flexibility (MCT, 2001b: 1). The key point here is 
that this report introduced a new concept, ‘cultural contents industries’ that refers to a 
new version of the cultural industries for the digital age.   
 
Even if responding actively to ‘accelerating digitization’ was the declared reason, the 
MCT’s adoption of the new concept seems to have instead stemmed from fierce conflict 
between that ministry and the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). Around 
2000, the MIC tried to take over responsibility for the whole area of the digital media 
industry. It insisted that because digital software was part of their territory, it followed 
that internet games were also. According to Oh Jee-Chul (October 2009), there were 
two major reasons behind the move. Firstly, as the MIC’s main task of setting up 
infrastructure for informationalization, such as internet networks, was almost complete, 
that ministry came to think that the content distributed over its infrastructures would 
become increasingly important. Secondly, the games industry was expanding rapidly and 
they wanted to lay claim to this important territory, insisting that the MCT should deal 
with off-line games and the MIC with on-line ones.  
 
This was unacceptable to the MCT, because from the outset and especially from the 
establishment of the KGPC, it had strategically focused on nurturing the on-line gaming 
sector. In this light, the MCT’s adoption of the term Cultural Contents Industry can be 
seen as an attempt to counter encroachment from the MIC with the argument that the 
key issue at stake was not the on-or-off line status of the games, but rather the nature 
of their cultural contents. This is to say that insofar as cultural contents were involved, 
the MCT had both right and cause to get into the digital world.  
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To meet the challenge from the MIC, we chose the concept of ‘contents’ against 
their concept of ‘software’. I borrowed the idea from top managers at MBC.
35
 After a 
private meeting with them, as the Chief of the CI Bureau, I spent a long time with 
the then Chief of Planning and Management Office thinking how to make this 
concept appealing. As a result, in the first Ministry reporting session in 2001, we 
could foreground this concept of cultural contents industries with another key 
concept of ‘CT’. During the session, DJ actively accepted the two concepts. It was 
after the event that ‘cultural contents industries’ and ‘CT’ became official terms in 
the CI policy field. Since DJ said that the MCT must do its best to nurture the 
cultural contents industries, the roles were clearly divided between the MCT and the 
MIC. In this context, some of Information Promotion Fund could be transferred from 
the MIC to the MCT. (Lim Byung-Soo, October 2009) 
 
The additional concept mentioned in the quote, that of ‘CT’ (culture technology), 
requires more explanation here. To ensure its power over the digital world, the MCT 
promoted this term passionately. According to Contents Korea Vision 21, CT refers to 
‘the technology with which cultural contents can be digitized’. The implication was that 
IT would inevitably become CT during the digitalization process under which culture was 
converted into digital cultural contents (cf. Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1  A Conceptual Map of ‘Culture Technology’ (CT)                           Source: MCT (2001b: 4) 
 
 
 
 
This political rise of the concepts of ‘cultural contents industries’ and ‘CT’ can be 
regarded as the turning point from which CI policy started out in the second half of DJ’s 
presidency. Indeed, through utilizing these concepts, the MCT was able to reorganize its 
CI Bureau (e.g. establishing the Cultural Contents Promotion Division in May 2001), 
revise its long-term plan for CI promotion significantly (June 2001), launch a new 
initiative to raise the status of CI in the public’s perception (i.e. designation of CT as a 
                                                          
35 MBC stands for Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, one of the three major broadcasting companies in Korea with 
KBS and SBS. ‘Munhwa’ means ‘culture’ in Korean.  
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growth-driving industry), and establish KOCCA, a monumental quango for the 
comprehensive promotion of the CI sector (August 2001). The last two need to be 
discussed in greater detail.  
 
 
5.3.2 Designating CT as a New Driving Industry & Establishing KOCCA (August 2001) 
 
In August 2001 the Presidential Advisory Committee on the National Economy declared 
CT as one of the country’s six next-generation growth-driving industries, thus publicly 
ensuring the MCT’s leading position in the promotion of the cultural contents industries 
(MCT, 2003a: 54). As a result, Culture Technology came to have the same status as 
Information Technology, Biological Technology, Nano Technology, Space Technology, 
and Environmental Technology. This was the moment when DJ’s conviction that CI 
should be a national basic industry was realized in a literal sense. This initiative 
attracted much intense media interest, which in turn played a key role in changing 
people’s lingering doubts about the vulgarity of popular culture. In addition, with the 
official recognition of CT as an independent subject, several departments and research 
institutes related to the topic were set up.  
 
Designating CT as a next-generation industry, government promised to invest 377.1 
billion won into CT up to 2006 (MCT, 2002a: 659), and plans to exempt practitioners 
from the requirement of military service were announced in order to attract key talent 
into the sector. On top of this, the MCT established a new quango to lead this huge, 
new project. At the macro-level, this explains the reason for and context of the 
establishment of the KOCCA (Korea Culture and Content Agency) in August 2001. KOCCA 
is one of the two case studies presented in Chapter 7, thus it is sufficient here to point 
out the main similarities and disparities between the KGPC and KOCCA.  
 
The KGPC and KOCCA were both newly established quangos, the former for the 
promotion of the games industry and the latter for the promotion of the ‘cultural 
contents industries’ excluding film, broadcasting and games. Lee Jung-Hyun, who had 
been the first secretary general of the KGPC, was appointed to be the first secretary 
general of KOCCA. In this light, it can be said that the MCT’s strategy for establishing 
KOCCA was not that different from the case of KGPC—recruiting experts from related 
industries and giving them full power without interference.  
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However, this time the budget was much larger and the project was closely monitored 
by DJ and the Korean media. In response to this unprecedented situation, the MCT 
decided to invite a high-profile figure as the first chief of KOCCA, and chose Suh Byung-
Moon, then a Vice Chairman at Samsung Electronics. He was the man who, in July 1995, 
established the ‘Samsung Entertainment Group’ that covered various genres of CI and 
employed around 600 staff members. After the group was closed (against his will) in 
January 1999 due to the Asian financial crisis, Suh decided to take up the opportunity 
offered to him at KOCCA, abandoning around a million pounds of stock options in order 
to do so (Suh Byung-Moon, November 2009). As a result of his appointment, many 
former members of the Samsung Entertainment Group, who had dispersed to take up 
positions at other companies, were once again brought together through their 
recruitment into KOCCA. Therefore, Suh noted that the dismissal of Samsung 
Entertainment Group was ‘bitter to Samsung, but became sweet to Korean CI as a 
whole’.  
 
For these reasons, KOCCA was able to build up a stable organizational structure in a 
relatively short time, and established a wide network through various industries, thus 
growing into the most influential centre for the promotion of Korean CI. According to 
the CI Bureau chief at the time, 
 
The early stage was ideal since the Ministry was eager to invite excellent talent into 
the organization and to guarantee full support. The passion was everywhere both in 
the Ministry and in KOCCA. It was very rewarding to see the pioneering efforts to 
quickly bring about visible performances. (Yoo, November 2009) 
 
 
5.3.3 Publishing White Papers Annually (since 2000) 
 
The final landmark of CI policy under DJ’s presidency is that the MCT started to publish 
information relating to its policies and performance regularly. Although a white paper 
was once published in 1997, it was only from 2000 onwards that the MCT has been 
publishing the Cultural Industries White Paper annually. According to Research on the 
Actual Condition of Cultural Industriezs Statistics (KCPI, 1999), there were no reliable 
statistics on Korean CI from either the public or private sector at that time. 
Consequently, along with the CI White Paper, the MCT also started to publish Cultural 
Industries Statistics annually. Moreover, white papers on individual genres of CI started 
to be published under the DJ government. To take a few examples, the 2000 White 
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Paper of Broadcasting Statistics, (KBI, 2000); the 2000 White Paper on Film Promotion 
(KOFIC, 2001); and the 2001 White Paper on Games (KGDPI, 2001).  
 
There is no doubt that ‘these white papers and statistics have provided much better 
conditions’ not only for evaluating existing policies and thus formulating new ones, but 
also for preparing businesses or planning academic research (Park Sea-Young, a founding 
member of KGPC and KOCCA, September 2009). Before these data started to be 
published regularly under the DJ government, there were no official data that could be 
trusted for such purposes. What made this difference? Above all, it should be noted that 
the ‘Framework Act’ added the production and publishing of an annual report on CI 
promotion as one of the Minister’s duties. In addition, by clarifying the scope of CI, the 
act provided the criteria with which existing statistics could be significantly revised and 
integrated. New quangos such as the KGPC and KOCCA, therefore, recruited experts 
who specialized in gathering related information and statistics. Meanwhile, as a 
‘research control tower’, KCTI (former KCPI) expanded the research division of CI and 
kept publishing upgraded and more detailed research reports, synthesizing the 
increased volume of information. With this new tradition, data about the actual 
conditions of and significant changes in Korean CI could be systematically accumulated, 
distributed and easily mobilized. This was indeed an important shift.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the processes through which Korean CI policy shifted under 
the Kim Dae-Jung government. I have examined the main landmarks in CI policy 
chronologically, and have identified the main forces and factors that shaped how these 
policies emerged and developed. The role of DJ and his close staff cannot be stressed 
strongly enough, but key roles were also played by the civil servants at the MCT who 
faithfully implemented DJ’s philosophy and by the private sector experts who 
established and ran the new quangos. The conflict between the Ministries and the 
import of British discourse on the creative industries were also important factors behind 
the shift.  
 
The first section touched upon how DJ’s overarching philosophy and ideas about CI were 
formed before he became President. Combining the Third Wave (Toffler) with the Third 
Way (Giddens), DJ came to the conclusion that the lack of democracy, freedom of 
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expression, a public sphere, social capital and creative capital caused the serious Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s. This failure was regarded as the ‘Second National 
Shame’ (next to Japanese occupation) by the Korean people. As his heavy criticism of 
Lee Kuan-Yew reveals, DJ believed that this failure was caused by the limitations of the 
developmental state that had been promoted by Asia’s authoritarian leaders without 
the guarantee of the public sphere and democratic advantages that sustainable 
development required (cf. Hall, 2003). Therefore, democratic reform became the prime 
task of his government, which aimed to ensure the twin advantages of social and 
creative capital in order to successfully launch Korea’s ‘Second National Building’.  
 
After his inauguration, DJ’s ideas were faithfully translated into concrete CI policies. CI 
should be regarded as a particularly important sector for the DJ government, because as 
a forerunner of the new economy, CI were believed to be a kind of touchstone which 
could prove whether nor not DJ’s reforms were producing the democratic advantages 
they aimed to ensure. In section 2 and 3, I explored eleven landmarks in the CI policy 
shift which emerged under DJ’s presidency. These landmarks are very important in 
understanding the future development of Korean CI.  
 
    Table 5.4 Landmarks of the Korean CI Policy Shift during the DJ Administration 
 
 
Through this analysis, at least four key findings can be suggested concerning the factors 
and forces driving the policy shift. First of all, the landmarks came about as part of a 
national survival discourse in a real sense. For example, key policy documents in the 
early days regarded the promotion of CI as a key task for the Second National Building 
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(MCT, 1998; 1999a). In this vein Korean policymakers believed that without an ‘active 
response to the advanced countries’ domination over the world market for CI’, Korea 
would be bound to lose ‘competitiveness in cultural industries’ and would thus lack both 
‘national culture and national competitiveness’ (MCT, 2000b: 9). However, they also 
believed that ‘thanks to the changing environment of competition due to the arrival of 
the knowledge society’, there was ‘little gap between Korea and advanced countries in 
terms of the starting line’ for nurturing CI (ibid.). Here, the key word must be national 
competitiveness in the cultural industries. It was highlighted as essential for national 
survival in the 21st century.  
 
Another undeniable finding is that the two significant external events in 1997 set up the 
perfect backdrop for the survival discourse. The first was the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis which may be regarded as shock at the regional level, ‘as the Great Depression of 
the 1920s and 1930s or the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the oil shocks 
of the early 1970s were worldwide’ (Pempel, 1999b: 224). As with other great crises, 
this economic crisis challenged and changed the conventional wisdom of society; 
namely, the developmental state model. Due to this upheaval, DJ, who had been bullied 
as the leading ‘communist’ by the developmental state, was able to win the 
presidential election in December 1997. This was the second event. These shifting 
conditions in the Korean political economy paved the way for the rapid shift in CI policy 
to be implemented. Without them, it would undoubtedly have taken considerably more 
energy and a longer time to form the requisite social consensus, change people’s fixed 
ideas and thereby initiate various policy changes.  
 
It should be also pointed out that behind almost every key moment in the shift in CI 
policy lay the visible hand of the ultimate boss, DJ. This is not to underestimate the 
roles played by cultural NGOs, especially in the film industry, and the civil servants, 
especially those in the CI Bureau. As a result of the first power change in South Korean 
history, the interests of these players all converged for the first time on a certain point; 
that is, DJ’s firm philosophy of parallel development and information revolution. The 
belief—Korea could go beyond the old developmental state model and ensure world-
class competitiveness by combining the Third Wave with the Third Way—became a kind 
of ‘credo’ (Schlesinger, 2007) that centred the discursive practices underlying the CI 
policy shift. DJ and his staff made all the important decisions on the grounds of that 
credo, while taking advantage of the two unprecedented events. As the slogan of the 
‘Second National Building Movement’ implies, the survival discourse and following 
reforms were very desperate. In this context, in contrast to previous Presidents, DJ was 
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able to take on the full responsibility for the daring realization of traditional cultural 
pledges, such as the arms’ length policy, the 1% budget, and the opening of the Korean 
market to Japanese popular culture. This is how the shift could be put into practice so 
radically and coherently. 
 
The final finding is that the eleven landmarks can be broadly categorized under the two 
directions: ‘ensuring ALP’ on the one hand and ‘nurturing CI into a national basic 
industry’ on the other. These are closely related with the two logics of democratic 
advantage respectively: social capital logic and creative capital logic. With the aid of 
these mottos, the MCT was able to change its own governance style over the cultural 
policy field, initiate new types of government plans and acts, nurture the cultural and 
creative ecology, and establish new types of promotion organizations. Even though each 
and every landmark shows that these two directions were considered at the same time, 
some display stronger emphasis on the first principle and others on the second. For 
instance, while  ‘Establishing KOFIC, KMRB and KGPC’ can be taken as the good example 
of the implementation of ALP, ‘Designating CT as a new driving industry and 
establishing KOCCA’ can be seen as the clearest case relating to the development of CI 
as a new national basic Industry. On the other hand, ‘Publishing white papers and 
statistics’ is an example where both principles were equally stressed, because it 
ensured that relevant information could be distributed quickly and transparently to both 
the commercial and public spheres. The two-track strategy composed of ‘Arm’s Length 
Principle’ and ‘National Basic Industry’ clearly provides the overarching direction for 
the Korean CI policy shift under Kim Dae-Jung.   
 
To conclude, the Korean CI policy shift was surely a result of the broader shift in the 
Korean political economy and the Korean state. At first glance, one may notice that this 
policy transformation initiated by DJ looks similar to the transformation of the Korean 
state by President Park Jung-Hee, in that the rise of the Korean developmental state 
was also based upon a sort of national survival discourse posited against international 
competition and was led by a thorough, powerful and visionary President. For instance, 
just as President Park declared six national strategic industries to open a new era of 
Korean industrialization in the 1970s, DJ declared six national strategic technologies to 
open a new era of Korean (post)industrialization for the new millennium;36 and, just as 
Park launched a nation-wide mass mobilization movement (i.e. Saemaul movement), DJ 
initiated the Second National Building movement. This observation is nonetheless half 
                                                          
36 Park’s six industries were steel, electronics, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, machinery and nonferrous metals industries, 
while DJ’s six technologies were information, biological, nano, space, environment, and culture technologies. 
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right because, even if the second half of DJ’s reform (i.e. making CI into a new national 
basic industry) corresponds to Park’s policies in some ways, this is not true of the 
principles, such as the arm’s length principle, that underlie the first half of his reform. 
Such principles were entirely absent during the developmental transformation of Korea 
in the 1960s and 1970s. It can be thus said that although DJ promoted CI and several 
other national strategic industries for the nation’s survival, this logic was not merely 
based upon a familiar set of industrial mobilization policies, but also on the introduction 
of completely new kinds of institutions designed to ensure democratic governance over 
the industries and the policy field. This is where a clear distinction can and should be 
drawn between Park’s policy regime and DJ’s, marking the latter’s CI policy shift as 
neo-developmental.   
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6. The Product of the Korean Cultural Industries Policy Shift 
 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the origins of the major shift in Korean CI policy over 
the last decade, and examined the process through which the shift was materialized. 
Following the Asian financial crisis and the first democratic change of government in 
Korea, the administration of President Kim Dae-Jung introduced a series of significant 
changes in the Korean CI policy arena. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-08) that 
followed inherited this neo-developmental policy shift, and went on to upgrade it by 
shaping a much clearer policy framework. Drawing on empirical evidence from 
interviews with key players as well as analysis of major policy plans and reports, this 
chapter seeks to (re)construct the policy framework which came into being in the 
process of, and as a result of, the policy transformation under the two progressive 
governments. How did it emerge and evolve during the course of its institutionalization? 
What are the structure and content of the framework? How different is it from the 
policy framework of the previous developmental state?  
 
As noted in the last chapter, the key points of the policy shift can be boiled down to the 
arm’s length principle and the emphasis on developing CI as a national basic industry. 
According to the Cultural Industries White Paper 2003 (MCT, 2003a: 9-10), the Korean 
government ‘had to’ actively intervene into its CI sector, because ‘in Korea the 
industrial base of CI is relatively weak, compared with that of advanced countries’. It 
was therefore argued that the government had to take the lead in establishing the 
‘industrial infrastructure’ necessary for increasing the global competitiveness of Korean 
CI and thereby turn the cultural industries into ‘a national basic industry of the 21st 
century’. This attitude is obviously the result of Korea’s experience of rapid 
industrialization led by the developmental state. However, both in theory and in 
practice, the introduction of new governance principles from the regulatory states, such 
as the UK and the US, into the Korean policy field was a more urgent task for the 
policymakers. Indeed, it was out of this set of complex relations that linked the Korean 
neo-developmental state with both the old developmental and the current regulatory 
states that the particular eclectic characteristic of the Korean CI policy framework 
emerged.  
 
The first section will address the emergence and development of the policy framework 
by analyzing and comparing the aims stated and the objectives evident in key CI policy 
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plans produced by the MCT between the publication of the New Policy (MCT, 1998) and 
that of C-Korea 2010 (MCT, 2005a). I shall tentatively suggest three stages in the 
evolution of Korean CI policy in order to trace the complicated (but real) characteristic 
of the eclectic policy framework and thus establish its distinctiveness. This will allow 
me to proceed to the second section aim, which is to delineate the architecture of the 
framework, which achieved full shape after the publication of Creative Korea (MCT, 
2004b). Three major strategies of the framework will be identified and explained in 
detail, mainly drawing on Cultural Industries White Papers (CIWPs, hereafter). These 
are: the introduction of a new style of governance system, the construction of new 
kinds of infrastructure, and the initiation of a new mode of intervention into the CI 
value chain. These strategies had been initiated early on under the DJ government, but 
emerged as a clear system during the Roh government when they became more closely 
connected to each other and converged on the concept of the ‘National Innovation 
System’. This chapter concludes by arguing that my analysis of the main policy 
documents and the interviews I conducted with key participants demonstrate that the 
neo-developmental transformation of Korean CI policy produced a conceptual 
architecture that was poised between those of the regulatory state and the 
developmental state models.  
 
 
6.1 The Evolution of the Korean CI Policy Framework: Three Stages 
 
The table below shows the major long-term Korean CI plans published during DJ and 
Roh’s presidencies. These plans can be divided into three groups in relation to the 
development of the policy framework: the beginning (1); the unfolding (from 2 to 5); 
and the climax (6 and 7). 
 
    Table 6.1 Key CI Policy Development Plans during the DJ and Roh Administrations 
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The New Policy was the master plan that set out the DJ government’s cultural policy. 
Therefore, it reveals the big picture concerning the promotion of Korean CI, which, 
while it was drawn up in the early stages of the policy shift, has been maintained up to 
now. The plans that followed sought to realize the big picture in concrete steps. For 
example, as noted earlier, the CI section of the New Policy was further developed into 
the monumental Five-Year Plan for CI Development (MCT, 1999a). It was then 
‘upgraded’ into Cultural Industries Vision 21 (MCT, 2000b) and later revised to cope 
with the rapid digitization, as in Contents Korea Vision 21 (MCT, 2001b). However, with 
the publication of Creative Korea (MCT, 2004b) the unfolding process went through a 
qualitative transformation. By successfully synthesizing and systematizing previous 
policy plans and initiatives, the final document brought about the climax of the whole 
process through which the Korean CI policy framework was produced. 
 
 
6.1.1 The Beginning: The New Policy (October 1998) 
 
The New Policy, published by the MCT in October 1998, had four grand ‘objectives’. 
These were the realization of the ‘Second National Building’ through the power of 
culture; the pursuance of the ‘knowledge and information society’ in which the cultural 
sector was to play a central role; the formulation of a ‘productive and civic cultural 
society’ (within South Korea) and the establishment of a ‘mature national community’ 
(including North Korea); and, finally, the embodiment of ‘open culture’ through the 
harmonization of the Korean cultural identity with universal globalism. With the 
exception of the forth one, these objectives are not directly related to culture in the 
traditional sense, and this reveals that the original intention of the DJ government’s 
cultural policy was to engage much wider sectors of society. 
 
The MCT introduced three strategies to expand the coverage of cultural policy and thus 
achieve these objectives (MCT, 1998: 8-10). Firstly, in order to produce a new kind of 
vision fit for the ‘cultural century’, the New Policy called for the establishment of 
macro-policy directions rather than micro-policy activities. It also called for the 
aggressive mobilization of the symbolic power of the coming new millennium. To change 
the status of culture into a key driver of national development, the plan attacked the 
‘old’ view that culture was something limited to the ‘value of purpose and abstractness’. 
Instead, the New Policy argued that culture was ‘directly and actively related to other 
social sectors’ and thus had also ‘pragmatic and strategic value’ for high-value-added 
creation, social inclusion and Korean reunification, and so forth.  Finally, the authors of 
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New Policy realized that a number of changes were urgently required if Korea was to 
move away from the methods of cultural administration that had previously prevailed.  
The first mission was to shift away from a ‘department store-like policy’, which simply 
managed various cultural sectors separately, towards a select-and-focus policy which 
would ‘nurture key sectors’, such as CI, in order to enhance the efficiency of the policy. 
The second mission was to replace the ‘provider-centred regulation policy’ under which 
the government had unilaterally led changes of policy object, and replace it with a  
‘consumer-centred participation policy’ which would enable the government and the 
people to work together to make changes autonomously. The final mission was to pay 
attention to not only ‘the changes of the policy object’, but also to changes in the 
‘policy subject’. So these strategies encompassed establishing a new policy vision, a 
new status for culture, and new styles of cultural administration.  
 
In order to embody these core strategies, ten smaller objectives were introduced in 
various areas of Korean cultural policy. For the purpose of this research project, I need 
to shed light on the seventh of these objectives, which concerns CI policy. The New 
Policy identified the nine most important tasks that were necessary for ‘establishing a 
system for the radical development of CI’ as follows: 
 
(a) Preparing the institutional base for CI development;  
(b) Establishing CI infrastructure as quickly as possible;  
(c) Selecting strategic genres (i.e. film, animation, broadcasting, music and games) 
and preparing support systems for them;  
(d) Enhancing synergistic effects between CI genres (e.g. establishing the system for 
sharing CI-related information); 
(e) Promoting the inception and production of CI and developing a modernized 
distribution structures for CI;  
(f) Establishing a system for nurturing skilled talent;  
(g) Supporting strategic export products and their entry into overseas markets;  
(h) Promoting fashion design products;  
(i) Preparing responses for the planned opening of the market to Japanese popular 
culture.  
 
During the later development of Korean CI policy, the last two of the nine tasks 
disappeared. However, the others have remained firmly entrenched as key objectives in 
each and every long-term policy plan.37 
                                                          
37 The tasks can be categorized as either ‘establishing comprehensive infrastructures’ (a, b, f) or ‘symbolic intervention 
into the CI value chain (c, d, e, g), although this policy framework was not yet introduced at the early stage.  
141 
 
 
 
6.1.2 The Unfolding: Three ‘Visions’ of CI (February 2000 – December 2003) 
 
The Five-Year Plan for CI Development was monumental in that it was the first 
government plan solely dedicated to CI promotion (cf. 5.2.4). According to the plan 
(MCT, 1999a), Korean CI policy had to focus on ‘establishing the base’ for CI 
development by aligning institutions, ensuring financial resources, nurturing skilled 
talent, and so forth for the first stage (1999). It was then to focus on ‘strengthening 
international competitiveness’ by developing strategic products for export and 
pioneering overseas markets for the second stage (2000-01). Finally, it was to attend to 
the ‘actualization’ of the vision of ‘CI as a national basic industry’ through the 
establishment of a symbolic CI complex and the consolidation of international 
competitiveness for the final stage of the plan (2002). The stress on export expansion is 
fairly conspicuous. 
 
About a year later, the plan was upgraded in CI Vision 21: The Five-Year Plan for CI 
Promotion (MCT, 2000b), which retained the same basic structure as the previous plan. 
Therefore, it is better to deal with the latter plan in greater detail to comprehend how 
the policy framework set out in the New Policy unfolded. The MCT also published similar 
long-term plans for CI promotion over the next few years: Contents Korea Vision 21 
(MCT, 2001b) and The Participatory Government’s CI Policy Vision (MCT, 2003b). These 
three plans, which contain ‘vision’ in their titles, are very similar in both form and 
content.  
 
For example, each plan suggested almost the same rationales for supporting CI, 
although the terms were slightly changed each time. To be concise, the plans conceived 
the rationale for promoting CI in connection with four different kinds of impact: Direct 
Cultural Impact (promoting cultural democracy, enhancing the creativity of the people, 
raising the diversity of cultural contents); Indirect Cultural Impact (strengthening the 
fine/basic arts sector, protecting cultural identity, improving the national brand); 
Direct economic impact (creating jobs and high added value in the CI sector, expanding 
exports of cultural contents, activating local creative economy); and Indirect Economic 
Impact (activating related industries, promoting exportation of other industries, 
improving local conditions) (see also MCT, 2000a: 22; 2003a: 4). Within this consensus, 
the later plans were produced to revise and complement the vision, strategy and action 
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plans suggested in the earlier plans. Therefore, an examination of each plan is required, 
along with a comparison between them.   
 
    Table 6.2 Comparing the Three ‘Vision’ Plans for CI  
 
 
As seen in the table above, the policy plans can be compared to each other in relation 
to at least three aspects; vision, strategy, and action plans. The broadest aspect for 
comparison is vision. The policymakers had quite ambitious objectives concerning the 
promotion of CI as ‘environment-friendly’ (smokeless) and ‘knowledge-intensive’ 
(weightless) industries. It is notable that the Korean CI policy vision became gradually 
more concrete with each new policy document, although each plan expressed its vision 
in the same tone, heavily stressing the importance of economic value. The first vision 
was very abstract and directly borrowed DJ’s phrase ‘make CI into a national basic 
industry of the 21st century and into a leading industry of the knowledge-based 
economy’. The vision became more concrete in the second; ‘preparing the base for 
becoming a key producer of cultural contents by 2003’. The final plan declared a very 
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specific vision; ‘making Korea the fifth strongest producer of CI in the world’ by 2008. 
Here, the ‘fifth strongest’ measures strength in terms of the domestic market size. 
According to the plan (MCT, 2003b: 5), the Korean CI market accounted for 1.5% of the 
world market in 2003, which was about the tenth in the ranking. It then set an 
ambitious goal of climbing up the rankings to fifth place after ‘America (40%), Japan 
(10%), Germany (5.5%) and Britain (4.4%)’ by 2008. The economic logic became 
increasingly clear as the policy vision evolved to stipulate very specific figures.  
 
In terms of strategy, the second aspect of comparison, the first two plans seem to have 
been well summarized in the last plan. The strategies for the promotion of Korean CI in 
The Participatory Government’s CI Policy Vision (MCT, 2003b) can be divided into two 
categories. They either seek to establish cooperation ‘between the central and 
municipal governments, private companies and related universities’ or to strengthen the 
growth base in terms of ‘talent, infrastructure, investment and R&D, and overseas 
expansion’. In the first two plans the establishment of a cooperative system for CI had 
been presented as simply an action plan for building an information-sharing network. 
However, it was elevated in the third plan to become one of the two overarching 
strategies of Korean CI policy. The second strategy of ‘strengthening the growth base’ in 
fact covers two related, but distinctive strategies suggested by former plans. The first is 
the nurture of various types of ‘infrastructure’ to enhance the basic competitiveness of 
CI, while the second concerns the promotion of strategic ‘genres’ and ‘products’ to 
achieve rapid growth in both domestic audience share and export scale.  
 
The final aspect of comparison between the plans is the action plans they put forward. 
As shown very well in the bottom row of Table 6.2, after the introduction of nine action 
plans for CI promotion in the New Policy, no significant changes were made throughout 
the evolution of the three long-term plans. Aligning laws and institutions, developing 
infrastructure and technology, promoting production, distribution and consumption, 
nurturing talent, expanding exportation, and promoting local CI are the main 
repertoires. At the same time, however, comparing each plan reveals that the policymakers 
who authored each plan did not employ the same theoretical framework for the action plans 
of CI promotion. For example, the concept of ‘infrastructure’ is very obscure. In some cases it 
refers to the facilities such as the CI complex or quango buildings, but in others it includes very 
broadly information networks or education systems. Additionally, each new plan made quite a 
few trivial changes. For instance, ‘technology development’ was suggested together with 
‘promoting inception/production’ in CI Vision 21, but was aligned with ‘fostering skilled 
talent’ in The Participatory government’s CI Policy Vision. Similarly, ‘aligning laws and 
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institutions’ was given the highest priority in Contents Korea vision 21, but was given the 
lowest in the next plan. No reasons were given for these changes. In line with the definition 
and scope of CI prescribed by the Framework Act on the Promotion of CI (cf. 5.2.3), these 
numerous and surplus changes in the key policy plans can be taken as evidence of a lack of 
consistent theoretical perspectives. However, this is not to say that there was no underlying 
policy direction for CI promotion or that the policy framework for CI changed very often. In 
spite of various insignificant changes at the action plan level, the core logic and main direction 
of CI promotion were inherited and refined in each successive plan.   
 
 
6.1.3 Climax: Creative Korea (June 2004) and C-Korea (July 2005) 
 
Korean CI planning went through a qualitative transformation with the publication of 
Creative Korea in June 2004. The background needs to be briefly explained. After 
President Roh’s inauguration, the MCT started to feel a strong pressure to ‘restructure 
Korean CI policy’ from both ‘civil society outside the government’ and the ‘Ministry of 
Planning and Budget’ (MPB) within the government (MCT, 2004a: 18). The concerns 
expressed from within civil society about the MCT’s stress on economic rationales for CI 
promotion were hardly new. Yet the pressure from the MPB to ‘prove the substance and 
efficiency of the CI-related budget’ was not only new but also very threatening, 
because from 2004 Roh’s MPB introduced an annual evaluation programme for public 
corporations and quangos supported by a government budget with the declared 
intention of cutting budgets for any organization with low performance grades. From 
this moment, the Korean CI policymakers started to expand the meaning of the ‘Arms’ 
Length Principle’ from ‘supporting without interfering’ to ‘supporting without 
interfering, but with thorough assessment’ (Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009; Yoo Jin-
Ryong, November 2009). There were also factors inside the Culture Ministry that 
contributed to the publication of Creative Korea.  
 
The traditional way of publishing a plan in the cultural policy field was to pick up 
smart civil servants and then order them to write it night and day for about two 
weeks. During the DJ government each sector in the cultural policy field started to 
accumulate capacity to make this kind of plan for itself. In addition, when the Roh 
government took office, civilian experts in their 40s suddenly assumed positions of 
power in the policy field through their appointment to the Committee of Policy 
Planning; a new organization established in the MCT. They made a guideline that the 
plans for cultural policy should be prepared under the leadership of researchers 
rather than of civil servants from then on. More importantly, Minister Lee Chang-
Dong, who had absolutely perfectionist tendencies, was unsatisfied with the 
convention of recycling the same ideas from previous plans and asked us to make a 
Yellow Pages of Korean cultural policy. He kept turning down our drafts, which made 
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us feel frustrated. As a result, we realized that Minister Lee really wanted the 
Yellow Pages. 38  We were expected not only to cover all the sectors of Korean 
cultural policy, but also to connect them with new and substantial logics. These 
missions had never been considered before in making any cultural policy plans or 
reports in Korea. (Yang Hyun-Mee who led the Research team for publishing Creative 
Korea, September 2009)  
 
Accordingly, a new type of task force was required at this time, composed of a 
committee of six scholars, a research project team of 16 researchers and experts, and 
an administrative support team of 14 civil servants. In addition, more than 20 sub-task 
forces were established, composed of around 200 experts from various cultural sectors. 
For about ten months, these people prepared the new ‘vision’ for Korean cultural policy. 
The result was Creative Korea, which was indeed a significant upgrade, compared to 
previous government plans. Its contribution to the Korean CI policy framework can be 
examined in several distinct dimensions.  
 
First of all, under this memorable policy plan the position of CI policy was articulated 
for the first time within a systematic blueprint of Korean cultural policy as a whole. 
With the ultimate vision of making ‘Creative Korea’ by ensuring ‘creative cultural 
citizens, a diverse cultural society, and a vital cultural nation’, the plan systematically 
inter-connected the five cultural policy categories of ‘culture and individuals’, ‘culture 
and regions’, ‘culture and the world’, ‘culture and the economy’, ‘culture and society’ 
(MCT, 2004b: 32-47). This wider context provided the opportunity for reflection on the 
position and significance of Korean CI policy against a far more comprehensive 
background than mere economistic thinking. 
 
The second important contribution made by Creative Korea was that it presented for 
the first time a comprehensive and integrated plan or framework for Korean CI policy.  
Since Korean CI policy had previously tended to be genre-centred and merely 
enumerated policy functions,  
 
It was difficult to comprehend the substantial relationship between policy functions 
and the actual process of CI, and in turn it was almost impossible to measure the 
performance of support provided by CI policy. (MCT, 2004b: 356) 
 
To overcome these limitations, Creative Korea introduced the Culture Industry Policy 
Process System (CIPPS) model so as to analyse the ‘organic connection between the 
input-out process, policy support, the various kinds of infrastructure, and so forth’, and 
                                                          
38 Lee Chang-Dong, Roh’s first Culture Minister, is one of the most successful Korean movie directors and has earned 
many awards from international film festivals including Cannes and Venice. Thus it can be inferred that he wanted to 
have a perfect scenario of his new mission of formulating and implementing national cultural policy.  
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thereby to formulate ‘concrete strategies and action plans’ which reflected both the 
positive and negative feedback between policy support and industrial development. In 
fact, on the basis of ‘system theory’, the CIPPS model was able to synthesize the policy 
frameworks which had been unsystematically presented in former long-term CI plans.  
 
       
          Figure 6.1 The CIPPS Model              Source: MCT (2004: 357) 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 6.1, this comprehensive system for the CI policy process consisted of 
six policy objects; quangos, local CI, environment infra, input infra, the 
production/distribution process, and the domestic and overseas markets. Each of them 
was not only identified as a key object of CI policy, but conceptualized as organically 
connected to the others. Hence, it can be argued that the success of the policy process 
system depends on the co-development of all the policy objects. It is important to 
remember that the six categories were deliberately formulated for the purpose of both 
describing the system properly and subsuming various strategy and action plans from 
previous long-term plans. As a result, some confusing concepts that had been used 
arbitrarily in former plans were refined and repositioned. For example, the problematic 
policy term, ‘infra’ was for the first time divided into two categories: five kinds of 
‘input infrastructure’ and three kinds of ‘environment infrastructure’.39  
 
The final significant contribution made by Creative Korea is that because it was the 
most synthetic and systematic roadmap of Korean CI policy ever produced, it showed a 
                                                          
39 The term ‘infra’ is often used in the Korean policy field as shortening of the English word, ‘infrastructure’.  However, 
this word has evolved in its own way in Korea. Therefore, in this thesis I will use infrastructure (in Italics) to refer to the 
Korean version (i.e. infra) which can be understood as a common noun rather than an abstract noun.   
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way in which DJ’s two most fundamental CI axioms could be combined smoothly. In 
short, the newly introduced concept of the ‘national innovation system’ can be 
understood to connect the arm’s length principle’s focus on democratic governance 
with the emphasis placed on economic development by the vision of CI as a national 
basic industry. For example, according to Yoo Jin-Ryong (November 2009), DJ’s third CI 
Bureau chief and then Roh’s third Vice Minister,  
 
It was the concept of the national innovation system that assured me that the MCT 
had not produced such a notable performance in its early stages by chance. After 
finishing my job as the last CI Bureau chief under the DJ government, I had an 
opportunity to prepare my Ph. D thesis in the US for a year. During this period, I 
pondered the question of whether the explosive growth of Korean CI did really spring 
from the MCT’s policies or from other conditions such as the rapid growth of the 
international CI market. In the end, I came to realize that the CI policies the MCT 
implemented in Korea were quite faithful to the theory of national innovation 
systems actively promoted by the OECD. 
 
The Korean CI policymakers’ tacit knowledge evolved into explicit knowledge in this 
way. Yoo became one of the active promoters for this new concept of the national 
innovation system (hereafter, NIS) for Korean CI in the cultural policy arena. Seen in 
this context, the CIPPS model in Creative Korea envisages the structure and process of 
this innovation system very clearly from the perspective of policymakers within the 
central government. Its six categories show how the ‘network’ between key players 
within the policy community can produce the optimal ‘environment’ within which the 
Korean CI value chain (from input through production and distribution to domestic 
consumption and export) could produce stable and sustainable performance. Although it 
will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, I should briefly note here that the 
three Korean CI policy strategies extracted from the three vision plans can be 
understood as the sub-strategies for building up this NIS. That is,  
 
Cooperative Network + Comprehensive Infrastructures + Symbolic Intervention in the 
Value Chain = the Korean NIS for CI.  
 
Thus, it is fair to argue that the CIPPS model not only redeployed but also synthesised 
the key points of the previous plans on the basis of ‘system theory’. It sought to 
configure the NIS so that all players in the CI field would have to cooperate and drive 
the required innovation through a much clearer framework.  
 
C-Korea 2010 (MCT, 2005a) took up the visions and strategies of the Yellow Pages for 
Korean cultural policy. However, this plan was unique in that it was made to cover 
three different industries at the same time; the cultural, tourism and leisure industries. 
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In this plan, ‘creativity’ was defined as the driving force of economic growth in the 21st 
century, ‘contents’ were viewed as a break-through in the era of job-less growth, and 
‘culture’ was described as the core competence that would decide global 
competitiveness in the contemporary society. Declaring that these ‘three Cs’ were 
equally important for the development of the three different industries, C-Korea 2010 
attempted to produce a comprehensive picture for the co-development of the industries. 
Therefore, C-Korea 2010 can be evaluated as a significant step forward from Creative 
Korea. 
 
 
6.2 The Essence of the CI Policy Framework: Three Strategies 
 
The preceding section explored seven long-term CI policy plans in order to examine how 
the Korean CI policy framework emerged and evolved during DJ and Roh’s presidencies. 
It became clear that the visions, strategies and action plans developed in a quite 
successive manner, and this evolution underwent structural transformation in Creative 
Korea. Indeed, the CIPPS model configured the synthetic version of the Korean CI policy 
framework very well. It should be also stressed that the arm’s length principle and the 
vision of a national basic industry were built up and combined to produce the Korean 
NIS for CI. To establish this NIS, three sub-strategies were introduced: democratic and 
cooperative governance, the establishment of comprehensive infrastructures, and 
symbolic intervention in the CI value chain.  
  
   Figure 6.2 Outline of the Three Sub-Strategies for the Korean NIS for CI 
 
Cooperative  
governance 
•   MCT & Other Ministries  
•   MCT & Cultural Quangos 
•   MCT & Domestic Industries 
•   MCT & Foreign Governments 
•   MCT & Local Governments 
Comprehensive 
infrastructures 
•   Environment Infrastructures                                                                                
(Copy right, policy research, legal/taxation system) 
•   Input Infrastructures                                                                                        
(Human, Technology, Financial, Physical or Information Infrastructure) 
Symbolic 
intervention 
•   Creation 
•   Distribution 
•   Domestic Market 
•   Overseas Market 
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These strategies, as shown in the diagram above, took key positions in the conceptual 
architecture of the Korean CI policy framework. This section draws mainly on annual 
reports on the performance and content of Korean CI policy in the CIWPs to analyze the 
content of each strategy, the relationships between the strategies, and the promotion 
activities devised by the MCT and its quangos to put them into action.   
 
 
6.2.1 The Cooperative Governance Strategy  
 
As noted, the first major strategy of the policy framework was to ensure democratic 
and cooperative governance in the CI sector. Transforming the Korean CI policy 
community into the keystone of the NIS is what this strategy was all about.  As clarified 
in Chapter 5, DJ’s most urgent agenda had been to transform the policy community 
from an instrument of industry manipulation into one of industry promotion. The ALP 
concept was frequently mobilized to indicate the government’s strong desire to 
establish a new type of governance system over the CI field. In this project, the most 
crucial agents were, of course, the civil servants who had previously been devoted to 
the country’s developmental project.  
 
In the past when the Korean private sector was much weaker than the public sector 
in terms of administrative and financial capacity, for example in the time of Park 
Jung-Hee, the role of spearhead might have been required. However, clearly, the 
times have changed. The age when ‘hard working’ was more important than 
‘creativity’ is now over. I believe that two kinds of role are desirable for the 
government at this time. Firstly, it should not be an obstacle to development itself 
and should get rid of other obstacles quickly. This couldn’t be truer for sectors 
which rely heavily on creativity. Creativity must be at the core of the cultural 
industries or the cultural contents industries. This also applies to other kinds of 
venture industries. I cannot think of any way in which the government could be more 
creative than the private sector concerning these industries.  
 
As this quotation from DJ’s last CI Bureau chief reveals, civil servants certainly began to 
feel that times were changing and that the role of the government was changing along 
with them. Moreover, there was a fundamental change in the way they perceived their 
own identity. He continued: 
 
I always talked to the civil servants at the CI Bureau like this: ‘Civil servants must be 
yard sweeping servants. When masters and customers need to walk through the yard, 
we must quickly sweep away the trash from the yard while staying out of the way 
ourselves. After sweeping all the inconvenient stuff, do not expect to be praised 
because that is what you must do as servants. All your policy practices should be 
conducted with this attitude. It is a delusion that you can lead the private sector’. 
(Yoo Jin-Ryong, November 2009) 
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On the basis of this identity change from ‘spearhead’ to ‘yard sweeping brush’, the MCT 
sought to achieve the transformation of the policy community as a whole. In order to 
achieve this, the MCT paid special attention to at least five relationships as the 
foundation of a new type of network (see Figure 6.2).  
 
The first of these relationships is that with other ministries. The democratic governance 
and cooperative network strategy was first applied to reinforcing the CI Bureau’s 
position within the MCT as the reliable control tower. In the early days of the DJ 
government, the MCT expanded its CI Bureau by absorbing several government divisions 
from various different ministries. By bringing together these divisions that had once 
been beyond the reach of their policies, the MCT was able to reorganize its own 
structure and thus drive forward more efficient and influential promotion works. For 
example, if the MCT had not absorbed the games industry division from the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare in August 1998, the striking growth of Korean games industry in the 
2000s might not have been possible (cf. Table 8.1). In turn, without the explosive 
growth of the games industry, it is highly doubtful that the MCT could have expanded its 
support for various other genres of CI so confidently. Since then, amid keen competition, 
the MCT has tried to maintain ‘cooperative networks with other Ministries’ (Oh Jee-Chul, 
October 2009; Yoo Jin-Ryong, November 2009).40 
 
The second group of relationships was with CI promotion quangos, where ALP was most 
literally applied. As will be shown in detail in Chapter 7, the MCT utilized the same 
philosophy of ALP in formulating and managing different quangos, although the civilian 
experts that staffed them and the genres they covered displayed quite distinctive 
characteristics. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the developmental state, the 
MCT sought to ensure the autonomy and expertise of the quangos to the greatest extent 
possible. Therefore, they recruited experts from the various industrial sectors under 
their remit and avoided interfering directly with their decision-making processes. Under 
the Roh government, this relationship expanded to the traditional culture and the arts 
sector. ‘Both referring to the case of KOFIC and benchmarking British Arts Councils’, the 
MCT transformed the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation (KCAF) which had been 
governed by a chief executive into the Arts Council Korea (ARKO) managed by the 
consensus of commissioners, thus completing an aim that had not been realized under 
DJ’s presidency (Yang Hyun-Mee, September 2009).  
 
                                                          
40 One of the notable examples is the construction of the ‘CI Promotion Committee’ which was composed of Ministers 
from related Ministries, in response to a prescription of the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries. 
151 
 
Once the relationship with the quangos had been reorganized, the realignment of the 
third set of significant relationships, that with the domestic industries, followed 
naturally.  Along with ALP, the ‘freedom of expression’ was a key driver in this shift. 
According to Cho Gwang-Hee (September 2009), former inspector of KOFIC,  
 
Although judges are relatively conservative in their society, Korean judges made 
quite progressive judgments as to the matter of censorship around the mid-1990s. 
They were no longer able to turn their faces away because there was no legal logic 
or base to sustain censorship. My point is that, whereas the legal system usually 
trails behind developments in society, in that case the legal judgment walked ahead 
of the reality of Korean society. It was a peculiar case. The Ministry, the industry, 
and even society didn’t appear to be fully prepared for the constitutional decision.  
 
Given this shift in the judiciary’s position, there was nothing for the administration to 
do other than abandon its old role as the headquarters of censorship. After DJ came to 
power with a major election pledge of ensuring freedom of expression, the MCT began 
wholeheartedly to accept the importance of freedom of expression for the future of the 
Korean CI sector, but also for the future of the Ministry itself. There is now a strong 
consensus within the Korean Culture Ministry that ‘ensuring the freedom of expression 
was the most important shift’ for the later growth of Korean CI (Oh Jee-Chul, October 
2009; Lee Hae-Don, October 2009).  
 
The fourth set of relationships to which the MCT paid particular attention was those 
with foreign governments, which were also changed considerably. Instead of insulating 
or blindly protecting Korean cultural industries, the MCT chose to let Korean CI compete 
with foreign products in the domestic market openly and squarely, and thus learn from 
them. The opening of the Korean market to Japanese popular culture is the best 
example of how this shift had a significant influence on the Korean CI field. In short, 
this shift from passive protectionism ‘in the logic of analogue’ to active exchange ‘in 
the logic of digital age’ did not only help enhance the quality of Korean cultural 
products by genuine competition, but also ‘brought about new chances to expand the 
market’ for Korean CI abroad (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009). Since then, the opening has 
functioned as an archetypical reference point whenever the MCT deals with the matters 
concerning cultural exchange with foreign governments. For instance, in preparations 
for the FTA agreement with the US April 2007, Roh’s MCT cut the longstanding screen 
quotas by half from 146 to 73 days a year, and also reduced broadcasting quotas, from 
25% to 20% for films and from 35% to 30% for animation. According to President Roh 
(2007), this decision was made against the logic that ‘to become the world number one, 
Korean CI must survive competition especially from the US’.  
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The final set of relationships that the MCT readdressed was those with local government 
in Korea. Activating local cultural and economic conditions and thus ensuring balanced 
development across the land had been one of the key rationales of CI promotion policies 
from the early days. To realize this objective, the MCT ‘used the project of CI clusters 
as the contact point with local governments’ (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009). After the 
legislation of the ‘Framework Act’, many local CI clusters were constructed with the 
help of matching funds from the MTC. As a result, the MCT was able to designate official 
‘CI quarters’ in eight cities in 2001, with a promise to support 30% of total construction 
expenses (MCT, 2002a: 711). Along with the promotion of CI clusters, the MCT also 
furnished a variety of support to ‘core cities’ in establishing and managing their own ‘CI 
promotion centres’. This aimed to ‘build up the national network’ through which the 
key information and experiences of CI policy making could be systematically developed 
and shared between the local/regional core cities (ibid.: 713).  
 
 
6.2.2 The Comprehensive infrastructures Strategy  
 
After establishing cooperative governance, the MCT concentrated on providing the 
necessary infrastructures for Korean CI. It is important to remember here that without 
the former the latter can only be a house of cards. For example, even though 
establishing CI infrastructures had also been a key strategy under the YS government, it 
was never achieved. According to Lee Jung-Hyun (September, 2009), former secretary 
general of the KGPC and later of KOCCA, 
 
I had also worked closely with civil servants during YS’s presidency. However, at that 
time the civil servants [at the Ministry of Information] had treated civilian experts as 
their subordinates. It was like a relationship in the Army. However embarrassed, we 
thought to ourselves that the indignity must be endured for the nation’s 
development. At that moment of frustration, disappointment and betrayal when we 
were also struggling to survive, the financial crisis occurred and DJ became the 
President. He stressed the importance of the cultural industries heavily and suddenly 
everything changed. Even before his inauguration, there was surely a similar move 
toward it. However, despite many discussions, that movement did not produce core 
groups that had power to drive the agenda with subjecthood, nor the required 
infrastructures for the development. Only when a historical backdrop, core groups, 
and infrastructures are combined, can the explosive growth of an industry become 
possible, as was the case of Korean CI under the DJ government. 
 
As seen in the evolution of the policy framework, infrastructure here refers not only to 
environment infrastructure but also input infrastructure. While the former is closely 
engaged in the governance over the policy community, the latter is more related to the 
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value chain of the industries. Put another way, the strategy of nurturing infrastructures 
was the linkage between the cooperative governance strategy and the symbolic 
intervention strategy.   
 
Firstly, it should be noted that the policy community, transformed into the control 
tower for CI promotion, closely worked together to build a new type of policy 
environment in favour of the industries. The underlying aim was to form a ‘creative 
environment for CI by replacing old institutions of regulation with new ones of 
promotion’ (Lim Byoung-Soo, October 2009). For this, first of all, the continuous reform 
of the legal system needs to be stressed. For Kwak Young-Jin (2000: 54), then Director 
of the CI Policy Division, after the legislation of the ‘Framework Act’, the MCT could 
modify ‘72.8% of the regulations and rules that were harmful to the advancement of 
Korea’s cultural industry in the interest of creative activities in the cultural and artistic 
arenas’. Furthermore, the ‘Framework Act’ was fully revised in 2002 in order to more 
actively ‘respond to rapid changes in the CI environment, such as advanced digital 
technology’. It was then partially revised four times under the Roh government, driving 
the establishment and revision of many other acts concerning the sub-sectors of CI.  
 
Under Roh’s presidency, the taxation system and copyright system were also 
significantly upgraded in many aspects. In April 2006, for instance, Roh’s government 
succeeded in introducing a whole new taxation system for CI by revising three acts; the 
‘Framework Act’ to introduce Special Purpose Companies (SPC) for CI, the ‘Corporation 
Tax Law’ to help SPC avoid double taxation, and the ‘Local Tax Law’ to help them 
acquire reductions and exemptions from acquisition and registration taxes (MCST, 2008a: 
188). Meanwhile, in order to protect and promote copyright, Korea fully accepted all 
the duties prescribed by the WIPO in 2003. Then in 2005 and 2006 the ‘Copyright Act’ 
was heavily revised to clarify the legal relationship between the copyright holder and 
the user, and to promote fair use of intellectual property, while the CI Bureau first set 
aside a budget for copyright issues in 2006 (ibid.: 3).  
 
Finally, strengthening policy research also played a pivotal role in establishing the 
environment infrastructure. Because policy research deals with how to continue 
improving the above-mentioned systems, the quangos such as KOCCA, KOFIC, 
KGPC/KOGIA all expanded their policy research teams under DJ’s presidencies. As a 
result, both the quantity and quality of Korean CI policy research were significantly 
enhanced by the time President Roh took office, and were further improved under his 
administration (Yang Hyun-Mee, September 2009).  
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Having detailed improvements in the environment infrastructure, I shall now turn to the 
five kinds of input infrastructure that directly impact the CI value chain (cf. Figure 6.2). 
Firstly, although the MCT had concentrated on the ‘quantitative expansion’ of human 
capital in the early days, from the middle of Roh’s presidency onwards, it started to 
place far greater stress on human infrastructure; and especially on ‘nurturing core 
talent’, in response to criticism that a ‘select-and-focus’ strategy was required (MCST, 
2008a: 8). In this direction, Roh’s MCT provided intensive support for nearly 90 
educational institutions; 5 high schools, 30 colleges, 44 universities and 10 graduate 
schools. In addition, the Graduate School of Culture Technology was established at 
KAIST, one of the top universities in Korea, in 2005. It planned to turn out about 100 
skilled culture technologists annually. On top of this, the ‘Cyber Cultural Contents 
Academy’ project, which was co-managed by KOCCA and the MCT, developed 115 
courses concerning cultural contents development that were available on-line and also 
accepted for credit as regular academic courses at 20 universities. 
 
Technology infrastructure was also increasingly stressed under the Roh government. In 
February 2005, the MCT opened the ‘Centre for CT strategy’ within KOCCA, with the 
aim of becoming a hub for the Korean CI field by furnishing integrated policy support to 
research and development on CT. This enabled the MCT to publish the CT Vision and 
Roadmap (MCT, 2006b) and The Five-Year Plan for CT Development (MCT, 2006c). 
Meanwhile, the ‘Cultural Contents Technology Development’ programme launched by 
the DJ government in 2002 had evolved into three sub-programmes: the ‘Core 
Technology Development’, ‘Customized Technology Development’ and ‘CT research 
Centre support’ programme. These schemes had supported a total of 105 technology 
development projects by 2007, 54 of which succeeded in applying for and registering 
patents (MCST, 2008a: 9). 
 
 Thirdly, along with taxation reform, the MCT initiated several initiatives to ensure 
stable financing for Korean CI. Under DJ’s presidency, the MCT and its quangos created 
and expanded a variety of funds to stimulate the early development of CI, such as the 
CI Promotion Fund, the Film Promotion Fund, the Publishing Fund, and the Broadcasting 
Development Fund (MCT, 2003a: 23). These funds were mainly used either to supply 
loans to help small companies plan and produce cultural contents, or to support 
contents with high potential for success with the necessary investments. For example, 
197.4 billion won was channelled through the CI Promotion Fund in the period up to 
2006, which was indeed a large sum for the Korean CI field at that time. After a 
155 
 
comprehensive reform of the government-supported funding system under Roh’s 
presidency, many of the existing funds were transferred to the ‘Fund of Funds for 
Investing SMEs’, and in turn the concept of SPC (Special Purpose Company) for CI was 
newly introduced. This reform is held to have enabled the private sector to save both 
time and money in organizing large-scale funds and thus to expand its investment into 
CI in a more stable environment (MCST, 2008a: 11). 
 
According to Creative Korea (MCT, 2004b: 359), Korean CI policy for physical 
infrastructure was to focus on increasing the efficiency and efficacy with which the 
existing infrastructure was managed, rather than on constructing additional facilities. 
The primary reason for this decision was that most of the key quangos had already been 
established under the DJ government along with facilities which provided the ‘necessary 
office space’, while also offering ‘prestigious equipment and studios for pre-production 
and post-production’ that the CI sectors could utilize (Lim Byung-Soo, October 2009). As 
both the industries and the policy community became more mature, the need to 
develop such physical infrastructure continued to decrease under the Roh government. 
One exception was the Cultural Contents Centre built in a high-profile digital quarter 
called ‘Digital Media City’ in Seoul. The centre was planned in 2002 and completed in 
March 2007. As a symbolic cultural complex, this high-tech building came to host major 
cultural quangos (KOCCA, KGDPI, Korean Film Archive, etc), education and 
entertainment facilities, production studios, and numerous contents companies (KOCCA, 
2009: 43-44).  
 
Last but not least, the MCT also cultivated the information infrastructure intensively. 
Above all, the importance of the statistics and White Papers published annually needs to 
be reiterated (cf. 5.3.3). These diverse sources of information regularly provided 
comprehensive and up-to-date information about relevant industries and policies. This 
was ‘a great advance’ compared with the previous chronic unavailability of valid data 
about CI (Park Sea-Young, September 2009). Equally significant is that under Roh’s 
presidency the MCT established various digital archives and information systems in order 
to systematically provide the industries with key information that was accessible at all 
times. The ‘Media Education Archive’, the ‘Games Industry Total Information Service 
System’, the ‘Content Export Information System’, the ‘Media Production Information 
System’ are core examples (MCT, 2007; MCST, 2008a).  
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6.2.3 The Symbolic Intervention Strategy  
 
Nurturing input infrastructures might be regarded as part of the intervention in the CI 
value chain. Without nurturing stable systems for providing talent, finance, information, 
and so on, the value chain cannot be developed or even sustained in the long run. In 
this light, the civil servants at the MCT planned to build up ‘a sort of incubator’ for a 
variety of inputs and capital (Lim, October 2009). Nonetheless, the third strategy which 
entailed symbolic intervention in the value chain was different from the input 
infrastructure strategy in that, rather than engaging the value chain as a whole, it 
always dealt with specific stages of the chain and thus with concrete contents and 
enterprises. Then, what did the symbolic in the ‘symbolic intervention’ signify? 
 
The industries have been asking us [civil servants at the MCT] for only two things: 
firstly, let them be and then give support when and where they are in desperate 
need. … I believe this shows the essence of the arm’s length principle. When I was 
the CI Bureau chief, the bureau made a lot of plans and then interventions because 
there was a direct threat to the industries due to the then Asian financial crisis. In 
addition, at that time many genres of the industries were still in their infancy. 
However, the situation has changed significantly. Now the government must be more 
aware of the danger of unnecessary intervention, while providing active support 
when the industries demand it. (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009) 
 
As Oh confirms, the shifting mode of government intervention is noteworthy. As Korean 
CI grew, the kind of support that the industries needed and demanded also changed.    
 
In the early stage KOCCA distributed a large amount of seed money to sustain and 
further promote the then infant content industries, which undoubtedly helped them 
substantially. However, the ‘symbolic function’ of the support that the MCT and 
KOCCA gave the industries is of greater importance. Korea is now a society where an 
idea can attract hundreds of million pounds in a moment. In this context, ‘direct 
support’ including the distribution of funds to enterprises has become increasingly 
less important. That kind of activity now only matters as a result of its symbolic 
function. That is, distributing money is still important insofar as it signifies the 
government’s will to nurture the industries and care for the individual firms 
endeavouring to grow. When I was at the MCT, I asked my staff to learn this point by 
heart. (Yoo Jin-Ryong, November 2009) 
 
This shift away from ‘direct support’ went hand in hand with the increasing stress 
placed on the principle of ‘select-and-focus’. As noted earlier (cf. 6.1.1), this was one 
of the core strategies suggested in the New Policy (MCT, 1998). The MCT chose key 
genres of CI to promote intensively, the games industry for example, and thus establish 
‘best practice’ for other genres to benchmark (MCT, 1999a). In relation to intervention 
in the value chain of particular genres, this strategy was understood to ‘support star 
contents which had high potential’ for commercial success in both the domestic and 
overseas markets (Suh, November 2009). Instead of ‘distributing subsidies to the 
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businesses according to the law of inertia’, as had been the case in the Korean culture 
and the arts sector at that time, the CI Bureau was eager to produce high profile 
examples of excellence in each CI genre (Oh, October 2009). This is the second aspect 
of the ‘symbolic’ intervention. The overall symbolic intervention strategy can be broken 
down into several categories that correspond to stages in the CI value chain (cf. Figure 
6.2).  
 
As the CIPPS model clearly suggests, Korean CI policymakers believed that the value 
chain comprised four stages from creation to overseas markets. Three policy objectives 
were repeatedly stressed in most CIWPs in relation to the first stage of creation or 
production. The first was to increase the industrial capacity for planning—since the 
production capacity had already been built up through OEM (original equipment 
manufacturing) arrangements—by reforming the finance and education systems. The 
second was to foster synergetic effects between CI genres in the age of OSMU (one 
source multi-use) by developing and accumulating various materials for content creation. 
The third was to discover excellent contents as early as possible and to motivate 
production companies to create high-quality contents by providing intensive support. 
Thus, in mobilizing all kinds of input infrastructure for promoting the activity of 
creation, the CI policymakers initiated quite a few promotion initiatives to stimulate 
individual companies and achieve CI policy objectives.  
 
   Table 6.3 The Number of Contents Supported by the ‘Excellent Pilot Production’ Programme  
 
                    Source: MCST (2008a: 12) 
 
Two important examples of these programmes should be mentioned (MCST, 2008a: 12-
13). Firstly, the ‘Excellent Pilot Production’ programme supported the production of 
572 contents between 2002 and 2006 (cf. Table 6.3). Under this scheme, some products 
were designated as a ‘Star Project’ and became international hits. The animations 
Pororo (2002) and Pucca (2004) are good examples. In a similar vein, the ‘Cultural 
Heritage’ programme, which involved the development of digital story-material for 
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content creation, supported 280 institutions, enabling them to complete some 160 
projects between 2002 and 2006. With a budget of 50.4 billion won from the MCT, about 
3,500 workers participated in the 160 projects and produced more than 600,000 digital 
items which have been utilized in many hit films, TV dramas and on-line games.  
     
Secondly, the most important objective for the intervention in distribution was the 
‘modernization of the distribution system’ (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009). To achieve this 
objective, the MCT concentrated on introducing a new kind of (digital) information 
system which was not only ‘considerably more transparent than the previous one’, but 
which could ‘cover the whole country’. For example, with independent cinemas selling 
their own tickets, there was no system for measuring the nationwide audience for any 
film. Consequently, it was very difficult for Korean film companies to analyze their 
domestic market share in order to establish meticulous strategies for distribution and 
marketing. To address this issue the MCT and KOFIC set up an ‘Integrated Computer 
Network for Cinema Tickets’ in 1999, so as to provide the industry with accurate 
information about ticket sales and thus enhance the transparency of film distribution, 
while also cutting distribution costs. Although only 40% of Korean cinemas had joined 
the computer network by 2004, the percentage rose to 92% by 2006 (KOFIC, 2007b: 63). 
The distribution systems for other genres such as the publishing and the game industries 
were enhanced in similar ways.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the MCT’s interventions related to expanding distribution 
channels. The internet superhighway was established rapidly under DJ’s presidency, so 
the illegal download of cultural contents had become both very easy and highly popular 
in Korea. To tackle this problem, the MCT enhanced the level of copyright protection 
and promotion (as part of nurturing environment infrastructure), and also initiated 
various projects and programmes to make the most of the technological revolution and 
the convergence between CI genres. The establishment of the ‘OSMU Centre for Cultural 
Contents’ in 2007 was the result of the policymakers’ long interest in the growing digital 
market. The mobile contents industry and the music industry were regarded as being at 
the vanguard of this kind of intervention, because of the newly emergent market for 
wireless communication (MCST, 2008a).  
 
Thirdly, the intervention in the domestic market can be boiled down to managing 
promotion activities to change the public’s perception of CI on the one hand, and 
expanding consumers’ capacity and opportunities to enjoy cultural contents on the 
other. A senior civil servant, Lee (October 2009) asserted, ‘the best thing that DJ’s MCT 
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did was to change the public’s negative perception of CI’. By stressing time and again 
that CI are one of the new strategic industries which would drive the national growth in 
the future, DJ and Roh’s MCT succeeded in slowly changing perceptions at the other 
Ministries first, and in turn changed the Korean public’s perception of the industries. 
Although the promotion activities implemented by the MCT were not the only factor 
which contributed to this perception change, some of them were quite effective. For 
example, the Culture Ministry initiated and actively promoted the WCG (World Cyber 
Games) and G-Star (Game Show & Trade, All-Round), while supporting many e-sport 
leagues such as ‘Nationwide Amateur E-sport Competition’ or ‘E-sports Festival for the 
Disabled Students’ (MCST, 2008a: 250). 41  Given that before the DJ government the 
games and comics industries were often linked to juvenile delinquency, it might be 
argued that these activities officially supported by the government must have helped 
Korean public change their prejudice toward certain CI genres. 
 
The MCT also attempted to expand the Korean public’s opportunities to enjoy cultural 
contents by directly supporting those who, for reasons of low income and/or regional 
inequalities in the development of cultural infrastructure, formed a culturally 
‘alienated’ class. This support comprised the provision of education courses concerning 
media literacy. This was expected to strengthen the domestic consumption base at first 
and then the domestic production base by ‘converting the vast majority of the people 
from mere consumers to cultural creators’ (MCT, 2004b: 362). These activities seem to 
have been highly desirable in that they were not only directed to serve economic 
rationales, but were also designed to contribute to the enhancement of cultural welfare, 
despite the difficulties inherent in measuring the impact of the latter kind of 
intervention. 
 
The final stage of the CI value chain to which intervention was applied was overseas 
markets. Exports of Korean cultural contents surged significantly during DJ and Roh’s 
presidencies (see Table 8.5). Nevertheless, according to the first CEO of KOCCA, Suh 
Byung-Moon (November 2009), even if ‘export expansion’ was the most important 
objective in his mind throughout his term time (2001-07), it was also the objective 
about which he entertained ‘most regrets for not having produced a more aggressive 
performance’. While enhancing cooperation between various quangos across ministries 
such as KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency), Korean Culture Centres in 
                                                          
41 WCG is one of the biggest game festivals in the world, has been held since 2001 and attracts more than 20,000 
participants annually from 50 to 70 countries. G-Star is an international game exhibition which has been held in every 
November since 2005. It attracts many game companies and promotes trade between them.  
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important world cities, the KTO’s (Korea Tourism Organization) overseas offices, and 
KOFICE (Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange), the MCT focused on two 
activities for intervention in overseas markets.  
 
The first of these activities was to furnish necessary information and advice about 
foreign markets to potential exporting companies. For example, as the beachhead of 
‘localized marketing’, KOCCA’s overseas offices in Tokyo, Beijing, LA and London were 
set up to provide a variety of services to the exporting companies. They give updates on 
foreign markets, provide legal support, offer businesses matching opportunities and 
support the marketing activities of Korean firms (MCST, 2008a: 13). These services have 
been especially helpful to ‘small enterprises’ which are not in a position to initiate 
overseas market entry without support. Supporting Korean companies to take part in 
international fairs and exhibitions was another main activity for the MCT, which actively 
encouraged Korean CI companies to participate in the events such as the Kidscreen 
Summit (animation), MIDEM (music), the San Diego Comic-Con International (cartoons), 
Licensing, Brand Licensing (characters) and E3, ECTS and TGS (games) (ibid.: 13-14). As 
seen below, between 2002 and 2006 export contracts worth over 443 million dollars 
resulted from Korean participation at such international fairs.    
    
    Table 6.4 Export Contracts Made through International Fairs    
 
 Unit: million dollars                                                                                      Source: MCST (2008a: 14)  
 
 
6.3 Conclusion  
 
The two themes this chapter has covered are the evolution of the Korean CI policy 
framework and the essence of the framework. The first section examined and compared 
the seven long-term Korean CI plans that were published during DJ and Roh’s 
presidencies, and broke the policy evolution down into three stages. The New Policy 
(1998) laid down the foundations for the formulation of the policy framework. Since 
that time up to the publication of The Participatory government’s CI policy Vision (2003) 
the framework developed in quite a successive manner. By comparing the three vision 
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plans, I showed the slow but steady evolution of the MCT’s visions, strategies and action 
plans for CI promotion.  
 
However, a structural transformation was introduced in Creative Korea (2004), the 
would-be Yellow Pages of Korean cultural policy. As the climax of the policy evolution, 
it was indeed highly significant. This most comprehensive and systematic of the Korean 
long-term plans not only summarized former plans and initiatives, but also suggested an 
enduring policy perspective for future development. By identifying key policy objects 
(i.e. quangos, Local CI, environment infrastructures, input infrastructures, creation 
/distribution processes, and the domestic/overseas markets), and then visualizing their 
relationships and working mechanisms, the Culture Industry Policy Process System 
(CIPPS) model succeeded in providing the most synthetic version of the Korean CI policy 
framework. It was also argued that the policy framework appeared to be oriented 
toward building the Korean NIS for CI in a fundamental sense. Put another way, the 
strategy combined the two mottos—‘Arm’s Length Principle’ and ‘National Basic 
Industry’—in order to establish a new NIS. 
 
The second section explored how this strategy of building the NIS was institutionalized 
by the two governments. It is important to remember here that there were few 
resources with which the government could promote the CI sector, when the DJ 
government was established in the middle of the Asian Financial Crisis. Therefore, 
neither the MCT’s budget nor the organization of CI were sufficient, and the MCT 
quangos were oriented for regulation rather than for promotion. The financial, 
information or legal systems necessary for supporting CI were lacking, the industries 
were still at an early stage of development, and the prejudice remained that the CI 
produced trifling, harmful pseudo-arts. A number of strategies were taken to address 
these problems and to build up the CI as a national basic industry.  
 
The first step was the cooperative governance strategy that introduced a new style of 
governance system into the Korean CI policy field. In a way directly opposed to the 
authoritarian governance of the developmental state, the post-crisis Culture Ministry re-
established its network of relationships with key policy players, including other 
Ministries, MCT quangos, the cultural industries, and local governments, while 
empowering its CI Bureau to a greater extent. In this process, the Ministry changed its 
own role from that of a panopticon and spearhead (i.e. an agent of directing, regulating 
and protecting) to that of a control tower and yard sweeping brush (i.e. an agent of 
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coordinating, promoting and bridging) in order to ensure democratic and cooperative 
governance over the CI field.  
 
The second strategy was designed to establish comprehensive infrastructures by 
building new kinds of infrastructure covering not just the environment but also various 
CI inputs, many of which had never been addressed by Korean CI policy before. Firstly, 
the changes of governance style and paradigm were directly translated into the 
development of environment infrastructure, covering the legal and taxation systems, 
copyrights, and policy research. Through this development, people came to see the real 
value of replacing old regulation policies with effective promotion policies, which had 
never been possible before. The MCT then went on to nurture various input 
infrastructures such as human, technology, financial, physical and information 
infrastructure. This was based upon the realization that without nurturing them 
systematically, the Korean CI would neither be able to make an economic take-off nor 
produce sustainable performance.  
 
The final strategy of symbolic intervention aimed to initiate a new mode of intervention 
in the CI value chain. The policymakers first divided the value chain into stages for 
active intervention; namely, creation, distribution, the domestic market and overseas 
markets. They then invented various tools to boost industrial activities at each stage of 
the value chain. While such government intervention into key industries was far from 
new in Korea, it was indeed a novel approach in the cultural sector. Moreover, what 
made this intervention notable was its symbolic mode, which can be summarized as a 
move away from ‘direct support’ with a simultaneous emphasis on the principle of 
‘select and focus’.   
 
By summarizing and synthesizing the discussions and findings up to now, Table 6.5 
presents the Korean CI policy framework at stake. To stress the distinctiveness of the 
policy framework, at least three points need to be made concerning the table.  
 
First and foremost, the policy framework was produced in close relation with, or under 
the guidance of, a broader policy (or even state) shift. The policy framework emerged 
as a product of slow but consistent evolution, which was indeed a process of learning-
by-doing fraught with many mistakes, over the period spanned by the publication of The 
Government of the People’s New Policy for Culture and Tourism (October 1998) and 
that of Creative Korea (June 2004). In other words, if President Roh had not followed in 
DJ’s footsteps in relation to neo-developmental policy transformation, it would not have 
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been possible to present the CI policy framework in such a systematic form. The three 
chiefs of the CI Bureau under DJ’s presidency became the Vice Minister, the Assistant 
Minister, and the Vice Minister of the Culture Ministry respectively under Roh’s 
presidency. They guaranteed the continuous and thus productive evolution of the policy 
framework in the making. Throughout this evolution, therefore, DJ’s two mottos of 
‘arm’s length principle’ and ‘CI as a national basic industry’ were continuously 
integrated into the framework, working as the foundations of the three strategies as I 
have summarized above. As the table below shows, and summarizing for conceptual 
clarity, I shall argue that while the creative governance strategy (1) and the 
environment infrastructure strategy (2.1) directly engaged with the arm’s length 
principle, the input infrastructure strategy (2.2) and the symbolic intervention strategy 
(3) were more closely related to the vision of CI as a national basic industry.   
     
   Table 6.5 The Korean CI Policy Framework 
 
 
For this reason, the policy framework reveals the eclectic character of the neo-
developmental CI policy shift without reserve. The ‘arm’s length principle’ was 
imported from the Western regulatory states to tackle authoritarian governance and 
crony capitalism, that is, the critical side effects of the East Asian developmental states. 
With the help of this new principle, Korean policymakers believed that they could build 
a national innovation system which was based not just upon the adaptabilities of a few 
big businesses but also upon the people’s creativity. They believed that this would 
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ensure the necessary innovation in a sustainable manner, which was a result that the 
national imitation system employed by the developmental state could not have 
guaranteed.  
 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that DJ and Roh’s MCT adopted many methods for rapid 
industrialization that had been devised by the Korean developmental state with the 
objective of ‘making CI into a national basic industry’. To get a proper perspective on 
this, imagine that the New Labour government had announced an intention to make 
Britain the third strongest country in the world as a key part of its CI policy vision, and 
had officially nominated CI as one of six national strategic industries for the future of 
Britain! How would such intervention have gone down in the UK? The government would 
no doubt have been drowned in a torrent of criticism that it was instigating a ‘corporate 
violation of public culture’ (McGuigan, 2003; 2005) or the ‘extinction’ of the cultural 
sector (Belfiore, 2002). However, this was not the case in Korea, where government 
intervention to produce rapid industrialization has been regarded as a virtue. It is this 
eclectic appropriation of attitudes from the regulatory state and from the 
developmental state that makes the Korean CI policy framework distinctive.   
 
Last, but not least, it should be pointed out that the Korean framework visualizes a 
phased development of the cultural and creative industries. As suggested, the first 
phase predicated on ALP was geared to introducing the key ingredients of the regulatory 
state model as the antidote to the notorious problems attendant on crony capitalism. 
Conversely, the second phase focusing on CI as a national basic industry was oriented 
toward reinventing the working mechanisms of the developmental state, such as the 
nationalistic promotion of strategic industries for the rapid growth of the domestic 
market and exportation, in order to adapt to the 21st century. In other words, the 
Korean government first attempted to ensure the negative consolidation of creativity 
by importing the wisdom of the regulatory state, and then sought to execute the 
positive consolidation of creativity by drawing on the familiar equation of the 
developmental state.  
 
Of particular importance here is the irreversible order of the two stages. That is, 
without ensuring the democratic/cooperative governance of CI and suitable 
environment infrastructures, there was no point in nurturing various input 
infrastructures or intervening actively into the CI value chain. This is because without 
ensuring democracy, freedom of expression, the public sphere and thus social capital, it 
is almost impossible to keep encouraging people to make the most of their creativity 
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and imagination. Although improving democracy in a society may not necessarily 
guarantee the enhancement of the people’s creativity, killing democracy would almost 
surely lead to the death of creativity. This is certainly the perspective that underlies 
the Korean CI policy framework.  
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7. Case Studies of KOFIC and KOCCA 
 
 
The preceding chapters discussed how and why the Korean CI policy shift took place and 
detailed the CI policy framework that was produced in the process. This chapter 
employs case studies on the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) and the Korea Culture and 
Content Agency (KOCCA) to examine how the espoused policy framework was put into 
practice by quangos that cover different genres of CI.  
 
KOFIC and KOCCA have a few things in common. First of all, these quangos were 
established as a direct result of the CI policy shift that was instigated from 1998 
onwards, despite the fact KOCCA was not created out of an antecedent institution as 
KOFIC was. Furthermore, the first chairperson of KOFIC and the first CEO of KOCCA 
were both former chief executives of Samsung group companies. More importantly, both 
organizations were considered to be flagship quangos for CI promotion in Korea. As 
noted earlier, KOFIC was the first quango transformed in accordance with the arm’s 
length principle and has been the most independent quango due to the nature of the 
film industry and the character of its staff. Compared to other quangos, KOCCA has 
received not only the biggest budget from the MCT, but also the most attention from 
the Korean media. The questions that will be covered in this chapter relate to whether 
these two representative quangos faithfully applied the new CI policy framework in 
their policy practices. How similarly and distinctively did they implement the key 
strategies of the policy framework, and why? Were there any significant changes in 
policy direction at either quango in the course of the implementation process? Did the 
governance and administration styles in and around the quangos really differ 
significantly? These are critical issues that will be addressed below.   
 
First of all, I will explore the background and historical significance of the quangos’ 
establishment. Their organizational structures and missions will then be analyzed to 
trace how the policy framework was translated into specific activities. In doing so, two 
main sources will be mobilized. The first is comprised of official policy documents 
published by the quangos, such as mission statements, institutional reports, and White 
Papers, while the in-depth interviews I conducted with figures that played key roles in 
creating/managing the organizations comprise the second set of sources. I will 
demonstrate that despite sharing the broader CI policy framework, the two quangos 
developed quite different policy directions in certain aspects. The differences sprang 
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from two quangos’ different histories, industrial sectors and staff, which are as crucial 
as the similarities between the quangos for understanding the characteristics of Korean 
CI policy (field).   
 
 
7.1 The Korean Film Council (KOFIC) 
 
 
7.1.1 The KMPPC, the Ancient Regime 
 
The film industry has always been one of the biggest and most popular sectors of Korean 
CI. In addition, several progressive figures from the industry played a pivotal role in 
making and then realizing DJ’s election pledges on cultural policy, including the 
abolition of censorship and the transformation of the Korean Motion Picture Promotion 
Corporation (KMPPC) into KOFIC. For these reasons, the legal groundwork for KOFIC was 
quickly prepared through a full revision of the Film Promotion Act in February 1999, and 
the quango was established in May 1999. Thus, KOFIC was not only the first quango 
transformed by the application of ALP, but is also held to have been the ‘most 
autonomous quango’ during DJ and Roh’s presidencies.  
 
We often called KOFIC a semi-private and semi-public administrative organization. 
The word, ‘institution’ was intentionally avoided. This expression aimed to stress 
KOFIC’s independent character from not only the Culture Ministry, but also from the 
film industry. … Under the two governments, KOFIC led the film policy planning and 
the Ministry almost accepted our plans as proposed, with the exception of some 
minor changes to the budget part. (Hwang & Ryu, policy researchers in KOFIC, 
October 2009) 
 
However, autonomy was the last thing that KOFIC’s predecessor, the KMPPC could have 
imagined enjoying. Although the KMPPC was founded in 1973 ‘to improve the quality of 
Korean films and to promote the industry’ (Motion Pictures Act, 1972), this aim was 
nothing but vacant rhetoric. This can be demonstrated by an examination of the list of 
its presidents (see Table 7.1).   
 
The first thing to note concerning the list is that until 1995 all the presidents of KMPPC 
were either retired Army generals or retired civil servants. Most notably, the four 
presidents who took charge of the Korean film promotion between 1976 and 1988 were 
former generals who had previously been charged with conducting ‘troop information 
and education’ for the Korean Army. Therefore, film policy inevitably took the form of 
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control and regulation in the interests of the military regimes then in power. How could 
the films promoted by these generals have attracted domestic audiences, let alone the 
interest of export markets?  Although the president’s role at the KMPPC was taken by 
people from the film industry after 1995, their terms of office were extremely short. 
Four different presidents served the KMPPC in only four years between 1995 and 1999.  
Clearly, it would have been impossible for them to form coherent and sustainable film 
policy. Accordingly, the performance of the KMPPC was far from visionary, and it 
focused on regulating the industry for easy state control of the masses (Lee, 2005; Jwa 
& Lee, 2006). 
 
    Table 7.1 The List of KMPPC Presidents            
      
Source: Lee Hyuk-Sang (2005) 
 
 
7.1.2 The Rise of Young Progressive Cineastes since 1987  
 
It had become increasingly obvious since the late 1980s that the old-style bureaucratic 
organization was no longer sustainable because it was not suitable for coping with the 
specialization and diversification demanded by the global film industry, or for reflecting 
the consequences of rapid industrialization and democratization in Korea. Within the 
Korean film industry, there were at least three events that are worth mentioning in 
connection to this change of atmosphere.  
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In September 1985, the Chun Doo-Hwan government gave in to aggressive pressure from 
the US and made an agreement on opening Korean film market without sufficient 
preparation (Kim, 2009), which allowed the free import and direct distribution of 
foreign films by Hollywood companies. These measures had been insistently requested 
by the Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA) and the United States 
Trade Representative (Jwa & Lee, 2006: 104), and were ‘implemented in the situation 
where the viability of Korean film production was absent, and thus bringing about both 
increased imports of foreign films and a decrease in the production of Korean films’ 
(KOFIC, 2007b: 38). This was due to the fact that Korean film companies at that time 
usually earned their money by importing and distributing Hollywood films. Since the 
government allotted the number of foreign films which a company could import 
according to the number of Korean films it produced, the Korean companies produced 
quite a few films, but many of them were not even released. In this situation, the 
sudden opening aggravated the Korean film industry’s dependency on Hollywood films. 
In short, the Korean government had abandoned its domestic film market in order to 
maintain and expand exports of Korean products to the large US market.  
 
The second event ensued as a consequence of the enormous side-effects that the film 
agreement had. Young Korean cineastes started to add their voices to the country’s 
historic democratization movement in 1987. Their first action was a signature-seeking 
campaign. Although this movement was led by director Chung Ji-Young, one of the 
veteran directors of the time and later a commissioner on KOFIC’s first board,42 the vast 
majority were young assistant directors who have now become veteran directors in their 
own right and remain active in the Korean film industry. According to Kim Hyae-Joon 
(September 2009), who was later a central figure in KOFIC,  
 
From this moment, Korean cineastes began to pay attention to film policy and to 
organize themselves as a group of policy participants. … From 1988 the group started 
to translate their requests of necessary reform into the form of articles in film-
related acts.  
 
The two most influential opposition leaders of the time, DJ and YS, welcomed this 
movement. While YS changed his position after merging his party with the ruling 
conservative party in 1990, DJ did not waver in his support for the movement. That is 
                                                          
42 Chung Ji-Young, Moon Sung-Geun (actor), Lee Chang-Dong (director), Kim Hyae-Joon (film policy expert) and Cho 
Gwang-Hee (lawyer) were some of central figures who led the strong and continuous democratization movement within 
the film sector and later established KOFIC. These people made an organization named ‘Choongmooro Forum’ for the 
reform drive of Korean film industry. Choongmooro is the name of street where Korean film companies were once 
clustered.  
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‘why the young cineastes could naturally support DJ in the following elections’ (Kim, 
September 2009).  
 
The third issue that needs to be outlined concerns the reforms that the YS government 
initiated in order to prepare for and respond to the Uruguay Round of free trade talks, 
and the significant effect they had on the Korean film industry, despite the fact that YS 
did not maintain any genuine support for the progressive group. The most important 
reform was probably the ‘Real-Name Financial Transaction System’ that was 
implemented in August 1993. Until the mid-1980s, there had only been one source of 
finance for Korean film productions, a group of private investors euphemistically known 
as Choongmooro Capital. This system was maintained through a network of film 
production companies, cinema owners and anonymous investors. Meanwhile, from the 
late 1980s, leading conglomerates started to enter the industry via video production. 
The implementation of the real-name system in 1993, however, brought about the 
separation of the conglomerates’ capital from Choongmooro Capital, which resulted in 
a rapid decrease in the latter, because ‘promissory notes suddenly stopped rotating in 
the network’.  
 
As a result, the young generation of cineastes who supported the 1987 
democratization movement were suddenly able to become independent from the old 
system of Korean film making, and produce or direct films with support from the 
more transparent investment that came from the conglomerates. They are the group 
who are now called the ‘first generation of film planning’ in Korea and who have led 
the striking development of the Korean film industries over the last decade. The 
older generation in the industry no doubt felt a sense of crisis for their survival in 
face of this rising young generation. (Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009) 
 
This is a brief description of the major fluctuations in the Korean film industry before 
the establishment of KOFIC. Both external forces such as the agreement with the US and 
internal conditions such as the democratization movement and the previous 
government’s reforms all combined to stimulate the rise of a new progressive 
generation of cineastes in the Korean cultural policy field. They consistently made the 
following three demands: ‘the abolition of censorship, the transformation of the KMPPC 
and the enhancement of financial support’ (Kim, 2009). After DJ’s election victory in 
1997, their requests were directly reflected in DJ’s cultural policy. In this context, the 
MCT transformed the ‘KMPPC, which had not been organically related with the real field 
of the film industry, into KOFIC, which is an administrative organization composed of 
civilian experts to pursue consensus’ (Lee et al., 2005: 142).  
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7.1.3 New Council Model for Autonomous Promotion  
 
It should be stressed that the transformation moved from the old corporation model 
governed by retired generals or civil servants to a new council model managed by 
consensus among experts from diverse backgrounds. As ‘a government-supported, self-
administered body’, KOFIC became increasingly able to enjoy ‘not only a wider mandate 
to shape film policy, but also a greater degree of autonomy from the government’ 
(KOFIC, 2001: 13). In accordance with ALP, KOFIC provided various film experts with the 
first opportunity to be the real subjects of Korean film policy making without having to 
consider the stability of the regime or the personal tastes of the president. This is the 
fundamental difference between the KMPPC and KOFIC. Indeed, it was this difference 
that made it possible for KOFIC to form and implement a ‘film promotion policy which 
reflected properly the voices of the real field of the industry’ (Lee et al., 2005). In 
short, the direction of film policy changed from one of regime-friendly regulation led by 
bureaucrats to one of industry-friendly promotion led by autonomous civil experts.   
 
If this transformation of the film quango toward autonomy was one side of the coin, the 
abolition of censorship was the other. According to Cho Gwang-Hee (September 2009), a 
former inspector of KOFIC and a lawyer specializing in the freedom of expression,  
 
The acts relating to film or performance used to be prepared by bureaucrats in the 
Ministry. After making a draft which was sure to be in favour of their own interest, 
they passed it to the members of the National Assembly. From a specialist’s 
viewpoint, those drafts were far from ‘normal’. They were inflected by the hidden 
interests of the Ministry and various lobby groups. If the legislature had been 
capable enough, they could and should have turned down or significantly revised the 
drafts in accordance with rational criteria. Since that was not the case, many 
dubious and incomplete laws were enacted. … One of the important roles that KOFIC 
played was to break the irrational link between the legislature and the 
administration in Korea. The council raised their voice against the old convention. 
 
KOFIC’s prime concern in this role was the nullification of censorship. Charged with the 
realization of DJ’s cultural pledge, KOFIC continuously voiced its decisive position 
against censorship on a practical level, and worked closely with the MCT and the 
current ruling party in that direction. That is, a group of young progressive people from 
the film industry played a key role in advancing the freedom of expression as well as in 
introducing a democratic governance model. For Oh Jee-Chul (October 2009) who was in 
charge of transforming the KMPPC at the MCT: 
 
This shift was not only good for the industry, but the Ministry. In the age of military 
governments, there was a saying that ‘the Film Industry Division in the Culture 
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Ministry is one of three hotbeds of corruption within Korean government’. Many civil 
servants in the division ended up in prison for receiving illegal favours from 
production companies or cinema owners at the price of illegal exemption of 
regulation. 
 
It all changed once the most notorious regulation, censorship, was abolished and the 
quango for film promotion became autonomous at last. The MCT was finally able to cast 
off its bad reputation. Put another way, the establishment of KOFIC was good news not 
only to the policy objects, but also to the policy subjects. This is what cooperative or 
creative governance is all about, one may say.  
 
 
7.1.4 Conflicts in the Early Stage of KOFIC 
 
Nonetheless, the establishment of KOFIC was not welcomed by all, and a group of 
opponents remained strongly opposed to this new trend. The older generation of 
cineastes, who had long enjoyed vested interests under the shade of Choongmooro 
Capital, felt a sense of crisis and alienation, for they were left outside of the new 
quango. They saw the establishment of KOFIC as a union of young comrades’ political 
intrigue to transform the ‘Korean film circle into the field of ideological empowerment’ 
(Cho, 2008: 67). The tension between these two groups, most conspicuously seen 
between Kim Ji-Mi’s Motion Pictures Association of Korea and Moon Sung-Geun’s 
Choongmooro Forum, stirred up a series of conflicts in KOFIC’s early days.   
 
After collecting opinions from various sectors of the film industry, the MCT originally 
invited ten commissioners to form the first board at KOFIC. Three of them were from 
the progressive group, three were from the conservative group and four were neutral 
(Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009). The first chairperson was Shin Sae-Gil, who was a 
former CEO of Samsung’s European Headquarters, while the first vice chairperson was 
Moon Sung-Geun. Even though Shin did not know much about film, the MCT invited him 
in the hope that KOFIC would be managed from the same competitive perspective as a 
private company. The young generation of cineastes did not fully agree with this 
decision, but accepted it because they thought Moon would be able to represent their 
opinions strongly enough. However, two conservative commissioners vetoed this 
structure, insisting that the first board was not legitimate because they did not 
‘officially accept the offer from the MCT’ and the chairperson from Samsung did not 
have a ‘specialty’ in film (Kyunghyang-Shinmun, 1999).   
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This was the attempt of the old generation to take initiatives in the newly 
established KOFIC, which had a much bigger budget than the KMPPC. Since the two 
were also very powerful,43 the MCT tried to mediate the conflict without a big noise. 
In this process, Shin became sick and tired of the irrational events around the film 
industry and resigned his post as chairperson, saying ‘because there is no system 
such as retirement in “culture and the arts” world, this sort of thing will happen 
again and again!’ (Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009) 
 
After his resignation, the MCT invited Baik Jong-Gook to be the new chairperson. 
However, since he was not only a retired civil servant, but had also once taken charge 
of film censorship, on this occasion the progressive commissioners could not accept the 
decision. Therefore, all three commissioners resigned, requesting a complete change of 
the board of commissioners including the new chairperson. As a result, on 27 January 
2000, a new board of commissioners took office at KOFIC and a new chairperson was 
appointed as the third chairperson. However, this new board failed to elect a vice-
chairperson, because the second vice chairperson, one of the three original 
conservative commissioners, refused to resign. Because the third board finally 
distrusted the second vice chairperson and elected its own vice chairperson, the second 
chairperson then sued the commissioners. He won his case in August 2001 and the 
commissioners of the third board made an appeal to the higher court (Munhwa-Ilbo, 
2001).  
 
These episodes show how deep and complicated the conflict between the 
old/conservative group and the young/progressive group of cineastes was in KOFIC’s 
early stages. However, the more significant point here is that the conflict was indeed a 
reflection of the tensions in the Korean film industry.  
 
There was a structural reason why the old generation became marginalized at that 
time. When a new type of capital entered into the film industry, the first concern 
was stable investment. Therefore, capital asked the candidates to submit project 
plans and management assessments. But the older generation could not adapt to the 
new circumstances, because they were used to being able to attract the required 
capital with only a sentence, ‘I am producer or director who!’ … Therefore, the 
younger generation could take up the new opportunities quite easily. (Hwang & Ryu, 
October 2009) 
 
In this context, with the old group being deeply threatened under the new system, they 
believed that ‘left-wing’ organizations such as ‘KOFIC’ and the ‘Pusan International Film 
Festival’ were blocking their chances and thus ruining the film industry (FFC, 2008). 
Therefore, during the progressive governments, voices of dissatisfaction and discontent 
form the old/conservative group grew increasingly.   
                                                          
43 Yoon Il-Bong was the last President of KMPPC appointed by DJ’s MCT and Kim Ji-Mi was not only a popular actress, 
but also the president of ‘Motion Pictures Association of Korea’ at that time.  
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If you met the old cineastes individually, you might feel alright. But if you met them 
as a group, you couldn’t help feeling very embarrassed. In that situation, they 
usually raised their voices to ask such stereotypical questions as: ‘How old are you?’ 
‘How long have you been in the film industry?’ ‘What do you know about films, you 
bastard?’ Many professionals invited by KOFIC from outside the industry must have 
gone through that process. (Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009) 
 
Although most of the old-generation cineastes were not actively making films any more, 
their influence remained strong, especially because their voices were amplified by 
influential conservative newspapers. ‘Since the government intentionally tried to keep 
its distance from those matters according to the arm’s length principle’ (DJ’s last 
Culture Minister, Kim Sung-Jae, October 2009), the gap between the two groups grew 
ever wider.  
 
In this light, KOFIC provides a wonderful opportunity to ascertain what can happen 
when a new good institution is built upon old ground. KOFIC’s early history holds up a 
mirror that reflects the state of Korean cultural politics at the time. The conservative 
group kept insisting that ALP was not a suitable governance system given the Korean 
industry’s situation, and therefore that KOFIC needed to be converted back into the 
KMPPC (Cho, 2008). Yet, this is quite an empty argument that is unsupported by the 
evidence. For instance, after KOFIC was established in 1999, the Korean film industry 
made rapid and substantial progress in almost every aspect. 
 
    Table 7.2 The Development of the Korean Film Industry (1997-2007)  
 
Source: KOFIC (2004; 2008a) 
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To illustrate, the number of films produced each year between 1998 and 2007 soared 
from 43 to 124; the number of screens increased from 507 to 1,975; admissions surged 
from about 50 million to 158 million; the market share of Korean films grew from 25.1% 
to 50%; and the annual number of Korean films exported skyrocketed from 33 to 321. 
Then, it seems rather difficult to deny that unlike the authoritarian governments, ‘the 
democratic government[s] considered the film industry as one of the most important 
strategic industries’ and ‘its new cultural policy greatly boosted the film business’ (Jin, 
2006: 19).  
 
Given the conflicts around KOFIC and the industry, this performance may appear quite 
surprising at first glance. Most of those I interviewed, however, including KOFIC insiders, 
civil servants and policy researchers agreed that the tension between the old and the 
young hegemony blocs was less a matter of ideology and policy than one of zeitgeist 
and survival, and that the wider historical trend was in favour of the ‘emergent’ group 
rather than the ‘residual’ one (Williams, 1980). That is, despite the struggles in the 
Korean film industry, KOFIC was able to firmly implement the new 
democratic/cooperative governance according to the arm’s length principle. It was 
therefore able to act as a fresh and powerful centre for the structural reform of the 
Korean film industry, and move with the irresistible historical trends that came from 
beyond the national industry. This is probably why the progressive reforms introduced 
have been retained by the incoming conservative Lee government. 
 
The conservative government established in 2008 has followed the policy frame and 
agenda discovered or developed by the progressive groups in spite of the rhetoric it 
has foregrounded, such as ‘the lost decade’. On the level of concrete policy practice, 
there is no other option. (Hwang & Ryu, October 2009) 
 
I believe that with all their efforts, it is impossible for the conservative groups to 
turn back the policy direction of the former governments. It is because there is 
something like the spirit of the times at work. ALP is the very spirit of these times. 
Secondly, it is because for the last ten years, the industries have changed a lot. That 
is, the control or manipulation over them such as we saw in the past [before 1998] 
now seems completely impossible. (Former CI Bureau Chief, 2009) 
 
 
7.1.5 Organizational Structure and Main Businesses   
 
According to Korean Cinema 2007 (KOFIC, 2007a), KOFIC has two goals. The first is to 
stimulate ‘the growth and development of Korean films through funding, research, 
policy development, education and professional training’, while the second is ‘to 
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further develop global markets for Korean films and to promote intercultural 
understanding through film-based exchanges’. In order to realize these missions, KOFIC 
carried out various initiatives through its five major divisions; the Domestic Support 
Department and the International Promotion Department under the Secretariat, the 
Korean Film Research Centre, the Korean Academy of Film Arts (KAFA), and KOFIC 
Studios. 
 
           Figure 7.1 KOFIC’s Organizational Structure                            Source: KOFIC (2006b: 13)   
     
 
 
It is useful to take a quick look at each division. Founded in 1984 to train human 
resources for Korean film industry, the Korean Academy of Film Arts had produced ‘365 
graduates including more than 60 feature film directors’ up to 2007, most of whom 
became ‘the core talent that has led the Korean film renaissance’ (KOFIC, 2007a) that 
has culminated in the past decade.  
 
Secondly, KOFIC’s post-production facilities in its Seoul headquarters and the Studio 
Complex at Namyangju are the largest film production facilities in Asia. KOFIC Studios 
was established in 1997 as the ‘nation’s premiere centre for filmmaking’ and has 
offered ‘all necessary production facilities and equipment’ including state-of-the-art 
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recording studios, a film processing laboratory, and digital visual effect suites (KOFIC, 
2007a).  
 
Thirdly, the Korean Film Research Centre was created by expanding the existing Policy 
Research Department to conduct the all-around research necessary for film policy 
development. In doing so, it collected statistics on the Korean film industry, developed 
broad marketing strategies for Korean films in both the domestic and overseas markets, 
and constructed a network of KOFIC foreign correspondents to connect the industry with 
the fast-changing world film community (KOFIC, 2007a).  
 
While these divisions concerned human infrastructure, physical infrastructure and 
environment infrastructure respectively, the other two divisions under the Secretariat 
were geared up to promote more directly the value chain of the film industry from 
planning/production through to distribution/exhibition in the domestic and overseas 
markets.  
 
The fourth division, the Domestic Support Department, had two distinctive missions; to 
support the industry and to promote the diversity of cinematic production. Domestic 
support for the industry was intended to realize ‘a fully-developed and rationalised film 
industry’ by invigorating investment funding for the commercial film sector and by 
reforming out-of-date systems of production and distribution. On the other hand, 
domestic support for cinema diversity dealt with the ‘less-commercial side, specifically 
targeting high-quality art/independent/low-budget films so as to keep the ingenuity of 
the local industry alive and blooming’ (KOFIC, 2007a). This two pronged strategy of 
emphasizing both the industrial modernization and the cultural diversity of the Korean 
film industry was unwaveringly maintained throughout DJ and Roh’s presidencies.  
 
Finally, the International Promotion Department focused on ‘supporting completed films 
in accessing international festivals and markets’, ‘providing R&D level support for films 
with an international aspect’, ‘creating an international network of film professionals 
through workshops, training, and development funds’, and ‘promoting cultural diversity 
within international, and especially Pan-Asian, sectors’ (KOFIC, 2006a: 14-15).  
 
As is well summarized in the Film Promotion Whitepaper 1999-2006 (KOFIC, 2007b), 
with this organizational structure, KOFIC carried out 92 initiatives over 29 categories in 
8 sectors over the period as a whole (see Table 7.3).  
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    Table 7.3 KOFIC’s Initiatives between 1999 and 2006       
 
Source: KOFIC (2007b) 
 
There are several points to be made about the table above. First of all, it is notable 
that these initiatives faithfully embodied strategies for building up the Korean NIS for CI. 
Significantly, the first strategy of cooperative governance was realized at the 
institutional level with the transformation of the KMPPC into KOFIC in accordance with 
ALP. The new council was not only freed from the arbitrary interference of politicians 
and civil servants, but was also composed of ‘widely acknowledged opinion leaders from 
the Korean film industry’ (Hwang & Ryu, October 2009). They made it possible to 
establish and enhance KOFIC’s credentials, which had never been imaginable when the 
KMPPC was led by retired generals or civil servants. The second strategy was the 
establishment of comprehensive infrastructures. Firstly, nurturing environment 
infrastructures is well reflected in the establishment of the Korean Film Research 
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Centre within KOFIC, which had become an active subject of Korean film policy making. 
The research centre was charged with a number of missions for ‘A. Strengthening policy 
functions’ and ‘B. Improving institutions’. Meanwhile, ‘C. Nurturing talents’ (human 
infrastructure), ‘G. Establishing Infrastructure and developing technology’ (physical 
infrastructure & technological infrastructure), and ‘H. Managing KOFIC Studios’ 
(Physical infrastructure) were geared to enhance the input infrastructures of the 
Korean film industry. Finally, the last strategy of symbolic intervention into the value 
chain was realized through ‘D. Promoting the domestic film industry’, ‘E. Promoting the 
cultural diversity of film’, and ‘F. Promoting the overseas expansion of Korean films’ (cf. 
Sectors in Table 7.3).  
 
It is equally significant that KOFIC’s promotional initiatives summarized above were not 
produced over a short period of time, but were rather the product of KOFIC’s gradual 
development. As clearly seen in the Domestic Support Department’s two aims, KOFIC 
not only supported industry, but also diversity. For instance, the continuous profile of 
both ‘industry’ and ‘diversity’ across three consecutive long-term plans for film 
promotion, all published by different boards of commissioners, clearly reveals that this 
two-track strategy was deeply inscribed into KOFIC’s visions.  
 
   Table 7.4 Visions of the Three Long-Term Plans of Film Promotion 
 
 
While the two tracks were maintained, KOFIC became more and more inclined to stress 
the cultural aspects. Even if the first board of KOFIC recognized the importance of the 
diversity of film culture, it ‘focused on the quantitative growth of the film industry 
which had been withering’ (KOFIC, 2007b: 114). Therefore, ‘supporting the diversity of 
films’ was just part of a broader objective of ‘supporting film production’. In the second 
plan, however, in ‘activating the production and distribution of Korean films’, to ensure 
diversity became the first and foremost objective. As declared in a white paper (KOFIC, 
2008b: 20), the ‘most urgent policy objective of the second board was to promote 
diversity’. This was because KOFIC’s industrial visions were achieved much faster than 
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its cultural visions. The third board of commissioners also maintained this stress, even if 
the third plan left out the concept of ‘harmonious development’ from its vision and 
instead adopted the ‘fifth strongest country’ vision under the influence of Creative 
Korea. For instance, between 2005 and 2007, the budget for ‘ensuring the diversity and 
the public character of film’ stood at 36.3 billion won, which was far greater than the 
18.7 billion won earmarked for ‘strengthening the basic infrastructures of the film 
industry’, and was second only to the 39 billion won budget assigned to ‘strengthening 
the competitiveness of Korean films’ by only a slim margin (KOFIC, 2008b: 29-30).  
 
Compared with the 1999 budget, it must be regarded a quantum leap. The sectors 
and themes which had never been on the agenda of Korean film policy got into the 
list of KOFIC’s businesses, which itself must be a very positive change. (KOFIC, 2007b: 
104) 
 
Thus far, I have examined the establishment and development of KOFIC, which quite 
dramatically reveals the character of the Korean CI policy shift. Although the KMPPC 
was supposedly charged with the promotion of the film industry in Korea, the direction 
and style of its management was absolutely regime-friendly and therefore its scale and 
scope of promotion could only have been straightjacketed. By introducing a new council 
model, KOFIC was able to ensure for itself the power and autonomy required to build up 
a network of trust and cooperation with the industry. This network and the following 
initiatives for nurturing infrastructures and intervention into the value chain provided a 
‘strong platform for the substantial development’ of the Korean film industry 
throughout the 2000s (Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009). I shall now turn to another 
flagship quango, KOCCA. 
  
 
7.2 The Korea Culture and Content Agency (KOCCA) 
 
 
7.2.1 From the KGPC via CIPC toward KOCCA 
 
KOCCA was the product of keen competition between Ministries around which would 
take leadership in promoting the ‘digital’ contents industries (cf. 5.3.2). According to 
Contents Korea Vision 21 (MCT, 2001b: 14), which was published ‘with the 
establishment of KOCCA as a momentum’, KOCCA was required to ‘prepare a 
comprehensive and systematic support system for the cultural contents industries’. 
Although KOCCA was established as a completely new organization rather than as the 
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result of transforming an existing institution as KOFIC had been, it did have some 
antecedents.  
 
As detailed earlier, the first secretary general of the Korea Games Promotion Centre 
(KGPC) was Lee Jung-Hyun, who was ‘courteously invited’ by the MCT from an IT 
company. He recruited the KGPC staff from the games industry without any interference 
from the MCT. According to a founding member of the KGPC who was still working in 
the games department of newly-merged KOCCA, 
 
In the early KGPC, it can be said that there was no distinction between the staff of 
KGPC and the staff of the games companies. We lived in the same office. We ate, 
played and talked together all the time. That is why the policies the KGPC made 
were widely evaluated as fit for the needs of the industry at that time. Since we 
lived together, it was not difficult to know what was needed for and demanded by 
the industry. (Cho Hang-Bong, November 2009) 
 
The civil servants at the MCT trusted and respected the KGPC staff and fully supported 
their activities and initiatives. Before long, several games companies supported by the 
KGPC started to produce visible performance in the on-line games sector and this new 
style of quango became known as a great success. According to the CI Bureau chief who 
led the establishment of the KGPC,  
 
At that time, Japan was too strong in video games and arcade games for us to 
compete with. That is why the MCT focused on on-line games. The first memorable 
performance was made by Kim Jung-Ryul, who established a company named 
‘Gravity’ in 2000. His game became a big hit not only in Korea, but abroad. His 
company was then listed on NASDAQ and he earned a huge profit. After him, many 
similar success stories emerged around the games industry. Now Korea is the number 
one in the world for the on-line games sector. Thanks to this success of the games 
industry, it became much easier for us to promote other genres in CI in the early 
stage. (Lim Byung-Soo, October 2009) 
 
It should be remembered here that The Five-Year Plan for CI Development (MCT, 1999a) 
declared film, broadcasting, games, animation and popular music to be the five 
strategic genres that should be nurtured intensively. As of 2000, there were only 
quangos for the first three CI genres; KOFIC, the KBI (Korean Broadcasting Institute) and 
the KGPC. The MCT was encouraged by the success of the games industry, and decided 
to set up quangos similar to the KGPC for the last two genres; animation and popular 
music. However, the MCT’s plan to establish a quango for each genre was not approved 
by the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) as they did not want to see so many 
quangos established.  
 
In the end, the MCT won the battle and secured the budget for establishing the 
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centres for nurturing the animation and music industries. This was due to the fact 
that the MPB could not fight against the powerful Culture Minister, Park Ji-Won. 
However, shortly after this was decided, Minister Park resigned and a new Minister 
came in. As a result, MPB kept delaying the implementation of the budget. (Lee 
Jung-Hyun, September 2009)  
 
The negotiations between the two Ministries resulted in the establishment of one 
quango for the two genres, the CIPC (Cultural Industries Promotion Centre). The budget 
was nearly twice as great as that for the KGPC; however, much time had already been 
spent in vain, so the MCT felt rushed. That was why the Ministry asked Lee Jung-Hyun, 
who had set up the KGPC, to head the process of setting up the new quango. As a result, 
in the hope of duplicating the success secured in the games sector, the CIPC was 
established in December 2000 in a very similar way to the KGPC. That is, staff members 
were recruited from the relevant industry and their direct knowledge of and close 
relationship with the industry was mobilized in formulating promotional policies.  
 
Meanwhile, in early 2001 Korean politicians asked the MCT to establish something like 
‘KoreaⓔMuseum’, a kind of incorporated company which focused on producing and 
distributing cultural heritage contents (KOCCA, 2009: 22). However, this idea had to be 
revised because both civil servants and quangos insisted that the government should not 
directly compete with industry by managing an incorporated company endowed with 
such a huge amount of public funding. The solution was to combine the role of the CIPC 
with the idea of the ‘KoreaⓔMuseum’, which resulted in the creation of KOCCA in 
August 2001. Although Lee Jung-Hyun again played a pivotal role in preparing the 
establishment of KOCCA as its first secretary general, it was Suh Byung-Moon, then a 
Vice Chairman at Samsung Electronics, who was appointed to be the first CEO of KOCCA. 
Yet the appointment process was far from smooth.  
 
 
7.2.2 Ensuring Cooperative Governance for KOCCA 
 
Since DJ’s vision of ‘CI as a national basic industry’ was literally realized when CT was 
officially nominated as one of six next-generation growth-driving industries, the 
establishment of KOCCA in the same month was hot news at the time. 116.2 billion won 
was prepared for its establishment, a sum that had never been imaginable for quangos 
within the MCT before (KOCCA, 2003; 2009). For comparison, it is useful to remember 
that the whole budget of the CI Bureau in the first year of the DJ government was only 
16.8 billion won (cf. Table 5.3).  
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Owing to the publicity KOCCA attracted, a number of candidates applied when the MCT 
opened recruitment for the position of its first CEO. Many of them were close to the 
then governmental party, including two candidates from the Blue House. After several 
screening processes, only two candidates remained, one from the political world and 
the other from the related industry. I was told by a couple of interviewees deeply 
involved that there was a heated debate within the MCT on which of the two should be 
appointed. Some argued that the first candidate was close to the politicians in the 
ruling party and would not only be easy to get approved by the Blue House, but would 
also be helpful for the future work of KOCCA. Others argued that as the example of the 
games industry had proved, a leader from the relevant industry would be more 
desirable for the mission of industry promotion than a leader from the world of politics. 
In the end, after fierce conflict within the Ministry, Suh Byung-Moon was appointed.  
 
The first point to be investigated here is why KOCCA was not established according to 
the ‘trendy council model’ (Lim Byung-Soo, October 2009) and managed by the 
consensus between a group of commissioners, but rather in accordance with the older 
corporate model with a CEO at the helm. There were at least three reasons. First of all, 
unlike the film industry, the other cultural contents industries were managed by 
businessmen and not by artists. According to Oh Jee-Chul (October 2009), who was 
promoted to the position of the Director of Planning and Management Office in the MCT 
at that time, although some voices called for KOCCA to be setup as a council like KOFIC, 
the ‘industries themselves did not want that model’. Since the industries were at infant 
stages, what counted were more concrete matters than autonomy, diversity or 
aesthetics. Relatively free from worries about civil servants’ interference or censorship, 
people in the industries were satisfied with the simple fact that the government had 
conferred the status of an industry on their works and promised full support.  
 
Secondly, there was as yet no core group in the new ‘cultural contents industries’ that 
could act as opinion leaders as the young generation of cineastes had in the film 
industry. In this context, the MCT judged that for the infant genres of CI, ‘it was better 
to have a close relationship in order to provide administrative support than to devolve 
power, thinking that it could be possible to transform KOCCA into a council like KOFIC in 
the future’ (Oh, October 2009). According to a senior researcher in KCTI at the time, 
 
The MCT decided it that way because the new content industries looked tight with 
businesses, whilst the film industry did with arts. In addition, there were no such 
184 
 
players in the industries as the directors, actors and critics in the film industry 
armed with great influence and high voices. Therefore, the people in the content 
industries shared neither any theoretical ground for policy direction, nor the will to 
speak up with their own voices. I thought the pop music industry might be different, 
but it wasn’t. (Yang Hyun-Mee, September 2009) 
 
Thirdly, whereas KOFIC had its own fund, KOCCA did not. To be more specific, KOFIC 
did not only have its old Film Fund (about 50 billion won), but obtained additional 
funding (about 200 billion won) from the MPB as the result of intense struggle against 
the abolition of screen quotas (Lim Byung-Soo, October 2009). In this light, the MCT 
agreed that the council model was suitable for deciding how to use the enormous 
amount of funds available to KOFIC. On the other hand, KOCCA’s whole budget was to 
be annually allocated from the Ministry’s budget, which required a different 
relationship with the MCT than that KOFIC had.  
 
What, then, is the major implication of the establishment of KOCCA according to the old 
corporate model? Can it be taken as evidence to show that the MCT stopped or 
retreated from its active reform of governance style shown in the earlier period? The 
answer is surely no. Though KOCCA was different from KOFIC (and similar to the KMPPC) 
in terms of governance structure, the new concept of ALP was also thoroughly 
implemented in its own way. The following episode illustrates this point very well.  
 
The CI Bureau chief at the time, Yoo Jin-Ryong met Suh Byung-Moon, the first KOCCA 
CEO on his first day and explained the long, fierce debate and conflict around his 
appointment. ‘I supported you, because you are the only one who has had the 
experience of failure in promoting CI!’ This was the first thing he said to Suh. As a 
former CEO of the Samsung Entertainment Group, Suh was the only candidate who had 
experienced the would-be businesses of KOCCA.  
 
I told him that this time he should succeed by using all the experience of the failure 
and that was the only way to show it was worthy appointing him in spite of many 
objections. In addition, I promised him that as the CI bureau chief at the MCT, I 
would do everything in my power to protect him and his organization from external 
pressures about recruiting staff or selecting companies to support. In return, I asked 
him to clearly promise me two things. The first was to do business as cleanly and 
fairly as possible, and the second was to deal with the industries in the kindest way 
possible. I made sure that as I would protect KOCCA from external pressures, so 
should he do everything to keep KOCCA clean and fair. He promised me that he 
would manage KOCCA’s businesses with transparent criteria and that he would resign 
if he or any of his staff took any kind of rebate or bribe from the companies they 
supported. (Yoo, November 2009) 
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This was how ALP was implemented in the early period of KOCCA as the antidote to 
crony capitalism in the cultural sector. Yoo Jin-Ryong recalled that he had never heard 
of any rumours about backhanders being taken by KOCCA when it was led by Suh (2001-
07). Of course, Yoo himself received many requests concerning KOCCA from politicians, 
ministers and high-ranking civil servants. Even though he ‘let Suh know the content of 
the requests, it was not for selecting the person or company, but for considering them 
more kindly than usual applicants’. Given that it had been normal for people to be 
appointed/selected through personal connections under the crony capitalism, such were 
the inevitable negotiations that KOCCA had to go through in order to implant its new 
governance principles into old soil.  
 
 
7.2.3 Main Missions of KOCCA  
 
The legal groundwork for KOCCA was first prepared through a revision of the Framework 
Act on the Promotion of the Cultural Industries in January 2002, a few months after its 
establishment. According to the revision, the objective of KOCCA was ‘to efficiently 
support the promotion and development of CI’ and its concomitant missions were as 
follows:  
 
    Table 7.5 KOCCA Missions as Prescribed by the ‘Framework Act’ (January 2002) 
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It needs to be stressed again that there were three kinds of sub-strategies for building 
up the Korean NIS for CI; those of cooperative governance, comprehensive 
infrastructures and symbolic intervention. In reference to the first, I have just 
examined how the arm’s length principle was implemented in the early stages of KOCCA. 
As with the case of the KOFIC, the freedom of expression (the prerequisite of ALP) 
played a key role in ensuring democratic governance over the industries. For example, 
according to Park Sea-Young (September, 2009) who has been promoting the comics 
industry since the establishment of KOCCA, 
 
As the central government started to support the industry …, the morale of the 
comics creators surged, the status of comics was enhanced, and the public’s 
negative perception of it changed. Soon Korean comics will meet the Centennial. I 
was told by many people from the industry that in the past Korean governments had 
always thought about censorship first, ordering them to erase this and that in their 
drawings. However, the DJ government encouraged them to draw good content, 
promising full support from production to overseas marketing. They were surprised 
with how much the times had changed. Since they were accustomed to being 
oppressed, the changes were felt very sensitively in the comics industry.  
 
Furthermore, owing to Suh Byung-Moon’s wide experience and network affiliations, 
KOCCA was able to establish the required cooperative network with related industries 
much faster and wider. He did not only invite many former Samsung staff into KOCCA, 
but actively used them as the link between the government and the industries.  
 
Since 1983 I had worked for the sectors such as video, games, animation and film in 
Samsung. Therefore, when I came to KOCCA, all the businesses were not new, but 
very familiar to me. The only thing that changed was that I had to work for the 
government, not for a private company. Since I have long experience, there was not 
much to worry about including the matters such as recruiting and organization 
management. … Although it may sound paradoxical, the dismissal of the Samsung 
Entertainment Group due to the Asian financial crisis was bitter to Samsung, but 
became sweet to Korean CI as a whole. This is because hundreds of staff, who 
accumulated experience and were educated through the investment of Samsung, 
started to disperse to all the sectors of Korean CI owing to the crisis. They helped 
systematize and modernize the sectors with their experience. (Suh Byung-Moon, 
November 2009) 
 
This is confirmed by the case of Cho, who worked in Samsung, then in KOCCA, and who 
now works in CJ E&M, a major media company in Korea.  
 
After quitting the Samsung Entertainment Group, I was working in a broadcasting 
company. Then I got an offer to work in KOCCA. The section manager who gave me 
the offer had been my senior in Samsung. When I came to work, I found that the 
team chief was also a former Samsung man. In the early days, many ‘talents’ were 
recruited in this way. Therefore, we did not need much explanation of the new 
works. … The networks with the industries we had were used to get necessary data 
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or convene meetings. (Cho Dong-Chun, September 2009)  
 
Owing to this cooperative network between its experienced staff and the industries, 
KOCCA’s ten missions prescribed in the ‘Framework Act’ were successfully implemented. 
Even if the ninth mission, the informationalization of arts organizations, was left out of 
the act in the fourth revision in 2006, the other nine missions were maintained right up 
to the end of Roh’s presidency. The most important point here is the missions can be 
categorized as either nurturing infrastructures or intervention into the value chain (cf. 
Sectors in Table 7.5). To illustrate, the two sectors, ‘A. Policy development’ and ‘H. 
Data management for public organization’ were engaged in nurturing environment 
infrastructures. Meanwhile, ‘B. Infrastructure facilities’, ‘D. CT development’, ‘E. 
Nurturing talents’ and ‘J. Cultural heritage database’ are the sectors that addressed 
physical infrastructure, technological infrastructure, human infrastructure and 
information infrastructure respectively, thus seeking to strengthen various input 
infrastructures. The other three sectors of ‘C. Opening CI enterprises’, ‘G. Supporting 
CI enterprises’ and ‘F. Distribution and exportation’ were intended to realize the third 
strategy of symbolic intervention into each genre of CI.  
 
 
7.2.4 Changes in Organizational Structure and Policy Stress 
 
Under DJ and Roh’s presidencies, KOCCA was able to continue pursuing its key missions 
without any significant changes in policy direction. As Suh (November 2009) clearly 
confirms,  
 
When it comes to promoting Korean CI, the DJ government made a great start. It 
kept stressing the importance of cultural contents and changed people’s perception. 
The Roh government inherited the policy direction without any significant changes. 
In addition, since I was reappointed as the CEO of KOCCA under the Roh government, 
the continuity of KOCCA could be ensured.  
 
Nevertheless, due to the development of both the infant industries and KOCCA itself, 
the stress placed on the different missions inevitably changed. A notable shift happened 
in the early years of Suh’s second term of office. This shift can be grasped by comparing 
the first and the last organizational structures of KOCCA under the DJ and Roh 
administrations. Figure 7.2 shows the original structure as of 2001.  
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      Figure 7.2 KOCCA’s Organizational Structure (August 2001)           Source: KOCCA (2009: 24) 
 
 
 
A Key point is that in order to become ‘the head temple of the programmes carried out 
by the MCT for promoting Korean cultural contents’, KOCCA expanded its initiatives 
from the financial and administrative support that the CIPC had implemented to the 
more ‘active function of discovering and investing in new projects’ (KOCCA, 2009: 23). 
For this, while maintaining the secretariat of the former CIPC, KOCCA established two 
new headquarters.  
 
Firstly, the ‘HQ for Industry Support’ was composed of teams that engaged with key 
genres of CI. Each team was supposed to support the production of high-quality 
contents, help facilitate exports to overseas markets and provide equipment in order to 
‘incubate’ enterprises with potential in each industry. Since KOFIC and the KBI already 
held the remit for the film and Broadcasting industry, the ‘Moving Image Support Team’ 
at KOCCA sought to complement the missions of the existing quangos rather than 
conflict with them.  
 
Secondly, the ‘HQ for Contents Development’ was composed of a Contents Business 
Team for planning and developing cultural contents (including the cultural heritage 
business), a Contents Technology Team for supporting the development of applied 
technology and its licensing, and a Policy Research Team for planning and implementing 
policy development through surveys and research. It can be roughly said that whereas 
the ‘HQ for Industry Supporting’ focused on the key genres of CI and promotion through 
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their value chains, the ‘HQ for Contents Development’ dealt with broader issues 
concerning necessary infrastructures.  
 
In 2002, the number of staff in KOCCA nearly doubled from 44 to 81, and its legal status 
changed to that of a ‘special corporation’. 44  To reflect these changes, KOCCA 
transformed its ‘Secretariat’ into the ‘HQ for Industry Planning’ and the ‘HQ for 
Industry Support’ into the ‘HQ for Industry Promotion’, while maintaining the ‘HQ for 
Content Development’ as it was. However, this change of organizational structure, 
which remained in place until 2005, was relatively less significant than what happened 
in Suh’s second term at KOCCA.  
 
Creative Korea was published in June 2004, declaring the ‘fifth strongest producer of CI’ 
as its CI policy vision. In August 2004, Suh Byung-Moon was reappointed as the CEO of 
KOCCA. While the first period ‘focused on keeping in place the new perception that 
cultural contents are indeed an industry’ and establishing necessary infrastructures for 
them (Suh, November 2009), in the second period KOCCA needed to adopt a distinctive 
strategy not only to reflect the changed situation of the industries, but also to achieve 
the new vision. According to 10 Years History of KOCCA (2009: 34-36), this brought 
about ‘significant innovation over the whole management’.   
 
Above all, ‘following the principle of select-and-focus, KOCCA’s key functions were 
reorganized around the three pillars of exportation, nurturing talent and technology 
development’. Among these, the promotion of exports was regarded to be the most 
urgent. For example, in 2005, about 15% of the whole programme budget (59 billion 
won) was spent on improving export performance. Secondly, the support style was also 
revised to increase long-term strategic support rather than short-term ‘one-off support’ 
and to increase cooperative initiatives with the private sector, local CI clusters and 
other CI promotion quangos, rather than initiatives led by KOCCA alone. In addition, a 
more strict evaluation system was introduced to manage the performance index and 
thereby ceaselessly improve the productivity of its initiatives. KOCCA organized its ‘own 
evaluation committee’ for this purpose, composed of professionals from outside the 
organization.  
 
   
 
                                                          
44
 ‘Special corporation’ in Korea refers to the corporation established on the basis of the ‘special laws’ for the 
purpose of promoting public benefit as part of public policy.  
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     Figure 7.3 KOCCA’s Organizational Structure (April 2007)              Source: KOCCA (2009: 243) 
 
 
  
 
These changes were first reflected in KOCCA’s organizational structure in April 2005 and 
again in April 2007. Firstly, the ‘HQ for Industry Planning’ (the former Secretariat) was 
transformed into the ‘HQ for Strategic Planning’ by acquiring the Policy Research Team. 
Secondly, the ‘HQ for Industry Promotion’ established a new team for exports and 
overseas exchange, downsizing the teams for supporting each genre. Thirdly, the ‘HQ 
for Contents Development’ was divided into two new HQs; the ‘HQ for Nurturing 
Infrastructures’ and the ‘HQ for Culture Technology’. To be brief, the changes in the 
organizational structure of KOCCA confirm that its missions for CI promotion were 
developed under the two overarching strategies of nurturing comprehensive 
infrastructures and symbolic intervention into the value chain. In relation to the former, 
the stress on CT became increasingly conspicuous, for example, with the establishment 
of the ‘HQ for Culture Technology’. In relation to the latter, although direct support for 
companies in each genre was maintained throughout the whole period, indirect support 
for the industries through the improvement of the export and distribution systems 
became increasingly important. Besides, it should be also noted that importance of 
overseas markets was the section of the value chain most stressed.  
 
Since most enterprises in Korean CI were very small, visible progress in export 
performance was inevitably slow. Their capabilities for international trade and 
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marketing were and still are very weak. That is why KOCCA established four overseas 
offices in the US, the UK, Japan and China against objections from the MPB. … 
Although there were some criticisms, I had not changed my conviction that the 
participation of Korean conglomerates in CI is necessary for making CI into our 
leading export industries. (Suh Byung-Moon, November 2009) 
 
This quotation is quite important because it shows clearly how KOCCA’s promotion 
tactics developed differently from KOFIC’s. In the course of time, KOFIC came to notice 
the importance of promoting the minority sector in the film industry and thereby the 
diversity of Korean CI, revising its earlier strategy of focusing on visible quantitative 
growth. However, this was not the case for KOCCA. It is quite difficult to find such 
concepts as cultural diversity and media literacy in its organizational structure or 
missions. KOFIC and KOCCA developed different responses to the modernization of the 
industries they promoted. While the stress on balance between cultural and industrial 
values became more important in KOFIC’s policy plans, KOCCA increasingly emphasized 
industrial values and focused on technology and exports. According to Suh (November 
2009), 
 
There has been a strong perception in Korea that arts should not be connected with 
money in order not to be corrupted. In that KOCCA dealt not with the arts but with 
industries, we were free from that kind of judgment. 
 
Therefore, it can be said that as ALP was implemented in different ways in the two 
quangos, so too were the other strategies. After the publication of Creative Korea in 
June 2004, the same vision (i.e. the ‘fifth strongest producer of CI’) and strategies (i.e. 
governance, infrastructures and intervention into the value chain) were shared in a 
much clearer form between cultural quangos under the MCT. Yet KOFIC and KOCCA 
made a series of changes in opposite directions.  
 
As touched upon in explaining the difference between the governance structures of the 
two organizations, the different implementation of the same vision and policy 
framework did stem from the distinctive history and characters of the industries they 
covered, and also from the different identities of the staff who led them. What should 
be stressed, nevertheless, is the fact that both quangos played their part in realizing 
the emerging CI policy framework in the process of Korean neo-developmental policy 
shift. KOFIC became the symbol of new governance in the policy field. And, according to 
the CI Bureau chief who took charge of establishing KOCCA, ‘when it comes to the 
symbolic support for building up the Korean NIS for CI, KOCCA was the most prominent 
organization’ (Yoo, November 2009). 
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7.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined how KOFIC and KOCCA were created and managed during the 
DJ and Roh administrations. Special attention was paid to the similar and different ways 
in which the two quangos espoused the CI policy framework and put it into effect. I first 
explored the historical background and significance of the quangos’ establishment, and 
then analyzed their main missions and organizational structures. It was assumed at the 
outset that the differences as well as similarities between the two flagship quangos 
could illuminate the unique characteristics of both Korean CI policy and the policy field. 
It is now time to provide an overview of the results of this analysis.  
 
The most important finding concerning the similarities between the quangos is that both 
of them faithfully followed the CI policy framework in establishing, implementing and 
revising their initiatives. Above all, the MCT sincerely tried to establish the quangos in 
accordance with ALP and the quangos used their increased autonomy and power to both 
manage themselves more efficiently and to establish cooperative networks with the 
industries. Secondly, nurturing various input and environment infrastructures was 
always their key mission, and these functions were ensured by internal organizations 
with exclusive responsibilities; such as KAFA and KOFIC studios at KOFIC and the HQs for 
nurturing infrastructures and culture technology at KOCCA. Finally, both quangos also 
undertook symbolic intervention into the value chain of the industries they served, to 
respond actively to both requests from the industries and the needs of the markets; for 
example, the work of the 09Domestic Support Department and the International 
Promotion Department at KOFIC and the HQ for Industry Promotion at KOCCA.  
 
It was no coincidence that they shared the three strategies for ‘building the Korean NIS 
for CI’ and the vision of ‘making Korea the fifth strongest producer of CI’. It was rather 
a natural consequence, because the quangos themselves actively took part in the 
process of preparing key policy plans for CI promotion. The quangos established their 
own departments for policy research and the MCT gave them the right and the space to 
voice their own experiences and perspectives. Having grown into key parts of the 
cooperative network within the Korean CI policy arena, the quangos stopped being 
passive organizations for simply implementing top-down orders or existing policies, and 
became instead influential agents that were capable of affecting the construction of 
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new policies. Given this atmosphere, KOFIC and KOCCA converged on the same policy 
framework spontaneously.   
 
It also needs to be stressed that even if ALP was the matter of immediate concern, the 
process of implementing it was never easy or smooth at either quango. The case studies 
reveal how the new governance principle was able to encourage the development of a 
public sphere within the Korean CI sector that had once been tightly limited and 
controlled by army generals. This helped enhance the level of social capital in the CI, 
which had been practically absent as a result of the structural corruption that had been 
brought about by relations of crony capitalism between the MCT, its quangos, and the 
industries. Nevertheless, the process was full of commotion. Noteworthy examples of 
the difficulties that had to overcome are the conflicts between the young/progressive 
group and the old/conservative group in constructing the first board of KOFIC and the 
tension within the MCT concerning the appointment of the first CEO of KOCCA. Up to 
the end of Roh’s presidency, this kind of confrontation reappeared whenever a new 
board was composed or a new CEO was appointed. Put another way, the new paradigm 
of governance could only be implanted through a painful process of struggle within the 
policy field where many old customs, formed under the long period of the Korean 
developmental state, were still in practice.  
 
These similarities, however, should not blind us the fact that the quangos implemented 
their shared policy framework in quite different ways. From the start, KOFIC and KOCCA 
were established in different styles. Since KOFIC was created in accordance with the 
new council model, ALP could naturally be realized through its governance structure. 
However, although created later, KOCCA followed the old corporate model, as the 
KMPPC had. ALP was thus not ensured institutionally, but through a personal agreement 
between its CEO and top civil servants at the MCT. This disparity partly sprang from the 
organizations after which the quangos were modelled. 
 
At the early stage KOFIC benchmarked CNC (the Centre national du cinéma et de 
l'image animée) to build up its organizational structure and mission list, but later the 
UK Film Council became the reference point to be examined and compared with 
more often. (Kim Hyae-Joon, September 2009) 
 
On the contrary, since KOCCA was ‘the first organization of its kind in the world’ (Yoo 
Jin-Ryong, November 2009), there were no models for it to benchmark in developed 
countries. Therefore, the experience and knowledge from the Samsung Entertainment 
Group, which Suh himself had established, became stepping stones for KOCCA. More 
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importantly, this disparity seemingly originated from the different history and 
characteristics of the industries with which the quangos dealt. The people in the film 
industry were already well organized into powerful interest groups and regarded 
themselves engaging with the arts rather than businesses; while those engaged in the 
newly-emerging genres of CI were not only scattered, but also regarded themselves as 
businessmen and leaders of venture companies. This difference varied the negotiation 
power of the quangos with the MCT.  
 
There is another notable difference. As the CI policy framework came to be formulated 
and implemented more systematically, DJ’s dream of ‘making CI into a national basic 
industry’ became more realistic. As will be shown in the following chapter, after the 
establishment of the quangos the domestic market for Korean CI started to grow very 
impressively and exports of Korean contents also expanded significantly. But the two 
quangos responded to this growth quite differently. Whilst KOFIC stuck to the 
‘harmonious’ two-track strategy that emphasized both industrial growth and (less 
tangible) cultural diversity, KOCCA became increasingly inclined toward the first 
objective. Taking the CI policy framework into consideration (see Table 6.5), it can be 
argued that the two quangos tended to espouse one part of the framework more keenly 
in order to address the quite different conditions in their sectors. KOFIC leaned toward 
a stronger emphasis on ALP for the negative consolidation of creativity (i.e. the first 
half of the framework), borrowed from the regulatory states to end the era of 
‘interfering [in industries] without supporting’. On the other hand, KOCCA focused more 
on ‘CI as a national basic industry’ for the positive consolidation of creativity (i.e. the 
second half of the framework), thus deploying concepts adapted from the 
developmental state model for the purpose of ending the era of ‘CI as add-on’.  
 
This was again due to the different natures of the industries covered by the quangos and 
the different character of the staff they recruited. The core group at KOFIC was 
composed of young progressive cineastes that had played a key role in the history of the 
Korean democratization movement and thus cultural politics. In addition, the film 
industry was considered to be sandwiched between industry and the fine arts in Korea. 
Therefore, the young cineastes who supported DJ did not only seek to modernize the 
industry, but also carefully monitored whether their businesses enhanced the nature of 
film as a genre of arts. This balance or tension distinguishes KOFIC from other cultural 
quangos; for example, KOCCA was on the ‘industrial logic’ end of the spectrum and 
ARKO (Arts Council Korea) was positioned at the ‘cultural logic’ end. In contrast, the 
core group at KOCCA did not share any ideological or cultural political kinship. The 
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consensus among them may be found from the fact that they were composed of former 
staff from the most competitive private companies in Korea, including the Samsung 
Entertainment Group. Therefore, ‘harmonious development’ between industry and 
culture was hardly likely to have been their primary mission.  
 
The different managing principles at KOFIC and KOCCA seem to have also influenced the 
distinctive development of their policy emphases. That is, the new council model of 
KOFIC must have helped the commissioners, who represented minor sectors such as 
independent or underground films, claim their share in an imposing manner. On the 
other hand, under the traditional corporate model, the decision-making structure at 
KOCCA was unavoidably centralized and could be fairly easily affected by the MCT, and 
thus increasingly came to seek more visible performance under pressure from Roh’s MPB. 
 
To conclude this chapter, Korean quangos tried to faithfully embody the neo-
developmental CI policy framework through their organizational structure, strategies 
and initiatives. However, their different histories, identities, core personnel groups, and 
power relations with the industries they served all led inevitably to the distinctive 
approaches and emphases they brought to the implementation of the shared policy 
framework. That KOFIC and KOCCA, which display quite contrasting policy 
developments, were the most important quangos in building the Korean NIS for CI is 
especially indicative. That is, the innovation system which the Korean CI policy 
framework was eager to build should not be taken to be a homogeneous, seamless or 
continuous entity. It was rather a hybrid entity spanning distinctive genres and groups 
of people. The neo-developmental CI policy shift, therefore, resulted in somewhat 
ambivalent products. It produced the most comprehensive and systematic policy 
framework ever in Korea, but also produced the varied or sometimes conflicting 
implementation of the framework. Also, while introducing a fresh, autonomous and 
motivational governance system, it also exacerbated the longstanding tension between 
old/conservative groups and young/progressive groups. I shall now turn to the 
performance of this policy shift and the policy framework in the following chapter.  
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8. The Performance of the Korean Cultural Industries Policy Shift 
 
 
It has been argued that ‘CI promotion is the area in which the policy performance of the 
People’s Government [the DJ administration] has been greater than any other’ (MCT, 
2002a: 22). As discussed in previous chapters, DJ’s CI policy was not only inherited, but 
also systematically upgraded under Roh’s presidency. The p ublication of Creative Korea 
(June 2004) marked the turning point from which the upgrade began. As a result, ‘the 
Participatory Government [the Roh administration] saw a rapid growth in the quantity 
of Korean CI’ (MCST, 2008a: 15). This raises the following questions that will be 
addressed in this chapter: How successful was the policy shift as a whole? If it really was 
a success, which mechanisms allowed this performance to be derived? What kinds of 
criticism have been raised despite the success?  
 
In the first section, I shall analyze and tabulate the economic performance of Korean CI 
during DJ and Roh’s presidencies. Mainly drawing on CI Statistics and CI White Papers 
that the MCT has published annually since 2000, I will explore several key themes, such 
as the growth of the Korean CI market and CI employment, the creation of added value, 
exports expansion and the ripple effects produced in other industries. At the end of the 
discussion, it will become clear that the Korean CI sector achieved both rapid and 
substantial growth between 1998 and 2008. This chapter then proceeds to clarify the 
virtuous circle that underlay this growth, and which Korean CI policymakers constantly 
bore in mind and succeeded in constructing in practice to some extent. In the second 
section I shall use interviews with key figures in the policy arena as the main source of 
evidence, and will set out the way in which the changed Korean CI policy community 
functioned as the keystone of the Korean NIS (national innovation system) for CI. 
 
One of the major arguments I will make is that the economic objectives of Korean CI 
policy were achieved as a result of the socio-cultural objectives that had also been 
stressed throughout the policy shift. However, in contrast to economic performance, it 
is very difficult to quantify the degree of change that occurred in terms of democracy, 
diversity, identity, creativity, and so forth, and therefore diverging interpretations of 
the new CI policy’s social and cultural performance have been voiced. It is in this 
context that the final section focuses on major criticisms raised against the policy shift. 
By exploring four influential criticisms and their de facto power within the policy arena, 
the current topography of the Korean cultural policy arena will be examined to evaluate 
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how solid the performance of Korean CI (policy) is. This chapter concludes by suggesting 
that the phased development of Korean CI was effectively realized on the basis of the 
virtuous circle that the CI policy framework had envisaged, and therefore any 
evaluation of the performance of the Korean CI policy shift requires that the eclectic 
characteristics of the policy framework be taken into account. 
 
 
8.1 The Economic Performance of Korean CI  
 
 
8.1.1 The Growth of Sales in the Domestic CI Market 
 
Examining changes in the level of gross sales in the Korean CI market is a good starting 
point for evaluating the economic performance of Korean CI, especially because the 
first and foremost ‘vision’ of the key long-term plans for CI promotion in Korea was to 
develop the domestic market. Remember, for example, the focus on making Korea the 
‘fifth strongest country’ in terms of CI. Table 8.1 shows the sales growth in the 
domestic CI market over a ten-year period, 1998-2007.  
 
    Table 8.1 Gross Sales in the Korean Domestic CI Market (1998-2007) 
 
    Unit: billion Won (≒million US dollar)                          Source: CIWP 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2008 45 
                                                          
45 There are some notes to be made about the table which I made by synthesizing data from five CIWPs. First of all, it is 
hard to directly compare the figures from before and after 2003, because during the early days the measure was in the 
making and thus some of the numbers were estimates. Therefore, to understand this table, several conditions need to be 
considered: the figures in ‘publishing’ up to 2002 include figures for comics; the figures for ‘music’ after 2001 reflect 
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It is notable that the combined gross sales figures for ten genres of Korea's cultural 
industries grew consistently each year over the whole decade, and recorded a striking 
growth rate of 285% from 15,224 billion won in 1998 to 58,614 billion won (hereafter, 
approximately $m) in 2007. The highest growth rates were achieved by the character 
industry and the games industry, which grew by 923% ($500m in 1998 to $5,116m in 
2007) and 723% ($625m in 1998 to $5,144m in 2007) respectively. The three industries 
that led the so-called ‘Korean wave’ in Asia followed close behind. The music industry 
grew by 568% ($353m to $2,358m); the film industry by 465% ($567m to $3,204m); and 
the broadcasting industry by 317% ($2,524m to $10,534m). The publishing industry’s 215% 
and the advertising industry’s 171% were not negligible either. The comics, animation, 
and edutainment industries, however, struggled to grow their markets, and this 
indicates that consistent and substantial growth was not shared equally by all the 
genres of Korean CI.  
 
   Table 8.2 The Growth Rate of CI Sales and GDP, Korea (1999-2007)     
 
                                                   Source: GDP growth rate from the National Statistics Office 
 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Korean CI market enjoyed ‘explosive growth’ 
between 1998 and 2008 (Yoo Jin-Ryong, November 2009). To be concise, with the 
exception of the first year for which data is not available, the 16.7% average annual 
growth rate for CI sales was almost three times greater than the average growth rate of 
the Korean GDP over the period, which stood at 5.6%.46 What should also be pointed out 
is that in terms of the domestic market size, DJ’s presidency saw much greater growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                
newly emerging on-line music market; since ‘film’ and ‘video’ were separate categories in the original documents up to 
2000, I added them to make the form of the data consistent; for the ‘character’ industry to merchandize the characters in 
cultural contents, the figure for 2005 is relatively low because it did not include the sales that arose in the process of 
distribution; the category of ‘edutainment’ came up only after 2003 and the reason why sales went down so quickly after 
2006 is that from then on the statistics only include on-line education industry in narrow terms, and exclude other forms 
of information exchange; and, finally, because it was impossible to find any data on publishing (2000 & 2001) and 
characters (2000) in any CI statistic or White Paper, I applied GDP growth rate to calculate the missing data and the sum 
for those years.  
 
46 The average GDP growth rate under DJ’s Presidency was 4.4%. For the comparison, however, the GDP growth rate of 
1998 was not included. It is because the data for the CI sales growth rate was not available for that year and also because 
the year was quite unusual owing to the Asian financial crisis. The annual growth rate of GDP is for the period of 1999-
2007. 
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than Roh’s. The average annual growth rate for CI between 1999 and 2002 was 26.1% 
(see Table 8.2). This was about three and half times greater than the average GDP 
growth rate of 7.3%.  Under the DJ government the Korean CI sector gave full play to its 
potential for high growth, whereas it seemed to mature under Roh’s Presidency (2003-
08), as the final year growth rate of only 1.1% symbolically shows. However, this does 
not alter the fact that Korean CI achieved rapid and substantial growth under the two 
governments. Despite being relatively slower, the average annual growth of 9.1%, 
achieved during the Roh government era, still exceeded the 4.3% growth in GDP by a 
factor of more than 200%.  
 
 
8.1.2 Creation of Added Value and Jobs 
 
Did the impressive growth of the Korean domestic CI market produce an accompanying 
growth in the value added? Could it be true that CI created higher added value than 
other industries, as the policymakers had originally argued? 
 
   Table 8.3 Added Value Created by Korean CI (2003-07)      
 
   Unit: billion Won (≒million US dollar)                                        Source: MCT (2005b) & MCST (2008b) 
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In 2003, CI Statistics were acknowledged as being ‘official statistics’ by the National 
Statistics Office, so I have used data produced for the years following 2003, as 
presented in Table 8.3. This table shows the figures concerning Gross Value Added (GVA) 
and the Value Added Ratio (VAR) of Korean CI during the Roh government. Above all, it 
is noteworthy that as gross sales of Korean CI increased, so did the added value they 
created. Gross sales increased from $44,195m in 2003 to $58,614m in 2007, and the 
gross value added increased in line from $18,353m to $23,647m, even though there was 
a slight decrease between 2004 and 2005.  
 
According to CIWP 2008, in 2005 when the gross sales of CI accounted for 6.6% of the 
Korean GDP, the gross value added figure for CI stood at $19,301m, with a Value Added 
Ratio of 35.8%. This was 40.1% (10.4 percentage points) higher than the 25.4% ratio in 
the manufacturing industries. In 2006, CI accounted for 6.8% of the Korean GDP and 
recorded a VAR of 37.1% based on a GVA of $21,470m; 50.1% higher than the 24.6% VAR 
in manufacturing.  In the final year, 2007, CI accounted for 6.5% of the Korean GDP with 
a GVA of $23,647m and a VAR of 40.3%; 65.8% higher than the 24.3% VAR in 
manufacturing. It is notable that whereas the value added ratio of Korean 
manufacturing industries went down during this period (25.4%→24.6%→24.3%), that of 
CI went up (35.8%→37.1%→40.3%), widening the gap between the Korean CI and 
manufacturing industries. Taking into consideration the much higher growth rate of CI 
sales achieved by the DJ government, it can be said that CI produced a much higher 
added value ratio and much faster growth in that ratio than the manufacturing 
industries did over the same period.  
 
How, then, did CI perform in the creation of jobs? Did CI also create more job 
opportunities than other industries? It is highly probable that the rapidly expanded CI 
market created both a diversity of and a large number of jobs.  According to an ‘Inter-
Industry Analysis’ (KOCCA, 2004), Korean CI were very efficient in producing wealth and 
jobs. The ‘production inducement coefficient’ of CI (2.105) was higher than that of the 
service industries (1.675), the ‘value added inducement coefficient’ (0.843) was also 
higher than that of Korean industry as a whole (0.753), and finally, the ‘employment 
inducement coefficient’ (15.9) was much higher than that of the manufacturing 
industries (7.5). Another set of time-series data shows the growth of employment in the 
sector. CI employment accounted for 5.59% of the total employment in Korea in 1995 
(941,066/16,833,569); this increased to 6.20% in 2000 (1,016,001/16,393,645) and 7.19% 
in 2003 (1,248,470/17,370,239) (KOCCA, 2007: 49). According to the Korea Chamber of 
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Commerce and Industry (KCCI, 2006: 11), for the years 2000 to 2005, the average annual 
growth rate of employment in Korean CI stood at  6.5%, which was four times higher 
than for Korean industry as a whole (1.6%). However, it should be noted that these 
figures are based on a loose definition of cultural industries. In these discussions, the 
arts sector is usually included, so the figures go beyond the official 10-genre scope 
suggested by the MCT; conversely, software is excluded, thus the figures may 
underrepresent the official 13-genre scope suggested by the DCMS. Limiting the scope of 
CI to the ten genres that the MCT mandated, and thus excluding architects, painters 
and so on, a somewhat different data set is produced (cf. Table 8.4). This data suggests 
that as the CI sector matured under Roh’s presidency, employment levels in the sector 
remained fairly steady at around 450,000.  
             
Table 8.4 Employment Levels in Korean CI (2003-07)   
 
 Source: CIWP 2005; 2008 
 
8.1.3. Export Expansion and Korean Wave 
 
According to Lee O-Young (2005), the first Korean Culture Minister, the term ‘Korean 
wave’ (Hanryu or Hallyu in Korean) was first invented on 2 November 1999 by a Chinese 
media organization (靑年報: Beijing Youth Daily) to denote a new social phenomenon 
that involved young Chinese people indulging in Korean popular culture and celebrities. 
This recent trend first emerged in mainland China and spread to Hong Kong and Taiwan 
during the late 1990s. It then spread across South East Asia in the early 2000s and has 
taken hold of Japan since the mid-2000s. In the course of its regional expansion, the 
scope of the Korean wave also widened. It first referred to Korean dramas and K-pop, 
but later came to include other types of Korean cultural products, such as Korean films 
and games. Nowadays, the Korean media use the concept, somewhat recklessly, to refer 
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to a rapid increase in exports of any kind of Korean product, for example, 
manufacturing goods in Eastern Europe or construction contracts in Northern Africa. 
 
At the earlier stage, however, Korean CI policymakers and Korean media did not pay 
special attention to the rise of the concept. For example, there was no mention of the 
‘Korean wave’ in Cultural Industries Vision 21 (MCT, 2000b) or CIWP 2000. It was in 
Contents Korea Vision 21 (MCT, 2001b) and CIWP 2001 that the term was first 
recognized by policymakers as a key word for expanding exports of Korean CI products. 
Since then almost every policy document relating to CI promotion has contained a 
section on the Korean wave. Tables 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 reveal how the Korean wave and 
the expansion of Korean cultural contents exports have interacted to reinforce each 
other.  
 
        Table 8.5 The Development of Korean CI Exports (1998-2007)    
 
     Unit: million US dollar                                                                         Source: CIWP 2003; 2007; 2008 
 
The change in total export volume should be first noted. It soared by 277% from 
$412.8m in 1998 to $1,555.4m in 2007. That is, during the ten years, the overseas 
expansion of Korean CI was as impressive as the growth of the domestic market. While 
much can be learned from aggregate figures for the whole CI sector, the differences in 
performance at the specific genre level are also significant. The publishing industry led 
the field in 1998 and accounted for 52.5% of the total CI export volume, while the 
games industry accounted for 19.9%. By 2007, this had completely changed. The games 
industry had taken the lead and accounted for 50.2% of the CI exports, while publishing 
contributed only 13.7%. Between 1998 and 2007 publishing industry exports fluctuated 
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around a mean value of about 215 million dollars, whereas those of the games industry 
grew by 849% from $82.3m to $781m. The broadcasting and character industries also 
achieved fantastic growth performances similar to that of the games industry. The 
export volume of the broadcasting industry reached $150.9m in 2007, a 1,409% surge 
compared to the 1998 level, while export volumes in the character industry increased 
208% over the 1999 level to peak at $202.9m in 2007. These four industries accounted 
for 86.6% of total exports in the CI sector in 2007: games industry (50.2%), publishing 
industry (13.7%), character industry (13.0%), and broadcasting industry (9.7%).  
 
To go one step further, the Korean wave troika industries (broadcasting, film and music) 
require special attention. Although all three industries achieved not only impressive but 
also consistent growth in the domestic market, they did not accomplish corresponding 
growth in exports, with the exception of the broadcasting industry. Music industry 
exports hit a ceiling of $34.2m in 2004, but then declined to account for only 0.9% of 
the total export volume of Korean CI by 2007; while film industry exports peaked at 
$76m in 2005, and then fell to account for 1.6% of CI sector exports. However, this 
performance belies the importance of the troika industries. According to CIWP 2003 
(MCT, 2003a: 130), the increase in Korean CI exports in the early 2000s was mostly due 
to the ‘intensive growth of exportation in the Asian region’, which was led not only by 
the emerging games and character industries, but also stimulated by the music and film 
industries. The following table shows Korean exports of key CI genres by region in 2007.  
 
    Table 8.6 Korean CI Exports by Region in 2007      
 
   Unit=thousand dollar                                           Source: MCST (2009a) 
 
This table reveals the important role that the Korean wave in Asia played in achieving 
the expansion of Korean cultural product exports. As of 2007, the regions that had been 
most strongly influenced by the Korean wave in the early 2000s accounted for 67% of 
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total CI exports. Limited to the troika industries, the percentage goes up to 84%. In 
addition, there is another story to be told beyond that of total export volumes. Firstly, 
the unique characteristics of the three industries need to be stressed. Unlike the games 
or character industry, the broadcasting, music and film industries co-created and shared 
a pool of Korean wave celebrities that has become well known across the whole Asian 
region. In other words, these three industries have become a kind of family of 
industries which produce synergy effects in promoting their products in overseas 
markets, and this then raises the brand value of made-in-Korea cultural products overall. 
Furthermore, a substantial volume of Korean cultural contents were and still are 
distributed and consumed through the black market, piracy and file sharing. This 
happens more in the troika industries than others and is a more serious problem in 
China and South East Asia than in Japan. Hence, the quantities of Korean films and pop 
music consumed in those markets must be far greater than the statistics suggest, and 
consequently, it can be inferred that the influence of the troika industries was also far 
greater than that indicated by figures for the performance of their legal exports.   
 
    Table 8.7 The Growth Rate of CI Sales and Exports, Korea (1999-2007)     
 
 
The final but important point to be made is that Korean CI exports grew much more 
significantly under Roh’s Presidency than under DJ’s Presidency (see Table 8.7). This 
was exactly the opposite of the situation in domestic growth. The average annual 
growth rate of Korean CI exports was 10.6% between 1999 and 2002, but was 22.3% 
between 2003 and 2007. Especially after 2004, when the volume of exports exceeded 
$900m for the first time, exports increased quite explosively. Since the inauguration of 
the Roh government, despite the visible maturing of the domestic CI market, the Korean 
CI sector has found another engine to drive growth from overseas markets. Although it is 
not directly inferable from the statistics, I would argue that Korean CI developed 
international competitiveness during DJ’s presidency and started to harvest the fruits 
during Roh’s presidency. This point will be explained further later through the 
discussion of a virtuous circle of Korean CI development.    
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8.1.4 Ripple Effects of CI 
 
The Korean wave was not only an indispensable factor in the expansion of Korean CI exports, 
but also contributed to achieving some of the cultural impacts expected by Korean CI 
policymakers. The most significant examples are the protection of cultural identity at home 
and the promotion further abroad of the national brand that had formerly been limited to the 
Asian region. For instance, the number of participants who took the TOPIK (Test of 
Proficiency in Korean) surged from 2,274 to 142,888 between 1997 and 2008, which was 
heavily influenced by the Korean wave, according to the Education Ministry in Korea (Kukmin-
Ilbo, 2009; Yeonhap-news, 2011). As a result of these socio-cultural influences, the Korean 
wave produced two kinds of ripple effects in economic terms; the growth of related 
industries in the domestic market and an increase in sales of industrial products in overseas 
markets. It is very difficult to calculate the indirect economic impact, let alone the cultural 
impact. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that shows a positive relation between the 
growth of CI exports and the growth of other industries.  
 
          Table 8.8 Data on ‘Korean Wave’ Tourists in 2004       
 
              Unit: million won (≒ thousand US dollar)                                                                 Source: KTO (2004)  
 
Firstly, just as they led to a substantial increase in interest in learning the Korean language, 
the growth of Korean CI output and the related Korean wave stimulated the growth of related 
industries such as tourism and leisure in the domestic market. The tourism industry is the 
most visible case. Between 1997 and 2007, the number of incoming tourists from Asian 
countries surged by 80% from 2,637,386 to 4,746,808 (MCT, 1999b; MCST, 2009b). During this 
period, the proportion of Asian tourists among total foreign tourists also increased from 67.5% 
to 73.6%. These increases are surely indebted to the Korean wave. According to research 
conducted by the Korea Tourism Organization in 2004, 20.1% of Japanese tourists, 59.5% of 
Chinese tourists and 53.5% of Taiwanese tourists surveyed confirmed that the Korean wave 
had influenced their choice of visiting Korea (see Table 8.8). Since these three countries 
accounted for 58% of all the incoming tourists, it is a significant fact that almost a third of the 
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tourists from the countries took the Korean wave into consideration in deciding their 
destination.47   
 
The Korean wave also played a pivotal role in promoting Korean consumer goods in the 
Asian region. In 2005, according to a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, ‘66.6% of Korean exporting companies admitted that the Korean wave had 
contributed to the increase in their exports’ (Hankyoreh-Shinmun, 2005). As the Korean 
wave seemed to last for quite some time in the region, the biggest Korean companies 
such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai started to actively deploy it in their marketing, and 
undertook systematic market research into the phenomenon. In 2004, for instance, Lee 
Kun-Hee, the owner of Samsung declared that Korea needed to ‘make the best use of 
the Korean wave network’ (Donga-Ilbo, 2004), and the Samsung Economic Research 
Institute (SERI) published a report entitled Perpetuating the Korean Wave and the Ways 
for Korean Companies to Use it. According to the report, it would be very effective to 
use ‘Korean wave marketing’, because of the popularity of Korean cultural contents 
across the region. For example, in 2000, Samsung Electronics cast the main actor of the 
Korean drama, Star in My Heart, in a computer monitor advertisement for the Chinese 
market and its sales grew miraculously from 430,000 in 1999 to 1,070,000. Later, LG 
Household & Health Care cast the main actress of another Korean drama, Model, in a 
cosmetics advertisement for the Vietnamese market, and its product rose to lead the 
market in terms of market share for the first time.48 However, Korean wave marketing 
is not the only way the Korean wave was mobilized to promote Korean export goods.  
 
According to the SERI report (2004: 3), it is desirable to distinguish four stages of the 
Korean wave: the expanding popularity of Korean cultural contents → the consumption 
of directly related products such as DVDs, character goods and themed tourism 
packages → the consumption of other products made in Korea, such as electronic goods 
or household items → an enhanced interest in the tradition and lifestyle of Korea. The 
report argued that foreign audience-consumers would not proceed from the second to 
the third stage if Korean products were not competitive, and that they would not 
proceed from the third to the fourth stage if Korea itself lacked national 
competitiveness (SERI, 2004: 17). SERI’s research indicated that while China and 
                                                          
47  In this context, the Korean tourism industry has been criticized for ‘depending too much on Korean wave, neither 
discovering new attractions nor establishing tourism infrastructures’ (Hankook-Ilbo, September 2007). 
 
48 This kind of data is easily found in any document about Korean wave. For example, in CIWP 2007 (MCST, 2008a: 15) 
the MCT reports that after broadcasting a Korean Drama DaeJangGeum (2003) in Taiwan, LG electronics could become 
the number one in market share and Hyndai Motors could increase its exportation of vehicles radically from 3,747 in 
2002 to 18,527 in 2005.  
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Vietnam had arrived at the third stage, Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong had remained at 
the second stage in 2004. On this ground, the report recommended Korean companies to 
understand the stage to which the Korean wave had matured in each country and use 
that information actively in producing appropriate marketing campaigns. This shows 
how significantly the Korean wave affected the exportation of other goods from Korea 
and how seriously the Korean conglomerates took this new phenomenon.  
 
 
8.2 The Virtuous Circle of Korean CI Development  
 
Although the growth of sales in the domestic market slowed down during the second 
half and thus some sectors appeared volatile in creating jobs, the preceding section 
confirmed that the Korean CI sector achieved striking growth in both the domestic and 
overseas markets under DJ and Roh’s presidencies. However, it does not necessarily 
follow from this observation that the new Korean CI policy was the crucial factor in this 
economic success. Whether the success was derived, as planned by the policymakers, 
through the phased development of Korean CI toward a new NIS is a matter for further 
investigation.  
 
       Figure 8.1 The Virtuous Circle of Korean CI development 
 
 
 
As Chapter 6 concluded, the irreversible order between the negative consolidation of 
creativity (i.e. ALP) and the positive consolidation of creativity (i.e. CI as a National 
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official & unofficial 
policy participants 
3. Change in the 
perception of the 
potential of Korean 
cultural contents among 
domestic audiences  
2. Creative contents armed 
with a new representation 
style including previously 
prohibited material 
4. New and  relevant       
(i.e. creative) policies 
produced by the changed 
and empowered          
Ministry & quangos 5. Environment & input  
infrastructures  via 
voluntary saturation of 
talent and investment 
6. Increased competition    
in the private sector & tight 
cooperation between  the 
private and public sctors for 
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7. Change in the 
perception of the 
qualitity of Korean CI 
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8. Korean wave which 
cosolidates the domestic 
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Basic Industry) lay at the core of the Korean CI policy framework. In this section, I shall 
argue that the phased development was achieved in practice through a virtuous circle 
due to close cooperation between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ participants in the policy 
community.49 Figure 8.1 illustrates the virtuous circle composed of key turning points in 
Korean CI development. The three blue boxes (i.e. 1, 4, 6) signify the points where 
official participants played the decisive role. Each box needs to be touched upon to 
explain the whole mechanism of the circle. 
 
 
8.2.1 Neo-Developmental Alliance, Creative Contents and Domestic Perception Change  
 
As the ‘cooperative governance’ strategy directly reveals, the partnership between the 
official and the unofficial participants in the CI policy field was not only the starting 
point of the virtuous circle, but also the control tower for its development. This 
unprecedented partnership, which may be called a neo-developmental alliance between 
the two parties, was constructed by President Kim Dae-Jung.  
 
On the one hand, there were a group of progressive cultural activists, most 
conspicuously in the film industry, who had not only supported DJ consistently since the 
1987 democratization movement, but who also played a key role in preparing DJ’s 
election pledges for the cultural sector. Together with DJ, they once comprised the 
opposition ‘distributional alliance’ that struggled against the then official ‘development 
alliance’ (Koo & Kim, 1992). It was then the longstanding President-centred ‘unipolar 
system’ (Kim Y-M, 1996) of Korean politics that enabled the progressive pledges that DJ 
and the progressive group had developed together to suddenly become the prime 
objective of the official policy participants after DJ’s election victory in December 1997. 
Mediated by the President and his powerful staff, those who had been enemies in the 
past became close allies, the most significant example being the activists in the film 
industry and the civil servants who staffed the MCT. In accordance with the civil 
servants’ change of identity from ‘spearhead’ to ‘yard sweeping brush’, the judges and 
the National Assembly members also changed their roles significantly. The judges made 
a series of judgments in favour of the freedom of expression, especially at the 
                                                          
49 For Chung Jung-gil (2010), there are roughly a dozen participants of two kinds in the Korean policy arena. First, the 
‘official participants’ were the President and his staff, the civil servants (the executive), the Members of the National 
Assembly (the legislature), and the judges (the judiciary). There were also ‘unofficial participants’ who did not have any 
authority in policy decisions but influenced the process of policy formulation: political parties, interest groups, NGOs, the 
media, policy experts (including researchers and think tanks), and citizens as the agent that shaped public opinion. 
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Constitutional Court and the National Assembly not only passed many key acts for CI 
promotion, but also helped the cultural activists surmount various obstacles.50  
 
The cultural industries were instantly stimulated by these significant changes. The new 
CI policy community brought about the rise of the neo-developmental alliance and in 
turn the birth of ‘creative contents armed with a new representation style’. The key 
factor here was the expansion of the freedom of expression.  
 
I was the last chief of the CI Bureau in the YS government and the first in the DJ 
government. So I can tell you with confidence that the level of freedom of 
expression was radically advanced by the DJ government. … After DJ’s inauguration, 
all the taboos were abolished. For example, the first big hit movie, Shiri (1999) 
could never have been made under the previous governments because it exposed the 
attractive points of North Korean terrorists. JSA and TaeGukGi were exactly the 
same. In addition to ideological expression, the tight control over expressions of 
violence and sexuality was also lifted. Over all freedom of expression was radically 
permitted for all aspects [of film] such as the subject, conversation, and mis-en-
scene. Even directors and scenario writers were perplexed by the new situation that 
allowed them to represent almost everything. (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009) 
 
As a result of these new freedoms, new types of contents emerged not just from the 
film industry, but also from all the other genres of Korean CI. The secret lay in the 
liberation of ‘creativity and imagination’ that had been straightjacketed under the 
developmental state and the transitional period. Former Vice Minister, Oh continued as 
follows:  
 
Before DJ’s government, Korean cinema was quite childish, which was inevitable 
because there were too many regulations and limitations on the cultural industries. 
Even if Korea had declared itself to be a democratic country, the lack of freedom of 
expression had been only second to that in communist autocracies. I am convinced 
that the essence of the cultural industries is creativity and imagination. And freedom 
is the necessary condition for their growth. That is why cultural industries could not 
have flourished in the countries like the former USSR, China or North Korea, I believe.  
 
Clearly, freedom of expression was central to the enhancement of Korean CI. However, 
such expression also had to be recognized by the audience. Just as Korean CI responded 
rapidly to the rise of the neo-developmental alliance in the CI policy field, Korean 
audiences also responded quickly to the concomitant enhancement of creative contents 
in the domestic market. This ‘change in the perception of the potential of Korean 
cultural contents’ operated at two levels. Firstly, Korean people started to abandon 
                                                          
50 For example, when KOFIC was going through serious disputes over the composition of the board in the early stage, the 
MCT decided to appoint a retired civil servant as its second chairperson in hopes of resolving the complex conflict 
smoothly. However, the progressive staff at KOFIC could not accept this decision and thus turned to the Assembly 
Members for help. According to Kim Hyae-Joon (September 2009), during the National Assembly audit of Korean 
quangos, the logics the progressive group provided were directly used by the Assembly Members to attack and thus 
nullify the ‘regressive designation’.  
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previously fixed ideas about the low or ‘childish’ quality of Korean contents, as they 
started to see their own social contexts and everyday problems being represented in 
Korean cultural products freed from the constraints of strong censorship. They therefore 
began to discover in Korean cultural products empathetic pleasures not afforded them 
by the foreign products that had formerly dominated the market. This can be 
considered to be the most important reason why the miraculous growth in domestic 
sales was possible during DJ and Roh’s presidencies, which witnessed a 568% increase in 
the domestically produced music sales, and similar increases of 465% and 317% in the 
local film and broadcasting industries. The other change in perception related to the 
value of Korean CI as an industry. As a veteran civil servant, Lee explained:  
 
It was only a decade ago that Korean people started to recognize that the cultural 
industries had economic value. The CI promotion began in earnest with the 
establishment of the DJ government, even if the CI Bureau had been established 
under the YS government. Since then, many unprecedented events came about. For 
example, the establishment of representative quangos such as KOCCA, the 
systematic modification of relevant laws and regulations, the provision of financial 
resources including various Funds, and the establishment of many divisions within 
the MCT, and so forth. Among these, the biggest achievement must be the new 
perception of the cultural industries as being indeed a serious industry. (Lee Hae-
Don, October 2009) 
 
At the outset, it was extremely difficult for the MCT to persuade even other Ministries 
that the cultural sector could be an industry of not only ‘consumption’, but also of 
‘production’ (Kim Sung-Jae, October 2009). Even though DJ could force the perception 
change at this level (for example, in his first meeting with high-ranking civil servants 
across the Ministries), it was impossible for the President to change public perception in 
the same way, since it was still influenced by arguments about the negative influence 
that vulgar/popular culture had on youth. However, as the noticeably different new 
cultural products emerged and achieved a series of huge commercial successes in some 
genres of CI, both the Korean media and Korean audiences started to recognize the 
enhanced creativity of Korean cultural contents and then the economic value of the 
sector.  
 
 
8.2.2 New Quangos and New Infrastructures Built through Voluntary Participation  
 
In order to keep pace with these turning points, the neo-developmental alliance 
proceeded to transform existing quangos or establish new quangos according to the 
arm’s length principle. As clearly suggested in the case studies on KOFIC and KOCCA, 
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these quangos were indeed a new species in the Korean cultural field, because the 
Culture Ministry recruited industry experts and gave them the power and autonomy 
necessary to manage the quangos and to formulate related policy. In a break from 
conventional bureaucratic approaches, then, the civilian experts who knew the ins and 
outs of the related industries were able to relate the quangos organically with the real 
situation in the industries, and thus to prepare and implement ‘new and relevant 
policies’ directly beneficial to the industries (Lee et al., 2005: 142). The Ministry 
trusted and supported these new organizations whole-heartedly. Of course, this was 
possible because the Ministry agreed with DJ’s philosophy of democratic governance. On 
another level, however, the MCT gave its quangos autonomy because it was surely a 
better and quicker way to foster growth in the industries and therefore also to expand 
the Ministry’s territory and status in the government.  
 
I believe the civil servants at the MCT had a unique experience under the DJ 
government. Before DJ’s government, they had taken an apathetic attitude which 
made them cling to simple and repetitive businesses within their bureaucratic 
sectors. But under the DJ government they were encouraged to advance forward 
aggressively and thereby realized that kind of movement could expand their 
territory. Insofar as the Minister and Presidential staff in the Blue house 
communicated with them closely, the civil servants who belong to a strict chain of 
command cannot go against the broad direction. According to my own experiences, 
they are absolutely bright talents. If the environment is ensured, they are surely 
able to achieve their mission. (Former Culture Minister, Kim Sung-Jae, October 2009) 
 
As former Minister Kim explained, the civil servants were recruited from the best and 
brightest in the country and, armed with ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans, 1995), they had 
been able to turn the ambitious plans of the developmental state into reality. However, 
faced with a new era, they found that the best way to ensure their legitimacy was no 
longer to dominate the policy field and their industries. Rather it was to give them 
autonomy and support. As leading figures suggested, the ministry was to ‘let [the 
industries] be and then give support when and where it was desperately needed’ (Oh 
Jee-Chul, October 2009) or to ‘not become an obstacle’ while ‘getting rid of other 
obstacles quickly’ (Yoo Jin-Ryong, November 2009). This was a major reason why the 
MCT shared the space and authority of CI policy making with the new quangos. 
 
Just as civil experts voluntarily took part in the space that the MCT prepared in the 
policy field, so too did Korean talent and investment spontaneously flock into the space 
in the industries that the MCT and its quangos had opened through the new and relevant 
policies. To understand the latter mechanism, it is useful to pay attention to a 
particular characteristic of Korean society.  
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Since its rapid industrialization, Korea has been regarded a country full of energy not 
just by Koreans but also by foreign commentators. When that energy is not directed, 
that sort of society inevitably becomes a very unstable place full of noise and 
conflicts. Koreans themselves have lamented this tendency that they call ‘pot 
spirit’.51 However, I don’t think that is necessary, because once a consensus is made, 
the previously unstable energy quickly converges, finds a form, and produces 
something new without difficulty. Nobody knows what will happen when the 
activated energy does not find an adequate form. But when the society succeeds to 
find the agenda to which it needs to devote itself, the resulting productivity is 
beyond expectation. The democratization of 1987 was a good example. When the 
agenda seemed to be accomplished, the upgrading of the economic system became 
the next agenda. Korean intellectuals found a new consensus in the ‘digital big bang’ 
as the agenda upon which the society should focus its industrialization after 
democratization. … It was in this context that DJ read The Third Wave again and 
again, and then stressed the importance of the cultural industries. (Lee Jung-Hyun, 
former secretary general of KGPC and then KOCCA, September 2009) 
 
In this context of ‘industrialization after democratization’, it can be argued what DJ 
sought to achieve with his famous slogans, the ‘arm’s length principle’ and ‘CI as a 
national basic industry’, was to give the collective energy of Korean society a form or a 
goal. The abolition of censorship liberated the repressed creativity and imagination of 
the creators; and then the ensuing performance of the CI sector stimulated Korean 
society to accept this new trend as its new consensus. To be short, the ‘pot spirit’ was 
ignited in a positive sense.  
 
More concretely, the MCT was encouraged to see that the change in the public 
perception of Korean CI was sustained for quite a while and therefore, together with its 
quangos, formulated and implemented more aggressive and diverse policies to ensure 
the environment and input infrastructures. Taking these signs from both the market and 
the government as unprecedented opportunities, Korean financial and human capital 
started to pour into the emergent ‘national basic industry’. As explained in Section 
6.2.2, the MCT and its quangos initiated numerous programmes and projects in order to 
‘nurture core talent’, such as providing intensive support to educational institutions, 
establishing a prestigious graduate school, and developing the Contents Academy; while 
also working to ‘ensure stable financing’ for businesses by launching various matching 
funds for each CI genre, and introducing new institutions such as the Special Purpose 
Company. Without this strategic or symbolic support from the government, it would no 
doubt have been difficult to attract Korean human and financial resources into the CI 
sector. 
 
 
                                                          
51 In Korea ‘pot spirit’ is a term numerously used in everyday life. That term refers to an assumed Korean characteristic 
that they are like a pot which easily gets hot when it is heated, but also very quickly cool off if the fire is put out.  
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8.2.3 Cooperation for Exports Expansion, International Perception Change, and 
Increased Interest in Korean CI  
 
Due to the particular history of Korea’s export-oriented industrialization, state 
intervention into the CI value chain focused on the penetration and expansion of 
overseas markets from the outset. For example, the first long-term Korean CI plan, The 
Five-Year Plan for CI development (MCT, 1999a), devoted the middle two years of its 
five-year span to the objective of ‘strengthening international competitiveness’. Since 
then, developing strategic products for overseas markets has never ceased being a 
major policy objective. Therefore, it was natural that the Ministry and the quangos 
came to pay increasing attention to Korean CI exports, as the domestic market 
experienced further growth. Government intervention to expand exports was based on 
the principle of ‘focus-and-select’, and brought about two instant results. It increased 
competition between the exporting companies, and led to close cooperation between 
the policymakers and ‘high potential’ businesses. The government provided promising 
businesses with the necessary information about overseas markets, helped them 
fundraise for the production and distribution of ‘star’ contents both directly and 
indirectly, and also praised their achievements with various awards and citations. This is 
quite a similar picture to the export expansion strategy of the developmental state. The 
key difference was, however, that this time there were no sticks.  
 
‘When most enterprises in Korean CI were very small’ at the early stage of the take-off, 
close cooperation between the businesses and the Ministry/quangos played a significant 
role (Suh Byung-Moon, November 2009). Although the Korean wave was initiated 
spontaneously by foreign audiences rather than intentionally incited by the Korean 
government, its continuation and growth would not have been so impressive without the 
role of Korean government. Indeed, the same mechanisms that underlay the growth of 
the domestic CI market were also applied to the penetration of overseas markets; the 
enhancement of creative contents and a change in the audience’s perception of Korean 
products.  
 
When censorship had defined the atmosphere around Korean CI, creators could not 
avoid self-censorship, consciously or unconsciously. The rise of Korean wave was 
heavily indebted to ensuring a free atmosphere for contents creation. Korean 
governments surely believe that was the biggest contributor to Korean wave. I also 
heard that opinion voiced from the industries many times. (Lee Hae-Don, October 
2009) 
 
In other words, at the time when the lack of freedom of expression in Korea was ‘only 
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second to that in communist autocracies’ (Oh Jee-Chul, October 2009), it was almost 
unthinkable that Korean businesses could have made meaningful and entertaining 
cultural contents for foreign audiences. How could they have exported contents that 
were regarded as ‘childish’ even in the domestic market? However, as new creative 
contents began to be produced, Korean CI exports also started to get on track. From 
this stage, increasingly keen competition between the businesses became more 
important than government intervention. In the process of competition for overseas 
markets, Korean firms motivated themselves to experiment and thus accumulated 
essential knowledge that allowed them to slowly build up their brands among 
international audiences. As a result, it was no longer optional but essential for Korean 
CI businesses to plan and produce ‘content aimed to not just at the domestic market 
but also at overseas markets from the outset’ (Lee Jung-Hyun, September 2009). Big hit 
films, such as Shiri (1999) and JSA (2000), marked the symbolic turning point in the 
domestic audiences’ perception of Korean films, and they were followed by big hit TV 
dramas, such as Winter Sonata (2002) and DaeJangGeum (2003), which marked a similar 
turning point internationally. Along with Korean TV dramas, K-pop and Korean films also 
stimulated changing perceptions of Korean contents among foreign audiences. As 
reported by Korean ambassadors in Asian countries (Hankyoreh-Shinmun, 2005),   
 
It was not unusual to see diplomat’s wives hurrying to go back home after dinner 
parties to watch DaeJangGeum before 9 o‘clock. (‘Ambassador’ to Taiwan, Hwang)  
 
When I visited the Foreign Minister, even the secretary welcomed me with open arms, 
saying he really wanted to visit Korea that winter. I also noticed that the Science 
Minister was explaining the technology used in Winter Sonata. (Ambassador to 
Malaysia, Lee) 
 
Last weekend I appeared on a radio programme which regularly invites foreign 
ambassadors. I was told that the questions from the audience were three times as 
many as average because of Winter Sonata. On Sunday I appeared on television 
during prime time, which was also owing to Korean wave. (Ambassador to Uzbekistan, 
Moon) 
 
Japan was not free from this new trend. According to an article written by a Japanese 
MP in 2004,   
 
Japan is facing the torrent of the Korean wave. Concerning its political influence, 
one representative example is that Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro publicly 
admitted Bae Yong-Jun [the main actor of Winter Sonata] must be more popular 
than himself in Japan. Nowadays, the election candidates for provincial governments 
are receiving the question, whether they watched the Korean drama. The candidates 
who watched it proudly answer the question, while the others who did not watch are 
busy making excuses. Japanese politics can be said to be heavily affected by Winter 
Sonata. … Due to the Korean wave, more Japanese tourists than ever are visiting 
Korea. (Donga-Ilbo, 2004) 
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The final stage of the virtuous circle captures the moment when the feedback came full 
circle and overseas reactions impacted back on Korea. This occurred when the strong 
rise of Korean wave in the Asian region correspondingly increased the Korean people’s 
interest in their CI sector. Korean firms, particularly the chaebols, started to recognize 
the economic value of Korean contents, in terms of marketing, promotion, and the 
brand value of their products. The Foreign Ministry started to believe in their diplomatic 
value, and the Education Ministry started to note their value in attracting foreign 
students to Korea or for promoting Korean language education abroad. Consequently, 
the Korean wave became a subject way beyond the authority of the MCT. To take an 
example, on 21 December 2004, the Korean Premiere Lee Hae-Chan convened a cabinet 
meeting to order the Ministries to ‘prepare strategies to make the Korean wave not a 
temporary event, but as something which could ensure sustainable cultural exchange 
and economic effects’ (Seoul-Shinmun, 2004). This kind of government effort increased 
year by year. For instance, in the cabinet meeting held about a year later, Premier Lee 
got reports from 16 Ministries on how they were supporting the Korean wave and then 
asked the Ministers to think about how to expand the Korean wave beyond Asia (Naeil-
Shinmun, 2006). The MCT took this enhanced confidence and interest in Korean cultural 
contents to be decisive evidence of the success of the policy shift, and this 
strengthened the neo-developmental alliance between official and unofficial policy 
participants. This is how the virtuous circle of Korean CI development was established 
and put into effect during DJ and Roh’s presidencies. 
 
 
8.3 Criticisms of the CI Policy Shift 
 
The previous section showed that the impressive economic performance of Korean CI 
during DJ and Roh’s terms was achieved through a virtuous circle which the neo-
developmental alliance in the policy field endeavoured to build up. Therefore, it is hard 
to deny that the Korean CI policy shift initiated by DJ was a very important, if not the 
most significant, factor in this economic success. Nonetheless, there have been several 
criticisms made against the policy initiatives. To understand why, it is crucial to note 
that since the establishment of the DJ government there were sharp conflicts in the 
Korean cultural policy field between cultural-value supporters and economic-value 
supporters, as well as between progressive civic groups and conservative civic groups (cf. 
Won, 2008: 158). Whereas the first conflict was about which value should be put first in 
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promoting Korean CI, the second was about which political ideology should be adopted 
for the policy practices (cf. Table 8.9). Within these power struggles, while the 
cultural-value supporters, as champions of the arts, criticized the new CI policy for 
being too industrial, the economic-value supporters, as strategists for CI, criticized the 
policy for not being industrial enough. Likewise, while the progressive civic groups 
criticized the new CI policy for being a neo-liberal approach as activists for cultural 
democracy, the conservative civic groups, as the guardians of precious tradition, 
criticized the policy for being a socialist approach. Why did the same policy shift cause 
such conflicting criticisms? Which criticisms were right and which were not? Or, despite 
their appearances, were they compatible positions? To address these questions, this 
section explores each of the four camps and their criticisms in detail.  
 
    Table 8.9 Major Criticisms of DJ and Roh’s CI Policy Shift 
 
 
 
8.3.1 Value-based Criticisms: Is CI Policy Cultural or Industrial policy? 
 
The first value-based criticism was raised by cultural-value supporters. Some academics 
and critics, who had been engaged in the culture and the arts sector for a long time, 
became the main agents of this position. Kim Moon-Hwan’s article (2003) can be 
considered the epitome of this position in several aspects. It is helpful to note his 
academic and cultural background first. He was a Professor of Aesthetics in Seoul 
National University, and introduced the Frankfurt School’s critical aesthetics into the 
Korean academy in the 1980s. In addition, he has been an active theatre critic since the 
1970s and once served as the chairperson of ‘International Association of Theatre 
Critics–Korea’. He was also one of the theorists who played a key role in establishing the 
independent Culture Ministry in 1990 by introducing the ‘French model’ on the basis of 
his long-time experience in the Korean National Commission for UNESCO. 
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In the above-mentioned article, Kim made two main arguments about the DJ 
government’s cultural policy. First, he suggested that the MCT placed too great an 
emphasis on the CI sector too strongly and thus lost its sense of balance. To illustrate 
this point, the significant increase in the budget and funds for CI promotion was 
compared with the relatively minor increase in funding for the arts. On this ground, Kim 
argued that even if the DJ government finally achieved the longstanding aim of a ‘1% 
cultural budget’ borrowed from France, the Korean reality was still far from being ‘an 
advanced country’ due to the considerably lower stress placed on the arts compared to 
CI. In a similar vein, his second argument was that the economistic approach of the CI 
policy was making inroads into Korean arts policy. For instance, the policy methods 
mobilized to promote the ‘performing arts’ were becoming increasingly rooted in 
‘economic thinking rather than cultural thinking’. It was further argued that ‘combining 
CI with the imagination and creativity of arts and humanity’52 was highly likely to lead 
to ‘putting the cart before the horse’ by subjecting imagination and creativity only to 
the profit orientated motivations of CI.  
 
It is not difficult to find criticisms in a similar tone. Won (2008: 172) argued that ‘with 
all formal advances, the CI promotion policy was not able to raise creativity, the source 
of CI’. On the basis of the ‘French understanding’ of culture, Lee Joon-Hyong (2007: 85) 
also noted that ‘fundamentally, industry policy can never be the main of cultural policy’ 
and that thereby ‘concentrating on the industry policy ought to not be urgent’. This line 
of argument evolved to point out that the economistic CI policy could bring about the 
wane of ‘cultural diversity’ by threatening not only the arts sector but also independent 
or underground CI products (Yoo, 2000: 60), and that it might also lead to the eclipse of 
‘cultural identity’ through recklessly imitating the success logic of Hollywood or global 
media conglomerates (Mun, 2009).  
 
Of particular interest is that these concerns seem to correspond with the decreasing 
influence of the French model and the increasing influence of British discourse in the 
Korean cultural policy field. According to Kim Moon-Hwan (November, 2009), who 
played a crucial role in importing both the French model in 1990 and the British 
discourse in 1999 (cf. 5.2.5),  
 
                                                          
52 This was the catch phrase that the MCT foregrounded to avoid the criticism that CI were eroding the significance of 
liberal or fine arts.  
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When we led the independence of the Culture Ministry, we expected to implant the 
French model. At that time, the French Culture Ministry was actually the Ministry of 
fine arts. … I am afraid that during the progressive governments with the ideology of 
social democracy, cultural democracy was not enhanced that much. It might be said 
that the British government has some responsibility for this. Korean cultural policy is 
increasingly dominated by economic thinking under the name of Creative Korea.     
 
In short, these cultural-value supporters believed that CI policy should be a cultural 
policy and not an industrial one. If impossible, they believed, CI policy should remain as 
a minor sector in the government’s cultural policy. However, it was argued that under 
the DJ government, CI policy became the major emphasis, thus causing an imbalance 
between the rapid growth of CI and the relative shrinkage of culture and the arts.  
 
Conversely, economic-value supporters saw themselves as CI strategists, the role of 
which is opposed here to that of championing of the arts. These strategists had no 
hesitation in applying ‘economic thinking’ to formulating and evaluating CI policy, not 
least because many of them are economists themselves. For instance, a group of young 
researchers from the Samsung Economic Research Institute grew into an influential bloc 
in the Korean CI policy arena. They stood at the forefront in providing positive evidence 
of the economic impact of CI (e.g. Kim Hyu-Jong, 1999), in making conceptual models 
of the newly-emerging value chain or distribution system (e.g. Shim Sang-Min, 2004) and 
in developing quantifiable indicators such as the Korean wave Index (e.g. Ko Jung-Min, 
2009). These economists from SERI played an increasingly visible role in forums and 
seminars held by the MCT, at which they provided a variety of statistics and reports. In 
addition, although not economists, the leading researchers at KOCCA played a similar 
role by elaborately analyzing the efficiency and effectiveness of each policy method 
and thereby suggesting alternative strategies and tactics for the policymakers and the 
industries (e.g. Yim Hak-Soon, 2007; Lee Byung-Min, 2007).  
 
Then, why did these CI strategists criticize the policy shift? In fact, their voices sound 
more like advice than criticism. According to Shim (2004), who was a senior researcher 
at SERI, the MCT’s policy direction of ‘supply-can-generate-demand’ was out of date. 
He thus advised that the MCT needed to make a ‘new start’ by recognizing the ‘product 
life cycle’ of Korean CI policy and thus launching an alternative policy direction of 
‘creating-demand’ more directly. For Ko (2004: 90-91), who was then another senior 
researcher at SERI, the government needed to concentrate on ‘nurturing global cultural 
contents enterprise’ in order to compete with global media conglomerates. He paid 
special attention to the situation where the ‘biggest Korean contents enterprise was 
less than 1/100 of the size of a global conglomerate’ in scale, and argued that without 
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addressing this problem, it would become more and more difficult for Korean 
enterprises to ‘enter foreign markets’ or even to ‘defend the domestic market’. 
Meanwhile, Lee Byung-Min (2007: 221-223), who led the policy research team at KOCCA 
under the Roh government, introduced a model for the ‘quantitative evaluation’ of CI. 
Defining CI policy as an ‘industrial’ policy rather than a ‘cultural’ policy, he noted that 
although the suitability of CI policy input, the efficiency of output and the effectiveness 
of the outcome could be assessed as having been quite high, some limitations of Korean 
CI policy had also been exposed over the course of time. For example, Lee argued, the 
Korean government’s investment in CI was very low compared with that in other 
national strategic sectors; there was still much to be improved in the environment 
infrastructures of Korean CI; greater stress needed to be put on consumer-oriented 
policies and policies for the parallel development of the fine arts and CI.  
 
To sum up, economic-value supporters and cultural-value supporters responded in 
completely opposite ways to the same CI policy. Viewing CI policy as fundamentally a 
‘cultural’ policy, the champions of the arts complained that investment in CI was too 
high and caused an imbalance between the CI sector and the arts sector. Therefore, the 
industrial growth of CI was unwelcome and seen as a symptom of ‘putting the cart 
before the horse’. On the other hand, regarding CI policy as a mainly ‘industrial’ policy, 
the economic-value supporters did not show any interest in comparing CI with the arts 
sector. Instead, they compared the scale of investment for CI with that of other 
national strategic industries, such as bio-technology or nano-technology. Consequently, 
their conclusion was, on the contrary, that the government’s investment in the CI sector 
was too small. Their primary interest lay in how to enable Korean CI to grow much 
faster and bigger. In this sense they seem to have regarded the impressive growth of 
Korean CI at the time as still insufficient, because it could and should have been 
expanded much further, if much greater investment had been guaranteed in accordance 
with its status as a ‘national basic industry’. 
 
 
8.3.2 Ideology-Based Criticisms: Is the CI Policy Shift Neo-Liberal or Socialist?  
 
The third criticism of the CI policy was raised by so-called ‘progressive’ civic groups in 
the Korean cultural policy arena. One of the most active and influential of these groups 
was ‘Cultural Action’ (CA), established in September 1999.  Most members of this group 
belonged to the generation who led the 1987 democratization movement as 
undergraduate or graduate students. Therefore, many of them actively supported DJ 
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when he was elected in 1997, and showed great interest in ‘cultural democracy’ and 
‘cultural society’ as policies that could overcome the anti-cultural status quo that was 
being aggravated at the time by both ‘neo-liberal globalization’ and ‘cultural 
conservatism’ (CA, 2002: 2). So, when the policy changes were implemented, some of 
them were recruited and appointed to key posts at the MCT and its quangos. Under the 
Roh government this kind of appointment was seen more frequently. For example, Lee 
Chang-Dong, the first Minister of Culture was the Policy Director of ‘Cultural Action for 
Screen Quotas’, a group which had a decisive influence to the birth of Cultural Action; 
while Shim Kwang-Hyun, the brain behind the MCT’s ‘Committee for Cultural 
Administration Innovation’53 was its Policy Director. Similarly, Kim Jung-Hun, the second 
Chairman of the newly-established ARKO (Arts Council Korea) was a joint-representative 
at CA, and Lee Young-Wook, President Roh’s first chief at KCTI was the vice-chairman of 
the CA policy committee.  
 
However, this honeymoon stage between the government and the progressives was so 
unstable that they later eventually turned into some of the severest critics of DJ and 
Roh’s cultural policy. In a document for evaluating DJ’s cultural policy (ibid.: 27), for 
instance, CA argued that DJ’s key principle of ‘supporting without interfering’ was right 
in restructuring the cultural policy of ‘regulation and interference’ into ‘promotion and 
support’, but was tainted because it had amalgamated ‘neo-liberal economic policy’. 
Therefore, DJ’s MCT was held to have undertaken the restructuring of Korean CI policy 
in favour of ‘capital and the market rather than public service and society’. Although 
Cultural Action was heavily involved in Roh’s MCT, such criticism was repeated more 
loudly in 2006. In the forum titled ‘Evaluating the Roh Government’s Neo-Liberal 
Cultural Policy’, Won Yong-Jin, then Chairman of CA’s executive committee, asserted 
that ‘While Creative Korea was being implemented, a change of Minister led to the 
abandonment of the Participatory Government’s emphasis on cultural policy’. In a 
similar vein, Ji Keum-Jong, then CA’s Secretary General, criticized Roh’s MCT for being 
like ‘a student who made a wonderful timetable, but does not observe anything’ 
(Hankyoreh-Shinmun, 2006). They both criticized the MCT for acting ‘as if it was a 
Ministry engaged in the economy’ and for only spreading ‘neo-liberal CI policy’.  
 
In brief, the progressive groups were ambivalent toward DJ and Roh’s cultural policy. 
Even though they admitted that some advances had been made in terms of governance 
systems and the policy environment, they were very disappointed with ‘neo-liberal’ 
                                                          
53 This committee led many reforms in the MCT at the early stage of the Roh government including the publication of 
Creative Korea.  
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approaches such as the FTA with the US and the subsequent reduction in the screen 
quotas. This group felt that their mission was to ensure that the expansion of cultural 
democracy took priority in the CI policy arena over that of activating the cultural 
economy. Unsurprisingly, this attitude caused several serious collisions between the 
progressive groups and the civil servants. As detailed in one of the quotes above, 
despite having played a significant part in Roh’s MCT, these progressives came to feel 
that their intervention was being increasingly blocked by the MCT bureaucracy. On the 
other side of this divide, my interviews with top civil servants at the MCT reveal that 
they regarded many of the Committee for Cultural Administration Innovation’s activities 
to have been ‘nonsense’ and irrelevant to the realities of government and the industries. 
 
It was not only civil servants that the progressive groups clashed with. Conservative 
groups in the Korean cultural field were also threatened by the counterparty’s hardball 
reform drives. In 2001, for example, Lee Moon-yeol, one of the most famous writers in 
Korea described the emerging progressive civic groups as the ‘Red Guards’ of the new 
government (Donga-Ilbo, 2001). In November 2001, provoked by his acrimonious attacks 
published in conservative newspapers, some members of the progressive groups 
collected hundreds of his books, held a funeral for them and handed over them to a 
junkyard for the price of a penny. This kind of symbolic, but quite extreme 
confrontation between the two groups happened again and again during the DJ and Roh 
governments. As a result, in November 2006 the conservative group finally launched the 
‘Forum for the Future of Culture’ (FFC), a counter-organization to progressive ones such 
as Cultural Action. Launching the FFC with about 70 artists and critics, its first 
representative declared that it would ‘distance itself from politics’ and ‘root itself in 
liberal democracy and the centre right’ (Yeonhap-News, 2006).  
 
It is quite interesting that while this group firmly defined their position as based on 
‘liberal democracy and the centre-right’, they thought themselves to be apolitical. 
Surely this was contradictory. For example, Chang Mi-Jin (2008), the first secretary 
general of the FFC argued in an article, ‘The Dogmatism and Despotism of the Left-
Wing Cultural Power-Bloc’ that the arts in the post-modern age could not and should 
not ‘confront capitalism’ and that the cultural policy of ‘the government with the 
socialist ideology’ could be considered highly regressive. More concretely, she criticized 
Cultural Action, claiming that its continued insistence on the ‘democratization of 
cultural politics’ was intended to transform the Korean cultural policy field into a 
‘battlefield armed with ideologies’ and thus to ‘elbow their way past the group with 
vested interests’. In a similar way, KOFIC was also criticized heavily. According to Cho 
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Hee-Mun (2008: 67), who led the film sector of the FFC and became the second 
chairman of KOFIC under the current conservative government, ‘KOFIC's various 
initiatives were distributed as if they were war trophies’ under the progressive 
governments. In an article entitled ‘Roll out the Red Carpet of Ideology and 
Propaganda’, he went on to insist that KOFIC’s ultimate goal was in fact a ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ for which films were mobilized. There is no doubt that these arguments are 
highly political. 
 
It is obvious that the conservative civic groups believed that the MCT’s CI policy under 
DJ and Roh was dominated by progressive groups which had manifested deep aspirations 
for ideological revolution in Korea since the 1980s. For them, the progressive 
governments’ slogans, such as cultural democracy, cultural politics or democratic 
governance, were nothing more than a rhetorical screen deployed to camouflage 
impure left-wing ideologies. With this allegation, the conservative civic groups 
positioned themselves as the guardians of precious traditions in Korean cultural policy. 
That is, for them, the ten years that followed the inauguration of DJ’s government in 
1998, the first progressive administration in Korean history, were ‘a lost decade’ that 
was dominated by rebellions against their cherished, stable tradition (Hankyoreh-
Shinmun, 2007). Therefore, they tended to underrate the value of both the new CI 
policy framework and the impressive economic performance it contributed to. For 
example, one of the main FFC agendas was to nullify the arm’s length principle. They 
continued to argue for the abolition of the new council model that had been introduced 
during the transformation of KOFIC and ARKO, and for a return to the old corporate 
model of the 1980s and early 1990s (cf. Pressian, 2009a; 2009b).  
 
To sum up, as with the value-based criticisms, the ideology-based criticisms also 
bifurcated along a fault line between two incompatible positions. While the progressive 
ideologues saw neo-liberal approaches in the CI policy shift, the conservative ideologues 
saw socialist approaches in the same policy shift. I maintain that these types of 
criticism were the inevitable result of the way in which the centre-left Korean 
governments defined their position on the basis of Giddens and Blair’s Third Way (cf. 
Hesmondhalgh, 2005). The problem is that any negotiation, or even conversation, seems 
to be impossible between the two parties in the foreseeable future. This is because the 
conflict between them has become ‘a matter of survival’ and a ‘generation gap’ in the 
cultural sector rather than ‘a matter of ideology’ (Hwang & Ryu, October 2009; see 
7.1.4). All my interviewees clearly felt that the extreme animosity between the two 
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parties has grown more sever since the inauguration of the current conservative 
government in February 2008.  
 
Thus far I have examined four major camps that raised notable criticisms of Korean CI 
policy. To conclude this section, I should point out that each of the criticisms discussed 
is firmly rooted in the interests of its matrix group: fine arts lovers, cultural economists, 
progressive groups or conservative groups. There are two consequences of this. Firstly, 
each criticism appears quite persuasive, as far as each group is concerned. Compared to 
the lower investments in the arts, the investment in CI appears to be too high; while in 
comparison with other national strategic industries the investment in CI appears to be 
too low. If one compares the emergent Korean CI policy with the policies of European 
socialists, it is too neo-liberal, but compared to the Korean developmental state’s 
policy, it is too socialist. These arguments are all correct. On the other hand, however, 
once removed from the perspective of each groups’ particular interests it is clear that 
these criticisms carry little weight beyond the circles of common values and ideological 
orientations. Indeed, none of these criticisms appear to be based on careful and 
comprehensive analysis of what actually happened during the policy shift in the policy 
community or the industrial field. In other words, each criticism displays quite 
subjective and thus myopic characteristics. Falling into a dichotomy of ‘cultural’ versus 
‘industrial’, the two value-based criticisms fail to strike the dialectical balance between 
the intrinsic/cultural and instrumental/economic values/sectors. Likewise, succumbing 
to inertial tribalism, the two ideology-based criticisms suffer a similar loss of dialectical 
perspective between left and right wing positions, as well as between subjective group 
agendas and the objective reality of the industries. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have dealt with how successful the neo-developmental CI policy shift 
was. In doing so, I first explored the economic performance of Korean CI between 1998 
and 2008, suggested that a virtuous circle initiated and nurtured by the neo-
developmental alliance in the Korean CI policy arena underlay that economic 
performance, and finally examined the major criticisms raised against the policy shift.  
 
In 1998 DJ and his MCT set up the ambitious objective of making CI into one of Korea’s 
national basic industries for the 21st century. Following that, as was explored, sales of 
224 
 
CI in the domestic market grew explosively, with accompanying significant growth in 
added value and employment. Whilst domestic gross sales of Korean CI skyrocketed, the 
export of Korean cultural products to overseas markets also surged significantly. One 
important finding concerning this economic success is that while the domestic market 
grew much faster under DJ’s presidency, exports of Korean CI increased more 
impressively under Roh’s presidency. Put more concretely, the DJ government enhanced 
the national competitiveness of Korean CI by building up the necessary conditions at 
home; and the Roh government started to harvest the fruit of this on foreign soil, while 
maintaining and upgrading the relevant domestic conditions. The policy shift bore other 
kinds of fruit too. Related domestic industries such as tourism and education grew 
significantly, and the exports of other industrial products such as cosmetics, clothes, 
and electronics also expanded under the influence of Korean wave.  
 
Another key finding as to the economic performance of Korean CI is that the economic 
success was not shared equally by all the genres within CI. As the case studies of KOFIC 
and KOCCA revealed, each of the genres had a different history, core group and 
orientation; and inevitably developed slightly different policies despite the shared 
broader policy framework. Accordingly, the performance of each genre in the domestic 
market varied considerably, as the disparity between the extremely impressive growth 
in the character and games industries and the slight growth in the comics and animation 
industries demonstrates. Two points can be briefly made. Firstly, the genres that had 
grown rapidly in the domestic market also performed well in overseas markets, while 
those that had produced limited domestic growth also did not fare well in the overseas 
market. Secondly, the Korean wave troika industries (i.e. music, film and broadcasting) 
need to be evaluated independently of other CI sectors. Although they led the Korean 
wave in Asia, these industries showed relatively unstable and low economic 
performance in overseas markets in comparison to their performance in the domestic 
market. Nevertheless, it should be noted that they played a far more important role 
than the exports figures might suggest, because they comprised a family of industries 
that co-created and shared ‘Hanryu stars’. 
 
In light of these disparities, it might be better to ask how successful the policy for each 
specific genre was, rather than to focus on the success of the CI policy framework in 
general. Nevertheless, the conceptualization of the virtuous circle that underlay the 
economic effectiveness of Korean CI policy, which I presented in the second section, is 
still useful for the overarching picture of the mechanisms involved that it affords. 
Concerning the virtuous circle, the importance of neo-developmental alliance between 
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the official and unofficial policy participants cannot be stressed strongly enough. As the 
keystone of the development, the alliance abolished many obstacles to the liberation of 
the long-repressed energy, creativity and imagination of both Korean creators and the 
Korean people, and thereby ensured the qualitative enhancement of Korean CI contents. 
At this stage ‘arm’s length principle’ and ‘freedom of expression’ were the key words. 
These changes in turn drove a change in the perception of Korean CI products among 
the audiences or consumers not only inside but also outside the country. The domestic 
perception changed first. According to former Vice Minister Yoo (November 2009), 
 
In order to build the national innovation system for CI, we believed, the most 
important engine was the common people’s positive feeling toward [Korean] CI. It is 
because CI could not achieve sustainable growth without it. Seen in this context, the 
CI policy at that time can be broadly considered to have been quite successful. The 
government-led support not only raised people’s interest in CI, but changed their 
fixed ideas about and attitude to the industries, which was a crucial factor for 
building the NIS as it is now.   
 
A direct result was the expansion of quangos led by civilian experts. Along with the 
Culture Ministry, before long these quangos began to produce a lot of effective policies. 
These policies then prepared the space which Korean human and financial capital 
spontaneously rushed to fill by ensuring the development of both environment and input 
infrastructures for Korean CI. It was argued that the core mechanisms in this project for 
‘industrialization after democratization’ were the government’s symbolic intervention 
which assured investors, and the Korean national characteristic called ‘pot-spirit’. This 
is probably the stage around which the vision of CI as a national basic industry came to 
play a more visible role than ALP. After that, both cooperation between the policy 
community and businesses, and competition among the businesses contributed to the 
slow but consistent realization of the final goal (of every Korean industrial policy), 
namely, export-oriented industrialization. Overseas audiences no longer regarded 
Korean contents as childish, but started to receive them quite passionately. ‘Star 
contents’ such as Winter Sonata or DaeJangGeum marked a clear turning point. With 
much evidence accumulated, a variety of parties in the Korean policy and economic 
fields started to share confidence in their cultural products and admit more openly the 
value and importance of the CI sector, making the neo-developmental CI policy alliance 
feel ‘proud’.  
 
Democratic governance and democratic leadership enhanced, if not introduced, 
during the ten years [1998-2008] were the strong platform for the substantial growth 
of Korean CI. With many of my colleagues, I am very proud that we have achieved 
such a result. (Kim Hyae-Joon, former secretary general of KOFIC, September 2009) 
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In this light, I would argue that DJ’s two logics of democratic advantage were achieved 
through the virtuous circle. The related principles of arm’s length/social capital 
logic/the negative consolidation of creativity were first implemented, and in turn paved 
the way for the positive consolidation of creativity/creative capital logic/the vision of 
national basic industries. In other words, the economic performance of Korean CI (policy) 
was achieved via the cultural results of the policy shift, such as democratic governance, 
freedom of expression, cultural creativity and diversity. This was how the economic 
performance of Korean CI was made possible. However, several criticisms, which did not 
take this phased development of Korean CI into consideration, have been raised.  
 
The supporters of cultural-value saw themselves as the ‘champion of the arts’ and 
belittled the economic performance of Korean CI for aggravating the imbalance within 
Korean cultural sectors. On the contrary, the supporters of economic-value saw 
themselves as ‘strategists for CI’ and criticized the economic performance of Korean CI 
as being insufficient. In another instance, the progressive civic groups, identified as 
‘activists for cultural democracy’, criticized the policy shift for depending on and then 
spreading neo-liberal approaches. On the other hand, the conservative civic groups, 
which saw themselves as ‘the guardian of precious tradition’, denounced the policy shift 
as following socialist approaches devised by extremely left-wing ideologues.  
 
Although these major criticisms are all grounded in appraisals of the performance of 
Korean CI policy from specific perspectives, they have defects that cannot be neglected. 
In adhering to the pre-designed logic of the groups that voiced them, each of the four 
criticisms lacks a comprehensive and balanced understanding of the policy shift. By 
prioritizing the arts sector over the CI sector and cultural rationales for CI policy over 
industrial ones in a normative manner, the champions of the arts ‘separated the 
economic mechanism of Korean CI from its cultural mechanism’ (Kim Hyae-Joon, 
September 2009). On the other hand, by regarding CI policy as an industrial policy that 
had little to do with traditional cultural policy, the CI strategists showed a similar type 
of disposition. Meanwhile, in the name of preventing neo-liberalism and promoting 
cultural democracy, some of the progressive activists revealed their ‘ideological 
tribalism’ in their implementation and evaluation of the policy (Kim Sung-Jae, October 
2009). While acrimoniously attacking this ideological influence, the conservative 
guardians repeated exactly the same mistake under a different ideological umbrella, 
namely, centre-right liberalism, which although originally declared to be politically 
neutral, turned out to be highly ideological. In short, they all failed to comprehend the 
eclectic nature of the neo-developmental policy shift, framework and performance.  
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The two incompatible value-based criticisms and the two incompatible ideology-based 
criticisms show that there is no simple way to reach a conclusion about the contribution 
of the newly-emerged CI policy to the cultural and economic growth of Korean CI. 
However, even if it is difficult to evaluate how much of the growth was directly derived 
by the policy practice, it is undeniable that the two progressive governments initiated 
unprecedented reforms in the Korean CI policy field which brought about notable 
cultural effects and thereby a significant economic impact on  the cultural industries 
and Korean society as a whole. There was surely a virtuous circle behind the economic 
performance of Korean CI. Foregrounding ambitious policy directions, the neo-
developmental policymakers not only established a new and useful framework for CI 
policy, but also put the framework into action to realize the phased development of 
Korean CI. Put simply, the economic success of Korean cultural contents between 1998 
and 2008 was not achieved by chance.  
228 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
 
This study started with an interest in the creative turn in national cultural policy around 
the world which was initiated by the British New Labour governments (1997-2010). 
Indeed, the trend ‘has had a remarkable take-up across many parts of the world’ 
(Cunningham, 2009b: 375), provoking such questions as ‘how far can “Creative 
Industries” travel’ (Wang, 2004)? Whatever their past histories or contemporary 
situations, many countries appear to have scrambled aboard the bandwagon of this new 
trend. Accordingly, the discourse on creativity has evolved into a ‘doctrine’ or ‘credo’, 
not only in the UK (Schlesinger, 2007), but also across the globe. Within this context, I 
selected South Korea, a representative developmental state of the post-Second World 
War period, as my case study. The aim was to examine in detail the Korean CI policy 
shift (1998-2008) that paralleled the British CI policy shift in both period and direction, 
and thereby to present a distinctive description of the way the cultural and creative 
industries have been nurtured in the era of ‘post-organized capitalism’ (Lash & Urry, 
1994). 
 
In doing so, I have addressed three major questions: How and why did Korea go through 
the CI policy shift in the period following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis? Has the shift 
produced a policy framework which is different from that of the previous developmental 
state, and if so, what was its form? What results have the policy shift and framework 
brought about in the Korean CI sector, and how were they achieved? This thesis has 
shown that these questions can only be answered by focusing on what may be called the 
neo-developmental transformation of the Korean state after the economic crisis.  
 
In concluding the thesis, this final chapter revisits the key findings on the neo-
developmental shift in Korean CI policy in the broader context of the creative turn. 
Three themes, which engage with the process, product and performance of the policy 
shift respectively, will be discussed in turn. The first theme is the relationship between 
the recent cultural (industries) policy shift and state transformation. As with the 
original British case, the Korean experience presents a case where the CI policy shift 
and state transformation occurred simultaneously and in tight combination. What made 
this unity possible? Is this pattern representative of the way in which many other 
countries experienced the creative turn in their own national cultural policies? This 
chapter then goes on to deal with the eclectic character of the Korean CI policy 
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framework that emerged and was shaped during the policy shift. The Korean way of 
nurturing the national CI sector was undoubtedly poised between the Western 
regulatory state model and the country’s former developmental state model. I argue 
that understanding this key point provides a clue to understanding one of the reasons 
why the British creative industries discourse has been so popular in the East Asian region. 
The final theme to be taken up is whether Korea’s phased development from the 
‘negative consolidation of creativity’ to the ‘positive consolidation of creativity’ might 
be replicable in other countries. It was indeed a key mechanism of the impressive 
growth of Korean CI during the last decade. DJ argued in his parallel development thesis 
that Asian countries had to fully accept Western democracy, because it is not only an 
efficient political system for dealing with social discontent through the mechanism of a 
public sphere, but also, therefore, an effective way to ensure sustainable economic 
development. When this argument was combined with the information society thesis, 
the logic of the phased development of national CI emerged. Then, can this logic of 
Korean CI development be appropriated by other countries to bring about a success 
similar to the Korean wave? 
 
After revisiting key findings of the Korean case, the contribution of this research will be 
briefly summarized. This chapter concludes by discussing the limits of the study and 
suggesting the direction of further study.    
 
 
9.1 State Transformation and the Cultural Policy Shift  
 
It is important to see the British Labour Party as having invented its own 
distinctive governmental project; one which undoubtedly involves 
neo‐liberal elements, but on different terms from the neo‐liberalism of the 
New Right of the Reagan and Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Labour 
represents a new hybrid. Such hybridity on the part of Labour governments 
is not new, but this does not mean that the Labour government is simply 
accommodating itself to capitalism in the same way as previous Labour 
governments, as some writers have claimed. (Hesmondhalgh, 2005: 99) 
 
 
As Hesmondhalgh noted, the new labour party pursued a distinctive state 
transformation project under the name of the Third Way. The initial umbrella slogan 
was ‘Cool Britannia’ and the rise of ‘creative industries’ discourse was part of this 
greater project. However, without taking into consideration this subtle but significant 
difference, ‘some writers’ have approached the issue as if the shift from cultural 
industries policy to creative industries policy was solely driven by the global dominance 
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of neo-liberalism at the time. As the story goes, with the help of coercive international 
organizations such as the WTO and the IMF, strong Western neo-liberal states imposed 
similar neo-liberal state transformations on other nation states in accordance with the 
global rise of the new economy. This, in turn, brought about a sweeping restructuring of 
their national cultural policies to facilitate the easy mobilization of the cultural sector 
for the ultimate goal of international competitiveness. It therefore follows that taking 
part in this creative turn is equivalent to promoting an uncritical acceptance of the 
commercialization and instrumentalization of the cultural sector and thus to violating 
the authentic remit of traditional public cultural policy. It is quite interesting that this 
kind of criticism has been raised most strongly in the leading Western neo-liberal 
countries. Whereas this argument contains much truth, at least from the perspective of 
critical intellectuals in developed countries with long traditions of the regulatory state, 
it does not necessarily hold up so well against the experiences of developing countries 
with different political-economic traditions.  
 
This thesis has engaged the central concept of the developmental state to explore how 
the Korean state went through the creative turn in its own particular way. As explained 
in Chapter 3, Korea actually achieved galloping industrialization over an extremely 
compressed period. The key factor in this success was the developmental state, which 
planned and directed economic development at home on the basis of authoritarian 
entrepreneurialism, while also successfully mediating its domestic society with the 
international power bloc of the time. The cultural policy of the Korean developmental 
state can be summarized by two concepts: culture as an add-on and as an ideological 
catalyst for mass manipulation. These two characteristics of Korean cultural policy 
changed completely with the rise of CI policy under the two centre-left governments 
between 1998 and 2008.  
 
It should be stressed here that the policy shift would not have been possible were it not 
for two unprecedented events in 1997. The first was the Asian financial crisis which may 
be thought of as ‘the Great Depression’ for the Asian region. This great economic crisis 
was deemed to be the ‘Second National Shame’ in Korea. As such, it decisively 
challenged the developmental state model, and gave Kim Dae-Jung the opportunity to 
win that year’s presidential election. This first Korean president from the opposition 
party was very different from previous presidents, as clearly and symbolically indicated 
by the fact that he became the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. However, in the midst 
of the great crisis he had inherited, there were two big issues facing the new president: 
‘who was to blame for the crisis’ and how extensively should the country plug itself into 
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‘international finance and trans-border capital flows’ (Pempel, 1999b: 225).  
 
As the representative of the Korean ‘distributional allies’, President Kim lost no time in 
laying the blame for the crisis squarely at the feet of crony capitalism and the state-
chaebol collusion that had been at the core of the Korean developmental state. This 
allowed him to emphasize his cherished desire for the parallel development of 
democracy and the market economy, the very policy that Giddens’s Third Way was 
deployed to support and validate. Moreover, influenced by Toffler’s Third Wave, DJ 
decided to raise the international competitiveness of Korean industries and companies 
by abandoning many old national norms in favour of new global norms, especially in 
terms of financial structure and corporate governance. Thus, the ‘parallel development 
thesis’ and the ‘informational revolution thesis’ became the two major axioms which DJ 
consistently used to define his state transformation project.  
 
The Korean CI policy shift was designed and driven under these dynamics. How were the 
two beliefs or credos applied to the cultural policy field? The parallel development 
thesis (i.e. The Third Way) was translated into the ‘arm’s length principle’ and the 
informational revolution thesis (i.e. The Third Wave) was embodied into the vision of ‘CI 
as a national basic industry’. Chapter 5 identified eleven landmark events that took 
place over the process of the policy shift, and confirmed that each and every event 
could be positioned in relation to one of those two categories. This clearly shows that 
the Korean cultural policy shift did not happen as a result of any natural development in 
the cultural sector, but as part of an intentional state transformation project which was 
triggered by and oriented toward the changing international conditions. As was the case 
in the British creative turn, the Korean cultural policy shift was introduced by the state 
with specific political intentions and objectives, and with the aim of restructuring the 
cultural sector and policy community in accordance with the rising ‘new economy’. In 
both countries CI were actively promoted as not only a treasure trove but also as the 
template for the knowledge economy. This inevitably brought about the 
instrumentalization of cultural policy and the commercialization of the cultural sector. 
Both the DCMS in the UK and the MCT in Korea sought to jump on this bandwagon in the 
hope of promoting an alternative national cultural policy that could help expand their 
territory and enhance their status within their governments. In this sense, many of the 
criticisms of the British CI policy shift discussed in Section 2.3 may be literally applied 
to the Korean shift.  
 
Can it be then concluded that the creative turn in the national cultural policy of Korea 
232 
 
was one of the many cases of ‘neo-liberal’ state transformation projects which were 
highly fashionable and extremely common in the 1990s and 2000s? If benchmarking New 
Labour’s Third Way were the same as adopting neo-liberalism, then this might be the 
case. However, that is too simplistic a view, as Hesmondhalgh clearly noted in the 
quote at the beginning of this section. The Third Way that the New Labour policymakers 
invented and which the Korean centre-left governments followed was indeed ‘a new 
hybrid’. Furthermore, despite the commonality of pursuing a Third-Way state 
transformation, the Korean way of implementing it was necessarily very distinctive from 
the British one. An even more complicated hybrid was required to appropriate a 
political ideology from a developed country while repeating some lessons from the rapid 
and impressive industrialization enjoyed under the Korean developmental state.   
 
It is indeed not so difficult to discern the factors that the recent state transformation in 
Korea appropriated from the developmental experience. First of all, the centre-left 
Korean governments actively redeployed the ‘national survival’ and ‘catch-up’ 
discourses that had been icons of the developmental state to justify and implement 
their major restructuring programmes, although they stopped short of employing the 
anti-communist militarism that had been the other representative ideological tool of 
the developmental state. Consequently, both the developmental and neo-
developmental state transformations in Korea appeared to have national development 
as their prime goal. However, the latter aimed to achieve this by guaranteeing 
democracy and individual creativity, neither of which had been allowed under the 
former transition. Therefore, the centre-left Korean governments did not hesitate to 
make major interventions in industry as the developmental governments had done, but 
were at pains to avoid interference in the industry. Last but not least, both state 
transformations were initiated and led by very charismatic and powerful presidents, 
Park Chung-Hee and Kim Dae-Jung, even if their political origins were dramatically 
opposed. Due to these particular historical and structural conditions, the character of 
DJ’s state transformation in Korea necessarily diverged from that of New Labour’s, 
resulting in the distinctiveness of paths the creative turn took in each national cultural 
policy arena and performances achieved as a result .  
 
To sum up, the post-crisis CI policy shift in Korea was obviously influenced and driven by 
the broader state transformation. The discursive practices, devised from the 
perspective of a ‘Second National Building’ to overcome the ‘Second National Shame’, 
primarily aimed to overcome the limitations of the developmental state model. For this 
purpose some elements of the regulatory state model were intentionally introduced and 
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thoroughly implemented. Nevertheless, the imported version was surely not 
Thatcherism, but the Third Way. In addition, such appropriations did not prevent the 
new regime from perpetuating some key features of the former developmental state. 
Therefore, the shift was not a neo-liberal but neo-developmental transformation, which 
sought an eclectic position somewhere between the old developmental state and the 
contemporary regulatory state. In this light, the Korean case reveals the way in which 
the rise of new CI policy in developing countries has been heavily influenced by broader 
transformations at the state level, and therefore, by the overarching transformation of 
the World System after the end of the Cold War. Clearly, if cultural policy 
commentators limit their gaze to the creative turn itself without acknowledging either 
the historical legacies or current political economic conditions of a specific country, 
then they will fail to comprehend an important explanatory dimension of the new policy 
trend.   
 
 
9.2 Neo-Developmental CI Policy and the Popularity of the British 
Creative Turn  
 
It [Creative industries theme] might be better thought of as a Rorschach 
blot, being invested in for varying reasons and with varying emphases and 
outcomes. Policy discourse, particularly that which has travelled so 
extensively and quickly as creative industries, will inevitably assemble 
differing evidence bases, interests and explanatory schema. … It is the 
interactions amongst the contending elements that determine whether a 
policy discourse can be said to have useful or deleterious effects – effects 
which should not be presumed in advance. (Cunningham, 2009b: 376) 
 
 
Corresponding to the observation above, this thesis may be taken as a case study that 
shows how differing ‘interests’ and ‘explanatory schemes’ can be mobilized by 
countries in planning and implementing a similar creative turn in national cultural policy. 
I have focused on showing how the creativity discourse can be situated in a country’s 
broader shift from a developmental state to a neo-developmental state. I believe this 
can provide a useful lens through which the Rorschach blot may be observed more 
clearly. The recent Korean CI policy shift may be viewed to present, at least, a 
regionally representative case of the creative turn, because of Korea’s former status as 
a representative developmental state in East Asia. In addition, the Korean shift has 
been regarded as a notable success among many countries in the region. Therefore, 
examining the characteristic features of the Korean policy shift can shed light on how 
and why the post-war developmental states of East Asia came to take up so 
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enthusiastically the creative industries discourse of a representative regulatory state 
such as the UK.  
 
A clue can be found in the structure and content of the emergent Korean CI policy 
framework. In Chapter 6, I explored this policy framework in detail. My analysis of a 
series of key long-term policy plans made it clear that the policy framework did not 
emerge out of the blue, but rather was the product of a slow but steady evolution. As 
with the formulation of British creative industries policy, ‘several distinct objects of 
policy’ were interrelated by the emergent policy framework as ‘policy thinking 
unroll[ed] and the machinery of government gather[ed] up wider circles of adherents’ 
(Schlesinger, 2007: 386). It was argued that the policy framework appeared in an 
almost-complete form in the Culture Industry Policy Process System (CIPPS) model that 
was introduced in Creative Korea (2004). Following that, the conceptual architecture of 
this policy framework was examined. Its two slogans were the ‘arm’s length principle’ 
and ‘CI as a national basic industry’. Furthermore, the policymakers increasingly came 
to see these two slogans as converging at the point from which the concept of the 
‘national innovation system for CI’ emerged. The development of cooperative 
governance, comprehensive infrastructures and symbolic intervention strategies can be 
understood to build up this NIS. It is worth stressing again at this stage that this policy 
framework was a thoroughly hybrid composition. As a product of the neo-developmental 
state transformation, it could only be poised between the regulatory state model and 
the developmental state model. This eclectic character requires further expatiation.  
 
As noted above, the first half of the new CI policy framework was composed in 
accordance with the ‘arm’s length principle’, which was borrowed from the Western 
regulatory states as an alternative to the primal function of developmental cultural 
policy, that of serving as an ideological catalyst for mass manipulation. Under the 
concept of ALP ministries were restructured, the freedom of expression was assured and 
civilian experts were brought into the policy community so as to replace the principle of 
‘interfering without supporting’ with that of ‘supporting without interfering’ (Kim Moon-
Hwan, 1996: 109). By abolishing many old conventions such as censorship and blind 
protectionism, the policymakers sought to secure a creative ecology that included a 
public sphere and the social capital of the Korean CI (policy) field that had formerly 
been absent. This negative consolidation of creativity was followed by efforts to 
stimulate a positive consolidation of creativity, under the slogan ‘CI as a national basic 
industry’. This second half of the Korean CI policy framework can be viewed as 
countervailing the developmental state’s treatment of culture as a mere add-on. 
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However, as mentioned in the last section, this second phase also corresponded well 
with some features of developmental industrial policy. The CI policymakers saw the CI 
sector as the ‘last battlefield of national competition’ in the 21st century (MCT, 2000b: 
10); just as the EPB (Economic Planning Board) policymakers had seen the heavy and 
chemical industries in the 1970s. Believing that Korean CI should be strategically 
nurtured in order to protect national identity and to further raise the international 
competitiveness of the economy, various input infrastructures were carefully built up to 
guarantee the sustainable development of the CI sector. On top of that, a new mode of 
intervention into the CI value chain was pursued so as to stimulate the growth of Korean 
CI businesses at each stage.  
 
Then, how does this eclectic neo-developmental CI policy framework account for the 
popularity of the British discourse of creativity in the East Asian region? First of all, it 
should be noted again that the underlying logic of the policy framework entailed the 
‘phased’ development of the CI sector. Even if the policy framework was poised 
between the regulatory and the developmental models, its foundations were realized 
during the first phase of its implementation and development when the obstacles to 
creativity were removed from the Korean CI sector. Without ensuring the negative 
consolidation of creativity, the positive consolidation of creativity would not have been 
feasible. Therefore, the regulatory state model played a more significant role than the 
developmental state model in constructing this policy framework. In other words, the 
stress on individual creativity in the British creative industries discourse corresponded 
to the post-crisis mood and need in East Asia. In this vein, furthermore, by 
foregrounding individual creativity, which had been underestimated and even oppressed 
in the past, the neo-developmental state could dramatically distance itself from the 
previous developmental state.  
 
The second reason for the popularity of the British discourse on creativity is that it 
provided a kind of ‘indulgence’ (in the Catholic sense) for pursuing the familiar ideology 
of nationalistic development. Due to the strong memories of ‘successful’ 
industrialization, not only the state but also the people have been reluctant to say 
farewell to some of the key developmental strategies in Korea. This was surely the case 
for economic nationalism predicated on the ‘catch-up’ discourse. However, the Asian 
financial crisis forced the neo-developmental state not to follow the familiar path 
openly. In this situation, the rise of the creative industries discourse provided a 
fantastic excuse for following (without admitting doing so) the heritage of the 
developmental state. The key logic of the British creative turn was to nurture individual 
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creativity and talent so as to produce IPR, the currency of the new economy, and thus 
to create wealth and jobs and guarantee the future of the cities and of the nation as a 
whole. This heavy emphasis on a nation-wide effort to enhance the international 
competitiveness of a national strategic industry resembles the logic promoted by the 
previous East Asian developmental states very closely. Generations of people have been 
conditioned to follow this kind of logic without question in East Asia. All that the neo-
developmental state needed were new flasks for the old wine.  
 
On the basis of the Korean case, therefore, I argue that the popularity of the British 
creative turn in East Asia was deeply related to the history of the region as a hot bed of 
the strong developmental state. After the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the myth of the 
developmental state was quickly deconstructed across the region. The British discourse 
of creativity as part of Third Way politics was just right for the situation. It furnished 
countries that were seeking an exit strategy from the developmental era with a 
plausible alternative discourse, and moreover, one that could be well mobilized for the 
double function of both criticizing the developmental state and simultaneously 
camouflaging the active reproduction of some of its well-known practices.  
 
 
9.3 The Phased Development of National CI: Is It Replicable? 
 
The U.S. government should make a decision to frankly subsidize a few 
sectors, especially in the high technology area, that may plausibly be 
described as ‘strategic’, where there is a perceived threat from Japanese 
competition. (Krugman, 1994b; cited in Woo-Cumings, 1999) 
 
Western officials should have realised this summit would be different when 
they arrived in Seoul to find their smart phones didn't work. The problem 
was that Korea's nationwide 4G network was too advanced. On early 
negotiating missions, key UK officials found themselves communicating 
with London via e-mail, on rented phones. That was never a problem in 
Pittsburgh, or in Toronto. (Flanders, 2010)  
 
 
As noted earlier, the developmental state was undoubtedly a third-world variant of the 
European national industrial state. However, as even Paul Krugman, one of the stark 
critics of the ‘Asia’s miracle’ (cf. 1994a), acknowledged, its first runner, Japan grew 
into a country which could threaten Western developed countries by the late 1900s. 
Then, as the BBC’s economic editor, Stephanie Flanders noted after the G20 Summit in 
Seoul about 15 years later, Korea has closely pursued the developed countries to 
become ‘Asia’s next giant’ (Amsden, 1989). For example, according to International 
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Trade Statistics 2010 (WTO, 2010: 13), Korea became the world’s 9th leading exporter 
(364 billion dollars) in 2009; marginally beating the UK which came in 10th (352 billion 
dollars). However, despite its remarkable development over the last half century, Korea 
has never abandoned its catch-up ideology, thereby distinguishing itself from Japan 
which has become a post-developmental state (Hill, 2007). As I have traced, this 
observation can be precisely applied to the Korean CI policy shift that took place over 
the last decade. As the CI grew lager, the policymakers and industries continually set 
higher targets vis-à-vis catching up with the ‘advanced’ countries, and aimed to become 
the fifth strongest producer of CI. When it comes to the performance of Korean CI policy, 
then, two major questions arise: Did the catch-up ideology once again serve as the best 
weapon for the rapid and substantial growth in the Korean CI sector? And, is this success 
mechanism replicable in other countries?   
 
The answer to the first question is ‘Yes, but No!’ It was certainly one of the best 
weapons deployed in the CI policy shift, just as it had been during Korea’s 
industrialization from the 1960s onwards. However, the most important factor was not 
the catch-up ideology, but rather the democratization of the policy community and the 
industries. Chapter 8 discussed the impressive development of the Korean CI sector both 
in the domestic and overseas markets, and then argued that this economic performance 
was achieved through a virtuous circle which was firmly based upon and stimulated by a 
neo-developmental alliance between the official and unofficial CI policy participants. In 
the rise of the neo-developmental alliance, one might see the replacement of one elite 
group with another, rather than thorough empowerment of the people, that is, 
democratization in a full sense. However, it is undeniable that this new power bloc took 
‘freedom of expression’ as their mantra, along with the ‘arm’s length principle’, and 
their new initiatives played a pivotal role in the liberation of the long-repressed energy 
and creativity of the nation’s cultural sector.  
 
This shift was instantly rewarded by the rise of landmark cultural contents in the 
domestic market, changing fundamentally the Korean public’s perception of their 
cultural contents’ quality. Encouraged by this early performance, the policy community 
expanded the CI promotion quangos and/or established new ones, and staffed both with 
the best and brightest in the industry. A direct result was the production of new and 
more relevant policies for the needs of the industries, which brought about the 
establishment of the necessary environment and input infrastructures and thus the 
transformation of Korean CI into a talent-and-investment magnet. The emergent policy 
community didn’t stop there. It also implemented symbolic intervention at the every 
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stage of the CI value chain, the most emphasized of which was surely export expansion. 
At this later stage the past experience of the export-led industrialization under the 
developmental state must have provided more important reference points than the 
principles borrowed from the regulatory states. However, since Korean cultural products 
had already matured, several landmark contents could keep emerging to gain huge 
success in overseas markets. As this success was maintained, foreign audiences started 
to see Korean cultural contents as a competitive brand, and this in turn attracted far 
greater interest on the part of Korean policymakers, businessmen and the public 
towards their own CI sector.  
 
Therefore, this thesis has argued that cultural initiatives and the democratization 
strategy, rather than economic initiatives or the catch-up strategy, were the most 
important factors in the impressive performance of Korean CI. However, it is also 
important to remember that this does not negate the role of the catch-up strategy. It 
was still one of the two best weapons deployed for the rapid and consistent growth of 
Korean CI. The key point is that the phased development of Korean CI, based on DJ’s 
parallel development thesis, was achieved through a virtuous circle in Korea. What 
remains, then, is the question of whether this phased development process would be 
replicable in other countries?   
 
Viewing the phased development process as a working model for CI development in any 
country facilitates an interesting comparison between the current CI policy practices of 
the regulatory states (e.g. the UK and the US) and those of the developmental states 
(e.g. China and Thailand). First of all, it should be noted that the two groups seem to 
have different priorities in developing their CI sectors. Given that the arm’s length 
principle was invented and implemented by the regulatory states a long time ago (e.g. 
the establishment of British Arts Council by Keynes in 1948), those states do not need to 
worry about transforming authoritarian governance into democratic one in their policy 
arenas. The good news is that these states can concentrate all their capabilities on the 
second stage, that of making CI as a national basic industry. However, there is also 
some bad news. Given their longstanding freedom of expression, the collective 
dynamics produced by the liberation of long-repressed creative energies cannot be 
expected or counted on in those societies.  
 
When it comes to the task of the developmental states in the 21st century (including 
many Arab nations under the current Jasmine revolution), the Korean experience 
suggests that there is no way to achieve substantial development in the CI sector, unless 
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the state ensures the democratic and cooperative governance of the CI (policy) field. 
The success of the East Asian developmental states in the Cold War era was not only 
due to the presence of the anti-communist bloc, but also driven by the nurturing of the 
manufacturing industries. It is an entirely different story when it comes to the 
promotion of CI in this age of limitless competition all over the globe, because the 
cultural and creative industries are dependent on creative innovation rather than on the 
elaborate imitation that had served well in manufacturing. In societies where there are 
layers of institutions that are ready to threaten and suffocate people’s freedom and 
imagination, it is hardly possible for the CI sector to attract audiences, talent or 
investment.  
 
Consequently, according to the phased development model, the problems that either 
the regulatory or the developmental states would face in an attempt to replicate 
Korea’s rapid CI growth are exactly the opposite of those the other group would face. 
On the one hand, the regulatory states have played mainly the role of referee in the 
relation to their domestic industries. However, in order to realize the vision of ‘CI as a 
national basic industry’ it would seem more effective for the state to simultaneously act 
as a player in the game of developing the domestic CI sector in the face of fierce 
international competition. As examined in Chapter 2, the New Labour administrations’ 
initiatives might be understood to play this role; for example, by establishing the DCMS, 
introducing new organizations such as the Creative Industries Task Force and NESTA, 
publishing numerous policy reports, and formulating/implementing many new policies.  
However, the performance of the policy practices seemed to fall short of the original 
expectations. Despite the fact that ‘the most sophisticated policy efforts to stage the 
creative industries idea’ occurred in the UK, this was also the country in which ‘the 
strongest critiques of it’ were raised (Cunningham, 2009b: 382). In a wider sense, Blair’s 
state transformation has been heavily criticized as an effort to turn Britain into a 
‘fantasy island’ by promoting ‘incredible economic, political and social illusions’ (Elliott 
& Atkinson, 2007). That is, the new role of government as an active player was neither 
familiar nor comfortable to many people in the UK. This is quite a contrast to the 
situation in Korea, where DJ’s legacy is still widely being praised on account of the 
increasing confidence of, and interest in, the national CI sector it produced. However, 
there are some excuses for Blair. Who could openly oppose the cause of enhancing 
democracy? Given the highly democratized nature of UK society (relative to Korea), 
Blair’s job may have been more sophisticated and demanding than DJ’s. In addition, it 
would appear to be considerably more difficult for the state to mobilize all available 
sources for nurturing and promoting ‘national strategic industries’ in Britain than it is in 
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Korea, because of the UK’s long history of industrialization. Owing to this difference, it 
seems inevitable that a regulatory state would have to take a slower path towards 
transforming its policy system in order to expand infrastructures and implement 
strategic intervention into the CI value chain.  
 
On the other hand, in many authoritarian developmental states, despite the existence 
of firm catch-up ideologies, the government might need to step back from its role of 
all-round player and consider the new role of fair referee. Korea was known as one of 
the most brutal and most repressive developmental states in the past (Castells, 1992: 
40), and its example clearly demonstrates that the role of the state in CI development 
needs to move away from the developmental system in some ways. Taking China as an 
example, in order to move away from the era of ‘made in China’ to that of ‘created in 
China’ (Kean, 2006), the Chinese authorities would have to abandon both their 
authoritarian mind-set and their tight control of the public sphere. This would then 
allow the growth of autonomous policy practices to build up social capital across the 
policy and industrial arena. Clearly, without returning freedom of expression to the 
people, introducing democratic and cooperative governance over the CI policy 
community, and ensuring this shift by reliable environment infrastructures, it is hardly 
feasible to encourage people and industries to make the most of their creativity and 
produce creative contents. Even enormous budgets for the one time development of 
input infrastructures for the CI industries, such as research institutes, venture capital 
funds, and post-production studios, cannot alone guarantee the sustainability and 
further development of the infrastructures without the voluntary involvement of the 
private sector. For this to occur, the common people’s perceptions must be first 
changed. A key factor here would be the creation of a series of landmark cultural 
contents which are creative enough in a cultural sense and successful enough in an 
economic sense to change any longstanding public doubt and prejudice towards their 
own cultural products.  
 
Once this first phase of the development is achieved, the second phase might appear to 
be relatively easy, given that the developmental states have no doubt accumulated 
similar experiences in promoting other industries over the previous decades. However, a 
variety of intense conflicts are likely to occur in the earlier stages of establishing a new 
governance mode and system for CI. These struggles for existence and power between 
groups who live in ‘different epochs’ but who share the same physical time-space will 
not only be very conspicuous, but also expansively, painfully and constantly reproduced. 
However, these tensions between conflicting values and ideologies need to be taken as 
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the natural growing pains that accompany a fundamental policy transformation out of 
the developmental state era. I argue that this is an inevitable process for countries, 
such as Korea, which went through a remarkably compressed industrialization, and 
therefore it should not be appropriated as evidence to nullify the significance of the 
transformation.  
 
 
9.4 The Contributions and Limitations of this Research  
 
By describing, explaining and evaluating the case of the Korean CI policy shift under the 
progressive governments (1998-2008), this study has sought to provide a distinctive 
account of nurturing CI beyond the old-style dichotomy between ‘protectionism’ and 
‘neo-liberalism’ in the age of post-organized capitalism. A significant and original 
contribution that this thesis makes is its utilization of a new concept, the neo-
developmental transformation, to demonstrate that the rise of the new CI policy in 
Korea was a far more complicated process than the protectionism/neo-liberal 
dichotomy might suggest, just as was the case with the whole state transformation 
process. In establishing this point, this thesis attempted to address the Korean CI policy 
shift from a comprehensive perspective, thereby paying attention not only to the 
process of the policy shift, but also to the policy framework that arose during the 
process and the performance of both the shift and the framework. This was necessary 
since one of the key aims of this study was to fill a gap in the literature of the 
international cultural policy research community, namely, the lack of knowledge and 
interest in the Korean CI policy shift. In addition to being an explanatory case study on 
the Korean national cultural policy, it is also an exploratory case study on the emergent 
trend of the creative turn, as discussed in the earlier sections. This trend has been 
accelerating in East Asia with the rise of China as the second biggest economy in the 
world during the last half of the 2000s (cf. Hartley & Kean, 2006). Therefore, this study 
is both timely and relevant. However, the explanatory and exploratory results of this 
case study both need to be complemented by further research.  
 
As an explanatory case study on Korean national cultural policy, the thesis has three key 
limitations. Firstly, it did not pay close attention to the concrete changes that the CI 
policy shift brought about in the industries and among Korean audiences. Since most 
interviewees were from the policy community, the evidence cannot be understood to 
fully reflect the other parties’ perspectives and opinions, although the interviewees 
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representing the quangos had had long careers in the CI industries. The change in the 
public’s perception of Korean CI, which was acknowledged by the policymakers as a key 
moment in Korean CI development, also needs to be examined further through an 
examination of the voices of the audiences themselves. That is, once the broad process, 
the product and the performance of the policy transformation have been brought to 
light, more detailed examinations of the Korean experience need to follow. This will 
surely allow for a more nuanced interpretation of the statistics presented in section 8.1 
that could address more concretely the relations of cause and effect concerning the 
emergent policy practices.   
 
In a similar but distinctive vein, further attention needs to be paid to the differences 
between genres within Korean CI. As the case studies of KOFIC and KOCCA showed, the 
national innovation system for CI was inevitably far from a homogenous entity. 
Therefore, the unique characters, objectives and development processes of each genre 
during the policy shift need to be examined at a more concrete level. To borrow Pratt’s 
expression (2005), research that takes as its object the whole system of the cultural 
circuit in each genre (including content origination, exchange, reproduction, 
manufacturing input, education and critique, and archiving) should be planned and 
implemented. This would enhance understanding of the ‘depth’ as well as the ‘breadth’ 
of the emerging cultural industries in Korea.  
 
Finally, this study has focused on the Korean CI policy shift between 1998 and 2008. 
Many things have changed since 2008, when the conservative party—which regarded the 
transformation period as the ‘lost decade’—resumed power. Although both the major 
policy initiatives and the impressive economic performance of Korean CI have continued 
without a break, the arm’s length principle has certainly been weakened. For example, 
all the chairpersons or CEOs of the quangos under the Culture Ministry were forced to 
resign in accordance with the first Culture Minister of new regime’s prime objective of 
‘Ferret[ing] out the Leftists!’ (Pressian, 2009b). Most quit, but some sued the Minister. 
At the time of writing, all the legal cases ended with the eventual victories of the 
former quango chairpersons over the Culture Ministry. It is hard to say that the neo-
developmental alliance toward phased development fares well in the current Korean CI 
policy arena. The conflicts between the young/progressive and the old/conservative 
groups have been exacerbated in this way. How and to what extent has this regressive 
move affected the policy field and the CI industries? This is a key question to be 
answered by other research.  
 
243 
 
In another direction, this thesis is an exploratory case study on the world-wide creative 
turn, and therefore should be complemented by research on the experience of other 
countries. Although it is reasonable to confer a high degree of representativeness on the 
Korean experience as an example from East Asian developmental states, as Doyle and 
Frith (2006: 56) rightly put it, ‘examining procedures and practices in one particular 
context … may well produce data that has no wider truth or significance’. Therefore, 
the findings of this study need to be confirmed by research, firstly, on other East Asian 
countries that have followed similar trajectories to Korea in the post-Second World War 
period. Taiwan is probably the best case which could be compared with Korea, in that 
many researchers have been comparing the two countries’ experience since the 
developmental era (e.g. Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Chu, 2003, Amsden, 2007), and 
because Taiwan has also adopted the creative turn.  
 
In addition, comparing Korea with Japan could produce another noteworthy lesson. 
During the developmental era, Korean CI had referred heavily to Japanese CI, as with 
many other industries. Television, music, and animation producers all accumulated their 
knowledge from looking at their counterparts in the first-mover among the East Asian 
developmental states. However, the Japanese story diverges from the neo-
developmental CI policy shift. When DJ opened the Korean market to Japanese popular 
culture, the dominant concern voiced predicted the end of the domestic industries. 
About 10 years later, this voice has completely disappeared from Korea. In contrast, 
Japanese right-wing groups are now busy holding demonstrations in front of major 
broadcasting companies in Tokyo, asking them to cut the air-time devoted to Korea-
related contents, especially Korean TV dramas and K-pop. That is, ‘Japan, once the 
teacher of analogue technology and cultural products to Korea, is now being 
embarrassed by its former pupil with Korea's rapid advancement in digital technology 
and cultural industry’ (Business Week, 2003: cited in Kim, 2007: 25). Given that even 
Korean wave can be considered to have followed or reproduced the successful 
penetration of the regional cultural market first pioneered by Japanese contents such as 
J-pop and Japanimation (Iwabuchi et al., 2004; Shin, 2009), this reversal in the 
direction of cultural exchange is quite interesting. Is this change related to the 
difference between neo-developmental and post-developmental CI policy? This is a key 
question in the East Asian cultural policy field.  
 
Finally, the Chinese experience of the creative turn also needs to be examined. As is 
well known, after joining the WTO in 2001, China has actively adopted the term 
‘creative industries’, along with many related policy practices (Hartley & Kean, 2006; 
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Hartley & Montgomery, 2009). Meanwhile, China took the Korean example as a 
significant reference point along with those of Singapore and Hong Kong (Kean, 2004: 
276). Then, as the biggest developmental state ever, China presents a unique case 
which refers to both the regulatory model and also to the neo-developmental model. 
What kind of policies has this complex combination produced: developmental, neo-
developmental or regulatory? Some of them may possibly fall into one category, but 
most would be difficult to position due to their hybridity. How much and in which ways, 
then, has each policy orientation contributed to the development of Chinese CI policy? 
In order to answer this kind of question, it is necessary to examine both the converging 
and diverging characters of the different countries, and to drill down to a more 
concrete level. For example, conducting case studies on equivalent quangos charged 
with promoting the same genre of CI in Britain, Korea and China, would help 
researchers grasp a more substantial understanding of the world-wide CI policy shift at 
stake.  
 
How long will the Korean cultural industries sustain their impressive performance? How 
long will the Korean wave last? The current Korean policymakers need to understand 
that the past success of Korean CI sector was built on the principle of democratic 
governance. While it may be not so difficult to put the quangos back to the state in 
which they had existed before the policy shift, it is no longer possible to control the 
cultural industries in Korea in the ways they were manipulated under the authoritarian 
regimes. This is not a matter of political ideology, but of economic reality. If the next 
government, which will be elected in December 2012, also neglects the importance of 
the democratic governance of the CI (policy) field, the impact of the negative 
consolidation of creativity may break down as hindrances to the development of CI 
reappear. If that were to be the case, the Culture Ministry’s annually increasing 
programme budget would be spent in vain. If not, however, then the Korean wave 
seems set to last for another decade.  
 
  
245 
 
Postscript 
 
After the viva in July 2012, the researcher was asked by the examiners to write a 
postscript to the thesis which provides both a more distanced reflection on and more 
direct clarification of the implications of the findings. This thesis explicitly used the UK 
creative industries policy debates (1997-2010) to examine and reveal how an equivalent 
policy shift occurred in Korean cultural industries policy (1998-2007). Therefore, this 
(informal) comparative study can be broadly considered to entail an examination of 
international policy transfer. Here, by ‘policy transfer’ I mean ‘a process in which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time 
and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and 
institutions in another time and/or place’ (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996: 344). It is 
noteworthy that the CI policy transfer resulted in almost simultaneous cultural policy 
transformation, i.e. the creative turn, in both countries, despite the differing contexts 
of a historically representative ‘regulatory’ state and a historically representative 
‘developmental’ state.  
 
How could the two countries go through a similar cultural policy turn at the roughly 
same period of time despite completely distinctive experiences of industrialization and 
modernization? This was the question that initiated and maintained my interest in the 
research, and the researcher found the notion of the ‘neo-developmental 
transformation’ is central and useful to resolving the puzzle. Thus far, however, I did 
not clearly explain to what extent and in which ways the policy transfer from Britain 
affected the neo-developmental policy transformation in Korea. One may fairly say that 
when it comes to the CI policy transfer, this thesis stopped short of showing a close 
connection between the UK and Korean creative turns. For example, Chapter 5 focused 
on a variety of sources and the development process of Korea’s CI policy transformation 
instead of digging into the processes through which the British policy discourse was 
imported (cf. 5.2.5). Nevertheless, it is worth remembering there were some reasons 
for this. Firstly, as mentioned in Chapter 4, over the course of time the Korean 
experience became the single object of the research, while the British experience was 
reduced to a reference point. In addition, the researcher could not find sufficient 
empirical evidence of the direct influence of the British creative turn on the Korean 
counterpart at the level of the concrete policy instruments. In this regard, the 
Conclusion chapter was mainly concerned with drawing lessons from the Korean 
experience in terms of a shift from its own developmental era, rather than elucidating 
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policy transfer between the two countries. However, this is not to say that there has 
been no lesson learned about the latter. Indeed, several significant points relating to 
this were brought up in the thesis, but have yet to be loudly voiced.   
 
Therefore, this postscript first clarifies the substance of the CI policy transfer from the 
UK to Korea: What was actually transferred and by whom; to what extent the policy 
transfer had influence on the policy building in the importing country; and how foreign 
examples got embedded in the local to take on new meanings? After reflecting on these 
issues, I will state more explicitly how and why I mobilized the concept of ‘neo-
developmental transformation’ in order better to grasp the policy transfer and ensuing 
policy shift. Clarification of the utility and limitations of the notion in comprehending 
the policy transformation at stake will be sought. The researcher will end this scriptum 
by bringing to light several issues concerning the performance of the new framework of 
Korean CI policy, including the Korean NIS (national innovation system) for CI and the 
validity of the CI statistical data. These discussions will help to highlight key lessons 
about the creative turn in general. Along with the fieldwork in 2009, my recent 
experience of joining a series of seminars to explore the future of Korean CI policy will 
be used as key source.54   
 
 
The Substance of the Cultural and Creative Industries Policy Transfer 
  
When starting work on the literature review, the researcher first examined the British 
creative industries policy debates and came to understand that the rise of ‘creative 
industries’ policy in Britain led by the Blair government was inextricably connected to 
the rise of both the new economy (or ‘post-organized capitalism’) as a dominating 
external force and of creativity as the nation’s key internal competence. As the 
literature review went on to examine the institutional history of Korean (cultural) policy 
making, I recognized the rise of ‘cultural industries’ policy in Korea after the 
inauguration of the DJ government was also driven by the same logic and trend. At that 
time, however, I was not sure whether that similarity was a consequence of an 
intentional policy transfer or coincidence.  
 
                                                          
54 These seminars were held monthly in Seoul between June and August 2012. In each seminar, a dozen experts from 
industries, quangos, research institutes and academia took part.   
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During the review it became clear the DJ government occupied a unique position in the 
historical development of cultural policy under successive Korean governments. 
Although Korean governments have implemented ‘cultural policy’ since the 
establishment of Republic of Korea in 1948, it was under President Park’s presidency 
(1961/63-79) that the Korean cultural policy field got organized in a real and official 
sense. Park’s cultural policy regime then underwent a fundamental shift during DJ’s 
presidency (1998-2003). What I had to ascertain was where the source and logic of the 
latter transformation came from; driven as it was by an unprecedented heavy stress on 
the arm’s length principle and the strategic importance of the cultural industries.   
 
Reading DJ’s presidential speeches, interviews and articles led me to notice an 
important fact. DJ had paid special attention to the British experience—both historical 
and contemporary at the time—when formulating his fundamental philosophy of the 
parallel development of democracy and the market economy. His relationship with 
Giddens and Blair, reinforced by the common thread of the Third Way, was undeniably a 
key source of the DJ government’s policy scheme. Nonetheless, it was a different 
matter to find concrete evidence in official ‘cultural policy’ documents that emerging 
British creative industries policies had had any direct influence on the rise of Korean 
cultural industries policy. The question then arose, to what extent did the emerging 
Korean CI policy refer to the British experience? Now, I can say with more conviction 
that the CI policy transfer from Britain to Korea was less like policy ‘copying’ (which 
involves direct and complete transfer of the details of the policy), and more like 
‘emulation’ (which involves transfer of the ideas behind the policy), ‘combinations’ 
(which involve mixtures of several different policies) or ‘inspiration’(where a policy 
change is stimulated by policy in another jurisdiction, but results in an outcome quite 
different from the original) (cf. Dolowitz, 2000: 25). There are several points to be 
made to elaborate this argument. 
 
 
a. Who Transferred What from Britain? 
 
 The first white paper of cultural industries, published by the Korean Culture Ministry in 
1997, compared several approaches to define and promote cultural industries and then 
argued that the ‘Sheffield model’ was the most suitable for application in the context 
of Korean cultural industries (MCS, 1997: 16). This reveals that it was not new for a 
Korean government to refer to British experience so as to formulate and implement its 
CI promotion policy. Since the establishment of the British Culture Ministry in 1997, the 
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mode of Korean Culture Ministry’s referencing became more active. As pinpointed 
earlier (cf. 5.2.5), DJ’s Ministers publicly cited and praised the British government’s 
efforts to enhance/expand the role of culture and creativity into a key driver of social 
and economic development. Furthermore, DJ’s CI Bureau chiefs ceaselessly examined 
the DCMS’s experiments in order to find lessons worthy of application to their own 
policy making. Moreover, almost as soon as the term ‘creative industries’ had appeared 
in the UK, it was introduced to Korea by the only government-supported research 
institute for cultural policy existing at the time. Therefore, it is correct to say that 
‘elected officials’, ‘civil servants’ and ‘policy experts’ all played their parts in the 
policy transfer.55   
 
Nevertheless, these connections must not mislead observers into exaggerating the 
degree of transfer. What I found through my field work and recent experience is that 
while Korean CI policymakers certainly were well cognizant of the British creative turn, 
they never tried to confer the status of a ‘model’ on the new trend. There are two 
interlinked reasons for this. Firstly, in contrast to the broad interest in the British effort, 
the new ‘creative industries’ policy framework was never systematically introduced to 
the Korean cultural policy (research) community during DJ’s presidency. Even if the 
report by KCPI introduced the new term swiftly, it was more like a dry description of 
the British cultural policy field and its components, than an in-depth analysis of the 
creative turn. Since then the research institute has not dealt with the ‘British creative 
industries policy’ as an independent research theme. Other policy research institutes 
took the same approach toward the British policy under the centre-left governments. It 
was under the current Lee government that the Korean policy community showed 
detailed interest in the rise of the new British term and policy (e.g. Yoon, 2008 [for 
Korea Industrial Technology Foundation]; Roh, 2009 [for KOCCA]).56 More fundamentally, 
however, the status of the British creative turn as a model to be emulated by other 
countries needs to be problematized. British policymakers certainly invented a new 
term and re-conceptualized old terms to provide an emerging policy object with a new 
definition, scope and direction. However, these practices fell short of producing a 
comprehensive and coherent model which covered policy ideas, attitudes and concepts; 
policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments and administrative techniques. 
                                                          
 55 According to Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 345), there are 6 main categories of actors involved in policy transfer. In this 
policy transfer, however, the role of political parties, pressure groups and supra-national institutions were negligible.  
56 However, these research reports still sought to provide a mere description of a ‘best practice’ of the UK, rather than 
active interpretation and/or critical evaluation of the policy practice. 
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They could have produced a variety of ‘models’ over many policy areas and processes, 
but the models themselves were fragmented along with various agencies’ distinctive 
desires, various industries’ different needs and various policies’ divergent objectives. In 
this situation, no doubt ‘a “best Practice” or “Xerox” policy transfer is unlikely to be a 
useful guide’ (Pratt, 2009: 19). This was also the point strongly raised by my supervisor, 
Philip Schlesinger, from the early stage of the research and the reason why I chose the 
term of ‘British discourse’ of creativity instead of ‘British model’ in examining the 
original creative turn in Chapter 2. In this light, I added a ‘Korean perspective’ to Figure 
2.1 (The British Creative Industries Policy Framework) which I drew by comparing the CI 
Mapping Document (2001) and Creative Britain (2007). If my research had dealt with an 
object of a far longer history and with more concrete institutions, say NHS policy, this 
would certainly have been a very different story.  
 
 
b. Adoption of the British Goal and Idea in Korea 
 
As Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 351) argue, the easiest way to prove that policy copying or 
emulation has occurred is to look at the ‘legislative bill’ authorizing the related 
programmes. As such, it is very difficult for a researcher to find any trace of copying or 
emulation from Korean CI acts. As examined in section 5.2.3, the ‘Framework Act’ 
adopted a completely different definition and scope of ‘cultural industries’ from the 
British case. Up to now, the Korean Culture Ministry has not officially adopted the term 
‘creative industries’ in publishing CI policy documents or naming its bureau/department. 
More significantly, the incorporation of the traditional arts sector and the growing 
software sector into the ‘cultural industries’ sector did not occur in Korea. Of course, it 
is undeniable that British arts councils were directly referred to in transforming the 
Korean Culture and Arts Foundation into the Arts Council Korea (ARKO), and Ofcom was 
heavily referred to in establishing the Korea Communications Commission (KCC). 
However, this kind of ‘copying’ was limited to the specific level of the institute, and 
lacked interest in the bigger picture of the creative turn. As Kim Sung-Jae and Kim 
Hyae-Jun acknowledge, for example, the transformation of the KMPPC into KOFIC was 
modelled after the French CNC, and the key policymakers did not know that the driving 
principle behind the transformation, i.e. the arm’s length principle, had a British origin. 
It was much later that they came to know where the principle originated. Four former 
top managers of KOCCA during the transformation period, whom I recently met for the 
first time, also admitted that they paid little attention to the British ‘creative industries’ 
policy structure and instruments.  
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What then was transferred? What did the policymakers look at when they admitted the 
importance of the British experience? I would argue that it was a particular policy 
goal/objective that cultural and creative industries can become a national strategic 
sector for the age of the ‘new economy’ by generating knowledge-based wealth and 
jobs, and a specific idea/attitude that creativity must lie at the centre of this new 
cultural policy project. For instance, Creative Korea (MCT, 2004: 27), arguably the most 
important Korean cultural policy document ever produced, begins with interest in 
Creative Britain, acknowledging the importance of creativity and the cultural industries 
for national development. However, the document never shows any interest in the term 
‘creative industries’. Another example: when DJ’s second CI Bureau chief slept on the 
problem of how to tear to shreds the Ministry of Information’s claim to incorporate 
within their territory all sorts of ‘digital contents’, he drew on ‘cultural contents 
industries’ rather than ‘creative industries’ to argue for the expansion of the 
conventional scope of ‘cultural industries’ (cf. 5.3.1). Since the abolition of the Ministry 
of Information under the current government, ‘content industries’ (without ‘cultural’) 
has been more frequently and comfortably used by the Culture Ministry. These episodes 
reveal that the Korean CI policymakers have their own drivers (such as inter-ministry 
competition and long-standing political agendas) around building up the emerging policy 
sector. Although there appears to have been a strong need to identify other 
governments and quangos that provided a neat example to ‘copy’ at that infant stage of 
Korean cultural industries (policy), the British creative turn was not studied 
systematically for that purpose. Instead, the policymakers seemed to satisfy themselves 
with engaging the UK’s conviction and experience in order to confirm their general 
direction, goals and attitudes, but where they headed to flesh out their policy 
framework was their own past of successful ‘industrialization’.  
 
 
The Pertinence of Mobilizing the Notion of ‘Neo-Developmental’ 
 
The foregoing has indicated that the CI policy transfer between Britain and Korea was 
by no means a ‘Xerox’ policy transfer. The Korean creative turn was inspired by the 
British one; emulated its key ideas and objectives; and unfolded by combining British 
governance systems and principles—most notably the arm’s length principle—with 
Korea’s experience of industrial intervention and social integration from the 
developmental era (i.e. nurturing national strategic industries). Given this substance of 
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the CI policy transfer, the key benefits of using the term ‘neo-developmental 
transformation’ are brought into clearer relief. 
 
 
a. Utility of the Notion 
 
Above all, it is worth noting here that ‘combinations’ (Dolowitz, 2000) or ‘hybridization 
and synthesis’ (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996) have been the most familiar form of policy 
transfer to the Korean people since the initiation of the country’s ‘late-late’ 
industrialization in the 1960s. This is mostly due to the eclectic characteristics of the 
Korean developmental state, poised between the statist model and the regulatory state 
model. Among other implications, what this thesis has found is the CI policy 
transformation, or the Korean creative turn, did not happen in vacuum: it was a direct 
result of the broader ‘state restructuring’ project after the supra-national financial 
crisis and the country’s first democratic government change in 1997. The restructuring 
brought about an even ‘more complex hybrid’ of policy agendas and practices, which 
seems now poised between the developmental state model and the regulatory state 
model; and this unique positioning is not only conditioned by the historical development 
of the Korean state, but also by the geopolitical options available to the ‘East Asian’ 
region.  
 
These three features are precisely what the concept of the ‘neo-developmental policy 
transformation’ was mobilized to shed light upon. I initially considered using the term 
‘post-organized’ policy transformation, but this was too broad a concept to stress the 
historical and geopolitical characteristics of East Asian industrialization and 
democratization. The concept of ‘neo-developmental’ was therefore evaluated to be 
the best in revealing simultaneously elements of continuity and discontinuity that the 
new policy development contained in relation to the history of Korean (or East Asian) 
policy making.  
 
It can be thus clearly said that this thesis seeks to take a broader socio-political context 
of policy making and transfer in understanding the recent transformation of Korean CI 
policy. And this is what distinguishes the thesis from other work in the cultural policy 
research field. First of all, there has been little research to compare the creative turns 
in the UK and Korea. I sought to do just that and thereby suggest an interesting 
parameter for wider comparison between the Western European and the East Asian 
contexts of CI policy making on the one hand (cf. Kong & O'Connor, 2009a) and between 
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the Park Jung-hee government’s and the DJ government’s cultural policy approaches on 
the other. At the heart of both projects lies this lens of the neo-developmental policy 
transformation. Since there has been no research to explore the meaning and 
significance of the Korean CI policy shift under the DJ and Roh governments in the 
broader context of Korea’s state transformation or in the broader context of the 
creative turn in world’s cultural policy, this thesis may furnish meaningful stepping 
stones to researchers with interest in such wider comparisons.  
 
 
b. Limitations of the Notion 
 
Nonetheless, no doubt the concept has some significant limitations as well. Today, it is 
not uncommon to argue that the Korean state has gone through a qualitative 
transformation following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Many have seen ‘neo-liberal’ 
elements resulting from the transformation (Lim & Jang, 2006; Pirie, 2008). This ‘neo-
liberal’ concept is fine insofar as one focuses on the governmental policy shift 
concerning the matter of financial and corporate restructuring. However, I would argue 
that since the financial and corporate policy shift was imposed by powerful 
international organizations such as the IMF (through treaties signed by the YS 
government), it cannot define the true character of the state transformation under the 
progressive governments. For this one needs to look to those governments’ cultural 
(industries) policy shift, because it is this that most clearly reveals the differences and 
similarities between DJ and President Park. Either way, it is undeniable that there was 
a variety of smaller policy shifts under the agenda of state restructuring. As with the 
case of the Third Way politics in Britain, the Korean version contained complex and 
sometimes conflicting elements. The problem is that the notion of ‘neo-developmental’ 
might not reveal such multiple layers of (Korean) state transformation, and could thus 
mislead by glossing such change as a seamless entity and a heroic synthesis against 
national crisis. The transformation was actually more like pain(s)taking processes of 
hybridization. 
 
This thesis has argued that the Korean creative turn brought about a ‘neo-
developmental cultural industries policy’. This idea is deeply indebted to prior 
scholarship in the field of research on the state, in particular derived from Richard 
Hill’s (2007) analysis of current East Asian states according to the degree of catching-up 
zeal in each society. As of 2007, defining the developmental state as the ‘prime vehicle 
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for catching up’, he puts Japan in the category of the post-developmental state where 
the passion for catching up has been ‘exhausted’; Taiwan and Korea in that of neo-
developmental states which ‘have yet to catch up with’ advanced economies; and 
Thailand in that of a developmental state with ‘commitment’ to the catching-up creed. 
Although I broadly agreed with this distinction, I sought to go beyond the single criterion 
of the categorization: the catch-up ideology. At least speaking of cultural (industries) 
policy, the Korean case shows that the degree of democratization of governance among 
policy actors and industries should be included as a key barometer for the 
categorization of East Asian developmental/neo-developmental/post-developmental 
states. Focusing on Korea’s particular experience, however, this study did not proceed 
to the point of suggesting a clear set of criteria covering not only industrial but also 
democratic concerns, with which the diverging degrees and trajectories of East Asian 
states’ developmentalist projects could be clearly positioned and compared. However, 
that would have been beyond the initial scope and is an issue to be urgently addressed 
in further research.  
 
In a similar vein, it should be also admitted that the notion of the neo-developmental 
state carries a sort of static and normative tone in envisaging the form and function of 
the state. In the early 1980s, it might have been a timely and useful approach to 
categorize different states within the dichotomy between the regulatory and the statist 
models. However, for the last three decades things have changed as a result of 
significant events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of neo-liberalism. 
Accordingly, the Anglo-Saxon regulatory states, as well as the Asian developmental 
states, have evolved toward a more complex cell division, bringing about the need for 
subtle distinctions between ‘neoliberalism, neocorporatism, neostatism, 
neocommunitarianism’, etc. (Jessop, 2002:  259-264). In this context, new attempts to 
understand the institutional setting for national economic development have arisen. To 
illustrate, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is one of these emerging perspectives: 
it seeks to go beyond a ‘modernization’ approach (which often overstated what 
government can accomplish), a ‘neo-corporatist’ analysis (which over-emphasized the 
role of trade unions), or a ‘social systems of production’ approach (which paid attention 
to the linkages between firms and institutional support mainly at the regional or 
sectoral level) (Hall & Soskice, 2001). In attempting to reflect the 21st-century political 
economy, the varieties of capitalism approach draws persuasive distinctions between 
two modes of capitalism among current developed economies: in liberal market 
economies (LBE) ‘firms coordinate with other actors primarily through competitive 
markets’, while in coordinated market economies (CBE) ‘firms coordinate with other 
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actors through processes of strategic interaction’ (Hall & Gingerich, 2004: 7-8). As we 
can see, this approach also adopts a kind of dichotomy between LBE (the US, the UK, 
Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and CBE (Germany, Austria, Japan, South 
Korea, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland), but it becomes more balanced and non-
normative by stressing equally the roles of the public and private sectors and by 
explaining in greater detail and in multiple aspects the institutional settings which 
affect industrial coordination within a nation-state. The notion of the neo-
developmental state can and needs to be further developed in reference to approaches 
of this kind.  
 
 
Difficulties behind the Creative Turn in Korea and Elsewhere 
 
As Kong and O’Connor (2009b: 1) stress in exploring ‘Asian-European Perspectives’ of 
creative economies and creative cities, the internationalization of creative industries 
policy discourse has brought to light ‘the need for “imported” policies to be sensitive to 
different national contexts’. Put another way, as with the advance of any policy 
discourse, the spread of the creative turn in the world’s cultural policy arena has been 
uneven and contingent. When the creative turn of British origins was emulated in other 
countries, some of the key objectives and ideas might have been preserved, but the 
scope, speed, intensity and influence of the turn could only be reshaped by the local 
context, in particular the nation’s institutional circumstances around the cultural and 
creative industries. It is thus natural that the process, product and performance of the 
creative turn vary across continents and then countries.  
 
As the thesis has shown thus far, the Korean turn was very different from the British one, 
although it had certainly been inspired by the original. In addition, the turn was driven 
not only by the future the progressive government was hoping for in the middle of an 
unprecedented economic crisis, but also by the past experiences of developmental 
statist industrialization. These particular conditions led the Korean turn to move slowly 
but steadily in a specific direction: that of building up the Korean NIS for CI. As I argued 
in Chapter 6, this direction took full shape after the publication of Creative Korea. 
 
Two points need to be briefly added concerning the innovation system. Firstly, there 
are two distinctive understandings of the concept of NIS. A narrow understanding 
focuses on science-based innovation, formal technological infrastructure and R&D-
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centred policies, while a broader understanding encompasses individual, organizational 
and inter-organizational learning and training systems (Lundvall, 1992; 2007). The 
former can be called the ‘STI’ (Science-Technology-Innovation) perspective of NIS, 
while the latter can be titled the ‘DUI’ (Doing-Using-Interacting) perspective. According 
to Lundvall (2007: 4-16), from Friedrich List to Christopher Freeman, the pioneers of 
the NIS concept have stressed both aspects, in contrast to ‘standard neo-classical 
economics’ that favours narrow interpretations of innovation systems. It is quite clear 
that the strategy of establishing a national innovation system for Korean CI adopted the 
broader interpretation of the NIS concept: it was composed of three sub-strategies for 
democratic governance, comprehensive infrastructures and symbolic intervention. This 
was a rational goal or choice for a country perplexed by bittersweet memories of its 
developmental experience vis-à-vis a national crisis. Secondly, it should be also pointed 
out that during the Roh government there was an explicit move led by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology to build up innovation systems for a few strategic industries 
including bio-technology and nano-technology. In this line, President Roh officially 
announced a plan for establishing Korea’s National Innovation System at the Blue House 
on 30 July 2004. However, there was no room for cultural (contents) industries within 
this project, as was later clearly seen from the fact that the Culture Minister was 
omitted from the council of Ministers set up to promote this NIS. Although the CI policy 
framework evolved toward building the NIS for CI, this move was not impressive or 
explicit enough for the government as a whole to recognize CT (Culture Technology) as 
a serious technology to be supported by building up the related NIS. Pulled by the strong 
performance of national champion firms such as Samsung and LG and pushed by the 
agendas of the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology, this idea of NIS has been 
used extensively, for example, in the computer chip industry in Korea, but has not been 
officially ‘transferred’ to the creative sector. 
 
Even if the Korean NIS for CI was not established by the devotion of the whole 
government, I have argued that the ‘neo-developmental alliance’ in the cultural policy 
field succeeded in producing a ‘virtuous circle’ by stimulating qualitative leaps in 
Korean cultural contents. To evidence this point, a few statistical data were mobilized. 
Nonetheless, it is still important to mention the limitations of the statistics. Due to the 
fierce competition between Ministries, the Korean Culture Ministry could not expand the 
scope of the cultural industries to their heart’s content during the CI policy 
transformation. This means the same kind of rapid shrink as occurred in Britain between 
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2010 and 201157 is less likely to happen in Korea. This is not to say, nevertheless, that 
Korean statistical data are immune to the common problems of CI statistics.  
 
These statistics are mobilized by the national and local governments—albeit with all 
these subtle differences—for two reasons: to show how significantly the creative sector 
has grown, and how rapidly it is and will be growing. Of course, the final aim is to 
convince people to buy into the importance of the industries and concomitantly into the 
importance of the Ministry/agencies in charge of promoting them. Problems spring from 
many directions, however: the lack of a history of data collection in the creative sector, 
confusion and imprecision of the key indicators and concepts that may underpin the 
sector, the methodologies of data collection/analysis still under development, and 
novelty, diversity, rapid mutation, etc. of the object measured. In short, decent 
statistics on CI have not yet been established in Korea, as with every other country. 
Therefore, what I sought to do in Chapter 8 was not to urge readers to take such data a 
face value. Even if there are disparities of degree between the categories (e.g. data on 
Korean CI exports are most reliable), those statistics tend to reflect ‘much “hope” value 
in the policy making’ (Pratt, 2009: 9). To keep this in mind helps to recognize what they 
are really indicative of between the policymakers’ aspiration and the creative sector’s 
performance.    
 
In concluding this postscript, let us remind ourselves once again that however speedy 
and expansive (Cunningham, 2009b), the spread of the creative turn has been uneven 
and contingent. As time passes, ‘This, Too, Shall Pass Away’! It is by no means the ‘end 
of history’ of cultural policy; ‘once-and-for-all’ and ‘one-solution-fits-all’ are both 
unfeasible and implausible myths. It is therefore not worthwhile deifying the creativity 
and creative industries discourse into a magic key. We have to admit instead that for 
many, life continues untouched by the turning or restructuring, while for some, many 
things might change. The over-ambition of policymakers and private partners should be 
thus curbed, in particular when their zeal and efforts are blind to local needs and 
context.  
 
This thesis has shown how different the creative turn in Korea or East Asia can be from 
that in Britain or Western Europe. One thing that is certain in both regions is that 
creativity is difficult. Without difficult processes of learning the rules and systems of a 
                                                          
57 According to the DCMS (2011), British creative industries accounted for 2.9% of the UK’s total GVA in 2009. One 
year ago, it was reported that those accounted for 5.6%. This rapid fall is a direct result from modifications to the scope 
and methodology, not from substantial industrial changes.  
257 
 
specific ‘domain’ and without the feedback and resources supplied by the related 
‘field’, a ‘person’ or a group of people, however talented, cannot achieve historically 
remarkable creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996; Gardner, 1993). Then, it is obvious that a 
handful of creative people, creative cities, creative industries or creative policies 
cannot ensure more and/or better jobs, wealth and growth for/in themselves. The 
creative turn might be an effective driver or efficient catalyst for a nation’s 
competence building in the age of knowledge-based economy, but surely is not a magic 
solution for each and every social, economic and physical problem.  
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APPENDIX  
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
The people who agreed to be interviewed for this research are listed here. Except one 
interview on 21 October 2009, all interviews were held in an individual face-to-face 
form. The positions listed below refer to the main positions related to CI policy that the 
participants held formerly or held at the time of the interview.   
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
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